A mathematical framework for analyzing incentives in peer-to-peer networks

Abstract

The existence and performance of peer-to-peer systems depend on the
contribution of resources from interacting peers. One of the challenges of
resource sharing in peer-to-peer systems is free riding. A situation users
attempt to exploit the system by utilizing the resources of others without
contributing. We view this from rationality perspective that every peer in
the network will attempt to maximize their utility of the system. In this
paper, we approach the problem of free riders mitigation from utility
optimization point of view, by modeling each peer's interest as Utility
Maximization Problem (UTP). We propose analytical model for the whole
network as a mixed integer linear programming model. The super peers in
the network are given the responsibility of maximizing the utility of all peers connected to them. This is to ensure fairness among the interacting peers and the stability of the entire system. This technique allows peers to either upload or download resources based on their best strategy and interest.

Keywords: Free rider, Utility, Peer-to-Peer, Incentives, Maximization,
Resources