Social Scientists’ Failure of Analytical Nerve: ‘Africa Rising’ from Above, or Uprising from Below?

Patrick Bond*

Abstract

If Africa has been ‘rising’ since the outset of early 2000s commodity super-cycle, as so many of its elites and allied international economic actors claim, what are we to make of the evidence of growing popular uprisings? This survey of narratives and evidence finds convincing the converse claim that ‘rising’ translates into ‘crashing’ when a more accurate accounting is made of the continent’s wealth. As a result of systematic looting, around 2010 the continent’s most advanced social movements began awakening from the apparent 2000s slumber, in the wake of an earlier era of IMF Riots dating to the 1980s. At that stage, the intensity of rhetoric between the contending forces grew shrill, and some such conflicts were resolved only by recourse to state force. This is the point at which the failure of the progressive African intelligentsia’s nerve was most acute: in its failure to either validate the merits of export-led growth based on extractive industries, as conventional wisdom had it but against which was all prior evidence and deep empirical observation, or to promote resistance by civil (and often uncivil) society. Will African social scientists return to some of the ideals that forty years ago helped make the continent one of the world’s richest sources of revolutionary thought? Or instead, do the dialectics of wealth generation and social upheaval call forth no more than intellectual disinterest or, indeed, fear?

Resumé

Si l’Afrique a été « en développement » depuis le commencement du super cycle des matières premières au début des années 2000, comme l’affirme la plupart de ses élites et alliés qui sont des acteurs économiques internationaux, que devons-nous faire de la croissance des révolutions populaires évidentes ? Cette étude composée de résultats narratifs et réels qui cherche à convaincre l’opposition de sa sollicitation « grandissante » traduite en « bouleversement » quand une comptabilité plus précise est faite sur la richesse du continent. À la suite de pillages systématiques, aux alentours

*Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society.
Email: pbond@mail.ngo.za
de 2010 les mouvements sociaux les plus développés du continent ont commencé à se remettre de la torpeur apparente des années 2000, dans le sillage d’une époque antérieure aux émeutes du FMI dans les années 1980. A ce stade, l’intensité des échanges avec l’opposition est devenue sévère, et certains de ces types de conflits ont été résolus que par le recours à la force de l’État. C’est à ce moment que l’échec du nerf de l’intelligentsia africaine progressive a été plus aigu : dans son incapacité à soit valider les qualités de la croissance tirée des exportations basées sur les industries extractives, comme l’avait la sagesse conventionnelle, mais pour lequel toutes les preuves antérieures et observations empiriques profondes étaient contre, soit favoriser la résistance de la société civile (et souvent incivile). Les chercheurs africains en sciences sociales retourneront-ils vers certains idéaux qui ont contribué, il y a quarante ans, à faire du continent l’une des sources les plus riches du monde en matière de pensée révolutionnaire ? Ou plutôt les conflits de la génération riche et le bouleversement social inviteront-ils à adopter pas plus qu’un désintéressement intellectuel ou, certainement, la peur ?

Introduction

For forty years, since the great Oil Producing Exporters Cartel shook the world economy and revealed Africa’s vulnerability to global economic chaos, social scientists have grappled with how to characterise the ‘neoliberal’ (market-driven) turn in public policy and New Public Management, macro-economic discipline, shifting spending priorities, intensified resource extraction, and harsher state-society-nature relations. Results have included renewed enthusiasm for entrepreneurialism and microfinance, ‘human capital’ accounting and the pricing of nature – as Payments for Ecosystem Services (and related ‘natural capital’ valuations) – so as to save it. Many local, continental and international social scientists have tackled these developments in Africa with sympathy to those who are inevitably victimised, mainly as a result of not having market access. The essence of this problem was one described by Karl Polanyi as a ‘double-movement’ in which waves of marketization were met by waves of resistance.
Figure 1: Waves of marketisation and resistance

Source: Burawoy 2014.

But the steeply sloping downturn after 1974 in a stylised graphic by Michael Burawoy (Figure 1) is not how most social scientists are being told to understand the rise of markets in Africa. Instead, the typical neoliberal story line is that Africa declined after liberation from colonialism due to excessive statist intervention which inevitably turned into inefficient state predation via parastatals, resource nationalism, excessive taxation, corruption, unsustainable social welfare policies and an overly protected economy. Once more sensible policies were adopted – not by Structural Adjustment Policy compulsion as in the 1980s but by choice and public participation from the mid-1990s onwards – Africa inevitably grew by leaps and bounds. Where there was backtracking, this could be traced to incorrigible elites (e.g., Zimbabwe) or civil war.

This is how, for instance, World Bank economist Shanta Devarajan has constructed the narrative of Africa Rising: ‘There’s no question that the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early 1990s received a lot of criticism. But then ask the question, “what changed?” As I was saying, the growth has accelerated since the 1990s. We can’t hide from that fact. And you look at what changed. And it’s that these countries adopted exactly the Washington Consensus policies in the mid-1990s.’¹

Or for the most brazen version, consider the argument by London financial researcher Charles Robertson in the 2013 YouTube version of what might be the most extreme case of ‘Africa Rising’ hype, *The Fastest Billion: The Story behind Africa’s Economic Revolution*: ‘Those billion Africans have just seen the biggest increase in wealth that the continent’s ever experienced.’² According
to the multinational corporate ‘Renaissance Capital’ team3 led by Robertson, ‘Africa’s growth could outstrip that of Asia’ between now and 2050, with the former’s GDP rising ‘from $2 trillion today to $29 trillion in today’s money by 2050.’ Adds Nigerian finance minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in the book’s preface: ‘Just as SubSaharan Africa (SSA) has suffered through its despots and destitution, so the seedlings of transformation have pushed through the African soil. As an increasing number of economists, investors and financial policy makers have realised, SSA has emerged from its own malaise, into a dawn that promises growth to rival, if not surpass, that recorded by Asia’s Tigers over the past two decades.’

The hyperbole is, in part, irritating because Robertson understands a degree of political economy and explains post-independence poverty in familiar ways:

Many of Africa’s civil wars at this time were over valuable mineral resources and were supported, financed and armed by outside forces. Apartheid South Africa, acting as a Western outpost in Africa, caused considerable destabilisation in Southern Africa through murderous wars and devastated national economies at all levels through the use of land mines, many of which remain hidden in place to this day. Even the best African leaders were inexperienced and easily duped by sharp practices from the developed world. IMF and World Bank policies, which were primarily designed to extract debt-service revenues through exports, damaged agriculture almost beyond repair and conditionalities that forced governments to cut spending on education and health. Growth figures from this era mask the fact that a good deal of it was debt. Grandiose white elephant projects ate up precious foreign revenues and income from resources were looted by local elites in conjunction with their foreign collaborators. Trillions of dollars were siphoned out of Africa. These were harsh lessons but Africans learnt them – some more quickly than others.4

This article takes this perspective seriously but diverges 180 degrees when it comes to which Africans were educated by the last three decades of neoliberalism. Because ‘Africa Rising’ rhetoric reproduces the kinds of banal, export-led, primary product-dependent and extractive orientation we have seen for so long, and because it continues to insert Africa into the volatile world economy on adverse terms, it is more appropriate to re-label the lesson Robertson should have taken forward as ‘Africa falling’.

Meanwhile, we must try to comprehend the central analytical argument in Robertson’s narrative, namely: the African elite’s ‘learning by doing’. His underlying assumption is that even without any change in power relations and incentive structures at the global scale, the continent’s rulers learned the merits of orthodox Western structural adjustment policies and no longer offered opposition: ‘While Africa has got its macro-economic management right, the
heady heights envisioned for the continent will depend primarily on whether or not Africa can sustain its growth levels… Africa is on track to deliver on all fronts,’ Robertson concludes. The main data used for celebrating ‘Africa Rising’ are in Figure 2: GDP and per capita GDP increases in Sub-Saharan Africa since around 1995, after fifteen years of decline.

**Figure 2**: Africa’s rising GDP (% real, 1981-2012) and per capita GDP (real $)

This supposed economic growth, plus the claim of a massive new middle class and explosive increases in cellular telephony capacity, are the essence of the ‘Africa Rising’ meme. Allegedly, ‘one in three Africans is middle class’ and as a result, Africa is ready for ‘take-off’, according to African Development Bank chief economist Mthuli Ncube, who defines middle class as those who spend between $2 (sic) and $20 per day, a group that includes a vast number of people considered extremely poor by any reasonable definition, given the higher prices of most consumer durables in African cities. Actually, according to even his data, those spending between just $2 and $4 per day constitute almost a fifth of all of Africa (and ‘float’ in and out of poverty), while the range from $4 to $20 per day amounts to 13 per cent, with only five per cent of Africans spending more than $20 per day. Below the $2 per day level, 61 per cent of Africans are mired in deep poverty.

As Jacques Enaudeau has argued, the ‘rising middle class’ argument can be traced back to the strategic briefs and equity research notes published from 2010 onwards by Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey, Goldman Sachs or Deloitte, advertising ‘the new African consumer’, finally in a position to spend some cash in brand new supermarkets. In a time when growth rates of industrialized countries stutter and when the Chinese and Indian engines of the
The global economy is somewhat slowing down, financial analysts and investment consultants can’t get enough of the one thing that they have dismissed for so long: Africa. ‘That’s where the flavor is,’ said Thabo Ncalo recently, manager of the Africa Fund for Johannesburg-based Stanlib, ‘the frontier markets,’ like Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria or Rwanda. Close your eyes and let your imagination do the rest: hundreds of millions of purses loosening their strings...

Of course it’s difficult to sell such a vision if ‘Africa’ remains associated with deadly conflicts, food crises and looming poverty. Thus baiting nervous investors and lobbying the media with the ‘African middle class’ is downright genius: there’s enough actual change taking place all over the continent to make the notion look respectable, and it remains vague enough to accommodate any expectation and get traction across the board. This is where development organizations, in their quest for better aid efficiency and alternatives to aid, join forces with investors.

But no one should be fooled, argues Robert Bates: is demand for the stuff underneath it – Africa’s mineral and oil wealth – that is driving the economic growth behind all these ‘Africa Rising’ narratives. The BRIC economies, and China in particular, have fuelled a commodities boom that has benefitted state coffers across the continent though questions remain over the actual extent (and the equities) of this boom. But perhaps the central reason we are seeing all this ‘good news’ in Western media links back to the West’s own idea of itself and of Africa. Africans are now, ‘finally’, playing by the West’s rules; as Professor Megan Vaughan, President of the African Studies Association of the UK, said in a recent speech, ‘What is striking is the fact that what is ‘saving’ Africa is the supposedly redemptive power of capitalism’, which, when coupled with the increasing adoption of liberal-democracy in Africa, vindicates the Western Way. Moreover, feelings of decline in the West – stubbornly low economic growth (or collapse), the threat of social upheaval, the rise of China, and so on – have made all these ‘Africa Rising’ narratives all the more breathless. The Economist, Money Week, and the rest seem to see in Africa’s rise hope for the West’s recovery.

Ncube knows this, for as Enaudeau recalled, the African Development Bank economist gave it straight to CNN: ‘it’s a call to say “look, please invest in Africa”.’ Sure enough, if the new is made to look like the old, it gains the reassuring quality of being just the same. In that respect, the ‘African middle class’ is a means to an end, a programmatic concept: rationalize to normalize, normalize to legitimize.
Rick Rowden, too, finds a self-interested standpoint in the neoliberal celebration:

Though African countries desperately need the policy space to adopt industrial policies, the rich countries are pushing loan conditions and trade and investment agreements that block them from doing so, all the while proffering a happy narrative about ‘the rise of Africa.’

This is evident when considering how the World Bank’s Devarajan rounds out his argument about how well neoliberalism works in Africa, and how durably the elites have learned by doing: ‘The difference is that they did it out of their own accord, out of domestic political consensus, rather than imposed from Washington or Paris or London. And I think that’s the point that people are not recognising, that the actual policies that are generating the growth, are actually very similar to what was criticised in the structural adjustment era.’

Legitimizing the looting of Africa through the two words ‘Africa Rising’ can be measured quantitatively using a Google citation index. It was especially after the Time front-page story in December 2012, as Figure 3 shows, that the two words spread rapidly.

**Figure 3:** Google citation index of ‘Africa Rising’, 2009-2013

The means of communication are terribly important, and indeed another major reason for the new Afro-optimism is increased cellular telephony access in many areas that were formerly off-grid for communications. The World Bank’s main 2011 Africa policy paper, for example, argued that the ‘success of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), especially mobile phone penetration, shows how rapidly a sector can grow. It also shows how the public sector can set the conditions for the exponential growth of a vital industry that could transform the continent.’
The reality is less encouraging. Although Africa is better off with cell phones than it was without (say, 20 years ago), the actual performance of the industry reveals profound weaknesses: the role of multinational capital in absorbing profits and dividends, the lack of genuine competition (collusion is notorious even in the largest economy – South Africa), relatively high prices for cellphone handsets and services, and limited technological linkages to internet service. Researchers Enrico Calandro, Alison Gillwald, MphoMoyo and Christoph Stork have remarked on a host of ICT deficiencies: ‘the mobile market has experienced significant growth, [but] outcomes have been sub-optimal in many respects’. As for Africa’s internet use, Calandro et al. conclude: ‘Large numbers of citizens across the continent still lack access to or cannot afford the kind of communication services that enable effective social and economic participation in a modern economy and society.’

A final illustrative example of dubious ‘Africa Rising’ hype comes from *Time* magazine’s correspondent, Alex Perry, in a December 2012 cover story:

Africa owes its takeoff to a variety of accelerators, nearly all of them external and occurring in the past 10 years:

- billions of dollars in aid, especially to fight HIV/AIDS and malaria;
- tens of billions of dollars in foreign-debt cancellations;
- a concurrent interest in Africa’s natural resources, led by China; and
- the rapid spread of mobile phones, from a few million in 2000 to more than 750 million today.

Business increasingly dominates foreign interest in Africa. Investment first outpaced aid in 2006 and now doubles it.

**Africa Falling**

Perry should have had an editor revise his words as follows:

Africa owes its economic decline (running at more than 6 percent of gross income per year once nonrenewable resource depletion is considered) to a variety of accelerators, nearly all of them external and occurring in the past centuries during which slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism locked in the continent’s underdevelopment, but several of which – along with climate change – were amplified in recent years:

- stagnant overseas development aid – around 60 percent ‘phantom’ anyhow – to most African countries, except to 14 ‘fragile states’, with Washington leading further cuts in funding to fight HIV/AIDS and malaria;
• tens of billions of dollars in foreign debt cancellation (of what was mainly unrepayable ‘Odious’ loans to dictators in 2005) yet at the same time a squeeze on low-income African finance ministries that immediately afterwards caused a dramatic rise in debt repayments (from 5 to 8 percent of export earnings);
• a concurrent looting of Africa’s natural resources, led by China and the West, resulting in dramatic recent falls in mineral and petroleum wealth (when calculated as ‘Adjusted Net Saving’ to incorporate resource-stripping); and
• the rapid spread of mobile phones, which because of high costs and low internet connectivity, has done very little to solve the digital divide.

Banking increasingly dominates foreign interest in Africa, as elite disinvestment into Western and Eastern financial markets continues to outpace aid and investment, amounting to an estimated $1.4 trillion in capital flight from the whole continent from 1970-2010.

To be blunt, the implication that wealth is being created by rising GDP in Africa is completely fallacious. The best way of thinking about the recent period is to negate Robertson’s words completely: ‘Those billion Africans have just seen the biggest decrease in wealth that the continent’s ever experienced.’ Robertson ignores the dramatic decline in Africa’s broadest measure of wealth, including ‘natural capital’ in the form of non-renewable minerals and petroleum, in contrast to those resource-rich countries (e.g. Norway, Australia and Canada) which ensure local reinvestment of the proceeds from extraction. In Africa, once non-renewable resources are dug out of the soil by multinational corporations which repatriate the profits or transfer-price the revenues to their advantage, the permanent debit against genuine national savings (i.e. a decline in a country’s natural capital stock, its ‘family silver’) far exceeds the momentary credit to GDP.

By how much? It is impossible to say with any degree of accuracy, but it is substantial and getting worse. Since the commodity boom began in the early 2000s, according to the 2011 World Bank report, The Changing Wealth of Nations, Africa has suffered negative ‘genuine savings’ mainly because of non-renewable resource decay in the context of resource-cursed neo-colonial politics. Figure 4 from that book shows that once non-renewable resources are removed from GDP (along with other small adjustments), the fall in ‘adjusted net savings’ is sharp, to negative 6 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2008.
Figure 4: Sub Saharan African adjusted net saving, percent of GNI (1995-2008)


Reading the business press, one would not know that Africa is losing an estimated 6 per cent of its wealth each year. You would be forgiven for having the opposite impression when reading most reports from those with pro-globalisation, export-oriented, petro-minerals-centric economic ideologies. Most multilateral financial institutions celebrate Africa’s national economies as among the world’s leading cases of post-meltdown economic ‘recovery’. Yet the neoliberal position neglects several features that have made Africa’s supposedly resilient economies far more vulnerable to both global and local economic and environmental crises. These include excessive financial and trade integration into a volatile world economy, resource extraction costs, the ‘ecological debt’ (as well as other non-remunerated value transfers) and climate change damage, as well as internal features of economies suffering from ‘Resource Curse’ and processes of extreme uneven and combined development. The correlation of decline in Africa’s real wealth – in Africa and especially in North Africa (due to large volumes of oil extraction from Libya) – is never mentioned by ‘Africa Rising’ advocates. But the GDP measure is especially pernicious when applied in Africa, because it treats all resource extraction as a positive, without factoring in the decline in natural capital – a country’s ‘family silver’ – which accompanies the extraction process.

This is no surprise, for Africa’s exploitative trade, finance, investment and labour-migration relations within crisis-ridden world capitalism have intensified in recent years. From the early 2000s, ongoing resource extraction by Western firms was joined, and in some cases overtaken by
China and, as we see below, South Africa’s role in the Brazil-Russia-India-China-SA (BRICS) bloc is as a gateway to yet more extraction, even at the risk of military chaos. Moreover, the phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ in Africa has also combined with larger-scale development of biofuels and genetic modification. As for domestic economic dynamics, the process of financial liberalisation generated not only rising credit access, but also over-indebtedness.

Digging deeper into the data, it becomes obvious that Africa’s alleged recovery is quite complex. As the world crisis unfolded in early 2009, for example, the continent’s largest economy, South Africa, was recorded by *The Economist* as the riskiest among the world’s 17 main emerging markets, largely due to its current account deficit. That deficit had soared after 2001, thanks to capital flight by most of the largest companies formerly listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). At that stage, in order to pay its overseas liabilities (especially profit and dividend outflows) as well as host the 2010 Soccer World Cup, South Africa’s foreign debt increased by around a quarter to $115 billion by early 2012 – having begun at just US$25 billion in 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected president. (Other African countries with dangerously high debt ratios were Ghana, Mauritius and Senegal.)

The South African economy witnessed more than a million net job losses in 2009-10 plus worsening inequality, leaving it with the highest Gini coefficient among major countries, even worse than Brazil, in the wake of six currency crashes since 1994 and extreme stock market volatility. Yet, with minor exceptions (the promise of a National Health Insurance), there were no substantive changes in developmental or macroeconomic policy, not even with the potential that president Jacob Zuma would lean more to labour and even Communist influence. That proved elusive, and in late 2013, the largest union in Africa, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa), formally broke away from the ANC mainly on grounds of Zuma’s persistent neoliberal policies.

Elsewhere in Africa, uneven development caused by adherence to the Washington Consensus in other smaller but higher-growth, resource-cursed economies, such as Equatorial Guinea, was even more extreme. In spite of rhetoric about a Keynesian turn in October 2008 under Strauss-Kahn’s leadership, IMF staff reaction to the crisis in Africa was a reversion to Washington Consensus dogma. Out of 22 IMF programmes on the continent underway in October 2009, according to the Center for Economic and Policy Research, 17 were contractionary orders and only five were expansionary. Yet by late 2009, Africa’s state deficits
were exploding because a very slight spending increase was conjoined with a huge revenue drop as commodity prices crashed, resulting in a dramatic switch from a positive fiscal balance (six per cent of GDP) to a huge deficit (minus six per cent) between 2008 and 2009. The crisis meant capital inflows shifted from an $80 billion inflow in 2007 to a $25 billion outflow of portfolio investments (mainly in South African financial assets) and thus a net decline in total inflows. Although remittances held up, foreign direct investment fell back in 2009, leaving aid as the only rising financial inflow. But even this was conditional, with most flowing to 14 ‘fragile states’: Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo and Zimbabwe.

Under the circumstances, most of Africa experienced a rising fiscal deficit and higher public debt. Most central banks imposed lower interest rates after 2009 than prevailed in 2007. Most let their money supply rise, in part to compensate for private credit contraction. A few countries went further: new exchange controls helped Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya fend off hostile financial forces. These classically Keynesian strategies also explain why Africa did not suffer as much as other regions during the crisis, even if the IMF harried so many weaker debtors with austerity directives. Slightly relaxed macroeconomic strategies help explain, partially, why in the wake of a huge commodities boom (2002-2008) and world-leading windfall profits for multinational extractive industries, a modicum of GDP growth was recorded in several African countries.

In reality, contrary to Devarajan’s protestations, Africa’s economic policies were indeed ‘imposed from Washington’. According to John Weeks, ‘Over twenty years, 1990–2009, the governments of 46 Saharan countries sought to manage their economies under IMF programmes during almost half the country years (417 of 920).’ Weeks concludes of the IMF and World Bank: ‘The two international financial institutions played a major if not decisive role in policy making for all but a few countries of the region.’ Only a few countries escaped Bretton Woods Institutions’ direct tutelage for extended periods (though most had long bouts of home-grown neo-liberalism): Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, The Gambia, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. As for every other country, as Weeks reports, ‘[t]here is little evidence, rigorous or circumstantial, to believe that the ‘reforms’ of the 1980s and 1990s lay the basis for that [2000s economic] recovery.’ Instead, behind the recent GDP growth was
the combination of the post-conflict peace dividend and the 2000s rise of a commodity market super-cycle thanks to a last-gasp burst of sustained demand from Asian minerals and petroleum purchasers, as well as a modicum of internal domestic demand flawed by artificial characteristics as we will observe.

For example, Africa’s long-deindustrialised manufacturing sector has been examined recently by Rowden, and ‘despite some improvements in a few countries, the bulk of African countries are either stagnating or moving backwards when it comes to industrialization’. As Table 1 shows, the proportion of GDP made up of manufacturing – a typical sign of maturing economic activity – has been shrinking in Africa, from a peak of 15.3 per cent in 1990 to 10.5 per cent in 2008.

**Table 1: Manufacturing shrinkage and mining growth, 1970-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% share of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; utilities</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing economies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; utilities</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African developing economies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; utilities</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Indeed from 1990-2010, manufacturing value added (MVA) per person fell in 23 African countries and was weak in 27 others (with only Namibia, Mozambique and Uganda above 5 per cent annual growth). Of even greater concern, Rowden reports, ‘Africa is also losing ground in labour-intensive manufacturing: Its share of low-technology manufacturing activities in MVA Added fell from 23 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2008, and the share of low-technology manufacturing exports in Africa’s total manufacturing exports dropped from 25 per cent in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2008.’ At the same time, Africa’s total imports and exports were falling in relative terms, from 6.5 per cent to 4.9 per cent of world volumes from 1980 to 2008 (Table 2).
Table 2: Manufacturing shrinkage and mining growth, 1980-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global trade volume (billions of tons)</th>
<th>Global trade volume (1980=100)</th>
<th>African trade volume (billions of tons)</th>
<th>African trade volume (1980=100)</th>
<th>Africa’s share of global trade volume (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development

Seeking an understanding of Africa’s economic plight thus requires much more serious inquiry than the multilateral institutions and their allies appear willing to consider. For example, a careful inspection of GDP shows clearly that the internal driver of growth in Africa during the 2000s, far outstripping exports, was ‘private consumption’. One side effect, given African deindustrialisation of even basic consumer-durable industries, was the rise of import bills. But it is instructive that private consumption across Africa was, from 2004 to 2008, well over twice as large a component of GDP growth as exports, as a result of the dramatic ‘financial deepening’ – the rise of private sector bank credit as a percentage of GDP – from 14.3 per cent in 2002 to 19.0 per cent by 2008. The period from 1980 to 2004 was replete with bank failures and credit contraction across structurally-adjusted Africa, and hence according to John Karikari, ‘excluding the top 15 countries, the ratio of private sector bank credit to GDP declined by about 50 per cent, on average, from 17.2 per cent to 8.7 during this period.’ The uptick in credit availability after 2004, once the failed banks’ assets had been written off and the new round of accumulation begun, did indeed drive a degree of domestic consumption, but the critical question of repayment remained a concern.

The untenable rise of credit in Africa, especially South Africa where consumer default rates are at an all-time and very dangerous high, goes unremarked upon by most commentators, including Ncube at the African Development Bank. South Africa’s consumer debt crisis sheds light on African macroeconomic and microeconomic problems, for one reason that rising debt for working-class and new middle-class consumers was untenable was the rise in real property prices by 389 per cent between 1997 and

---

3-BOND- Social scientists’ failure of analytical nerve.indd 50
08/06/2014 14:54:55
2008 (the highest in the world, with the second highest bubble, Ireland, at less than 200 per cent). Meanwhile, wage levels had been outstripped by profits for most of the previous 17 years of post-apartheid neo-liberalism, leaving workers to rely upon higher rates of consumer credit to make up the gap. By late 2010, the main state credit regulator registered ‘impaired’ status for 8.3 million South African borrowers, a rise from 6.1 million in 2007. The role of over-indebtedness was central in the financial crisis experienced by workers at Lonmin’s Marikana platinum mine in 2012, as well, as garnishee orders on salaries reduced paycheques to a bare minimum, resulting in very high militancy and demands for more than 100 per cent wage increases. While there are not reliable data on consumer credit systems in most African countries as a result of the extent of informal and NGO lending, the overall world trend is highly disturbing. It offers no basis for claiming credit systems assist in ‘Africa Rising’.

More recently, the trend in African financial markets has been for governments to mop up excessive savings in banks by issuing sovereign debt bonds, not just in South Africa but in ten other countries with growing domestic financial markets: Ghana, Gabon, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Zambia and Tanzania. According to Joseph Stiglitz and Hamid Rashid, ‘By February 2013, these ten African economies had collectively raised $8.1 billion from their maiden sovereign-bond issues, with an average maturity of 11.2 years and an average coupon rate of 6.2 percent. These countries’ existing foreign debt, by contrast, carried an average interest rate of 1.6 percent with an average maturity of 28.7 years.’ As a result of these yields and ongoing speculative funding flows emanating from northern financial centres, foreigners are seeking much higher lending rates available in Africa, according to Nairobi-based Stanlib banker David Makoni: ‘Judging from high levels of order book subscription at issue, African sovereign debt seems to be “flavour of the month” with international investors.’

From January-September 2013, the eurobond market hosted $8 billion in new African debt issuance, rewarding the governments of Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa. But Stiglitz and Rashid warn, ‘Should oil and copper prices collapse, Angola, Gabon, Congo, and Zambia may encounter difficulties in servicing their sovereign bonds.’ Indeed, they remind, ‘the record of private-sector credit assessments should leave one wary’ because when ‘shortsighted financial markets’ combine ‘with shortsighted governments’, this could lay ‘the groundwork for the world’s next debt crisis,’ in countries which they term Africa’s ‘subprime borrowers’.
In sum, ‘Africa Rising’? No, only the corporations which loot Africa and a very few comprador elites are prospering, and at great risk to both long-term and short-term prosperity, thanks to the extreme distortions they introduce. As Jumoke Balogun put it at the Compare Afrique blogsite,

Currently, the top five most unequal countries in the world are in Africa: Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and Sierra Leone. Surprisingly, South Africa, the Continent’s most influential and diversified economy, is slightly more unequal today that it was in 1993 shortly after apartheid ended. Further, three out of the twenty most expensive cities in the world are also on the continent: Luanda (2nd), N’Djamena (8th), and Libreville (20th) – all of which are more expensive than London… Considering that Africa is the poorest and most underdeveloped continent on the globe, these numbers provide a startling account of the current state of play: the few who have, have everything, and the majority who don’t, have nothing. This is not to suggest that Africans who have amassed great personal wealth are culpable for the alarming disparity, but this is what uneven development looks like. This is where Africa is. This is what many deem worthy of celebration.43

Another writer, Ama Biney, has also debunked ‘Africa Rising’ rhetorics:

For whom does it rise? It rises for neoliberal and neo-colonial African governments selling off large tracts of land to outsiders for food or biofuel jatropha while their people go hungry and landless… It rises for a small African middle class whilst the 99 percent remain in the rural areas as farmers, unable to get subsidies like their European counterparts whose governments intervene on their behalf. Africa rises for those with forked tongue who ‘talk left and walk right.’ Africa is rising for the charismatic Christian preachers engaging in what they call ‘prosperity preaching’ to congregations obliged to pay one tenth of their miserly wages as tithes so the preacher can wear designer suits from Italy. Africa is rising for the continued exploitation of its enormous wealth by MNCs, tax evaders and those who engage in illicit wealth appropriation in a continued (not new) scramble for Africa. Africa is rising for a tiny black elite who believe in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and market fundamentalism alongside their governments committed to such policies. Africa is rising for those African women who equate economic freedom with the means to purchase Brazilian and Korean weave, false eyelashes and nails in their aspirations to resemble an African Barbie doll. Africa is rising for those few countries who have recently discovered oil: Uganda, Ghana, Ivory Coast – but will their people say the same in 20 years and not meet the same wretched fate as the peoples of the Niger Delta of Nigeria?44
Africa Uprising

The conditions created by the combination of austerity, dictatorial regimes, socio-political injustice and ecological stresses have generated a new wave of protests across the continent since 2010. In a 2013 measurement by the African Development Bank (AfDB) based upon Agence France Press journalistic data, major public protests rose from an index of 100 in 1996 to nearly 250 in 2012 (Figure 5), especially because ‘Several countries saw strong protests against the increasing cost of living, including Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda.’

Figure 5: Public protests and civil violence in Africa, 1996-2012

Source: African Development Bank (2013)

As a result, the beginnings of a Polanyian ‘double-movement’ – i.e. excessive market penetration of society countered by social activism, as identified by Karl Polanyi (1944) in The Great Transformation – stirred in Africa around 2010. The upswing in uprisings began in the three North African countries where regime changes resulted within a year, but there is also evidence of increasing protest south of the Sahara, including in South Africa’s platinum mines where the Marikana massacre of August 2012 was one result, and in December 2013 the cleavage of the largest trade union from the ruling party was another.

But a central challenge remains in most African countries: can nascent economic justice movements follow the Latin American road in which IMF Riots during the 1980s paved the way for more sustained construction of social movements to channel leftist activism more effectively, and even changes in government? Aside from ongoing progressive mobilisations in Egypt and
Tunisia in reaction to IMF and fundamentalist Islamic repression, only in South Africa is that process apparently ascendant. But the potential remains great, as Figure 5 shows. According to the African Development et al., ‘Public protests in North Africa in 2012 had a political undertone that reflected an extension of the Arab Spring revolts. The protests were primarily motivated by calls for further and deeper political reforms… Protests in sub-Saharan Africa were mostly over economic concerns. More than half of public protests were to demand salary increases or to complain against the increasing cost of living.’ In 2011, the Bank added, ‘nearly all African countries faced increased protests’ while the 2012 experiences were concentrated in fewer, larger countries.46

Of concern, however, is that these protest figures – only 250 in 2011, for example – are vast underestimates, given that in South Africa alone, the number of violent protests in the year 2012-13 was recorded by police as 1,882, with nearly 10,500 additional non-violent ‘Gatherings Act’ incidents. There, police minister Nathi Mthetwa observed that, ‘Over the past four years, a total of 46, 180 protests were attended to and all were successfully stabilized, with 14,843 arrests effected’47 – although debate continues on how successful the police were in Marikana, as a result of incontrovertible evidence (most supplied from their own computers after clumsy cover-ups) that their massacre of mineworkers was premeditated, and entailed planting of weapons on mineworker corpses. Nationally, it is difficult to identify decisive trends and correlate these to particular political causalities, but it is evident that a higher level of violent incidents occurred after 2008, perhaps due to the combination of the global economic crisis (leaving more than one million South Africans newly unemployed) and the rise in electricity prices of 128 per cent that occurred over the subsequent four years.

The varied nature of these local gatherings makes them difficult to quantify, but according to official police ‘crowd management’ statistics, in the period 2009/2010 there were 8,905 incidents, 1,008 of them classified ‘unrest’ incidents. In the period 2010/2011 there were 12,654 incidents, 973 of them classified ‘unrest’ incidents. In the 2011/2012 period (as of April 2012) there were 11,033 incidents and 1,091 of these are classified ‘unrest’ as opposed to ‘peaceful.’ In the case of ‘unrest’ incidents the police intervene (often using force) where they perceive threats to security or damage to property. ‘Peaceful’ incidents are defined as those where there is co-operation between the police and the convener and where no police intervention is necessary. The many more incidents of protest where there are fewer than 15 people are not recorded by the police, as such events are not considered applicable under the Gatherings Act (yet in many cases, larger protests occur with participants placing themselves in groups of 14 or more at a 50 metre distance in the event they did not obtain police permission).48
There are not many scientific studies of African protests to date, in part because of African social scientists’ failure of analytical nerve, and the rest of this article relies mainly on qualitative analysis; but it is worth considering at least one of the causal vectors, namely rising food prices, where direct correlations between prices and food riots have been observed (Figures 6 and 7). There are a great many other areas in which such correlations could be made, including climate change, given that Africa has been an important source of core activist initiatives in the world movement for ‘climate justice’.  

**Figure 6**: Food and Agricultural Organisation Food Price Index, 1990-2011

![Food and Agricultural Organisation Food Price Index, 1990-2011](source)

*The real price index is the nominal price index deflated by the World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index (MUV)*

**Source**: Food and Agricultural Organisation

**Figure 7**: African food riots, 2003-12

![African food riots, 2003-12](source)

**Source**: Adapted from New England Complex Systems Institute, USA.
Another causal vector that will continue is the traditional class struggle. The ability of labour to move from micro shop-floor and industry-level demands to national policy will be crucial to Africa’s future uprisings. For optimists, the World Economic Forum’s September 2013 Global Competitiveness Report demonstrated that Africa’s labour protesters are by far the world’s most militant, even if not yet most effective. In one questionnaire given to representative samples of corporate managers, the topic of ‘Cooperation in labour-employer relations’ is quantified on a scale of 1 to 7, from ‘generally confrontational’ to ‘generally cooperative’. The mean for the worlds’ working classes was 4.3, i.e. with a bias towards quiescence. Table 3 shows the results from 148 countries, of which 39 are African: northern and Asian workers are most pliable, and African (especially South African) are most militant. Of the 39 African countries surveyed, 30 were higher than (or at) the world mean level of militancy. South Africa was by far the most militant working class, for the second year in a row.

Table 3: Africa’s relative worker militancy, 2013, amongst 148 countries

| (10 most pliable, along with 39 African countries, with 1 as most militant and 7 as least) |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1 Switzerland 6.0 | 63 Sierra Leone 4.4 | 117 Egypt 3.8 |
| 2 Singapore 6.0 | 66 Madagascar 4.4 | 118 Cape Verde 3.8 |
| 3 Denmark 5.8 | 67 Zambia 4.3 | 119 Tunisia 3.8 |
| 4 Norway 5.8 | 69 Ghana 4.3 | 121 Ethiopia 3.8 |
| 5 Netherlands 5.7 | 73 Kenya 4.2 | 122 Lesotho 3.8 |
| 6 Sweden 5.7 | 78 Liberia 4.2 | 123 Zimbabwe 3.7 |
| 7 Qatar 5.6 | 85 Libya 4.2 | 126 Cameroon 3.7 |
| 8 Hong Kong 5.6 | 91 Morocco 4.1 | 127 Benin 3.7 |
| 9 Japan 5.6 | 93 Uganda 4.1 | 130 Mozambique 3.6 |
| 10 Austria 5.5 | 95 Malawi 4.1 | 137 Algeria 3.4 |
| 28 The Gambia 5.0 | 100 Nigeria 4.1 | 141 Chad 3.3 |
| 32 Rwanda 4.9 | 102 Guinea 4.0 | 142 Mauritania 3.3 |
| 36 Côte d’Ivoire 4.8 | 104 Namibia 4.0 | 143 Burundi 3.2 |
| 38 Mauritius 4.8 | 108 Botswana 4.0 | 145 Angola 3.1 |
| 45 Seychelles 4.6 | 110 Burkina Faso 4.0 | 148 South Africa 2.6 |
| 54 Mali 4.5 | 114 Gabon 3.9 | |
| 57 Senegal 4.5 | 116 Tanzania 3.9 | |

In addition to movements to democratise societies, which are invariably drawn from and compel further struggles for socio-economic justice, innumerable micro-struggles continue. These include community campaigns to preserve natural resources and rethink the merits of extractive industries (especially minerals, fossil fuels and river sources), in places like the Niger Delta, Zimbabwe’s diamond fields and South Africa’s platinum and titanium belts. Others are national initiatives of labour and its allies to meet basic needs and balance local economies through domestic (‘import-substitution’) production, with South Africans the most active, as we will conclude. Finally, there are numerous struggles associated with extremely serious Islamic or other religious-based insurgencies, in not only Egypt but Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia. Aside from occasional condemnations of US imperialism in Africa, usually these faith-based civil conflicts do not feature in the broader discourses of African citizenries rising up against injustice. But while chaos characterises large swathes of Africa, groups like The Lord’s Resistance Army, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab will continue to prosper.

**Specific African Uprisings**

In addition to climate, the reproduction of Africa’s exploitative trade, finance, investment and labour-migration relations within crisis-ridden world capitalism has met with sustained – albeit still uncoordinated and largely ineffectual – resistance, as the data reviewed earlier suggest. This is especially true in North Africa, where counter-revolution has prevailed in most countries. Since the Washington Consensus narrative was unchanged in all important respects, contradictions grew more extreme. Initially, for example, there was even awareness in Egypt’s military that neoliberal reforms carried out by Mubarak were responsible for the revolts insofar as they compelled a core working-class constituency – independent trade unions – to view their struggles in political terms.\(^{51}\) However, it is equally certain that the counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt, including the army leadership that retook power in 2013, would not be able to deliver the socio-economic progress demanded in Tahrir Square. They soon banned strikes and protests. With class struggles constantly breaking out as part of the process, Samir Amin celebrated the earlier groundedness of the movements:

The workers’ strikes in 2007 (the strongest strikes on the African continent in the past fifty years), the stubborn resistance of small farmers threatened with expropriation by agrarian capital, and the formation of democratic protest groups among the middle classes (like the ‘Kefaya’
and ‘April 6’ movements) foretold the inevitable explosion – expected by Egyptians but startling to ‘foreign observers’… Although the youth movement is diversified in its social composition and in its political and ideological expressions, it places itself as a whole ‘on the left’. Its strong and spontaneous expressions of sympathy with the radical left testify to that.\textsuperscript{52}

What lessons would be drawn for other country-specific protesters, including the ways to spark such rapid and deep revolts that a dictator can be removed from power with at least temporary support from the military? Perhaps the most acute observer of the potential for emancipation in Africa is Sokari Ekine, who follows the continent’s blogs at the weekly \textit{Pambazuka News}. Her mid-2011 review of developments in several countries is revealing: ‘Uganda, Swaziland, Kenya, and Botswana actions are in response to concerns over food security, rising unemployment particularly amongst youth, political marginalisation, corruption of government officials and a pushback against the entrenched leadership of the circle of “rulers for life”. Military dictators have been replaced by democracy dictatorships under militarised states.’\textsuperscript{53}

Eastern Africa was typical of the resulting fusion of neoliberalism and repression. In Kampala, wrote Ekine, ‘The government has blamed inflation on external factors out of their control, obviously believing Ugandans are so ill-informed as to not make the connection between the $740 million spent on fighter jets and tanks… Museveni who, in a show of militarism, chose to wear military fatigues during the recent swearing in of MPs, complained that his guests, President Kabila of the DRC and Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, were pelted with stones by people.’ In Nairobi, Ekine reported, ‘Grassroots movements such as Bunge La Mwananchi (The People’s Parliament) and the “Unga Revolution” (a collection of civil society groups including Bunge La Mwananchi) campaigning for economic and social rights have been formed in response to the rising cost of living and loss of social benefits.’\textsuperscript{54}

The same dynamic was observed in Southern Africa. In Manzini, ‘The Swazi pro-democracy uprisings which began on 12 April were met with beatings, teargas and hundreds of arrests. Many of the protesters were driven 100 miles into the country where they were dumped by the police. Student leader Maxwell Dlamini and Musa Ngubeni of the Swaziland Youth Congress were arrested, tortured and remain in detention.’ In Gaborone, ‘Botswana, much revered in the west as ‘Africa’s success story’, public sector workers – transport, schools, clinics and government staff – began striking on 18 April. The ruling party has been in power for
45 years and people are calling for a change. The leader of the opposition, Duma Boko has called for an ‘Egypt’-style uprising.’ In Harare in February 2011, Robert Mugabe’s forces arrested 45 attendees of an International Socialist Organisation Zimbabwe meeting who were reviewing footage from Tahrir Square and Tunisia.  

West Africa had similar issues but more success with country-specific and demand-specific protesting. In Dakar, Senegal’s well-respected mass movements rose up in June 2011, burning down the country’s national electricity building and tax authority. They protested at cabinet ministers’ houses to force both a resolution of an energy crisis and a withdrawal of President Abdoulawaye Wade’s proposed legislation that would have seen him extend his neoliberal political rule. That protest was successful, as was the January 2012 ‘Occupy Nigeria’ national demonstrations against the doubling of the fuel price mandated by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, who had visited a few days earlier. Millions of Nigerians took to the streets as an eight-day strike cost $1.3 billion in output. It quickly became evident to President Goodluck Jonathan that he would have to concede on the socio-economic front, or be ousted from power.

Conclusion: How much Pressure?

This degree of anger must, at some stage, result in a more effective Polanyian double movement than has happened to date. The earlier era of protests – in the form of IMF Riots – did not derail neoliberalism in Africa, even though after the debt crisis got underway in the early 1980s, World Bank president A.W. Clausen was worried enough to tell a board meeting, ‘We must ask ourselves: How much pressure can these nations be expected to bear? How far can the poorest peoples be pushed into further reducing their meagre standards of living? How resilient are the political systems and institutions in these countries in the face of steadily worsening conditions? I don’t have the answers to these important questions.’

More recently, the world’s elites have been aware of the potential for more sustained critique, for in 2011, the IMF’s then managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was asked by a journalist, ‘Do you have any fears that there is perhaps a far left movement coming through these revolutions that want more, perhaps, closed economies? I mean, there have been a lot of pictures of Guevara there.’ His answer:

Good question. Good question. There’s always this risk, but I’m not sure it will materialize. Look, during the global financial crisis we went just through, at the beginning many were afraid of the possibility of an increase in protectionism. It didn’t happen. Why? Because, I think, that
most governments, maybe not all of them, but most governments and most people, man on the street, have understood that there was no good solution in this direction. I’m not saying that everybody agrees with this, but most had understood that the closed economy were not the way to benefit from global growth and certainly from investment. And we’re in a globalized world, so there is no domestic solution.\footnote{57}

To make the case that we need not worry about Africans inspired by Che – whose mid-1960s fight against Mobutu alongside (briefly) the father of current DRC president Joseph Kabila, was utterly miserable – Strauss-Kahn used ‘protectionism’ as a proxy. In the case of South Africa, normally amongst Africa’s most aggressively neoliberal regimes, Strauss-Kahn should have been worried, for in 2009, a Communist Party member, Rob Davies, was made trade minister, and by 2013 he had begun widespread cancellation of free trade deals, and even imposed an 82 per cent tariff on import of Brazilian chickens. The ‘domestic solution’ Strauss-Kahn despises is also to be found in the reimposition of capital controls, defaults on Odious Debt, state-directed investment and favourable interest rates (Asian ‘developmental state’-style), Keynesian reflaction and more social spending. These strategies are all gaining steam, leading \textit{The Economist} to worriedly headline its 12 October 2013 special issue on the world economy, ‘The Gated Globe’.

What the IMF leader should also have considered was a deeper set of critical reactions to the era of African neoliberalism in which financialisation has fused with extractivist accumulation, and in which the ‘Africa Rising’ argument is increasingly revealed as far from the truth. If so, then the ‘far left movement’ seeking ‘closed economies’ – i.e., those protected from especially the ravages of deregulated global finance – would find a much more compelling Polanyian double movement which has emerged in civil (and often uncivil) society. As we have seen, the resistance stiffened especially beginning in 2011. This is true not only in North Africa where socio-economic grievances were central to understanding revolts in even the (neo-liberally) best-performing of African countries, Tunisia, but also in Sub-Saharan Africa, where after years of ineffectual IMF riots, growing unrest was observed in crucial sectors and geographical spaces from Senegal in the west, to Uganda in the centre and to Swaziland in the south.

Most crucially, the South African bottom-up rupture with the African neoliberal-nationalist script is worth following; indications in late 2013 are that connectivities can be found in sites of grassroots and labour struggle, offering hope for stronger alliances of poor and working people than
we have ever known here, perhaps also beyond South Africa’s borders. A February 2014 General Strike call against the South African finance ministry – on Budget Day speech in parliament – would be one indication of the ability of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa to reach downwards into the unemployed and especially the youth, for ‘united front approach’ support and linkage to the communities’ service delivery protests (as per the local phraseology).

But to do this kind of linkage-formation properly – first within countries so that substantial national movements form and then across the continent, region by region – will surely require much more than the bravery of ordinary people to contest the elite’s Rising Africa meme in practice. The uprisings of North Africa as well as many other African sites since around 2010 also demonstrated a failure by street activists to ensure that their national intelligentsia came on-side and remained there. The organic intelligentsia in the social movements can only go so far, before encountering the necessity of being joined by Africa’s social scientists to give intellectual aid, legitimation and often, too, a good dose of constructive criticism when called for. And as Fanon remarked more than a half-century ago, ‘One of the greatest services that the Algerian revolution will have rendered to the intellectuals of Algeria will be to have placed them in contact with the people, to have allowed them to see the extreme, ineffable poverty of the people, at the same time allowing them to watch the awakening of the people’s intelligence and the onward progress of their consciousness.’

Notes

1. Quoted in Bond 2010.
12. Calandro, Gillwald, Moyo and Stork 2010. Cell phone penetration ‘figures tend to mask the fact that millions of Africans still do not own their own means of communication.’ Moreover:
- Africa continues to lag behind other regions both in terms of the percentage of people with access to the full range of communications services and the amounts and manner in which they can be used – primarily as a result of the high cost of services;
- the cost of wholesale telecommunication services as an input for other economic activities remains high, escalating the cost of business in most countries;
- the contribution of ICT to gross domestic product, with some exceptions, is considerably less than global averages;
- national objectives of achieving universal and affordable access to the full range of communications services have been undermined either by poor policies … [or] regressive taxes;
- as a general trend across the continent, while the voice divide is decreasing, the internet divide is increasing and broadband is almost absent on the continent; and
- the fixed-line sector continues to show no signs of recovery…
17. IMF 2009.
23. Most of the extractive corporations operating in Africa send profits to London, New York, Melbourne, Paris, Toronto, Rio de Janeiro, Shanghai or Beijing, with Johannesburg representing a ‘branch plant’ halfway house (no longer the site of accumulation for South African mining capital). The world’s largest mining and metals house, BHP Billiton, is actively disinvesting, and Africa’s largest company, Anglo American, continues its investment shift abroad.
25. The Changing Wealth of Nations is rather conservative in calculating non-renewable resource depletion, leaving out several important minerals (including diamonds and uranium), and also neglecting the tax fraud and transfer pricing associated with transnational capital. These problems are documented by Khadija Sharife (2011) in Tax Us If You Can and by Leonce
Ndikumana and James Boyce (2011, 2012a, 2012b) in various studies that deserve much more attention, e.g. their recent book on *Africa’s Odious Debts* and updated 1970-2010 estimates of flight capital from Africa.


32. Rowden 2013.

33. Unctad 2011.

34. Unctad 2011.

35. Unctad 2012.

36. A degree of domestic economic reflation was recorded in most of Africa, including all oil exporters and middle- and low-income countries alike. Certainly, in the subsequent period, after 2008, when private sector decline was initially dramatic, African governments showed the ability to raise consumption using three Keynesian countervailing measures: budget deficits (so that falling tax revenues were not ‘pro-cyclically’ amplified throughout the economy), lower interest rates, and expanded money supplies. In spite of their overall orientation to the Washington Consensus, IMF staff were sufficiently worried about the depth of the world crisis in 2008 to 2009 in allowing large deficits, especially in regionally-powerful countries such as South Africa.


38. Davel 2011.


41. Thomas 2013.

42. Stiglitz and Rashid 2013.


44. Biney 2013.


47. Mthetwa 2013.
48. Bond and Mottiar 2013. Data of this sort should be considered valid only insofar as reliable trends can be discerned, and this is a matter of subjectivity when it comes to protest, given that definitions vary dramatically and that those recording the events – especially Agence France Press journalists – do so in a manner that fluctuates over time. Protests become regular and hence no longer of news value.

49. Bond 2014.
52. Amin 2011.
54. Ekine 2011.
55. Ekine 2011.
57. International Monetary Fund 2011.
58. E.g. Mamdani 2012.
59. Fanon 1963.