Introduction

Security Regimes in Africa: Prospects and Challenges

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The articles in this special issue of *Africa Development* emanate from a conference held by CODESRIA, in partnership with the University of Humanities and Social Sciences of Bamako, Mali, on the 28 and 29 of September 2016. The conference was part of a larger CODESRIA project on security regimes in Africa that seeks to understand the security challenges in Africa, and the security measures and regimes that have developed to deal with these challenges. The project also aims at bridging the divide between policymakers, practitioners and researchers working on peace and security in Africa in order to generate more context-appropriate responses. Mali, itself a country in conflict, represents a space of knowledge production. Having the conference there provided researchers and practitioners with an opportunity to show solidarity and reflect on the security challenges confronting the country.

Security regimes have attracted widespread scholarly attention as a means of preventing and managing conflicts. The concept of a regime was first applied to security by Robert Jervis, who defined it as the ‘principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate’ (1982:357). For Krasner, too, regimes were ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures’ (1982:185). The concept is applicable to institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and mechanisms, as well as to issue areas such as the arms race,
illicit drug trafficking and violent extremism. There has been a broadening in the conceptualization of the nature and functioning of security regimes to include both formal and informal institutions, and to areas of cooperation at international, regional, national and local levels. For example, regional security mechanisms such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram, vigilante groups and other forms of community-based security provision are all discussed as forms of security regimes.

African scholars have paid particular attention to the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and to the security organs within RECs. Franke (2010) described Africa’s security architecture as multi-layered, ‘polycentric’ and ‘a system of decentralized collective security’. The rise in violent extremism and transnational crime on the continent has added to the proliferation of regional and community-based security arrangements; the articles in this issue are largely concentrated on these formations. These articles raise the often asked and still pertinent questions. Whose security are we referring? What do we mean by security? What are the security challenges on the continent? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the security regimes and how have they dealt with violent extremism? How can we create greater peace, security and dignity for all in Africa?

From State Security to Human Security and Back Again?

The discourse on peace and security has gone through multiple conceptual shifts, from security centred on states and acquired through a build-up of the means of coercion, to that of security as centred on people and communities and defined by the ability to exercise choice, and live without fear or want and in dignity, commonly referred to as the human security perspective. The latter conceptualization developed in a changed post-Cold War conflict context in which many countries had descended into civil war. Security in this context, it was argued, was to be achieved through addressing the human security challenges that emerge from a lack of political and economic development, and environmental and other social factors (crime, gender inequality and so forth). The human security paradigm has always been contested by International Relations scholars, who have deemed it too elastic and incoherent, and by states, which have found it difficult to operationalize, and prefer to retain, strengthen and employ their instruments of coercion to protect themselves. It is now commonly accepted that both state and human security are necessary for peace to prevail. But although the discourse has increasingly shifted towards human security, the practice has remained that of state-centred security through the use of military force.
The formation of the AU itself in 2002 represented a shift from state-centred security to a more human security-oriented approach. Tieku contends that the formation of the AU was informed by three major issues: ‘security threats, underdevelopment and the impact of international, political and economic forces’; and that it came in the wake of the Kampala Movement, which generated a ‘set of principles on security, stability development and cooperation in Africa’ (2007: 28). A human security approach is embedded in the Constitutive Act of the AU (African Union 2001), which provides for intervention in the affairs of member states to ‘prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ to protect people against state-perpetrated violence. RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have also incorporated a human security perspective into their policy frameworks. However, the dominant forms of response to conflict by these security regimes have been through conventional, largely militarized, methods. This has increasingly become the case in the response to the rise in violent extremism perpetrated by groups such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia and others. Although these responses may bring quick wins, they are like applying a band-aid to a deep wound: a temporary measure that will not resolve the fundamental problem of the patient. It is therefore important that we understand the nature of the security challenges, as well as the strengths and limitations of the formations that have been constituted to address these challenges, and begin to think anew about how to meaningfully address the underlying problems that give rise to the varied forms of conflict we have experienced on the continent.

**Causes of Conflict in Africa**

The causes of conflict are multiple and contested. Many authors have elaborated on these causes and on those that are specifically fuelling violent extremism (Alao 2013; Botha 2015; Crenshaw 1994; Forest and Giroux 2011; Ikelegbe and Okumu 2010; Mamdani 1996, 2009; Mbembe 1992; Mkawandawire 2008; Obi 2009; Reno 2011; Williams 2011). Paul Williams (2011) identified five ingredients of conflict on the continent: neo-patrimonialism, resource scarcity and resource abundance, sovereignty, ethnicity and religion. Others have sought to categorize the litany of causes through the prism of colonial legacies, weak/fragile states and security structures, political and resource governance, underdevelopment, political exclusion/marginalization, religious radicalization, human rights abuses and
environmental challenges; while feminists have highlighted the link between gender inequality and conflict (Caprioli 2005; Ekvall 2013).

Neo-patrimonialism (patron/client relations) is a dominant theme in explanations of African politics (used to explain conflict, weak states, lack of democratization, informalization of politics, corruption and so forth). The terms ‘big men’, ‘bigmanity’ and ‘strong men’ are all used to describe the patrons and kinds of state–society and interpersonal relations that are formed in these contexts. For Williams, ‘the factionalisation of society that neopatrimonialism inevitably produces leaves them at a significant risk of instability’ (2011:55). The seminal works of two African scholars – Peter Ekeh (1975) on the two publics and Mahmood Mamdani (1996) on the bifurcated nature of the African state – explained why this form of politics emerged in Africa. Ekeh argued that the ‘civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and the primordial public’ (1975:92). Furthermore, postcolonial elites simultaneously operate in the primordial and the civic publics and, since they have no allegiance or moral obligations to the state, they plunder it for the benefit of the primordial from which they get psychological security. In this dual structure ‘duties are de-emphasised, whilst rights are squeezed out of the civic public’ (Ekeh 1975:107). This, for Ekeh, explained the rise of ethnicity, state alienation and the ensuing corruption. Mamdani (1996) also brought attention to dualism and differential citizenship in the postcolonial African state to explain the lack of democratization.

The theme of neo-patrimonialism, which, in essence, seeks to posit an intrinsic wrong in the nature of African states, has had great resonance in the academic literature. It has generated a plethora of work on alternative networks, sources of power and personalized rule, and has been used to explain everything from poor governance to the lack of economic development (and has been widely critiqued as such). It is argued that the state is weakened through these sets of relations and is essentially seen as a means to an end; usually one of primitive accumulation. The state, in this context, becomes the sought-after prize to gain access to the vehicle of self-enrichment, hence the contestation for state power. The weakened state is then unable to deliver services, maintains itself through violence and intimidation, and sees its citizens begin to disassociate from it. This situation, it is argued, provides the breeding ground for dissent, rebel movements and/or violent extremism. Thus, the state – bifurcated/rentier/weak/fragile/collapsed – is itself in many instances the source of insecurity.

The ‘resource curse’ has been highlighted as another cause of conflict in many countries that rely on primary commodity exports in the form
of minerals (oil, gas, diamonds...). Many have challenged this perception, arguing that resources do not cause wars: it is the extractive nature of these states and their governance that ‘are the crucial factors in elevating the risk of armed conflict’ (Williams 2011:74). Resources do, however, sustain wars as they provide the ‘opportunity structure’ for them to continue.

Africa has various governance challenges, including: issues of marginalization, lack of development, pervasive poverty and unemployment, lack of democratization, leadership challenges, the inability to broadcast power or rule beyond the state capital; ‘bigmanity’ (Utas 2012); and the excesses and ‘banality of affluence’ of the elites in the postcolony (Mbembe 1992). Security challenges, such as the proliferation of non-state actors, the state not having a monopoly on the means of coercion, ineffective, partisan, unprofessional and unaccountable security providers, incomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, porous borders, and so forth, have all been forwarded as explanations for continued conflict.

Many conflicts have also been fought over the right to self-determination, more recent examples being Eritrea, Western Sahara, Cabinda (Angola), South Sudan and the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger, while the manipulation of ethnicity by elites has also been at the root of many conflicts. Religious fundamentalism, Christian and Muslim, is also linked to the rise in violent extremism, but this always has to be contextualized to explain the increase in fundamentalism itself. Many of the explanations of conflict in general, and violent extremism in particular, fall back on socio-economic deprivation and state repression explanations, such as economic marginalization, inequality, poverty, food and water insecurity, low human development, lack of human rights and state-sponsored violence. This list can obviously be extended. However, the point is not to provide an exhaustive list but to highlight the complexity of the challenges, their structural nature, and how they may vary across space, time and types of conflict.

Many of the conflicts are of a regional nature, with more than one state embroiled in the conflict; and violent extremism in particular manifests itself as transnational. The response has therefore been to establish regional institutions to deal with these challenges. For example, mechanisms such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the MNJTF. The articles in this issue identify some of the strengths and weaknesses of the emerging security regimes.
Security Regimes as Response to Conflict Challenges

The AU set itself the aim of creating an ‘integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa’ through finding ‘African solutions to African problems’. It has largely used the processes of peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction to achieve this, and has relied heavily on the RECs and Mechanisms to be the building blocks of its peace and security architecture, most notably in the provision of peacekeepers for its standby force. Although the AU seems to have done well in terms of halving the number of conflicts on the continent, this has been short-lived, as we see the relapse of some states into conflict and the emergence of new conflicts. The level of violence associated with these conflicts resembles that of the 1990s. Many African countries also remain on the list of the world’s most fragile states: eight out of the top ten are in Africa (World Bank 2015), while seven of the least peaceful countries in the world are located in the African continent (Institute for Economic and Peace 2016) and African countries continue to score low on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2015). As Africa deals with its old and new security challenges (climate change, rapid urbanization, the youth bulge) it is imperative that we reflect on the nature of our security regimes.

Ian Taylor’s article employs a Gramscian analysis to reveal the hegemonic nature of liberal peacebuilding and posits liberal peace as a security regime. This, he contends, is achieved through a particular vision of positive peace that consists of ‘liberal democracy; the growth of civil society; the promotion of liberal human rights and support for market liberalization’. All alternative narratives of peace have been emasculated and thus Africa has been unable to input into the construction of peace, and/or the continent’s notions of peace have been sidelined. Taylor argues that liberal peace is part of a global attempt to promote capitalist restructuring in post-conflict societies. This project, however, has to confront the fact of an absence of hegemony in the postcolonial state that renders it unsustainable. Liberal peacebuilding, then, amounts to nothing but ‘a virtual peace satisfactory to donors and external actors’. This analysis cautions us that our peacebuilding interventions do not address the needs of the continent and are not context appropriate; with the result being the high rate of relapse into conflict.

Horace G. Campbell’s article analyses the ‘dominance of the dollar’ as one of the principal causes of global insecurity. He asks whose interests are being served by the US security agenda in Africa. How are people of African descent internationally affected by the US’s attempts to militarize its relations with Africa? Campbell shows how US financial institutions are ‘at the centre of the global illicit economy’, since much of the capital flow
is in dollars and therefore passes through US financial institutions, with as much as 55 per cent remaining in the US. He also illustrates how the ‘dollar glut’ actually forces other countries to financially support the US’s global military build-up. The US military in turn is seen as protecting the global architecture of capitalism. Campbell highlights how this military–financial complex plays itself out on the continent in formations such as AFRICOM and in the intervention in Libya. Taylor’s and Campbell’s analyses are a sobering reminder of the asymmetrical global order. They also remind us that we need to look beyond the technical and operational level of our security regimes and pay more attention to the ideologies informing policies and practice, as well as to the global machinations of capital and how it influences the ways in which we provide security and reconstruct post-conflict states.

Cheryl Hendricks provides an overview of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture. She argues that, although progress has been made, there are still many challenges in relation to representation, programme implementation and achieving the broader transformative agenda of gender equality. She argues that the WPS agenda has been narrowed to focus on the inclusion of women without a deeper reflection on what that participation may mean for legitimizing post-conflict patriarchal and militarized orders.

The MNJTF is a regional response to counter-terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. It was originally formed in 1998, revived in 2012 specifically to counter Boko Haram, and became operational in 2014. It has been authorized by the AU to deploy an 8,700 – strong force in the region. Usman A. Tar and Mala Mustapha contend that the MNJTF reflects the emergence of a new regional peace and security architecture in the Lake Chad Basin. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) consists of Algeria, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan. Some of its members (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad) constitute the MNJTF. Tar and Mustapha examine the incentives and challenges of the MNJTF and argue that while this security regimen was established to create regional security and hegemonic stability, it is also driven by resource geopolitics. Although it has registered gains against Boko Haram, most notably with the recapturing of thirty-six towns, its effectiveness is undermined by the contestation for regional power, insufficient funds, operational constraints and a lack of coordination.

Isaac Olawale Albert’s article reviews the formation and functioning of the MNJTF. He asks why was it necessary to form this body given the existence of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS)? He contends that it would have been difficult to get both regional organizations to deploy a peacekeeping mission. The initial mandate of the MNJTF was to ‘patrol the Lake Chad region, conduct military operations against arms dealers and suspected terrorists and to facilitate free movement of persons’. Although he views the formation of this security regimen as an example of ‘African solutions to Africa’s problems’, he, too, notes its limitations in terms of a trust deficit and access to funding.

Armel Sambo’s article analyses the internationalization of terrorism that motivated states to overcome their domestic rivalry and create frameworks for collaboration on security. The recurring attacks by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region led the riparian countries to revitalize the LCBC, founded in 1962, to better face the new security challenges. With the implementation of the regional coalition, the MNJTF, the core countries established a military instrument to fight terrorism in this part of Africa.

The formation of the MNJTF is a stark reminder of how conflicts spill across borders, and thus of the need for regional cooperation and solutions through the formation of regional security regimes. These security regimes, however, remain financially and logistically weak and are founded primarily on state-centric stabilization approaches to security. Cooperation in the security sphere is a challenge, as state actors have divergent interests and national and regional politics easily dominate decision-making. These formations are also unable to respond to the many causes of conflict – human security challenges – highlighted above. As such, they can only be one form of response to deal with the multitude of conflict-causing factors.

Dorcas Oyebisi Ettang looks at the possibility of community-based security regimes to combat drug-related crime. She notes that although there are frameworks in place to prevent transnational crime and drug-trafficking in particular, it is easy for traffickers to penetrate Africa’s porous borders. Her emphasis is on local and community-based responses to drug-related crime to assist policy implementation, through a study of the Kokstad municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. She suggests a number of preventative and support programmes, including addressing economic and social needs, strengthening community policing forums and ensuring stronger cross-border and inter-provincial information sharing. This article is complemented by Nadine Nibigira’s, which reviews the joint-committees set up by the police in Burundi as examples of community security regimens.

Henry Kam Kah’s article highlights the food insecurity faced by those in the north of Nigeria and Cameroon as a result of Boko Haram’s insurgency. He notes that attacks on livestock and markets and the fact that many people
have abandoned agriculture have led to over 15 million people in the north-east being food-insecure, with 5.2 million being chronically food-insecure. The majority of internally displaced people in the north can only secure one meal a day. This article focuses our attention on the everyday impact of conflict on the human security of people.

Boubé Namaïwa argues that the naive optimism that describes the practice of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa as moderate must be reviewed. He believes that this posture does not take into full consideration the dynamics of practices in these religious currents. African Muslims are capable of involvement in acts that are often unproblematically attributed to Arab culture. He contends that the democratization of political systems has allowed Islam in Africa to surpass the framework of worship to occupy the public sphere and the street.

In this environment of democratic governance, religious and jihadist discourses become audible. By occupying the public spaces that mosques constitute, radical Islamists have transformed these spaces into genuine political propaganda platforms, similar to the Greek agora. To counter religious violence, the author proposes the de-marginalization of non-European intellectuals, combating unemployment, controlling and limiting certain sermons, controlling financial flows and mobilities and fighting ignorance.

Hamidou Magassa contrasts the capacity of the Malian state to exercise violence with the predatory behaviour of bio-political individuals and families that constitutes and challenges the Malian nation-state over the long run. He argues that, by losing its institutional legitimacy, the Malian state found itself in a situation where it had to struggle to secure itself instead of trying to secure its citizens. Citizens, sometimes with the complicity of the state, had to resort to seeking aid from self-defence militias in areas of the country lacking a state presence. Finally, he argues that state leadership on security matters in Mali will depend on an intra-Malian dialogue that goes beyond external agreements.

Nadine Nibigira’s article addresses ‘Joint-Committees for Human Security in Burundi’. For this author, if one of the consequences of the implementation of the Arusha Agreement was the creation of a national police force, which was a wish of all the parties involved, the desire was to curb the hegemony of the army on internal security and the maintenance of public order. It was in this context that the establishment of joint human security committees as a new security regime in Burundi was called for in response to the recurrence of political crises that had always had negative implications on the lives of citizens. The early warning and prevention role that a joint human security committee was called upon to play on a day-to-
day basis was substantially revised by a 2014 ordinance. This decision was seen as a political move that further politicized this security arrangement to reinforce the political power of the ruling regime, which was also politicizing the regular defence and security forces. The current context of post-electoral crisis in Burundi has to be understood in the light of these changes.

The renewed rethinking of security regimes in Africa must not ignore its own limits. It is in this vein that Naffet Keïta starts with the identification, description and analysis of the strategies of security regimes to strengthen the social and public control mechanisms for ensuring security in crisis and transition societies such as Mali. After reviewing the changes in security governance in Mali, he concludes that certain institutional configurations that work in ‘strong’ states may not be appropriate in states undergoing a transition, where state institutions are weak and the projection of state capacity is limited.

The recent surge in private security agencies is examined to show the transformation of the economy of security sector governance in Mali, the remaking of cities under the influence of this ‘bunkering’ and the evisceration of public and private spaces through the proliferation of surveillance cameras. Keïta also examines the irrationality of the simultaneous preoccupation by the security firms and public security agencies with the same tasks. Should we in this context talk about the liberalization or the privatization of the security sector?

Moussa Yarbanga and Natiwinde Sawadogo’s article reviews constraints related to the security of the mobility of people and goods in Burkina Faso. Their goal is to establish a database based on the mapping of a few border communities that will allow the elaboration of a strategy of mobility of people and goods, road density, and physical and bio-physical constraints on movement. The authors then analyse the movement of people and goods that occurs despite the challenges to such movement. They urge the best use of technological and scientific advances, such as the Geographic Information System (GIS), to map the national territory in aid of security efforts.

Finally, Ambroise Dakouo argues that the reform of security regimes in Africa must take into account traditional local security regimes. In Mali, the historical fragility of the state has always led various communities to take recourse to local security arrangements to ensure their safety. Under these conditions, SSR should involve genuine social engineering projects that seek to take into account both these local sources and social legitimacy.

Together these articles provide us with greater insight into the causes of conflict, its impact and the capacity to respond to challenges. It is clear that many conflicts cannot be resolved by mere military intervention. They require
political and socio-economic responses. The regional security regimes are also too weak to be effective and sustain themselves. They therefore become dependent upon external assistance, whose forces in turn determine the peace and security agenda. This has led to inappropriate responses, the remilitarization of our societies and repetitive cycles of conflict. It is time for Africa to think outside of the received ways of managing conflicts and to develop more context-appropriate interventions informing security regimens.

This issue will be useful to political actors, non-governmental organizations and technical, financial and security partners involved in the question of security in Africa.

References

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