Genealogies of Coloniality and Implications for Africa’s Development

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Abstract

How Africa was conceived as an idea and integrated into the evolving Euro-North American-centric modernity is a tale of genealogies of colonialities and African resistance(s). Genealogies of coloniality span eight broad and overlapping epochs in the production of Africa that impinged on its development in various direct and indirect ways. The eight epochs distilled are the paradigm of discovery and mercantilist order running from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century dominated by the slave trade and mercantilism; the post-1648 Westphalian order that inaugurated the exclusion of Africa from sovereignty; the 1884-5 Berlin consensus, scramble for and conquest of Africa that concretised the dismemberment and fragmentation of Africa; colonial governmentality that was characterised by production of African colonial subjectivity; the post-1945 United Nations decolonisation normative order that amounted to the accommodation of Africa to the lowest echelons of the modern world system; the Cold War coloniality that polarized Africa ideologically and reduced it to a theatre of proxy hot wars; the post-Cold War triumphalism of neoliberal order that Francis Fukuyama (1992) articulated as ‘the end of history and the last man’; the post-9/11 anti-terrorist order that produced a new securitization order; and the current coloniality of markets and new scramble for Africa. The article posits that African development’s trials and tribulations are deeply embedded within these overlapping epochs that were accompanied by epistemicides, genocides, usurpations, appropriations and disruptions. Africa is today still struggling to free itself from the constraining global colonial matrices of power that have been in place since the time of colonial encounters.

Résumé

La façon dont l’Afrique a été conçue comme idée et son intégration dans la modernité centrique évolutive Euro-nord-américaine est une histoire de généalogies coloniales et de la/des résistances(s) africaines. Les généalogies coloniales ont traversé huit époques vastes et qui [...] se chevauchent dans...

Introduction

A critical engagement with genealogies and lineages of coloniality is part of an effort to write the ‘history of the present’ in Africa. It is also a concern about how Africa was problematically and forcibly integrated into the evolving Euro-North American-centric modernity and its capitalist system over the last 500 years. At a methodological level, a genealogical approach enables a systematic analysis of continuities and discontinuities simultaneously taking full account of temporalities of ideas, systems, institutions and orders across time. This is useful in understanding how coloniality unfolded as a central leitmotif of modernity, imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. For Africa, writing ‘the history of the present’ entails dealing with an interrupted historical continuity. Euro-North American-centric modernity as a broad discursive terrain that produced the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. The disruptions were accompanied by epistemicides, linguicides, and genocides. Caribbean decolonial theorist and poet, Aime Cesaire (1955 [2000]) captures the disruptions referred to very well when he explains what became of our societies, our being and our political economies.
Pal Ahluwalia and Paul Nursey-Bray (1997:2) reinforced the thesis of disruption of African development trajectory when they argued that ‘African history was denied or appropriated; African culture belittled; the status and standing of Africans as human beings was called into question’. Therefore the Focauldian idea of ‘an uninterrupted continuity’ does not apply to Africa (Foucault 1984:83). Africa is largely a product of active operations of colonial matrices of power that were well defined by the Peruvian sociologist, Anibal Quijano (2000a, 2000b, 2007), as invisible imperial designs. To gain a better understanding of the history of the present in Africa and the genesis of postcolonial African development challenges, one has to dig deeper into complex systems of thought, complicated historical processes, constitution and configuration of specific modern/imperial/colonial structures of power that produced Africa as a cartographic entity, an idea, a reality; as well as particular reproduction(s) of African subjectivity as deficient and dependent. A comprehensive critical decolonial historical analysis of genealogies and lineages of coloniality has to be traced historically from the colonial encounters of fifteenth century. At the same time, a phenomenological methodology becomes handy in capturing those intimate details of the lived experiences of African people who subsisted under Walter D. Mignolo (2000, 2011) termed the ‘underside’ of Euro-North American-centric modernity.

This article, in dealing with Africa’s development, discerns eight broad and overlapping epochs beginning with the age of colonial encounters right up to the contemporary period dominated by coloniality of markets/logic of monopoly capital. The article is made up of three broad sections with sub-sections. The first section provides a background on how Africa was integrated into the evolving modern world system. The second section examines each of the eight genealogies of coloniality and elaborates on the lineages from the time of early colonial encounters in the fifteenth century to the present age of coloniality of markets. The last section is the conclusion which emphasises the need for forging ahead with the unfinished projects of decolonisation of the modern world system and deimperialisation of the global/international order. Broadly, the article reveals how global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power actively work to disrupt and constrain African development trajectory. Today, African development remains a dependent process.

The Genesis of Coloniality

As defined by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), coloniality is a global power structure. It is different from colonialism because it ‘refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well
beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243). Coloniality ‘is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007:243).

Genealogically speaking, coloniality is founded on theft of history. Theft of history for Africa translated into theft of its future. The theft of history partly explains how Africa, which is acknowledged as the cradle of humankind, ended up as the most marginal continent in world affairs. Christopher Ehret (2002:3) underscores the fact that ‘Africa lies at the heart of human history. It is the continent from which the distant ancestors of every one of us, no matter who we are today, originally came.’ Today, Africa is locked in an enduring ‘paradigm of difference’ that downgrades its stature in world affairs and questions its contribution to human civilisation, progress and development (Mudimbe 1994:xii). Even though the African continent and its people collectively known as the ‘Africans’ are the most written about, they still remain the least understood of the world’s people. This reality provoked Achille Mbembe (2001:9) to argue that: ‘The upshot is that while we now feel we know nearly everything that African societies and economies are not, we still know nothing about what they actually are.’

The paradigm of difference is central leitmotif of coloniality which reproduced an Africa that was and is considered ‘unthinkable.’ Georg Willhelm Fredrich Hegel emphasized the ‘unthinkability’ of Africa, arguing that ‘Africa proper does not belong to humanity’ and ‘is difficult to comprehend, because it is so totally different from our own culture, and so remote and alien in relation to our own mode of consciousness. We must forget all the categories which are fundamental to our spiritual life, i.e. the forms under which we normally subsume the data which confronts us; the difficulty here is that our customary preconceptions will still inevitably intrude in all our deliberations’ (Hegel 1998:176-177). He urged Europeans who wished to understand Africans to ‘put aside all our European attitudes’ so as to ‘abstract from all reverence and morality, and from everything we call feeling’ because ‘nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in his character’ (Hegel 1998:177).

This Hegelian argument is surprising because Africa has the longest history of encounters with those who wrote about Africans. Africans had encounters with the Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Persians, Phoenicians, Arabs and many others (outsiders/foreigners) long before the so-called ‘discovery’ of the so-called ‘New World’ (Latin America) by Christopher Columbus in 1492 (Bennett 1984). This reality explains why unlike Latin America, no European or other race claimed to have ‘discovered’ Africa (Soyinka 2012:27).
Historically speaking, the reality of a long interaction of Africa with the outside world even prior to the rise of modern Europe poses the challenge of where do we begin to trace the genealogies of coloniality. Egypt, which Cheikh Anta Diop (1981; 1987) spent an entire academic life studying and explaining as the most celebrated and most developed African civilisation, even prior to the rise of Greek civilisation, experienced a catalogue of colonial invasions. The same is true of North Africa that even became part of the Roman Empire by 146 BC before it was later colonized by the Arabs in the seventh century. This early cultural and colonial encounters produced what became known as the Mediterranean commerce that became dominant until the fifteenth century when it was overtaken by the TransAtlantic commerce (Fernandez-Armesto 1987). Can we therefore trace the genealogy of modern coloniality to this period? The historical reality is that prior to the fifteenth century the cultural and colonial encounters that obtained did not leave a ‘profound or epochal legacy for either of the two continents’ (Oyebade 2000: 413).

This article, therefore, traces the genealogy of coloniality in Africa from the fifteenth century for two main reasons. In the first place, the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity that gave birth to a modern world-system that decolonial theorists understood as constitutively racially hierarchised, patriarchal, sexist, imperial, colonial, capitalist, Christian-centric, hetero-normative, asymmetrical and modernist traceable to 1492 (Quijano 2000a; 2000b; 2007; Mignolo 2000; 2011; Grosfoguel 2007; 2011, 2013; Maldonado-Torres 2014). In the second place, ‘Europe’s renewed interest in and subsequent intercourse with Africa from the fifteenth century onwards had long-lasting and revolutionary effects on the continent’ (Oyebade 2000: 413). The fifteenth century witnessed a rise of a particular Euro-North American-centric modernity that was underpinned by a world-system and an international economy.

Ontologically speaking, a new racial discourse of defining and classification of people – racially hierarchizing them, and then colonising and ruling over, dominating and exploiting those that were deemed racially inferior emerged. Those who became victims of the politics of alterity became legitimate subjects for enslavement. Compared to the Roman Empire that was underpinned by the idea of inclusiveness and the logic of the humanitas, the post-fifteenth century Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and later British, French, Germany and Italian empires were informed by the logic of differentiating the humanitas from the anthropos. But in Rome, in the spirit of humanitas, the Romans never questioned the humanity even of those people they designated as barbarians (Goffart 1980; Etherington 2011; Mamdani 2013: 76-84). This reality led Mahmood Mamdani to argue that:
If there is a parallel to the Roman capacity to absorb local elites as the empire expanded – in the process turning Rome itself into a multicultural centre – that parallel is provided by the Ottoman Empire and not the modern Western Empires of Britain and France (Mamdani 2013:84).

Both empirical historical evidence and decolonial theory indicates that the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the fifteenth century produced a distinctive world-system that was not only underpinned by a world economic system known as capitalism, but by racism as an organising principle. The modern world-system referred to as 500 years old is one founded on what Ramon Grosfoguel (2013) termed the ‘four genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century’, namely, the conquest of Al-Andalus that was accompanied by destruction and dispersal of Jewish and Muslim people; the invasion, conquest, and colonization of indigenous people of the Americas; the enslavement of black African people and their transportation through the ‘Middle Passage’ to labour in the plantations; and the patriarchal motivated attacks on women that included burning alive of Indo-European women who were accused of witchcraft.

Coloniality, therefore, emerges within Euro-North American-centric modernity discursive terrain as a negative side that survived the dismantlement of direct colonialism to exist as a global power structure underpinning the asymmetrical global system of power operative in the present. Quijano (2000a:342) defined coloniality as ‘one of the specific and constitutive elements of global model of capitalist power’; and he elaborated that, ‘It is based on the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power, and it operates on every level, in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale.’

In summary, one can argue that the post-fifteenth century modern world was constituted by six core elements. The first is known as the world-system that is constituted by coloniality of power and is structurally asymmetrical. The second is called the global or international order/European world order constituted by imperialism and coloniality. Kwame Nimako and Glenn Willemsen (2011:13) defined the world order this way:

‘European world order’ refers to an international political-economic system that emerged between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries and laid the foundation for an international legal framework and system, including maritime and company law as we know them, that came to be dominated by European states and people of European descent around the world.

The third element is termed the international economy constituted by capitalism. As part of this international economy:
Europe was the location of ideas, design, planning and innovations; Africa was the source of captive Africans for enslavement; the Caribbean and the Americas were the sites of production, and Europe again of consumption of the goods produced by the enslaved (Nimako and Willemsen 2011:13-14).

The fourth element is a *techno-scientific epistemology*, which is hegemonic and fundamentalist to the extent of claiming not only to be disembodied and unsituated but also neutral, truthful and universal (Grosfoguel 2007). The fifth element is that of a *hierarchized conception of being* constituted by racism and Eurocentrism. The final feature was that of Christian-centric modern world, which made it intolerant of other religions.

Taken together, they constitute a particular *Euro-North American-centric modern civilization*. This civilization, its systems and orders, as noted by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:3) did not rise ‘up spontaneously’ out of the interactions of radically heterogeneous global forces, as if this order were a harmonious concert orchestrated by natural and neutral hidden hand of the market’ as such classical thinkers as Adam Smith wanted us to believe. Enslavement, conquest, colonization, dispossession, domination, repression and exploitation characterised the dragging of Africa into Euro-North American-centric modernity. Fundamentally, the Euro-North American-centric modernity produced two scripts. The first is a ‘public script’ that emphasised modernity’s ability to overcome all obstacles to human progress and promised emancipation, civilisation and development. This script, as noted by Sylvia Wynter (1995:5), sold modernity as ‘glorious achievement’. Decoloniality exposes the ‘hidden script’ of modernity known as coloniality. Here I am using James C. Scott’s (1990) concepts of ‘public transcripts’ and ‘hidden transcripts’ to highlight the two faces of modernity. Coloniality as hidden script enabled racial classification of human population, enslavement of non-European people, primitive accumulation, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism. To Wynter (1995:5) this script is that of ‘history’s monumental crimes’ that encompass genocides, epistemicides as well as ‘ongoing ecological disaster unprecedented in human history.’

Eurocentrism is part of the hidden script in the sense that it is articulated as part of civilizing mission, emancipation and development. In reality, Eurocentrism is the foundation of politics of alterity that produced what the Nigerian decolonial scholar, Chinweizu (1975), articulated as ‘the West and the rest of us’. At its centre is what William E. B. Dubois (1903[1994]) termed the ‘colour line’. The leading existential Africana philosopher, Lewis R. Gordon, argued that: ‘Born from the divide of black and white, it [colour line] serves as a blueprint of the ongoing division of humankind’ (Gordon 2000:63). He elaborated that:
The color line is also a metaphor that exceeds its own concrete formulation. It is the race line as well as the gender line, the class line, the sexual orientation line, the religious line – in short, the line between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ identities (Gordon 2000: 63).

Eurocentrism is ‘expressed in the most varied of areas: day-to-day relationships between individuals, political formations and opinion, general views concerning society and culture, social science’ (Amin 2009:179). It exists as a condescending worldview that accords history to Europe, complete and sovereign being to Europeans, confer the right to judge others to Europeans as well as racial superiority to Europeans. The Ethiopian historian Teshale Tibebu (2011:xv), just like Quijano, identifies what he termed ‘Columbian modernity’ as the discursive terrain within which Eurocentrism, colonialism and colonality emerged.

Columbian modernity, as noted above, is founded on what the distinguished anthropologist Jack Goody termed ‘the theft of history’. This theft of history unfolded as a ‘European game’ of usurpation of world history. This means that the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity across the non-European world was accompanied by theft of and usurpation of human history, resulting in re-articulation of human history from a Eurocentric imperialist historiographical narrative (Zeleza 2005; Depelchin 2005). Through the process of theft and usurpation of world history, Europe put itself on a new and high pedestal as the centre of the modern world from which the ‘world is described, conceptualised and ranked’ (Mignolo 2005:33). This usurpation of world history unfolded in terms of colonisation of space, time, knowledge, being and even nature (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (1997) termed this Euro-American narration of human history the ‘Athens-to-Washington’ discourse.

Once African history was stolen, African people lost that agency to make history outside of a discursive framework created by Euro-North American-centric modernity. To borrow an important point from Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, I posit that while African people continued to make history after the colonial encounters and even under direct colonialism, they were no longer able to do so outside coloniality (Marx 1898:12). Coloniality was not a circumstance they had chosen to make history under. This is why Zeleza (2005:1) concluded that ‘African history has yet to rid itself of the epistemic violence of imperialist historiography.’

Euro-North American-centric modernity impacted on the very question of human ontology as well. The very shift from God-centred society to a Man-centred society laid a foundation to ‘discovery’ and conquest of non-European people. Magobe B. Ramose (2003:464) traced the rise of ontological
differentiation of humanity to Aristotle’s definition of ‘man’ as a rational animal. This immediately gave birth to the ‘reason and unreason’ boundaries in the definition of being. This Aristolean differentiation was applied when the imperialists came into contact with such people as Africans, indigenous people of the Americas, and others found outside Europe. They had no reason and therefore they were not different from animals. Rene Descartes’ dictum of ‘I think, therefore, I am’ did not help matters; rather it confirmed the Aristolean definition of being. The next contour of alterity became that of ‘civilisation’ versus ‘barbarism’. On this, Ramose argued that:

This line between civilisation and barbarism was an extension of the boundary between reason and unreason. The conqueror claimed the status of being the possessor of a superior civilisation. […]. The conquer was civilised and the African was the barbarian. […]. The line between civilization and barbarian thus established the relationship of superior and inferior (Ramose 2003: 464).

The third contour of alterity took the religious terminology of ‘fidels’ versus ‘infidels’. This drawing of lines that determined and defined identities as well as power differentials produced what Maldonado-Torres (2007:245) termed the ‘imperial Manichean Misanthropic skepticism’ that exists as a narrative of doubting the very humanity of black people. Maldonado-Torres elaborated that the skepticism was ‘not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007:245). Within these racially-driven human encounters, African being became re-articulated by the Western opinion-makers as a disabled one constituted by deficits and lacks. This articulation of non-Western subjectivity and being is well captured by Grosfoguel:

We went from the sixteenth century characterisation of ‘people without writing’ to eighteenth and nineteenth century characterisation of ‘people without history,’ to the twentieth century characterisation of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 214).

All these imperial skepticisms accumulatively resulted in what Bonaventura de Sousa Santos termed ‘abyssal thinking’ constituted by invisible ‘abyssal lines’ separating humanity into ‘zone of being’ for whites and ‘zone of non-being’ for black people (Santos. 2007: 45-53). Thus since the time of colonial encounters, non-western people found themselves struggling to regain their lost ontological density and to cross the ‘abyssal lines’ into the ‘zone of being’.
Historicizing the Genealogies and Lineages of Coloniality

The first genealogy of coloniality, historically speaking, can be rendered as the *discovery paradigm and mercantilist order*. It is one of the earliest central categories in the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity. Understood from an African historical perspective, the discovery paradigm and mercantilist order began to envelop Africa in 1415 when Portugal invaded the Moroccan port of Ceuta (Newitt 2010). Ceuta formed a bridgehead for further Portuguese imperial expansion that challenged Muslim dominance in North Africa in place since the seventh century. But broadly speaking, the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order that covers the period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries inaugurated a commercial shift from the Mediterranean-centred economy to the Atlantic-centred economy, linking western Africa, the eastern coasts of North Africa and South America as well as the Atlantic coastline of Europe and north Africa (Newitt 2010: 1). At the same time that the Spanish Atlantic sphere was being extended to the Pacific, the Philippines and China, the Portuguese were creating the Indian Ocean sphere that was extending to the East Indies. Eventually four continents of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas were linked together through interdependent economic activities, migrations of people and slaves, as well as ‘cultural interplay of religions and ideas from all four continents’ (Newitt 2010:1).

Analytically, the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order was constituted by five core elements: exploration, ‘discovery’, cultural/colonial encounters, trade, and human trafficking. The leading external imperial powers were first Portugal, Spain, Holland, and later joined by Britain, France and others. The Arabs were also very active in what became known as the slave trade. Active on the ground were explorers, merchants and missionaries. The leading explorers were James Bruce, Mungo Park, David Livingstone; Henry Morton Stanley; John Hanning Speke and many others. To the historian Walter Rodney, those described as explorers were in actual fact early scramblers for Africa. This is how he put it: ‘Make no mistake about it, gentlemen like Carl Peters, Livingstone, Stanley, Harry Johnston, De Brazza, General Gordon and their masters in Europe were literally scrambling for Africa. They barely avoided a major military conflagration’ (Rodney 1972:140).

Besides explorers were such merchant companies as the Dutch East India Company formed in 1621, British Company of Royal Adventurers Trading in Africa formed in 1660; French West Indies Company/Senegal Company formed in 1664; British Royal Africa Company formed in 1672; and others also dominated the mercantilist order and were actively involved in the slave trade. Some of the companies had powers to institute colonisation. One can
also argue that the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order unfolded in the form of a ‘frontier’ from the occupation of some isolated islands such as Madeira and the Azores in the first place in 1419 and 1431 respectively, the Cape Verde Islands in the 1460s, and the Guinea Islands in the 1470s to the establishment of coastal forts and slave trade stockades like that of Goree Island in present day Senegal (Newitt 2010:6-8). By 1482, the fortress of Elmina was established by Diogo de Azambuja and later many other fortresses were built in the India Ocean.

The expansion to the Indian Ocean commenced with the two voyages of discovery. The first by Bartholomew Diaz in 1488 and the second by Vasco da Gama in 1498 and his successful circumnavigation of the southern tip of the African continent until he reached the East Indies. To get a clear grasp of the unfolding of the paradigm of discovery and the creation of a mercantilist order, one needs to get the sequence of historical events clearly. The beginning is with invasion of Ceuta in 1415. This was followed by the Portuguese landing on the shores of Senegal in 1441 and a Portuguese raiding party capturing ten Africans on the west coast to sell them on the Lisbon slave market. The next event was the Portuguese colonisation of the Island of Sao Tome 1473 and the establishment of sugarcane plantations that needed slave labour. The establishment of a fortress at Elmina in 1482 that was visited by Christopher Columbus in the same year is another important event because it made him to realize the habitability of those zones that were said to be inhabitable and influenced his later grand designs. Diogo Cao’s claim to have discovered the mouth of the River Congo in 1483 enabled Portugal to establish links with the rich Kingdom of Kongo in central Africa.

Bartholomew Diaz’s voyage of 1488 enabled him to sail around the southern tip of the African continent. The other important event is that of Columbus’s voyage that eventually took him to the Americas in 1492. It was followed soon after by Vasco da Gama’s voyage of 1498 that took him to the East Indies. The signing of the Treaty of Tordesillas by Spain (Castile) and Portugal in 1494, whereby they attempted to divide the world into Portuguese and Spanish colonial enclaves and spheres of influence is another important event in the series of historical unfolding of the paradigm of discovery and the inscription of mercantilist order. Two points emerge here. The first is that Columbus’s voyage of 1492, a date that is figuratively used as marking the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity must be understood as part of a sequence of historical events that involved Portuguese penetrating Africa (Boorstin 1983:157). The second is that the sequence of events outlined above must be understood in combination as marking the unfolding of the expansion of Europe to the Americas, Asia, Caribbean and Africa.
Two examples provide a good measurement of the consequences of the paradigm of discovery and the practices of the mercantilist order. The first is that of the slave trade of which James Walvin (2013:11) understood to have shaped the modern world in profound ways: ‘The key features of the modern world which we now take for granted (the human face of the Americas, the food-ways of the world, the questions of lingering poverty across swathes of sub-Saharan Africa – all these and many more) have historical roots which take us back to the story of slavery and the Atlantic slave trade.’ The second is that of the Kingdom of Kongo and the Portuguese. A lot has been written about the impact and consequences of the slave trade; suffice it to say that it was a major feature of the mercantilist order revealing the negative aspect of the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity, which is why Johannes Mende Postma in his book *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815* (1990: 1) argued that, ‘The slave trade itself produced one of the most embarrassing chapters in human history, which has haunted historians, moralists and economists ever since.’

The Kingdom of Kongo was one of the earliest African political polities that were destroyed by its encounter with Portugal in the fifteenth century. The conversion of leaders of Kongo to Christianity, including changing African names to European ones and Europeanisation of their court, did not protect their subjects from enslavement by the Portuguese. This led the Bakongo king Nzinga, a Mvemba in 1526 (who had changed his African name at baptism to Dom Afonso: 1) to formally complain to the Portuguese government about how the Portuguese merchants ‘daily seize our subjects, sons of the land and sons of our nobleman and vassals and our relatives’ leading to depopulation of the Kingdom of Kongo (Davidson 1961:147-148).

This complaint fell on deaf ears. Eventually, the Portuguese physically invaded the Kingdom of Kongo in 1665 and killed the Bakongo king and reduced it to vassalage that included sending tribute in the form of slaves who were then exported to Portuguese plantations in Brazil (Chinweizu 1975: 29-30). The slave trade continued for over three hundred years, severely affecting development in Africa. Walter Rodney in his influential book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972) correctly traced the development of how Europe underdeveloped Africa from the fifteenth century and emphasised the role of the slave trade in this process. Indeed, the paradigm of discovery and the mercantilist order constituted an important genealogy and is part of lineages of coloniality that cannot be ignored in any attempt to write a history of the present in Africa.

The eventual abolition of the slave trade and the rise of what became known as ‘legitimate trade’ did not release Africa from the deepening nexus
of the evolving and exploitative capitalist modern international economy (Law 1998). The onset of Industrial Revolution in Europe increased their appetite for raw materials and markets. The abolition of the slave trade coincided with the shift in Europe and North America from mercantilism to industrialism. Industrialists were interested in other commodities such as gold, diamonds, palm oil and others, different from commoditized human being (slaves) that was the mainstay of mercantilism. The increasing demand for raw materials and markets coupled with some strategic considerations informed imperialism and colonialism. The next contour of coloniality worth exploring relates to the Westphalian order that unfolded from the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648.

**The Post-1648 Westphalian Order and the Exclusion of Africa from Nation-state Sovereignty**

Institutionally speaking, Euro-American-centric modernity is credited with the production of the modern nation-state as superior and enduring form of organisation of power and people. The birth of the modern nation-state is traceable to the end of the Thirty Years War, particularly to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The signatories of the Peace of Westphalia agreed on three principles. The first was the principle of state sovereignty. The second was the principle of equality of states. The third was the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another (Alan 1986; Linklater 1996). At Westphalia was born the institutionalization and ‘norming’ of a particular modern world order as a juridical political formation (Hardt and Negri 2000). The dominant European states by then, namely, Germany, Spain, France, Sweden and the Netherlands agreed to recognise and respect each other’s sovereignty while they were involved in violating those same principles outside Europe.

What must be noted is that by the sixteenth century the concept of a nation-state was emerging in Europe as a new kind of human association (Oakeshott 1975). For Africa, the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries was dominated by a plethora of organisational forms of human associations ranging from hunter-gathering societies, chiefdoms, kingdoms, dynasties, kinship, to clans and many others (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1970; Ajayi and Crowder 1974; Warner 2001). It was also during this same period that in Europe human population was being classified in accordance with race and being hierarchised to the extent that African subjectivity was written out of the human order.

Imperial reason founded on racism and Eurocentrism consistently reproduced Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor Roper racist discourse of an Africa that was non-existent beyond being enveloped in darkness. It is not surprising that under the Westphalian order, African people were not
considered part of humanity that was expected to any form of sovereignty. The polities that existed in Africa during the constitution of the Westphalian order ‘did not count as states according to the criteria adopted by the European state system’ and such excluded entities were considered available for appropriation ‘subject only to their capacity to conquer the incumbent power holders by those which did count’ (Clapham 1999: 522). It is not therefore surprising that European men set many times since 1648 to order the world without including African people right up to the post-1945 period. The British journalist-cum-historian, John Keegan, highlighted how European men had met four times in the modern age to re-order the world without the presence of Africans and Africans from the Diaspora. This is how he put it:

Four times in the modern age men sat down to reorder the world – at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars; in Paris in 1919 after World War 1, and in San Francisco in 1945 after World War II (Keegan 2002:1).

Perhaps due to the strong hold of racism and Eurocentrism, Keegan ignored in his list of sittings that European men also sat at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 the agree on how to share Africa among themselves. For African people, the Berlin Conference impacted profoundly on their lives and constituted an important genealogy and lineage of coloniality as it inaugurated not only the scramble for Africa but also the cartographic constitution and configuration of Africa. Even though the notion of self-determination was later debated at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and adopted as the Fourteenth Point of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, it was not meant to cover Africa that was under colonialism. It meant to resolve the issues and problems of Eastern Europe that were arising from dissolution of multinational empires such as the Ottoman that gave birth to what became known as the ‘Eastern Question’ (Anderson 1966). But for Africa, it is important to deal with the impact of the Berlin Conference as a major component of coloniality and reveal its profound impact on the African present.

The Berlin Consensus of 1884-5: The Scramble for Africa and Conquest

The Berlin consensus was an agreement among European powers to divide Africa among themselves. While the institutionalisation of the slave trade became the first manifestation of the negative of Euro-North American-centric modernity, the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 enabled the scramble and colonialism (Crowe 1970; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 20213a:45-50). The scramble for and partition of Africa among European powers amounted to an open disregard and disdain for the African people’s dignity, rights and freedoms
The Berlin Conference was hosted by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who is credited for unifying Germany. The unifier of Germany presided over the process of the partition of Africa. This irony led Ali Mazrui to argue that:

It is one of the ironies of the great German leader Otto von Bismarck that he helped to unify Germany in the nineteenth century and initiated the division of Africa soon after. The unification of Germany led to the emergence of one of the most powerful Western countries in the twentieth century. The partition of Africa, on the other hand, resulted in some of the most vulnerable societies in world history (Mazrui 2010: xi).

The Berlin Conference introduced and defined the rules of the partition of Africa among European powers. Use of treaties and concessions bearing the signatures of African kings and chiefs must not be taken to mean that African leaders consented to colonisation. The treaties were obtained fraudulently through trickery, chicanery and outright lying by European negotiators and agents. The case in point is the Rudd Concession of 1888 that was claimed to have been signed between the agents of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and King Lobengula Khumalo, the last leader of the Ndebele Kingdom in southern Africa in the immediate post-Berlin Conference period. What obtained later is that the pre-literate Ndebele king had not understood the terms of the treaty that were written in English and there was a difference between what was shared with the Ndebele king verbally and what was contained in the written treaty (Brown 1966; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). When the true facts of the Rudd Concession were later understood by the Ndebele king, he immediately and vehemently repudiated it and even sent some Ndebele chiefs to Britain to formally register the repudiation to the Queen Victoria of England (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). It must also be emphasised that even if African leaders refused to sign the treaties, that would not have mattered because imperialism and colonialism were violent processes, not negotiated projects. At another level, it must be made clear that the treaties were meant to prevent conflict among European powers rather than seeking African consent.

The nineteenth century became an age military conquest of Africa, occupation and settlement. The possession of guns gave Europeans an advantage over the African people to the extent that they celebrated the Maxim gun in colonial poetry and song. By 1914, the whole of Africa had been brought under colonial rule violently except for Liberia and Ethiopia (Pakenham 1991). The partition and colonisation of Africa, as noted by Mazrui, ‘unleashed unprecedented changes in African societies: political, economic, cultural, and psychological’ (Mazrui 2010: xii). African people
of different ethnic backgrounds were forcibly enclosed into one of the demarcated colonial boundaries of the colonial state. At another level, some African people with common ethnic background were randomly fragmented into different colonial states. Adekeye Adebajo correctly characterised the essence of the Berlin Conference in this dramatic manner:

Berlin and its aftermath were akin to armed robbers forcibly breaking into a house and sharing out its possessions while the owners of the house – who had been tied up with thick ropes – were wide awake, but were powerless to prevent the burglary. It would be hard to find examples in world history in which a single meeting had had such devastating political, socioeconomic, and cultural consequences for an entire continent (Adebajo 2010:16).

The Berlin Conference dramatised and confirmed the fact that Europeans did not consider those people found in Africa to be human beings that deserved to be treated with dignity. The logic that informed the slave trade also informed the partition of Africa. It is a logic of dismissing not only the humanity of African people but of considering them to be a ‘present’ that was ‘absent’ in considerations of world affairs. This logic was informed by what James M. Blaut (1993:15) called the ‘myth of emptiness’ which was constituted by four major Eurocentric propositions: that Africa was empty of people; that where people were found they were mobile, nomadic and wanderers without any sense of political sovereignty and territorial claim; that African people had no idea of private property; and finally, that African people lacked rationality.

The long-term consequence of the Berlin consensus is that African people found themselves enclosed in territorial boundaries that were decided in Europe. Whatever political attempts to exercise their political agency, it has to be performed within ‘iron cages’ or ‘bondages of boundaries’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013). The curse of Berlin as Adekeye (2010) calls it, remains a long-standing form of coloniality because it is permanently inscribed on the boundaries of African states that African leaders accepted as inviolable in 1963 at the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which later changed name to the African Union (AU). Ricardo Rene Leremont (2005:2) correctly noted that the present ‘borders of African states we fixed by European colonialists during a narrow window of time (essentially from 1878 to 1914)’ and that in the 1960s, African leaders ‘reified’ these borders. The problem was compounded by the fact that the colonial powers that met at Berlin in drawing borders acted ‘like some demented tailor who paid no attention to the fabric, colour or pattern of the quilt he was patching together’ (Soyinka 1994:31).
Colonial Governmentality and Reproduction of African Subjectivity

At the centre of colonial governmentality in Africa one finds British direct rule that shifted to indirect rule; Portuguese Luso-tropicalism and French assimilation and association as dominant colonial forms of administration. These different namings of colonial governmentality spoke to variations rather than difference in logic and purpose. Thus, broadly speaking, colonial governmentality was constituted by six core elements. These were violence, defining subjectivities, inventing tradition, appropriating/exploiting resources and people, dominating/repressing people, and ruling in accordance with the interests of the colonial settlers and metropolitan centre. Achille Mbembe (2000) clearly deciphered the three major roles of violence in colonial governmentality, whereas Mahmood Mamdani perfectly articulated the core elements of ‘defining’ and ‘ruling’ as two major leitmotifs of colonial governmentality.

Violence of colonial governmentality takes the form of ‘foundational violence’, that is, a form of violence that is at the centre of military conquest. Mbembe (2010: 10) elaborates that this foundational violence ‘helped create the very object of its violence’ which is the conquered people that had to be coerced to accept colonial governmentality. The second form of violence is ‘legitimation’ violence that provides the colonial order ‘with a language and self-interpreting models’ (Mbembe 2010:11). The final form of violence is ‘maintenance violence’ which had to be constantly replicated ‘in the most banal and ordinary situations’ and its function is to ‘ratify’ and ‘reiterate’ (Mbembe 2010:11).

Besides use of violence, Mamdani (2013) understood colonial governmentality to be driven by the logic of ‘defining’ and ‘ruling’ those who became victims of colonisation. This colonial project of ‘defining’ and ‘ruling’ was partly informed by long-standing racial social classification of human population as well pragmatism in the construction of a colonial order that was not too expensive to the empire. The outcome in the British colonies was a bifurcated colonial state that produced a bifurcated subjecthood of ‘citizens and subjects’ (Mamdani 1996) as a variant of what Albert Memmi (1957) termed ‘the colonizer and the colonised’. Mamdani noted that the practices of defining and ruling cascaded from the fear of the ‘Indian disease’ where the attempt to introduce direct colonial rule premised on eradication of difference between the coloniser and the colonized provoked active resistance among the colonised (Mamdani 2013).

The important point arising from Mamdani’s analysis is that ‘The management of difference’ which ‘is the holy cow of the modern society, just as it is central to modern state-craft’ is traceable to the colonial administrative
‘transition from direct to indirect rule’ (Mamdani 2013:2). It was in the process of shaping and management of difference that ‘invention of tradition’ emerged as part of colonial order. The concept of ‘invention of tradition’ was coined by Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (1983) in their influential edited volume entitled *The Invention of Tradition* that sparked heated debates. The colonial inventions included reproduction of African identities as authentically tribal and codification of such invented subjectivities into colonial law to back up colonial politics of ‘divide’ and ‘rule’. Defining entailed ‘inventing’ subjectivities whereby ‘the native is pinned down, localised, thrown out of civilisation as an outcast, confined to custom, and then define as its product’ (Mamdani 2013:2-3). Mamdani’s analysis provides a sophisticated rendition of ‘colonial governmentality’ in his engagement with the colonial ideas of Sir Henry Maine as a colonial ideologue:

> Through a theory of history and a theory of law, he distinguished the west from the non-west and a universal civilization from local custom. In the process, he distinguished the settler from the native, providing elements of a theory of nativism: if the settler was modern, the native was not; if history defined the settler, geography defined the native; if legislation and sanction defined modern political society; habitual observance defined that of the native. If continuous progress was the mark of settler civilization, native custom was best thought as part of nature, fixed and unchanging. The native was the creation of theorists of an empire-in-crisis (Mamdani 2013:6)

Under colonial governmentality, the colonised African people were forced to lose their African subjectivity as they were reproduced by the colonial paradigm as objects. In the process, what was lost was African ‘personality’ as a form of sovereign subjectivity. Consequently, Africans continue to suffer from alienation and dispossession that was imposed through a combination of colonial assimilation policies, indirect and direct rule, forced particularism and ghettoization, and even ‘dilution in a nameless universalism’ as understood by Cesaire (Gallagher 2009: 34). The proposed therapy by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) and Chinweizu (1987) is that of ‘decolonising the African mind’, which is proving to be very difficult in a context where coloniality is still actively working to hail Africans into embracing coloniality as a dominating worldview.

**The Post-1945 United Nations Decolonisation Normative Order and Cold War Coloniality**

The post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order emerged from two world wars (1914-1918) and (1939-1945). It effectively carried over the Westphalian sovereignty order only re-proposing it as an inclusive global norm that
included: first the smaller states of Eastern and Central Europe that previously were part of multinational empires. During the interwar years (1918-1939), Africa was far off from being considered for enjoyment of sovereignty. It was still enveloped in the paradigm of difference. What disturbed the inter-war years’ paradigm of difference was Adolf Hitler, the leader of Germany, who advocated Nazi racist ideology and imported the paradigm of racial difference that was reserved for the colonies into the centre of Europe, resulting in what became known as the ‘Holocaust’ (Cesaire 1972: 36).

It was the practice of racism at the centre of Europe rather than its practice in the colonies that provoked western powers to take such actions as the production of the Atlantic Charter; the Nuremberg Trials; the formation of the United Nations; and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hitler’s crime was that of using coloniality and racism, which was designed for those people in the ‘zone of non-being’ and practice it at the centre of the ‘zone of being’. This is why Cesaire argued that:

> Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole edifice of Western Christian civilisation in its redden waters, it oozes, seeps, and trickles from every crack (Cesaire 1972:36).

Hitler’s application to white people of colonial procedures and technologies of subjectivation aroused the Western world to the dangers of narrow nationalism and racism as though they had not practicing it against non-western peoples for centuries (Du Bois 1947:230). For Africa, post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order provided Africans with a platform to critique and expose the hypocrisy and double-standards of Western colonial powers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2001). Therefore, the struggles for decolonisation proceeded as claims for inclusion of Africans in the post-1945 human rights normative order. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was closely studied by African freedom fighters and its linguistic inventories were used to put pressure on Europe to decolonise Africa.

When decolonisation was eventually realised in the 1960s onwards, the reality was that postcolonial states were admitted to the lowest echelons of the hierarchised and asymmetrically-organised global international system. Consequently, the decolonisation process ushered into the post-1945 modern world order a group of the world’s weakest and most artificial states (Clapham 1996). The post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order succeeded in accommodating some of the anti-systemic movements that had arisen in the peripheries of the Euro-American-centric world system, creating a myth of a decolonized postcolonial world (Grosfoguel 2007: 219).
The Cold War (1945-1989) that co-existed with the African decolonisation trajectory was a form of global coloniality that dramatised the emergence of two competing imperialist empires, one claiming to be spreading international socialism and the other to be defending western capitalist-christian civilization. Capitalism and communism are related creatures of Euro-American modernity. Capitalism is expected to be succeeded by communism in the Marxist linear rendition of changing modes of production. The United States of America (USA) and the now defunct Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were both imperialist and colonialist, while both also posed as supporters of decolonisation (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012). Inevitably, the anti-colonial liberation struggles became imbricated in post-1945 superpower ideological struggles. Postcolonial Africa became a terrain for some of the most brutal and ‘hot wars’ sponsored by the superpowers in such places Angola and Mozambique.

Both the USA and USSR interfered in African affairs, with the former supporting some of the most notorious African dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire – as long as he claimed to be opposed to communism – and the later supporting equally notorious dictators like Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, as long as he claimed to be a Marxist revolutionary. At the economic level, the USA and its Western partners opposed and undermined any development initiative that was not authorised by the Bretton Woods institutions and, worse still, all those that were informed by communist thought. Consequently, Africans were ‘thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about the future’ (Adedeji 2002: 4). Adebayo Adedeji, a former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), identified what he called ‘the operation of the development merchant system (DMS) under which foreign-crafted economic reform policies have been turned into a kind of special goods which are largely and quickly financed by the operators of DMS, regardless of the negative impact of such policies on the African economies and polities’ (Adedeji 2002). What emerges clearly here is that what Adedeji describes as DMS carries coloniality which actively works to deny agency to Africans to chart an autonomous path of development.

**Post-Cold War Triumphalism of Neoliberal Order**

Francis Fukuyama (1992: xi) argued that the end of the cold war indicated that first, there was ‘a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government’; second, ‘that liberal democracy may constitute ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the ‘final form of human government’ (end of history); and third, that ‘liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions’
unlike earlier forms of government, hence it was the future. But historically speaking and from an African side, by the late 1970s African economies underwent prolonged recession. The Washington Consensus emerged as a Western initiative of managing the economic recession. Western welfarism informed by Keynesianism was replaced by neoliberal principles that privileged market forces in the struggle against inflation.

The Washington Consensus was constituted by a set of ideas and institutional practices that began to dominate the world economy from the 1970s onwards. At the centre of the ideas and institutional practices unleashed by the Washington Consensus was a neo-liberal development merchant system. David Harvey (2007:2) emphasised that ‘neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’. In the neoliberal thought, the role of the state was reduced to that of creating and preserving an institutional framework appropriate for the free operation of the logic of the market (Harvey 2007:2).

What was distinctive about neoliberal advance was its anti-statist philosophy which culminated in the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) directly intervened in African economies through impositions of what became known as ‘conditionalities’ that eroded the social base of the postcolonial state and exposed it to attacks by the poor African people (Laakso and Olukoshi 1996). The imposition of SAPs took away the little that was remaining of African people’s control over economic policy. The Washington Consensus and the neo-liberal order it supported inaugurated what can be termed coloniality of markets. But before turning to the analysis of coloniality of markets, it is important to analyze the consequences of another global event that impacted on Africa, which is that of the 9/11 (September 11, 2001) terrorist attack on the USA.

The Post-9/11 Anti-terrorist and Securitisation Order

In the wake of September 11, Africa began to feature prominently in Western discourses of security in general and the emerging US’s anti-terrorist security paradigm in particular. Africa became increasingly indentified as home of weak and failing states that pose a threat to global security. It was Robert I. Rotberg who emphasised that the ‘problem of failed nation-states’ transcended the ‘previous humanitarian dimension’ even though ‘the phenomenon of state failure is not new’ (Rotberg 2002:127).
It is important to emphasise that in the post-9/11 period, Africa which has been previously approached as a development and humanitarian case, immediately became framed as a security concern. It became a global risk area (‘terror thrives in Africa’s rich ruins’) (Abrahamsen 2005:65). The consequences has been that the powerful USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have not only been justifying establishment of military bases (for example, the US Africa Command [AFRICOM]) on African soil as part of US’s global anti-terrorism strategy, but have also been abusing the noble principles of the Right to Protect (R2P) to intervene in particular African affairs and directly playing a role in the removal of hated African leaders from power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b).

The perfect example has been the NATO military intervention in Libya that resulted in the killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2012. This direct military intervention in Libya, a country that is richly endowed with oil, raised questions about the connections between this event and the new scramble for Africa’s natural resources. The USA and its partners have used the discourses of exporting democracy and human rights as covers for the pursuit of long-term imperial/colonial interests. These issues are captured in Horace Campbell’s Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya (2013) where he highlights how military force is continuously being used to impose the USA and its partners’ will on the rest of the world. The global financial crisis that rocked Europe and America has added to the rise of a new scramble for Africa’s resources as part of recuperation.

Coloniality of Markets and the New Scramble for Africa

The leading European philosopher, Slavoj Zizek (2009) declared that capitalism and neoliberalism died twice – as a political doctrine and as an economic theory, first being shaken by the terrorist attack on the USA in 2011 and second, being adversely affected by a capitalist global financial crisis of 2008. Based on these two arguments, Zizek advocated for a return to the socialist path as the future. The reality on the ground indicates that capitalism has managed to transcend the two storms. Capitalism is continuing on its deployment of the long-standing strategy of primitive accumulation as part of deepening exploitation of large parts of the of the world while, along the way, raising speculative interests of finance capital and industry to even higher levels involving selling and buying of money itself (Mbembe 2012).

Because of high levels of mechanisation and technologisation of industry, labour has lost its value as a well-spring of capitalism (Mbembe 2012). This is taking place within a context of increased cultures of consumption. But what are scarring are the continuous tensions between the inexorable march of
capital and the long-standing struggles for popular democracy and distribution. It is this reality that indicates that coloniality of markets, that is, reduction of every valuable thing, including knowledge and life itself, to a commodity and judging its value through marketability. Coloniality of markets is also meant to capture the current triumphalism of capital involving intensified identification of new site of accumulation and investment over and above the popular human demands for better life and material security (Mentan 2010: xi).

Coloniality of markets is today driving the new scramble for Africa’s natural resources at a time when there is also an increasing Afro-enthusiastic discourse of an Africa that is ‘rising’, which celebrates increasing demands for African raw materials as a sign of economic growth instead of deepening coloniality (Melber and Southall 2010; Taylor 2014). The celebrated so-called ‘Africa rising’ phenomenon is taking place at a time when there has been an increased number of competing powers over Africa’s natural resources including Brazil, India, China, Russia on top of those from Europe and North America. Development based on the intensification of resource extraction by diverse partners rather than industrialisation is nothing but a manifestation of coloniality of markets.

Conclusion

Genealogies and lineages of coloniality dealt with here indicate that the world system has remained resistant to decolonisation and the world orders it has been proposing and producing are impervious to deimperialisation. This reality explains why development in Africa remains one of the most enduring challenges. Decolonisation did not produce a genuinely postcolonial world in which Africans took charge of their developmental trajectory. African development has been made dependent in orientation. The Bandung paradigm of development that was premised on decolonisation was frustrated and defeated by global colonial matrices of power. What is needed is for Africa, together with the rest of the global south, to intensify the unfinished decolonisation struggles, while remaining extremely vigilant about the subversive global imperial designs that continue to sustain an asymmetrical world system and continue to reproduce a subaltern position for Africa.

Decolonisation must robustly engage with Euro-North American-centric epistemology that continues to sideline knowledge from other parts of the world that is more relevant to the realities of the struggling peoples of Africa. The long-standing notions of being founded on racial classification and hierarchisation of human population must be totally rejected. Only if and when these three holy cows of Eurocentrism were dethroned would it be possible for new humanity to be born, a new pluriversal world become possible and development be realised.
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