The Youth and Political Ideology in Ghanaian Politics: The Case of the Fourth Republic

Ransford Edward Van Gyampo*

Abstract
The youth of Ghana have played an important role in both local and national politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Among other things, they have served as the foot-soldiers and channels through which party manifestoes have been transmitted to the electorate and polling agents during registration and voting exercises. Through chanting of their party slogans and house-to-house campaign, the youth have often made the presence of their various parties felt across the country. In developed democracies, one key factor that motivates the youth in playing active role in politics is political ideology. This is because political ideology largely shapes the political future of the youth, especially students in tertiary institutions. Unfortunately, a brief survey shows that political ideology, though relevant, contributes little in whipping up support for political parties among the youth.

The article discusses the reasons for the seeming irrelevance of political ideology among the youth. It recommends massive campaign by political parties to educate the youth on their respective political ideologies, their relevance and the need to uphold them. It also stresses the need for party leaders themselves to insist on ideological purity in all their dealings with other parties to serve as an example for the youth to emulate.

Résumé
La jeunesse ghanéenne a joué un rôle important à la fois dans la vie politique locale et nationale depuis la naissance de la Quatrième République. Entre autres chosee, les jeunes ont servi de militants, mais aussi on permis la transmission des manifestes de partis à l’électorat et aux agents électoraux au cours des inscriptions sur les listes et des opérations de vote. A travers la chanson des slogans de leurs partis, ils ont souvent rehaussé la présence de leurs divers partis travers le pays.

* University of Ghana, Legon. Email: vangyampo@yahoo.com
Dans les démocraties développées, un des facteurs clés qui motivent la jeunesse pour jouer un rôle actif en politique est l’idéologie politique. Ceci est dû au fait que l’idéologie politique forge dans une grande mesure l’avenir politique des jeunes, en particulier les étudiants dans l’enseignement supérieur. Malheureusement, une brève étude montre que l’idéologie politique, bien que pertinente, contribue peu à encourager le soutien aux partis politique chez les jeunes.

L’article discute des raisons de l’apparente inutilité de l’idéologie politique parmi les jeunes. Il recommande une campagne massive de la part des partis politiques pour éduquer les jeunes sur leurs idéologies respectives, leur pertinence et la nécessité de les maintenir. Il souligne aussi la nécessité pour les dirigeants de parti d’insister eux-mêmes sur l’orthodoxie idéologique dans leurs interactions avec d’autres partis pour servir d’exemple que les jeunes peuvent émuler.

Introduction

Political parties, whether in democratic or authoritarian dispensations always have an ideology that is intended to provide the fundamental policies that will guide them, particularly when they assume the reins of power (Wayo-Seini 2006). Political party ideology sets the beliefs of the party and based on them, the basic rules and regulations that guide its members. Indeed, the ideology of gives an immediate indication as to what the party beliefs are and for that matter its philosophy. In other words, political ideology, to a greater extent, concerns the beliefs, traditions and philosophies of political parties (Wayo-Seini 2006:2).

In many democracies, the ideology and philosophy of a political party are extremely important in attracting the youth to that party. In western democracies, for example, political ideology is particularly important in shaping the political future of the youth and students in tertiary institutions because it sets the tone for their future participation in politics by making them aware of the beliefs and principles of the various political parties (Zukin et al. 2006). The young conservatives, the labour youth and the young liberals in the United Kingdom and their counterparts in the United States are very politically active in tertiary institutions and, through healthy debates and other youth activities, they serve as training grounds for future politicians (Zukin et al. 2006:120).

One is however not sure about the relevance of political ideologies among the youth, particularly in times of voting. The paper therefore seeks to test the relevance of political ideology among the youth in Ghanaian politics under the Fourth Republic.

By Fourth Republic, I am referring to Ghana’s fourth attempt at constitutional and democratic rule after independence. The first attempt was in 1960, when the first constitution was drafted by Ghanaians under the presidency of Ghana’s first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Following
the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime, a new constitution was drafted in 1969 under the leadership of Dr. K.A. Busia. Busia’s regime was also toppled by the military and after close to ten years of military rule, the 1979 constitution was adopted under the presidency of Dr. Hilla Limann. The Limann regime was also toppled by the military and after close to thirteen years of military rule led by Ghana’s former President J. J. Rawlings, who was then a flight lieutenant, the 1992 constitution was promulgated. This marked Ghana’s fourth attempt at constitutional rule.

Structure of the Article
First, the term ‘youth’ in this article is defined, followed by a review of the age structure of Ghana. The next section discusses the methodology used in data collection which is followed by a review of the state of current thinking about the youth in Ghana in order to state in clear terms, the contribution of this paper to the literature. The concept of ideology would be discussed immediately after the literature on the Ghanaian youth is reviewed. The background to politics and formation of political parties in Ghana is then given to facilitate the understanding of how various ideologies emerged in Ghana. The role and contributions of the youth to Ghanaian politics in the Fourth Republic would also be discussed. This is also followed by an attempt to spell out the ideologies and philosophies of the two main political parties in Ghana, namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The question ‘Does ideology matter to the youth?’ is then discussed with the aid of empirical data collected from a sample of 200 respondents who fall within the category of youth. This is then followed by some concluding remarks and recommendations.

The Youth Defined
There is no universal definition of youth, given that it is a socially constructed category that enjoys tremendous variability from society to society. Various definitions, however, exist for the term ‘youth’ in official documents. According to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, youth is defined as the age between 15 and 24 years. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana also defines the youth as ‘anyone who is acknowledged by deeds as identifying with and committed to youth development’. This definition is shared by the main opposition party in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) which has no age limit or barrier for determining who is a member of the party’s youth wing. The ruling party in Ghana, the New Patriotic Party’s definition of youth is a person between the ages 18 to 39 years. Other political parties in Ghana such as the People’s National
Convention define youth to embrace persons aged between 18 to 35 years.\(^6\) The Convention People’s Party’s (CPP) definition of youth is any person aged between 14 to 38 years.\(^7\) Again, in the Draft National Youth Policy of Ghana\(^8\) and in many youth policy documents in Africa such as the African Youth Charter, a youth is a young man or woman who falls within the age group of 15-35 years.\(^9\)

In this paper, the term youth refers to young men and women who fall within the age bracket of 15-39 years. The lower age limit of fifteen years provides a major human – development watershed. That is, it coincides with that period when most children experience puberty. The upper age limit of thirty-nine years is the point when most young men and women fully enter adulthood. It is also in consonance with the cliché in Ghana that ‘life begins at 40 years’.\(^{10}\)

**Age Structure of Ghana’s Population**

Ghana, like many other countries in the world, has a largely youthful population (Asante 2006:222). The 2000 Population and Housing Census data estimates Ghana’s population at 18,912,079 (Ghana Statistical Service 2002). Out of this, 15,054,015 (79.6%) are less than 40 years old (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>18,712079</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than 40 years</td>
<td>15,054,015</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 years and above</td>
<td>3,858,064</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 2000 Population and Housing Census. Ghana Statistical Service, 2002

The voting age in Ghana is 18 years while the age at which one qualifies to be a Member of Parliament is 21 years.\(^{11}\) The records of Ghana’s Electoral Commission in 2005 shows that out of the 10,586,377 who registered for the 2000 elections, the majority of (76.19%) were between 18 and 39 years; with only 23.72 per cent aged 40 years and above. In 2004, the respective percentages were 68.46 per cent and 31.43 per cent (See Table 2).
Table 2: Age Group Statistics of the 2000 and 2004 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Election 2000</th>
<th>Election 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Voters</td>
<td>10,586,377</td>
<td>10,354,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-18 Years</td>
<td>8,065,825</td>
<td>7,089,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>76.19</td>
<td>68.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Years and over</td>
<td>2,511,290</td>
<td>3,255,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>23.72</td>
<td>31.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9262</td>
<td>9902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, Accra, 2005

Even though the total number of voters within the age category of 18-39 years in the 2004 elections was lower than that of 2000, the youth still constitute the bulk of Ghana’s voting population by a wide margin (Asante 2006:223). Despite this dominance of the youth on the national population of Ghana, the country has no youth policy. Indeed, Ghana has suffered from lack of state-sponsored youth policies right from the regime of Kwame Nkrumah, the first president until 1999 when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) drafted one after coming into power. This policy was however not implemented. Instead, the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), after assuming the reins of power in 2001, decided to draft a more comprehensive one which has still not been finalised.12

Methodology

Using a combination of different sampling techniques, a survey was conducted between 5 and 27 April 2007 to test the relevance of political ideology in determining the outcome of elections among the youth in the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC. Preference was given to only the NPP and NDC because they both have been in power and have also been in opposition one time or the other. Using the Purposive Sampling technique, 200 respondents made up of 100 from each of the two main parties (See Table 7 at appendix) aged between 15-39 were carefully selected from the Accra metropolis and Tema municipality to represent the southern sector of Ghana and Tamale metropolis to represent the northern sector. The selection of 100 respondents each, to represent the two main parties in Ghana was
done with the assistance of the National Youth Organisers of the two parties who gave hints about where their supporters could be found within the selected areas of study. As shown in Table 3, the respondents comprised 82 females and 118 males.

Table 3: Gender Distribution of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the Study

The breakdown of the respondents, comprising 82 female and 118 male respondents is as follows:

- 25 respondents (11 females and 14 males), from the University of Ghana Campus comprising five each from the five traditional halls of residence (Legon, Volta, Commonwealth, Sarbah and Akufo);
- 25 respondents from Tema municipality (11 females and 14 males);
- 50 respondents from Accra metropolis (20 females and 30 males);
- 100 respondents from Tamale metropolis (40 females and 60 males).

On the University of Ghana campus, only the Volta Hall is a purely an all-female Hall. To get 5 female respondents out of a population of about 1000, every 100th female student was selected. The same technique was used in selecting respondents from Common Wealth Hall of residence which is an all-male Hall and has a population size slightly above that of Volta Hall. For the rest of the Halls of residence, the ratio of male to female residents is about 70:30. In this regard, three respondents were selected at random to represent the male and two to represent the female in these Halls which have both male and female residents (Akufo Hall, Legon Hall and Sarbah Hall).

In the Tema municipality, there are twelve traditional communities with Community One being the biggest. Five communities comprising the first, third, fifth, seventh and nine were selected. Three female respondents were randomly selected from the first community and two each from the third, fifth, seventh and ninth communities. In selecting the 14 male respondents from Tema, six were selected randomly from the first community and another two were randomly picked each of the third, fifth, seventh and ninth communities.
In selecting the 50 respondent from the Accra metropolis, Accra Central, the centre of the metropolis, was chosen. There are three electoral areas here, namely, Kinka, Kolewoko and Ngleshie. In selecting 20 female respondents from the three electoral areas, eight were picked at random from Kinka, the most populated of the three electoral areas; while the remaining 12 were picked randomly with six coming from each of Kolewoko and Ngleshie. The same methodology was applied in selecting their 30 male counterparts. In this regard, 12 male respondents were selected at random in Kinka, and nine each from Kolewoko and Ngleshie electoral areas.

In the Tamale metropolis, a random selection of five major suburbs was done. These are Nyohini, Sabongida, Bulpela, Kkapagyili and Choggu. In selecting 40 female respondents needed from there, eight each were picked at random from each of the towns. The same method was again applied in selecting their male counterparts resulting in 12 male respondents being randomly selected from each of the five major suburbs identified in Tamale.

The age bracket of 15-39 was selected not necessarily in consonance with the ruling New Patriotic Party’s definition of the youth; but more to be in line with the definition of youth earlier stated and given this age bracket also covers the bulk of Ghana’s voting population.

More respondents were selected from Accra than Tema because Accra, being a metropolitan area, is bigger and more densely populated than Tema. Moreover, more male respondents (118) were interviewed than their female counterparts (82) because they were more easily available and co-operative than their female counterparts. The reason(s) for this may form the subject of another study.

Of the 200 respondents finally selected, Table 4 shows that about 170 at least had some form of education while 30 had no education at all. In all, 28 respondents had basic education, 48 had secondary education while 94 had tertiary education.

Table 4: Educational Background of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: From the Study*
The respondents were asked five major questions from which to draw our inferences for the study. Admittedly, therefore, the work is a sample study of the youth and may not necessarily reflect the general attitude of the Ghanaian youth during voting.

With this in mind, we proceed to look at the questions that were posed to the 200 respondents. First, they were asked whether they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties. The second question sought to find out whether they knew the respective political ideologies of the parties. Finally, the respondents were asked to mention the variables that influenced their voting one party in preference to others.

State of Current Thinking on the Youth

There are several extant works generally on the youth, in Africa and in Ghana. Scholars are unanimous about the vibrant and active nature of the youth in the political processes even though they fail to discuss the factors that make the youth active in the political process. Accordingly, Knebel (1937), Miller (1936) and Rivta (1975) have described the youth as active agents in the social and political processes and have, therefore, called for greater responsibilities to be entrusted to them. However, what makes the youth active in the political process have not been looked at by these scholars. Some scholars in Africa like Diouf (2003), Durham (2000) and Burgers (2003) have pointed out the negative perceptions about the youth. They see the youth as a threat to society; as irresponsible people and a means through which leaders climb to power. Generally, the youth in Africa have been labelled as ‘a lost generation’ especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where civil wars have led to massive population displacement, a social upheaval described by Richards (1995) as a crisis of the youth; and in South Africa, where the ‘political’ youth generation of the 1980s has had to come to terms with unemployment and social marginalisation in the 1990s. Thus, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, terms like the ‘the lost generation’, and ‘marginalised youth’ have gained currency (Ntsebeza 1993). In West Africa, for instance, though the youth constitutes 60-65 per cent of the population, they are bedevilled by apathy, disenchantment, disempowerment and exploitation (Konteh 2007). These scholars nevertheless recognise the contribution of the youth in providing support base to political leaders who seek to capture political power. But they have been silent about what motivates the youth to be active and to provide support for political leaders.

Writing on the youth in Ghana, Chazan (1978) argues that though Ghanaian societies have traditionally allotted a major political role to the youth, their activities at the state level are actually limited to the mere expression of support for leaders. According to her, in the Ghanaian traditional
setting the youth were recognised as active political agents and were legally represented by their leader, ‘nkwaakwaahene’, in the council of elders. She noted that the youth played the role of pressure groups and approved or disapproved the nomination of rulers and could destool the chief. She also observed that although political parties in modern times stress mass participation in their formative years, once in power, they narrow the opportunities for individual involvement and limit activities of the youth in the central government by shifting them to the local level (Chazan 1978).

Lentz (1995), on her part described the youth in Ghana as very vibrant and noted that even though this characteristic sometimes makes them prominent players during conflicts, it has led to a certain distrust of, if not hostility, towards them by governments. The government shows its discomfort with them by accusing them of parochialism and tribalism. For this reason government is reluctant to take them on as serious negotiating partners, thereby restricting their negotiating abilities and scope of action. Nonetheless, the youths have remained significant actors in various political arenas in the country (Lentz 1995).

Ahwoi (2006) observes that the youth are often manipulated by the adults in the political parties to fight their ‘dirty’ and unprincipled political wars within and outside the parties. He argued for adequate political empowerment for the youth through sound instructional programmes, including education on party philosophy, criticism and self-criticism (Ahwoi 2006).

Asiamah (2006) largely agrees with Ahwoi but calls for government funding of youth activities in political parties. He is apprehensive that the lack of funding for youth activities in political parties leaves the youth at the mercy of private financiers who then use them for their own interest. He notes that the youth in Ghana have grown in political participation and must therefore be made part of the decision-making process. He cited instances of the youth being told to bid their time to allow their adults whose political tenure was cut short by *coup d’etat* to ‘finish their term’, as an example of their frequent marginalisation in the affairs of the state. He believes the youth should undergo constant training to and prepare them for the future (Asiamah 2006).

All these works recognise the Ghanaian youth as vibrant but failed to discuss factors that could spur them on to be more supportive of regimes or party ideologies. Also, even though much of the problems and negative perceptions about the youth have been identified in the literature along with solutions on how to empower them, the positive contributions of the youth have not been clearly portrayed in extant literature. Furthermore, in discussing measures to empower the youth, there is considerable silence about the role of ideology in development of this corp of loyal and effective core support-
ers of the political process. The role of political ideology in shaping the
department of the political future of the youth as well as empowering them is too crucial to be
downplayed or treated with significant silence as has been done in existing
literature. This is part of the void that this paper attempts to fill. But before
then, we need a closer examination of the concept of ideology to be sure
that this is what is really needed to liberate the Ghanaian youth and unleash
their potentials.

**Ideology**

The term ‘ideology’ was likely coined by the French thinker Antoine Destutt
de Tracy (1815) at the turn of the nineteenth century. For De Tracy, ideology
was the science of ideas and their origins. Ideology understands ideas to
issue, not haphazardly from mind or consciousness, but as the result of
forces in the material environment that shape people’s thinking (Tracy 1815).
De Tracy believed his view of ideology could be put to progressive political
purposes since understanding the source of ideas might enable efforts on
behalf of human progress (Tracy 1815:9).

Ideology today is generally taken to mean not a science of ideas, but the
ideas themselves, and moreover, ideas of a particular kind. Ideologies are
ideas whose purpose is not epistemic, but political (Bell 2000). Thus, an
ideology exists to confirm a certain political viewpoint, serve the interests
of certain people, or to perform a functional role in relation to social,
economic, political and legal institutions (Bell 2000:278). Daniel Bell dubbed
ideology ‘an action-oriented system of beliefs,’ and the fact that ideology is
action-oriented indicates its role is not to render reality transparent, but to
motivate people to do or not do certain things. Such a role may involve a
process of justification that requires the obfuscation of reality (Grant 1987).

An ideology entails a body of concepts, values and symbols which
incorporate conception of human nature and thus indicate what is possible
or impossible to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of human
interactions; the values which humans ought to either reject or aspire to;
and the correct technical arrangements for social, economic and political
life which will meet the needs and interests of human beings (Andrew
1995:16). An ideology begins with the belief that things can be done better
than they are; it is basically a plan to improve society. It is a verbal image of
the good society, and of the chief means of constructing such a society
(Downs 1957:96). On his part, Kousoulas (1975:66) defined ideology as ‘a
cluster of beliefs relating to the basic organisation of society, its core values
and man’s place in it… it is fairly consistent, pervasive and affect our thinking
on questions of social organisation, values, processes, or priorities; it is a
mental filter which colours our perception of reality and determines our
reactions to key issues’. Stewart (1962:6) broadly agreed with this, noting that an ideology comprises a set of beliefs and ideas which incline a nation to accept certain reforms and to reject others; it is a product of present needs and facts, and of beliefs, more or less accurate, about the past.

Ideology, indeed, is a ready-made tool which helps the individual, literate as well as illiterate, to make a quick option on major political issues (Bluwey 2002:76). Often, it is spelt out in an elaborate form to serve as a national consensus on basic values and as a guide to rulers as well as followers (Bell 2000). Where this happens, the constitution proclaims the ideology and government and all forms of political activity are expected to be carried out within that framework. In other cases, it becomes a handbook for revolutionary groups who set out to change the very fabric of social organisation (Bluwey 2000:79).

Most ideologies can be traced back to philosophers. Classic liberalism, for example, can be traced back to the seventeenth century English philosopher, John Locke, who emphasised individual rights, property and reason (Grant 1987:54). There are several ideologies. Andrew (1995), for example, gives a straightforward account of eight different ideologies: liberalism, conservatism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, feminism, ecologism and nationalism. He gives an account of the rise of these ideologies in question to describe the variety of ideas that have fallen under a single label. Other ideologies include marxism, capitalism, etc.

Marx and Engels are perhaps the most famous of all the theorists of ideology. Like De Tracy, Marx and Engels (1976) contend that ideas are shaped by the material world, but as historical materialists they understand the material to consist of relations of production that undergo change and development. Moreover, for Marx and Engels, it is the exploitative and alienating features of capitalist economic relations that prompt ideas they dubbed ‘ideology.’ Ideology only arises where there are social conditions such as those produced by private property that are vulnerable to criticism and protest; ideology exists to inure these social conditions from attack by those who are disadvantaged by them (Marx and Engels 1976). Capitalist ideologies give an inverted explanation for market relations, for example, so that human beings perceive their actions as the consequence of economic factors, rather than the other way around, and moreover, thereby understand the market to be natural and inevitable (Marx and Engels 1976:29).

Preachers and followers of a given ideology, especially when they are in the opposition, argue that if their plan is followed, things will be much better than they are at present. The concept of ideology has therefore been commonly used as a political weapon to condemn or criticise rival creeds or doctrines (Heywood 2002:40).
As a rule, ideology is acquired through the formal structures of socialisation: the family, religious organisations, educational system, political parties and voluntary associations. In totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the state usually undertakes direct responsibility for the inculcation of the single, unified national ideology. In liberal democratic regimes, the individual acquires the values through the informal and imperceptible influences of the family, peer and other social groups, the school, the church and the press (Bluwey 2002).

Ideologies have been crucial in shaping political events. Just as a ship cannot sail without a rudder, an ideology serves as a plan of action that guides politicians in their endeavours as well as holds together movements, parties or revolutionary groups (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:4). To fight well and endure sacrifices, people need an ideological motivation. Indeed, the founding fathers of the United States, for example, shaped their Constitution as they did because they were convinced of the rightness of the ideas of political thinkers like Locke, Montesquieu, and so on. In the developing world, many young revolutionaries are still fired by the ideas of Mao Zedong, an apostle of revolutionary violence against colonialism (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:8). Andrew (1995) believes ideology has an immense impact on education and argues that if the origin of ideas is understood, then it could be used with great benefit in enlightened education and to diagnose the roots of human ignorance and serve as a foundation for a rational progressive society (Andrew 1995:3).

From the discussion so far, it is clear that the role of ideology in politics cannot be relegated to the background. Indeed, no political analysis can be complete without an examination of the ideology and ideas of the relevant group (Heywood 2002:127).

But even though ideologies help to develop ‘immature’ societies, it is held that in the industrialised democratic societies, they no longer serve anything more than a decorative role (Andrew 1995:11). Most of the major parties in industrialised societies have achieved, in the welfare, mixed economy structure, the majority of their reformist aims. The Left had long accepted the dangers of excessive state power and the Right had accepted the necessity of the welfare state and the rights of working people (Eccleshall et al. 1998). This reflects a change in the perception of the political terrain by political parties, both of the Left and of the Right. Thus, it is no longer possible to gain political power by appealing to only one section of the community by claiming that the views of the other section are simply false (Eccleshall et al. 1998:14). As Seymour Martin Lipset remarked, ‘this very triumph of the democratic social revolution of the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate
them to political action’ (Lipset 1969:406). Several other weaknesses of ideology have been pointed out. In the view of Marx (1972), ideology may denote not only practical ineffectiveness but also illusion and loss of reality. Oakeshott (1962) has also pointed out the fact that ideology represents a simplification, abstraction and an ‘abridgement’ of social reality. This distorts a much more complex social and political reality. They may be mere theoretical blueprints or ideals that leaders, especially in emerging democracies, sometimes find no difficulty in abandoning after winning elections and to face real or current political imperatives (Heywood 2002). The concept of ideology also denotes a totalitarian mentality which prevents all political discussions other than on its own content, making it quite distinct from pluralist, free and tolerant rational society (Andrew 1995).

The weaknesses of ideology notwithstanding, its essence is of importance to this work because it gives the theoretical base for analysing findings as to whether ideology has a place in determining voting among the youth or not. Many philosophical and scientific ideas have functioned within ideologies, in fact many philosophers and natural scientists have allowed their thoughts to be used in an ideological manner and have contributed willingly to ideological promotion (Andrew 1995:19).

In Ghana, the two main political parties, the NPP and NDC have ideologies that are supposedly used to bind members of their parties together. But are these ideologies of any practical application to the youth, who constitute the bulk of the voting population? (Asante 2006).

The argument of this paper is that ideology plays little or no role in determining which party to support and who to vote for among the youth. Indeed, most supporters of the two parties are either oblivious of the ideology of their parties or do not know their exact meanings and imperatives. For a proper appreciation of this point, it is necessary to first discuss the background to politics and formation of political parties in Ghana. Indeed, it would be quite difficult to grasp the ideology of political parties in former colonies anywhere in the world and for that matter in Ghana, without referring to some historical antecedents dating back to the pre-independence and early post-independence era.

**Background to Politics in Ghana**

Ghana was a British colony under the name Gold Coast. As the colonial powers receded, new leaders, movements and political organisations emerged in the two decades leading to independence. This happened in an atmosphere of indirect rule which principally relied on traditional political elites under the constant guidance of colonial officials (Awoonor 1990).
Given the background of the gap between the rich south and the poor and underdeveloped north as well as the policy of separate development of the three constituent parts of the Gold Coast, political parties in the pre-independence era were imbued with a very strong character of regionalism (Wayo-Seini 2006). The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) had its members largely from the South and even though the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) was more nationalistic in nature, it was regarded as a party committed to championing the course of the ordinary man in the then Gold Coast (Austin 1964). In 1954, the Northern People’s Party (NPP) was also established to promote northern solidarity and accelerate development in the north as well as to work with likeminded parties in the south to delay the attainment of self government so that an interim period could be used to rapidly bridge the gap between the north and the south (Dickson 1968). Indeed, the view of the people from the north was that independence should be delayed until such a time that the region was placed on a footing of equality with the south (Ladouceur 1979:93). A strong ally of the NPP was the Moslem Association Party (MAP) which also emerged in the early 1950s and whose strength lay among Moslem immigrant communities in the major towns.

After the 1954 elections, the government of Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister and, later, president of Ghana, who led the country to independence, sought to proceed to full self-rule as soon as outstanding questions could be settled. The north, it seemed, stood alone in its determination to oppose or at least to delay independence even though it was considerably weaker politically. Just at that moment when the future seemed bleak to the NPP leaders, there arose a new political movement, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which became a strong and dominating ally of the NPP (Austin 1964). Essentially, the NLM was an Ashanti movement of political protest against what many Ashantis considered to be unfair treatment in the hands of the CPP government. The protest was primarily over low prices of cocoa the government offered to cocoa farmers, but among the Ashantis, this quickly transformed into a political issue directed against a government seen to be dominated by coastal elements. The NPP and NLM were united primarily in their opposition to the CPP and were joined by a number of smaller parties and groups, such as the Togoland Congress Party (TCP), the MAP, and the Anlo Youth Organisation (Austin 1964:45).

It was not until the attainment of independence in 1957 that regionalism gradually faded away and the parties opposed to the CPP in the legislature merged to form the United Party (Chazan 1983). This effectively established two main political traditions or ideologies in Ghana, namely, the Nkrumah
group (CPP) and the Danquah/Busia (UP) traditions. A striking difference between the two main traditions is that while the CPP aligned itself to the East and therefore favoured socialism, the Danquah/Busia tradition was pro-West and therefore favoured capitalism (ibid). A third tradition which emerged out of a long period of military rule under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) could be described as the Rawlings tradition. This tradition, dependent on the exigencies of time was either pro-East, non-aligned or pro-West (Shillington 1992). While the Nkrumah group is represented in contemporary Ghanaian politics by a number of political parties particularly the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) and Peoples’ National Convention (PNC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP) represents the Danquah/Busia tradition while the Rawlings tradition is represented to a large extent by the National Democratic Congress (NDC).

Having gone through the historical antecedents of political parties in Ghana, one key question that comes to mind is whether they were formed on the basis of any political ideology. This question is pertinent because the historical antecedents of political parties show that parties conformed to the three regions that were administered separately by the colonial government (Austin 1964:318). Thus, it can be argued that the protection of regional interests was the prime motive for the formation of political parties. Though from the outset, political parties like the CPP was seen as an Africanist national movement; it was only when they gelled into post-independent national political parties that their ideologies began to become more apparent.

**Ideologies of Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic**

In this section we attempt a brief discussion of the political ideologies of the ruling NPP and the main opposition NDC.

**Ideology of the New Patriotic Party**

The preamble of the Manifesto of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) (2004:1) summarises the party’s ideology as follows: ‘The party’s policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property owning democracy in this land, with the right to life, freedom and justice, as the principles to which the government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen’.

This constitutes the guiding ideology of parties that have succeeded the United Party since 1958. The main creed has been the avowal of individual freedom in a liberal democratic state where the development of the individual and of society in a free political atmosphere, under the rule of law, is the principle of the state. Thus, the NPP operates under the liberal democratic
ideology and believes in the market economy, free enterprise, fundamental human rights, and a vigorous pursuit of private initiative without any hindrance. Based on this ideology, the NPP has some fundamental beliefs that are stated explicitly as follows:

(a) The individual must be enabled to develop in freedom to attain the highest level of their potentials or talents;

(b) The provision of quality education, further training and expanding economy that creates jobs, as well as the provision of good health facilities and medical care for all Ghanaians form the basis for the development of the individual and the nation;

(c) A free enterprise economy is the surest guarantee of economic growth and prosperity. Government must create the environment for business to thrive and for efforts and initiative to be rewarded. What a person makes legitimately must never be taken away arbitrarily. The rights and needs of the individual are paramount as enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana;

(d) Individuals and societies make a state – states do not make individuals – therefore the party believes in freedom of expression and association, freedom from oppression, from fear and from arbitrary arrest; and

(e) Justice is either for all or it is for none. Every Ghanaian is entitled to the protection of the law. The sovereignty of the people and the state should be anchored in the rule of law and independent judiciary.

According to Nana Ohene Ntow (2007), the General Secretary of the ruling NPP, these are the beliefs which successor parties of the UP tradition have always held. They are beliefs which inspired the Progress Party Government of 1969-1972 and informed all the policies and programmes of the government. They are the same beliefs that inspire the NPP government. He asserted that time has vindicated these beliefs as they have become commonly shared by most parties that believe in participatory democracy.

**Ideology of the National Democratic Congress**

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has its antecedents in the 4 June 1979 and the 31 December 1981 military coups. It was from the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which ruled Ghana after the December 1981 coup until January 1992 that the NDC originated. In sharp contrast to the ruling NPP, the NDC has no long history. Its founder, J. J. Rawlings, who ruled Ghana for about twenty years, has been the main pillar of the party.
The NDC’s ideology is Social Democracy and is spelt out as follows in ‘A Social Democratic Agenda for Ghana’ (2006):

(a) Belief in the equality and egalitarian treatment of all persons with respect to their political, social, cultural and religious relations in a multi-party environment;
(b) Belief in the principles of development through the united participation of all Ghanaians;
(c) Belief in the protection of the under-privileged and the upliftment of the socially disadvantaged;
(d) Belief in the fact that the orderly, stable and prosperous existence of society is a condition for the orderly and prosperous development of individuals within the society; and
(e) Belief in the free market system but with commitment to the cause of the socially disadvantaged and the principle of equity in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources.

Apparently, the kind of social democracy being advocated by the NDC blends the efficiency of the market and private initiative with state’s intervention to protect the poor and to ensure justice for all.

With this background of the emergence of political parties and their ideologies, we can now discuss the contributions and role of the youth in Ghana’s Fourth Republic and how they were influenced by the ideologies.

The Youth and Politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

The youth of Ghana have played an important role in local and national politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1993. The youth have served as foot-soldiers and vehicles through which party manifestoes have been transmitted to the electorate, particularly those in the hinterlands. In all elections held under the Fourth Republic, the youth played a crucial role; serving as polling agents during registration and voting exercises. In this role, they have promoted fairness and transparency in the electioneering process especially during voter registration exercises which are crucial for the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and their acceptability. For example, the decision of some parties to use indigenous youth groups to monitor polling centres, especially in the rural communities, has contributed immensely towards the checking of impersonation (Asante 2006:226).

Another key role of the youth in the political process lies in their zeal to make the presence of their parties felt across the country. They are often seen chanting their party slogans and moving from house to house, campaigning for their parties in an attempt to win more supporters. In the 2004 general elections, for instance, the NPP youth used the propaganda that a
vote for Professor Mills of the NDC would mean a vote for former president Rawlings. This propaganda seemed to have worked in almost all the areas that the NPP won the elections in spite of all efforts by the NDC youth to disabuse the minds of the electorate regarding the NPP’s propaganda.

Furthermore, the youth have also served as pressure groups within their parties and often brought pressure to bear on national executives over pertinent issues, including matters bordering on internal democracy. Some youth have resisted attempts by party executives to impose parliamentary candidates on them in their constituencies. For instance, in the run up to the 2008 parliamentary elections of Ghana the youth in the ruling NPP embarked on massive demonstrations, which sometimes resulted in violent clash with the security agencies, in an attempt to press home their disapproval of imposition of candidates on them by the party executives. These were the experiences of several constituencies, including Ablekuma South, Abirem, Bekwai, Suhum. In addition, the youth wing of these two main parties sometimes organised press conferences or issued press statements to enlighten voters about their party positions on national issues or to deny allegations made against their party. Furthermore, the youth have been instrumental in organising party rallies and hoisting of party flags in an attempt to promote the ideals of their respective parties. Moreover, usually rally support for their peers who contest parliamentary seats. It is from such support base that Haruna Iddrisu, the National Youth Organiser, and Isaac Asiamah, Policy Analyst of the NDC and NPP respectively, secured their election to parliament (Asante 2006:227).

Fundraising activities for political parties is crucial role in many emerging democracies where the commitment of the state to funding political parties is low. Since no meaningful party activity can be embarked upon without adequate funding, the youth continue to support their parties’ fundraising activities through the sale and distribution of party cards and other paraphernalia.

It is also well-known that the youth make up the party stalwarts that get anything done in the interest of the party. They are mostly available for engagement in any violent activities or in settling inter-party and intra-party conflicts. There are several reported cases where the youth of the two leading parties have clashed over the venue, timing for organising rallies and other seemingly petty issues. In October 2004, for instance, supporters of the NDC and NPP clashed in the Yendi constituency during an NDC rally (CDD 2005:30). Again in the Tolon/Kumbungu district during the 2004 elections, the NPP youth stormed an NDC stronghold to investigate allegations of under-aged voting. This led to a clash between the two groups resulting in the death of two persons (Heritage 2005:1-3).
In some constituencies, such as Mion and Tolon in the Northern Region and New Edubiase in the Ashanti Region, ballot boxes were stolen and burnt by the youth of either the NPP or the NDC. The youth activists were also involved in the destruction of bill boards, posters, etc., of their opponents as well as physical assault of their rival contestants (Asante, 2006:229). The youth have generally been identified with the conflicts in the parties – both as causes and factors in the internal and external violence that often engulf the parties. Given that their activities often verge on violence, it is instructive to ask what sort of orientation the parties give their youth, or, to put it more effectively, does ideology matter to the youth?

**Does Party Ideology Matter to the Youth?**

The result of a mini survey conducted between 5 and 27 April 2007 to test the relevance of political ideology in determining the outcome of elections among the youth of the NPP and the NDC seems to confirm the earlier assertion that ideology does not matter so much to the youth. Admittedly, the findings were based on the mini survey conducted, but could possibly explain some of the features of the Ghanaian youth around the issues being addressed.

The respondents were first asked whether they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties in Ghana. About 158 respondents out of the 200 sampled (79%) answered in the affirmative while 42 (21%) said they did not support any of the registered political parties (Table 5).

**Table 5:** Do you support any of the registered political parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** From the Study

This is a confirmation that Ghanaian youth are politically active and constitute the bulk of the voting population in the country. It should be noted however that some respondents were suspicious of the motive behind the survey despite all the explanations given to them and the assurance of confidentiality. Consequently, they gave responses which suggested that they were politically neutral even though there were strong indications and evidence that they were active supporters of political parties. For instance, some of the respondents were personally known to this researcher as party functionaries who even held positions in their respective political parties. Yet, they claimed
political neutrality. In a rather curious twist to the exercise, at least 25 out of the 42 respondents who claimed political neutrality owned up that they were only trying not to jeopardise their political chances and fortunes should the party they did not support assume the reins of power. It follows then that the number of youth party supporters are far more than has been recorded in this mini-survey.

But why would some youth want to be seen as politically neutral? Could it be that their party loyalty is skin deep or that some of them have genuinely lost confidence in the political system? This question is pertinent because it is widely believed that despite the invaluable role they play in bringing political parties into power the youth play little or no role in actual policy making and that still puts them at the receiving end of official policies. It is even known that some youth leaders have expressed disappointment and regret in supporting their respective parties. In other words, two main reasons may account for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of some youth to openly identify with the political parties of their choice. First, it could be a strategy to benefit from any political party that wins power. Second, it could also be that they may have lost confidence generally in the political system and so may be unwilling to identify themselves with any party. Whatever may be the true reasons, it is incontrovertible that the vast majority of the youth sampled were politically active.

The second question posed to the ardent supporters of political parties show that only 21 (13.3%) out of the 158 respondents know anything about the political ideology of their parties. The remaining 137 respondents (86.7%) of the young party enthusiasts have no awareness whatever about party ideology (Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** From the Study

A simple cross tabulation of political parties and awareness of party ideology shows that of the 137 respondents with no awareness of the ideology of the party they supported, 70 were from the NPP and 67 from the NDC. Similarly, of the 21 who claimed to know their parties’ ideologies, 8 were from the NPP while 13 were from the NDC. This suggests that most of the youth...
who helped the NPP gain political power were not aware of the ideology of the party. The study also shows that, comparatively, there is only a slight difference in the level of youth awareness in both parties (8 in NPP and 13 in NDC) (see Table 7).

**Table 7: Political Parties and Awareness of Party Ideology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Awareness of Party Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** From the Study

A cross-tabulation of the educational background of respondents vis-a-vis their awareness of party ideology is instructive. Table 8 shows no significant relationship between education and awareness of party ideology. Out of the 21 respondents who claimed to know their parties’ ideologies (see Table 6), 10 had no education, 1 had basic education, and another 1 had secondary education while 9 respondents had tertiary education. The table also shows the distribution of the 137 respondents without any awareness of party ideology thus: 20 had no education; 27 had basic education; 40 had secondary education; and 50 had tertiary education.

**Table 8: Education and Awareness of Party ideology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Background</th>
<th>Awareness of Party Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** From the study

Table 8 is very revealing. It shows that youth who are clueless about their party’s ideology outnumber those who know by nearly ratio 7:1. Furthermore, it shows that the problem of political illiteracy is more with the so-called educated youth than the uneducated; hence they outnumber them 2:1. The figures show at once that there are far more educated youth than uneducated in Ghana but that their education does not translate to
political knowledge or awareness. It stands to reason that if the youth, the real masses that sway electoral victory one way or the other have no understanding of the basic ideology that rules their party, it means they have no idea whatsoever how the parties are run; it also means they are more like pawns in the party and the party leaders are at liberty to use and dump them. It means their position in the party, formidable as it seems by their sheer number, is very insecure. Finally, it also means that the role the youth play in the party is mainly to secure for themselves a measure of relevance – it means the older politicians tolerate and use them; they are not really trusted.

To buttress this point, the NDC hosted an international conference in 2007, which was attended by all parties that subscribed to the Social Democracy ideology. Participants at the conference were made up largely of the party gurus and bosses; the youth were hardly seen. Some researchers have attempted to explain the nature of relationship between the party leaders and the youth. Asante (2006), for instance, has observed a degree of apprehension between the leadership of the parties and the youth. He said most of the adults in the party perceive the youth as half-empty caps (Asante 2006:228). Asante further notes that the older politicians’ perception of the youth range from the mildly negative view that young people are a risk and an unknown quantity, to the extreme view that characterises them as potentially dangerous to themselves and society (Asante 2006:230). Could this explain why no conscious effort was made to get the NDC youth to attend such an important conference? Perhaps. But it shows a deliberate failure of the party leadership to groom the young ones for leadership and reveals a more underlying problem, namely, an inclination on the part of the party leaders to be non-ideological in their politicking. It makes the party ideologies look as mere window dressing.

A cross tabulation between gender and awareness (Table 9) shows that more male (18) awareness of party ideology than female (only 3). That is in the ratio of 6:1. But with 67 male and 70 female respondents claiming no awareness of party ideology (Table 9), it means the degree of awareness for both genders is very low – low enough for both genders to be used as pawns despite their overwhelming voting population.

Table 9: Gender and Awareness of Party Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Awareness of Party Ideology</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the Study
The 137 respondents who know nothing of their party ideology naturally have nothing to say about the relevance of ideology to the political movement. But even 12 of the 21 who claim to know say political ideology is irrelevant (Table 10). In between the two parties, the same perception dominates (Table 11).

**Table 10: Is the concept of political ideology relevant?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the study

**Table 11: Political Parties and Relevance of Ideology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Relevant of Party Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the Study

Remarkably, of the 12 respondents who consider party ideology irrelevant, five said it is too abstract and not practical, and therefore, has no place in modern-day politics. Another four said there is no ideological difference between political parties in Ghana while the remaining three said the attitude of political leaders make any talk of ideology irrelevant. They cited the several defections from one political camp to the other by respected political leaders and argued that if ideology was that important, leaders would not easily defect at will (Table 12).

**Table 12: Reasons Why Ideology is Irrelevant**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the Study
From the study and the preceding analysis, it seems the youth of Ghana are a collective in double jeopardy. They constitute 80 per cent of the national population and averagely 72 per cent of the voting population (Tables 1 and 2). They take the battle cry of the parties to the grassroots, convince reluctant voters, function as electoral officers, fight physical battles to see their party prevail or to defend their party thereby constituting themselves into the party security outfit and so on and so forth. It is therefore an irony that this same youth should be largely uninformed about the ideology and ultimate objectives of the party. What then fuels the fervour of the youth that makes them do so much for so little? What philosophy or worldview defines their voting pattern?

Answers to this question are not easy because they have to balance theoretical postulates with practical experience. For instance, from the theoretical point of view, Heywood (2002) has identified four theories of voting, namely, party identification model, sociological model, rational choice model and dominant ideology model. For the youth who make up 72 per cent of the voting population and play a fundamental role in deciding who gets elected into what office and yet are not taken into confidence in the party plans and core philosophy, it is irresistible to ask which of these theories inform the voting of youth for election candidates. Interestingly, none of the respondents cited ideology as the reason for voting a party (Table 13). This means there are no thoroughgoing objective principles guiding party activities and election in Ghana.

Table 13: What makes you support or vote for your party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Influence</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Influence</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Interest</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Policies</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the Study

What then can be said to influence youth voting during elections? Personal interest tops the table with 76 affirmations a total figure of 158 respondents. Others are parental influence (44); peer influence (23); and good policies (15). By implication, the 44 who voted for parties based on the influences of their parents and grandparents fit into two main theories of voting – the sociological model of voting (the dominant model) and the party identification model of voting. It means the youth support political parties in keeping with their parents’ preferences.
The 23 respondents who voted as a result of peer influence also voted in conformity with both the sociological and the party identification models. Similarly, 76 respondents claimed they supported their parties for their personal gains and interest. Impliedly, they were more concerned about what they can gain from a political system when their parties assume the reins of power than the actual ideology of the party. In this respect, the respondents tend to be more concerned about the improvement in their individual and family well-being regardless of the ideology the parties offer. Again, 15 respondents claimed their vote was in support of the good policies contained in their party manifestoes. This satisfies the rational choice model of voting. In all, 91 respondents were influenced by the rational choice model during voting, which is good.

Discussions and Conclusion

This paper has furnished a sample study of the youth involvement in the political process of Ghana. Though the findings cannot be overgeneralised because of the small sample used, yet it is a valuable indication of the political attitude of the Ghanaian youth alongside their voting preferences and the raison d’être for their political choices. With this, it can be concluded that even though the vast majority of the youth are politically active and play a crucial role in the emergence of political leaders in the country, nevertheless, their actions are not guided political ideology. Findings from the mini study show an uncomfortable pattern: that the youth are motivated mainly by what they can gain from the parties and the political process. This self-centred reason for voting and supporting political parties may be the result of poverty and unemployment among the youth in Ghana. T is also the reason why it is so easy for the political class to manipulate and use them for their selfish reasons despite the advantage of number they have over every other segment of the population.

Given the results of the survey, political parties, as key agents of political socialisation, have not fared well in socialising the youth and setting up their organisation firmly on the basis of a strong ideology. For as long as the political class is able to continue running without party ideology, so long will there be no particular destination they are taking the Ghanaian polity to. The damage they do by this lack of ideology is double in that they rob the present of developmental essence and framework and rob the future of developmental vision. This sociogeneity are not operating within a developmental paradigm and they are not training the youth to develop any. This is a serious challenge not just for the political class but the country and the youth in particular. The youth are the agents of social transformation, but for them
to truly achieve that feat, they need a thorough reorientation and conscious development. They need to imbibe the right philosophical outlook and commit to the historical challenges of their country. The political class has to design this process and see it through for positive change to happen. Without a properly weaned national ideology, it will be difficult to bring to birth the Ghana of its compatriots’ dream.

Notes
1. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for this view.
9. I am grateful to Professor Pearl Robinson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University, Medford, USA, for this view.
12. I am grateful to Mr. E.K Adomah, National Co-ordinator, National Youth Council for sharing this view during a discussion I held with him on Wednesday 16th April, 2008 in Accra.
13. According to Andrew Heywood, there are four main theories of voting. These are:

   **Sociological Model:** This model links voting to group membership, suggesting that voters tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the economic and social position of the group to which they belong. Rather than developing a psychological attachment to a party on the basis of family influence, this model highlights the importance of social alignment, reflecting the various divisions and tensions within society. The most significant of these divisions are class, gender, ethnicity, religion and region. In simple terms, the model states that people may vote for an aspirant if he belongs to their class, comes from their ethnic group, shares the same religious beliefs, etc. This model allows for rationality insofar as group interests may help to shape party allegiances. The model has however been attacked on the grounds that, there is growing empirical evidence that the link between sociological factors and party support has weakened in modern societies. In particular, attention has been paid to the phenomenon of class dealignment and the need for people to vote on issues and not on class, religious or ethnic grounds.

   **Rational Choice Model:** In this model, voting is seen as a rational act, in the sense that voters are believed to decide their party preference on the basis of personal interest. Rather than being habitual, a manifestation of broader
attachments and allegiances, voting is seen as essentially instrumental: that is, as a means to an end. The model stresses the importance of ‘issue voting’, and suggests that parties can significantly influence their electoral performance by reshaping their policies. It is generally accepted that one of the consequences of partisan and class dealignment has been the spread of issue voting. The weakness of the theory is that it abstracts the individual voter from his or her social and cultural context.

**Dominant Ideology Model:** This model stresses the importance of political ideology in influencing the behaviour of voters. The model simply states that the dominant ideology influences voters. Consequently, if voters’ attitude conforms to the tenets of a dominant ideology, parties would develop their policies in line with the tenets of that ideology so as to get the support of voters. The weakness of this ideology is that, it takes individual calculation and personal autonomy out of the picture all together. Impliedly, people are not willing to weigh the merits and demerits of policy options being presented to them. Once a candidate or a policy conforms to their ideological persuasion, they would support it (Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, Palgrave: MacMillan Press, 2002, pp. 242-245).

**References**


**Oral Interview**
Ohene-Ntow, Nana, General Secretary of the NPP, 2007. ‘Interview’, 1 May.