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## **Ethnic Militias and Criminality in the Niger-Delta** (Pp. 315-330)

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### **Abstract**

*The proliferation of ethnic militia and their activities in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta region has moved from the closing of flow stations to kidnapping for ransom. The aim of these militia groups have changed from asking for fairness and equity in the distribution of the wealth of the Nigerian state into a serious form of criminality especially the kidnapping of indigenes and expatriates for ransom. The activities of these groups have adverse economic and security implications for the region and the nation at large. It is against this background that this paper examined the activities of ethnic militia and the consequences of their activities for the Niger Delta Region. Finally, the paper proffered solutions to the continuing crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.*

### **Introduction**

In Nigeria, ethnic and religious groups have taken the centre stage and play prominent roles in the dynamics of governance of the Nigerian state. Ethnic, socio-political formations like the Ohaneze Ndigbo, Arewa Consultative Forum and the Afenifere are the most visible on the political arena. These groups have a penetrating influence. They, particularly at the youth leve, are called ethnic militias, though the agenda and activities of these groups, i.e the militias and the ethnic socio-political groups may not necessarily be related. The most prominent of the ethnic militias include Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF),

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) and religious militia groups in Northern Nigeria. As already stated, these movements, seeking to protect and advance different ethnic interests, are now contesting not just the political space and democratic dividends, but also resource control as part of the liberation of the political environment. (Agbu, O. 2002). These groups, who claim to represent ethnic and regional interests, adopt diverse strategies which include violence and criminally motivated actions in the conduct of their activities.

There are, however, different opinions on how to tackle the problems emanating from the actions of these groups. Some argue that the activities of these militia groups are a way of demanding for fairness and equity in the distribution of the wealth of the nation, the bulk of which they believe comes from the region. These groups see the activities of ethnic militia as manifestations and frustrations expressed as a result of the dysfunction in the structure and character of the Nigerian state. The solution for this group lies in addressing the national question, particularly as it affects the Niger Delta region. Others see the activities of the militia groups particularly in the Niger Delta region, as an act of criminality. The solution for this group is that since this is purely a security issue, the state must deploy its coercive machinery to put these criminal activities under some meaningful control.

A plethora of these groups has emerged from all the geo-political zones of the country, but are more pronounced in number and activities in the Niger Delta. One of the implications of the activities of the groups is the proliferation of small arms and weapons. This has led to an increase in criminal activities in the region with profound security implications.

It is against this background that the paper examined the phenomenon of ethnic militias in the Nigerian context with particular reference to the Niger Delta region. The paper also examined criminality in the Niger Delta and also proffered solutions on how to address the activities of militia groups which, some argued, presently constitute a threat to the survival of the Nigerian state.

### **Conceptualizing Ethnic Militia in Nigeria**

Duverger, M. (1976) sees militia as a

a kind of private army whose members are enrolled on military lives, one subjected to the same discipline and

same training as soldiers, like them wearing uniforms and badges, heady by a band and flags and like them ready to meet, the enemy with weapons in physical combat

He noted further that militia groups vary significantly from regular armies, because members of these militia groups remain civilians without military culture. Furthermore, they may be obliged to meet and train regularly and be ready to hold themselves at the disposition of their leaders.

They are never mobilized on a permanent basis and also not maintained full time by their organization. Moreover he noted that two categories are distinguishable among the militia, namely those who may be referred to as a kind of “active army”, who are ever ready for confrontation and others who are described more or less like “reserve”. Furthermore, he observed that the military character of the militia appear not only in its composition but also in its structure, which is usually “based on very small groups which build up into pyramids to form larger and larger units (Duverger, 1976).

An ethnic militia movement can be described as an extreme form of ethnic agitation for self determination as various ethnic groups assume militant postures and gradually metamorphose into militia groups which rely on ethnic identity and purport to act as machinery through which the desires of the people are actualized. The common characteristics of these ethnically inspired groups are

- the resort to violence,
- a preponderance of youth membership,
- an ethnic identity affiliation.

From the foregoing explanations and definitions, an ethnic militia can be described as youth organization formed for the struggle against deprivation and marginalization which have transformed into violent militant youth some of who, have also changed their objectives from struggles for ethnic desires into criminal activities.

### **Ethnic Militias in the Niger Delta**

The emergence and growth of militia groups in contemporary Nigeria can be traced to the internal contradictions in the Nigerian political economy. First, is the nature of the Nigerian state which has been a violent one and has

striven to maintain control and dominance of the society through violent approaches.

Militia groups became visible in the country in the 1990s when the Nigerian state was in distress under callous military dictatorship, particularly during the Babagida and Abacha regimes. One of the consequences of the character of these regimes was the rise of militia groups. (Adejumobi, 2002).

The other dimension to the rise of militia groups under the Babangida and Abacha regimes was the marginalization and social deprivation, particularly of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta region. The response of the government to the Niger Delta crisis has been the militarization of the region to keep at bay restive youth and other groups to ensure the free flow of oil to the Nigerian state. This has led to the emergence of several militant youths while the existing non-violent groups have resorted to violence as a challenge to brutality occasioned by the presence of military personnels in the region. The objective of these militant groups is to challenge the violent posture of the state and highlight the marginalization and deprivation that characterized the Niger Delta region.

The above context has led to the emergence and growth of militia groups in the Niger Delta region. Between 1990 and 1999, not less than twenty-four ethnic based minority right groups emerged in the region with radical postures. These include the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Chikoko Ijaw National Congress, Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Ijaw Peace Movement (IPM), Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM) and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Others that emerged after 1999 include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF).

None of these groups, at their inception, had violent inclinations as their objectives. The prevailing circumstances forced these formations into violence some of which have degenerated into criminal activities.

The nature and character of the Nigerian state, failure and lack of political leadership and political institutions, the struggle for power and unfair or unequal economic relations among ethnic nationalities are some of the factors that have prompted the emergence of ethnic militia groups in the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta region in particular. The resolve is to

resist the deprivation, social injustice, marginalization, neglect, and seeming insecurity of the people through whatever means including the formation of underground organizations.

### **Factors Responsible for the Emergence and Proliferation of Ethnic Militia**

Diverse explanations have been put forward for the growth in the number of ethnic militia groups in Nigeria. Babawale (2001) conceives of the emergence of militia groups as being due to imperfections in Nigeria's federal system. He observes that the emergence is due to the manipulation of ethnicity by the governing elite across the various geo-political zones. Furthermore, these groups were formed as a consequence of mismanagement of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian state and were meant to be the militant organs of expression of defiance against oppressive rule. Danjuma (2002) argues that the formation and activities of ethnic militias are traceable to neglect by government or a perception of such neglect on the part of many ethnic nationalities in the Nigerian state and suggests:

Neglect by government or even perceived neglect can be capitalized on by opposing groups to whip up ethnic sentiments which invariably results in communal conflicts. It is this neglect or a perception of it, which has resulted in the creation of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Arewa Peoples' Congress among others.

The point must be made that the emergence and proliferation of militia groups can not be hinged on a single factor. However, the major factors responsible for the emergence and proliferation of ethnic militia groups in the Nigerian state can be examined under the following themes: the perception by the elite of the various ethnic nationalities who see the structure and operations of the Nigerian federal state as a failure and consequently their interests and ethnic aspiration have not been accommodated and properly taken care of as opined by Fredrick Fasheun the leader of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). Fasheun (1999) explains that:

we looked outwards to build the Nigerian state and the picture we got was a blurred picture. We didn't see the

Nigerian State. So we looked inward to our ethnic nationalities and we saw the ethnic nationalities. So we recoiled into our shelves so as to develop our ethnic nationality and provided platforms on which we can interact. The military, during their subjugation of this country, did a lot of havoc to us. All platforms for expressing social discontent were disrupted; the Nigerian Labour Congress was disrupted, the ASUU proscribed; NBA, NMA and so on and so forth. So there were no platform for social interaction and unity continued to elude us. So we looked inward, like is said, into our ethnic nationalities and we decided that, okay, let us have these social platforms like the Ijaw National Congress, the Igbo Peoples Congress.

In a similar note Fawehinmi (2000) mentioned the emergence and proliferation of ethnic militia group on perceived injustice, deprivation and marginalization of some ethnic nationalities and contended that

The ethnic militant organisations arose in Nigeria because of perceived injustice, perceived exclusion of various forms, such as political injustice, ethnic marginalization and economic exclusion in terms of access to social services.

He further elaborated that

These organizations are products of several reasons, several areas of misgovernance of our country. OPC came into being as a result of the dastardly, illegal and immoral scuttling of the June 12 (1993) election. In the North, APC is in the limelight because the masses of the North are ignored by their leaders (who) are not able to improve the quality of life of the poor people... In the East, the insecurity has been very unwholesome and this cannot be contested. The police is unable to take care of lives and property in the East and therefore the Bakassi Boys emerged. Then the Egbesu Boys situation is even more depressing, because they come from the Niger Delta and

98 percent of our resources are derived from the Niger Delta. And when they cried for succour, the Federal Government gave them bullets... when they asked for education; food on the table, the Federal Government met them with bullets. So the Egbesu Boys said 'No, enough is enough'.

Thus, it is arguable that the collapse of most institutions, inter-ethnic inequity has stimulated the political elite of the various ethnic nationalities to promote and encourage new organizations that, would promote interests of those ethnic nationalities. In doing this these groups have drawn strength from "the new global recognition of ethnic self-determination as an intergral part of the promotion of global human rights (Amuta, 2000).

A second factor in the emergence and proliferation of ethnic militia groups is the collapse of the state institutions established for the protection of life and property, particularly the Nigerian Police Force. Fawehinmi identified the failure of security agencies as a major consequence for the rise of the militia phenomenon in Nigeria. He opined that

The abysmal failure of the security agencies of government has contributed to the strength and social acceptability of the ethnic militia organizations in various parts of the country... The inability of the police to provide security has compelled the public to transfer the confidence that should have been reposed in the police to the ethnic militia who have proved, in some cases, to be more reliable and effective in checking the menace of armed robbers in local communities... Government should bear the responsibility for the growth and development of ethnic militia organizations that are rooted in its failure to satisfy the welfare needs of the masses and its failure to provide security of lives and property.

The third factor in the emergence and proliferation ethnic militia groups can be seen as a symptom of what Bangura (1999) referred to as "an extraordinary youth crisis". This crisis has its offshoot in the growth and increase in the nation's youth, as a consequence of the nation's rapid

population growth. This situation has been heightened by the collapse of the educational system, the construction of opportunities in the formal job sector and the relegation of most of the nation's youth to existence in very harsh conditions, either from a difficult informal sector or from the nightmare of an overcrowded job market. Under these circumstances, increasing numbers of youth particularly in the nation's major urban centres have been exposed to living on the streets and in a culture of marginality which is found in drugs, loose morality, violence, profanity and disrespect for societal values and norms (Bangura, 1999).

A common factor in the growth and proliferation of ethnic militia groups in Nigeria is the increase in the number of small arms. There is an estimated 3 million small arms and light weapons in Nigeria and most of these arms are in private hands and more than 80 percent of these privately owned arms were acquired illegally (*Vanguard*, 2000).

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has not only given rise to a culture of violence; it has encouraged disaffected groups into mounting direct challenges to legitimate authorities. Obasi, N. (2002), observed that

The ease with which virtually any group can obtain light weaponry has not only encouraged the proliferation of armed ethnic militia, but has also emboldened such groups to carry on their activities with little regard for state owned security and law enforcement agencies”.

Evidence abound of the fact that a large proportion of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria in recent times end up not with the criminal gangs operating in many urban centers but with ethnic militia groups, in various parts of the country. There is also evidence of a large concentration of this in the Niger Delta.

### **Ethnic Militia Groups and Criminality in the Niger Delta**

#### **The theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil**

The theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil started on a small scale in the 1980's. It has graduated from amateurs who utilize crude methods in the extraction of refined petroleum products and crude oil from the distribution pipelines of the MNCs to advanced technologies to tap refined petroleum products and crude with the aid of

sophisticated communications equipment and transportation means across creeks, rivers and rivulets.

It has become large and extensive in scale since the late 1990s. Aerial Survey and Patrol of the creeks and waters of Rivers and Bayelsa States revealed a large number of boats and barges involved in illegal bunkering. The refined petroleum products and crude oil are transported through ships and barges and sold in the high sea. The crude oil is sold at very low prices; when the price per barrel was 26 USD, as at 2003, it was sold for 7USD. By 2004, it was sold at about 15USD per barrel (Oduniyi, 2003).

There is also the involvement of the community and ethnic militia in the illegal economy, some of which control the waterways and creeks. It is assumed and claimed that the illegal trading is undertaken by rival and well-armed ethnic based militia groups. However, there was no such organized militia when the illegal trading began in the 1980s. When militia became active in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s, they were engaged in violently compelled benefits from MNCS. However, when they began to be involved in the illegal theft and trade in refined petroleum products and crude oil, they were merely foot soldiers to big time bunkerers.

Oil barons form militia groups to enrich them and import also weapons to arm themselves for the purpose of securing and defending their operations. Some leaders of the militia groups are now involved in illegal theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil. Some even exchange refined petroleum products and crude oil for communication gadgets and arms for militia wars (Ikelegbe, A. 2005).

The illegal oil business further underpins communal and ethnic conflicts in the Niger Delta region. The weapon inflow empowers the communities and militias for violent conflicts and other activities bordering on criminality. The theft and illegal trade in refined petroleum products and crude oil provide financial backing for its leading militia groups and armed gangs.

Profitable as it may seem, it is also a known fact that a thousand persons lose their lives annually in bloody encounters between militias, communities and the armed forces (Maier, 2004). Militia groups are involved in violent crime in the Niger Delta.

### **Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in the Niger Delta**

Tables 1 and 2 show cases of kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger-Delta between 2002 and 2007 for ransom. This has been prevalent in the core oil producing states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa. The incidence of kidnapping and hostage-taking began in 1990 and took a new dimension recently when kidnapping and hostage-taking did not only involve workers with MNCS but politicians. A large number of indigenous expatriate workers, particularly foreign nationals and security personnels attached to them and MNCS have been kidnapped and taken hostage for the purpose of ransom. It is evident that there are syndicates and warlords to whom some militia groups are loyal (Omonobi and Okhomiya, 2003).

The extensive regime of violence in the struggle for appropriation has not only been directed at the MNCs but has also involved the imposition of illegal levies on road users, land property developers and contractors handling projects (Onojowo 2001). The earnings in form of ransom from this criminal activity are utilized to sustain the militia groups.

### **Ethnic Militia Activities and Criminality in the Niger Delta**

The activities of ethnic militia groups in the Niger Delta have transformed from activities to counter the violence of the Nigerian state, the struggles against deprivation and marginalization to criminal acts.

The dimension and magnitude of criminal activities caused by the activities of ethnic militia groups will be explored through the Dollard et al. (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that people are pushed into aggressive behaviour by drive influenced by frustration. This explanation can further be explained from two points in relation to activities of militia groups in the Niger Delta.

Firstly, frustration leads to some form of aggression. This may not take place in all situations since the level of tolerance differs from one group to another. The magnitude of the perceived stumbling block is a function of frustration projection. Given the relative strength of the Nigerian state in the case of the Niger Delta – government face-off often results into frustration displacement. As a consequence, therefore, the activities of militia groups are directed at government and other groups in the region who would ordinarily not be affected (Hewstone and Stroebe, 2001).

The major point is that aggression is a consequence of frustration. The socio-economic hardship and inequity in the distribution of the nation's oil wealth, a large proportion which comes from the Niger Delta occasioned by marginalization and deprivation, is expressed in violence activities by militia groups in the region. This accounts for crime related activities which include hostage-taking, demanding for ransom, robbery, vandalization of oil pipelines, illegal bunkering and attacks on military personnel's.

In other to substantiate the criminal base of activities engaged in by militia groups, there is the need to raise three vital issues. The first is why do militia activities occur and are sustained? How is the image of this militia activities constructed and maintained? Third, can these activities by militia be classified as crime? Crime is a function of driving philosophies underpinning state criminal definitions and criminal justice process. From the moralist perspective, militia activities occasioning crime hinged on injustice is a non-violation of the penal code, but from the perspective of law enforcement, it constitutes a legal breach that need to be checked and sanctioned. Making this a crime diverts the attention of the exploited from the root cause of inequity which is firmly institutionalized in the Niger Delta (Summer, 1990). The problem of environmental pollution or degradation, socio-economic closure, deprivation and such others are unlikely to attract the same degree of moral condemnation that attends militia related problems (Munae and McLaughlin, 2001).

The major emphasis of the people of the Niger Delta is: give us our place; accord us the honour that befits us; let our voice count in the projects that affect our lives and bequeath us what is just, right and proper. It is in the light of the above that the activities of militia groups should be contextualized. At the outset of the formation of militia groups, their objective was to fight against deprivation, inequity and marginalization in the Niger Delta. However, this has degenerated into criminal activities such as bunkering, vandalization of petroleum pipelines, kidnappings and hostage taking.

### **Solutions to Menace of Ethnic Militia in the Niger Delta**

This paper has analysed the dynamics of ethnic militia groups and criminality. In investigating the most efficient way of dowsing the tension generated by activities of militia groups in the Niger Delta region, the paper suggests the adoption of the Vulnerability Reduction Strategy (VRS)

approach. This approach is inherent in the combination of accommodative, compromise and collaborative strategies.

- **Accommodative strategy:** This approach involves the discontinuation of the current competitive approach which often generates exaggeration of value of granting concession on resource revenue allocation to the affected region, the use of talent and manifest threat built on fear of reprisals and the use of force, management of truth on the actual number of barrels of crude pumped from the Niger Delta; the accommodative approach that necessitate committed actions from all parties. This will include invitation of stakeholders to a conference, acceptance of the unadulterated claims of deprivation, presentation of sincere and realistic demands and concessions and stoppage of self- inflicting risks.
- **Compromise Strategy:** This approach involves the manifestation of informal third party intervention void of interest that will assist in the transformation of conflict elements. The joint acceptable informal group will help douse the existing tensions, facilitate formal roundtable conferences between the aggrieved groups and the implacable state. The informal group will attempt solutions to existing deprivations, perceived injustice and marginalization. The informal group will neutralize elements of future conflicts.
- **Collaborative Strategy:** At this stage effort will be made to constitute formal mechanism that will be responsible for formal grievance handling. This will involve the establishment of joint committees which will be responsible for the implementation of jointly agreed resolutions (Jegede & Foluke, 2007).

There are major steps necessary for dowsing the crisis in the Niger Delta which includes:

- provision of a conducive environment that will enhance meaningful negotiation;
- Encouragement of the mutual interdependency of Nigerian state and the oil communities;
- total commitment on the part of the state towards the provision of resources and the expansion of existing resources made available to the people;

- resource allocation must be integrative, equitable and information must flow unimpeded from the top to the bottom;
- the circumventing of resources meant for the region by the elite group must be checked and arrested;
- efforts must be intensified, by governments at all levels, in collaboration with the organized private sector and civil society groups to expand the opportunities and improve the quality of education and skill acquisition for the youth;
- there is also the need for imaginative and far-reaching initiatives in the areas of job creation, poverty alleviation and the refocusing of youthful energy towards constructive endeavours.

Above all, there is the need for the government to put in place security mechanism to curbs the menace of militia groups in the region.

### **Conclusion**

The Nigerian government's approach to the problem of ethnic militia is flawed. It has criminalized militia groups, and branded them as disgruntled and misguided elements or terrorist groups rather than looking at the underlying issues. These groups have, more or less, conformed to these negative characterizations. The paper opined that fundamental issues bordering on social deprivation, inequity in the distribution of the Nigerian state's wealth, and marginalization related to the regions minority status in the Nigerian federation and the situation where the dominant ethnic groups use the oil resources gained from the Niger Delta to develop their own areas need to be addressed. The litany of hardship in the area has been well documented. The response of the Nigerian state to the crisis in the Niger Delta has been to militarize the region with the intention of keeping at bay restive youth and militia groups. Against the backdrop of a non responsive approach to the fundamental problems of activities of militia groups in Niger Delta, some of these groups have shifted from the objectives and orientation of their emergence which include agitating for equity and justice in the distribution of the nation's wealth and power, deprivation and marginalization to criminal activities bordering on lives and properties. (Illegal theft and sales of refined petroleum product and crude oil, kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom).

In conclusion, before the issue of criminality occasioned by the Niger Delta can be addressed, there is the need to examine the fundamental issues bordering on deprivation, marginalization, inequity and security of the area.

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**Table 1: Police Records on Some Cases of Kidnapping/Hostage-taking / Sea Piracy in Niger Delta**

S/N	Nature of Case	Date Reported	Location of Case	Militants involved	Hostages/ Victims & their Origin	Date Released	Reason for action
1.	Kidnapping	03/03/04	Biseni, Bayelsa (BYS)	32 militants	13 hostages	08/03/04	Oil company security operatives/ Youths clash
2.	Hostage taking	19/12/05	Peretoru, BYS	24 Militants	42 Hostages	03/01/06	Impeachment of BYS Speaker/Governor
3.	Hostage taking	15/01/06	Swali, BYS	48 Militants	14 Expatriates & 1 Nigeria	23/02/06	Arrest of one militant in Port Harcourt.
4.	Sea Piracy	19/02/07	Sagbama BYS	9 Sea Pirates	6 Policemen	19/02/07	No source of livelihood
5.	Militant attack	10/05/07	Otueke, BYS	Faceless Militants	16 victims	23/05/07	Detention of Alamieyeseig ha
6.	Kidnapping	25/05/07	Akassa, BYS	40 militants	9 Expatriates of TEXACO	08/06/07	Oil production without development of the area.
7.	Kidnapping	31/07/07	Amarata BYS	14 Militants	11 year-old boy of a member of BYHA	04/08/07	Welfare of militants
8.	Kidnapping	08/08/07	Gbarain, BYS	11 Militants	Mother of the Speaker of BYHA	22/08/07	Welfare of militants
9.	Kidnapping	18/08/07	Akassa, BYS	23 Militants	Mother of a member of BYHA	07/09/07	Welfare of militants
10.	Kidnapping	08/10/07	Odi, BYS	Commander Pius Group	1 Nigeria	15/10/07	Ransom
11.	Kidnapping	15/10/07	Southern-Ijaw BYS	Unknown	1 Nigeria	15/10/07	Ransom

*Source: Culled from Police Crime Diary, Bayelsa State Command.*

**Table 2: Selected Cases of Abductions/Kidnapping for Ransom (2002-2003).**

S/ N	Action/Date	MNC/Oil Serving Co.	Youth Group/Ethnic Group/State	Ascertain ed Purpose	outcome
1.	Hostage taking of 10 workers/April 2002	Shell	Militant Youth Gang, Ekeremor LGA, Ijaw/Bayelsa State	Ransom Demand for NGN 3.1m	Resulted from failure to yield to alleged frivolous demands
2.	Kidnap of staff/June 29 – July 2003	Oil servicing Co. working for Shell	Ijaw youth militants in Bomadi/Burutu LGAs/Delta State.	Demand for NGN 25.4m	State government intervention/Negotiated release after 14 days.
3.	Kidnap of 9 crew & 4 military escorts of oil barges/ November 11-13 2003.		Ijaw militants	Ransom/other demands	Released 2 days later after threats by state government/security agencies.
4.	Kidnap of 19 oil workers	Chevron Texaco	Militant Ijaw youths/ Bayelsa State	Ransom demands	Intervention of state Government
6.	Kidnap of 7 workers / November 28- December 2003	Bredero Shaw Oil Servicing Co. (Shell)	Militant Ijaw Youths/ Delta State.	Ransom demands for USD 5m.	State Government Intervention/Negotiation.
7.	Murder of 7 workers & military personnel/April 2004	Chevron Texaco	Militant youths along Benin River Area / Delta State.	--	--

*Source: Williams 2000: Agency France-Press 2003.*