Neo-liberalism, Human Security, and Pan-Africanist Ideals: Synergies and Contradictions

*Kwame Boafo-Arthur*

Introduction

Neo-liberalism and human security have gained prominence in discourses on Africa’s political economy in contemporary times. As an ideology or creed neo-liberalism has become synonymous with post-Cold War economic management in several countries. It has come to be seen as the best mode for assuring efficient management of state resources and ipso facto national productive capacities. By further implication, the neo-liberal ideology has not only become the centrepiece of modern economic management practices but is also conceptualised as the best mode for the delivery of an elusive human security, especially in the developing world.

On the other hand, as a concept, human security in Africa has lately assumed critical importance on the basis of the unmitigated slide of Africa into a state of anomie, hopelessness, and helplessness in developmental terms. Human security, conceptualised as the security people should have in their daily lives, not only from the threat of war but also from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards, conforms to the Pan-Africanist ideal in its current usage. This is because the Pan-Africanist ideal is encapsulated in the fulfillment of the developmental aspirations of Africans, both on the continent and in the diaspora. However, the state of African economies is a far cry from the ideal envisaged by Pan-Africanists.

This paper intends to interrogate the tenuous relations between the neo-liberal creed and human security in Africa and Pan-Africanist
ideals on development, democracy, social enhancement, etc. It is argued that uncontrolled neo-liberalism has supplanted human security in both its classical and modern connotations as well as Pan-Africanist ideals. There is, therefore, the need to infuse neo-liberalism with humanism to suit prevailing African conditions in order to attain the Pan-African ideal construed in terms of rapid economic growth, dignified standard of living, sovereign equity in the comity of nations, etc. The paper delineates the key features of Pan-Africanism, human security, and neo-liberalism with a view to interrogate and tease out both positive and contradictory linkages. The conclusion is that the practice or implementation of neo-liberalism in its classical form is inimical to the ideals embedded in Pan-Africanism and the neo-conceptualisation of human security. Neo-liberalism can be a positive tool for the attainment of Pan-African ideals, which in reality encapsulate human security in the classical and modern senses, only if it is infused with African Humanism to conform to the socio-political conditions in individual African countries.

**Pan-Africanist Ideals: Past and Present**

Pan-Africanism owes its intellectual origins to Africans in the diaspora who were bent on ending subservience to African colonial overlords who were instrumental in the slave trade and had subjugated Africa for years. The impetus for these diasporan African ideas flowed from the experiences of dispersed Africans who felt emptied of their being ‘through dispossession or slavery, or socially, economically, politically, and mentally through colonialism’. ‘With this loss came enslavement, persecution, inferiority, discrimination, and dependency’. It equally involved a ‘loss of independence, freedom and dignity’. Since the expression of these sentiments, regaining lost dignity has become the mainspring of most actions by Pan-Africanists.

The crystallisation of Pan-Africanist ideals came through the writings and songs of leading Pan-Africanists. The first to be clearly expressed were the concepts of *freedom* and *common identity*. The yearning for the former was because of the bondage in which those
in the diaspora found themselves, and the common identity from the need to ascribe to racial oneness. They perceived their strength in the collective recognition of their common racial stock. The development of the concept negritude by Aimé Cesaire and its later amplification by Leopold Senghor and of African Personality by Leon Damas flowed from the desire for identity and racial unity in addition to the longings for freedom. Africans studying in the United States and the United Kingdom were deeply attracted to the monumental works of W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Sylvester Williams, George Padmore and others because their works explicated African conditions and suggested means for dealing with such depressing issues as ignorance, illiteracy, enslavement, colonialism, and many others.

Notable African leaders such as Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Kenyatta etc., were greatly influenced by these early Pan-Africanists. The Pan-African Congresses started by Marcus Garvey in 1900 were the spark that ignited educated Africans to sharpen their wits for the struggles for colonial emancipation. Indeed, these congresses, especially the Manchester Congress of 1945, apart from bringing leading Africans studying across Europe and America together, served as springboards for launching the political careers of many of the immediate post-independence African leaders.

Apart from the yearnings for racial identity and freedom, another ideal to come out without ambiguity was the equality of all men. The manifesto of the Fourth Pan-African Congress stated in part: ‘we ask in all the world, that black folk be treated as men. We can see no other road to peace and progress’. Part of the resolutions of the pivotal Pan-African Congress of 1945 in Manchester demonstrated what the ideals of the Pan-Africanists were. In the declaration to the colonial powers subsumed under the 1945 resolutions, the desire for freedom, education, democracy and social betterment were re-emphasised. What may stand in sharp contrast to current ideological posturing by neo-Pan-Africanists was the critique of monopoly capital and ‘the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone’. This part of the resolution at the Pan-African Congress of 1945 implied that even from its early beginnings Pan-Africanists had cause to assail the monetarist pretensions of economic management embedded in current neo-liberal practices of the Bretton Woods institutions. The belief was that hankering for private profit by
private entrepreneurs was not in the best interest of Africa. This stands in sharp contrast to the current prevailing notion that sees private capital and entrepreneurship as the engine of economic growth and development.

African unity was another favourite theme of the early Pan-Africanists. A united continent with interlinking federations was preferred. There was equally a call for African renaissance and African personality that were to take into account the valuable and desirable heritage of the past and ‘marrying it into modern ideas’. African nationalism or loyalty was more preferable than parochial tribal affiliations.

The desire for the regeneration of economic activities in place of the existing colonially structured economy was another ideal that was relentlessly stressed by the early Pan-Africanists. Even though early Pan-Africanists rejected international communism, they expressed a belief in a ‘non-exploiting or communalistic type of socialism’. There was also a strong belief in democracy, which was seen as the most desirable mode of government that hinged on the principle of one-man-one vote. However, the type of democracy expressed by some Pan-Africanists leaders after independence ran counter to the liberal democratic principles we know of today. According to George Padmore who also had a great deal of influence on Dr. Nkrumah, ‘Panafrikanism subscribes to the fundamental objectives of Democratic Socialism, with state control of the basic means of production and distribution’. With reference to the same democratic mode, Dr. Nkrumah noted:

Democracy, for instance, has always been for us not a matter of technique, but more important than technique - a matter of socialist goals and aims. It was, however, not only our socialist aims that were democratically inspired, but also the methods of pursuit were socialists.

It appears that Dr. Nkrumah’s preference for Democratic Centralism, which was the true expression of the socialist technique of democratic engineering, was influenced by George Padmore’s Democratic Socialism. The preference for a one party state that came into vogue across the continent in the 1960s was the natural translation of the theoretical ideals of Democratic Socialism or Democratic Centralism into reality.
The foregoing ideals with several potential applications could be summed from the works of the early Pan-Africanists. The struggle for independence and the activities of the immediate post-independence African leaders brought some of these ideals to the centre of politics and sharpened others in consonance with the developmental problems of our time. As poignantly pointed out by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, ‘the constitutional implications of Pan-Africanism present to its builders a challenge to create a heaven on earth for African humanity’. Dr. Azikiwe was emphatic on the need to guarantee human rights for citizens, social security among the workers, and collective security among the populations, and noted that African unity would be strengthened if leaders succeed in resolving the problems created by the processes of social interactions in Africa.

People of African descent laid the foundations of Pan-Africanism in the pre-independence era but the implementation and nurturing of Pan-Africanist thoughts fell into the laps of the immediate post-independence African leaders.

**Post-Independence African Ideals**

The ideals and philosophies were derivatives of the pre-independence views. Freedom, *economic development, racial identity, education, democracy* etc., were the key components of the ideals. The euphoria that surrounded the attainment of independence ran very deep, and this could be understood from the perspectives of the views of pre- and post-independence African leaders. Independence led to the transfer of the management of African economies that were deficient in capital and human resources into the hands of elected African leaders. There was a strong belief that African leaders could facilitate development faster than could be attained under colonialism. Independence was, therefore, necessary ‘for the welfare and well-being of societies characterized by poverty, ignorance and disease, and for the direction of political entities lacking natural cohesion’.

The problems faced by Africa at independence engendered various responses in different countries. These problems included low levels of economic development, lack of social cohesion, high illiteracy levels, the lack of manpower resources, poverty, hunger, diseases, etc. However, the responses from countries in East Africa were
more concrete than in West Africa because they revolved around specific ideological viewpoints. In East Africa, leaders adopted far-reaching strategies that aimed at tackling the developmental problems holistically. In the minds of the leaders concerned, these strategies were the means through which Pan-Africanist ideals could be realised. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania came up with the Arusha Declaration that embodied several concepts such as ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ and ‘Socialism and Rural Development’. The *Ujamaa* or villagisation policies embarked upon later by Julius Nyerere were all aimed at accelerating the development of Tanzania. Priority was given to rural development with socialism rooted in African communal experiences as the guiding principle. Kenneth Kaunda shared similar sentiments with Nyerere but with a humanistic approach, while Kenya favoured a pragmatic African socialism, which in effect was capitalism with an African face. Their colleagues in West Africa expressed similar sentiments that favoured socialist modes of economic management but not in such compact, academic, and holistic vein.

The sum total of their ideals reflected the classical Pan-Africanist notions in the Cold-War context. For instance, in Nyerere’s *Freedom and Development*, freedom was contextualised as freedom from external interference in the affairs of Tanzania, freedom from hunger, disease, and poverty, and personal freedom including right to live in dignity and equality, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. The enjoyment of these freedoms was predicated on economic and social development; in absence of this, national freedoms might be endangered by foreign elements.¹⁰

Human security in its present conceptualisation tallies with the well-thought out ideas expressed by Julius Nyerere in *Freedom and Development* as well as by Kenneth Kaunda in *Humanism: A Guide to the Nation*. Dr. Kaunda enjoined Zambians in particular and Africans in general to remember that in building a man-centred society we should not forget that people are above ideology and man above institutions. He notes: ‘Society is there because of Man’ and ‘whatever we undertake to do we have got to remember that it is Man that is the centre of all human activity’.¹¹ The import is that every action taken should lead to the optimum satisfaction of man. This would imply his security, social welfare, economic well-
being, etc. Kaunda was not dogmatically socialist like Nyerere because ‘humanism recognizes the importance of private initiative in the economic development of the Nation. But at the same time, it abhors the exploitation of human beings by other human beings’. Clearly, Kaunda did not see private initiatives in nation building as an exploitation of man by man.

The Kenyan approach which was also termed African Socialism had the following features: political democracy; mutual social responsibility; various forms of ownership; a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society and its members; diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic power; and progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income.13

In the West African sub-region, Kwame Nkrumah was much more concerned with the continental political struggles that would lead to a united Africa than to pay heed to a systematised, concrete, and coherent economic blueprint as was the case for instance in Tanzania and Zambia. Most of his writings were basically political treatises with the underlying objective of goading African leaders to realise the essence of a United States of Africa. Where he dealt with economic issues, the pronouncements were political statements couched in the context of a United States of Africa. For instance, in *I Speak of Freedom*, Nkrumah stated with regard to a continental market:

An African Common Market, devoted uniquely to African interests, would more efficaciously promote the true requirements of the African states. Such an African Market presupposes a common policy for overseas trade as well as for inter-African trade, and must preserve our right to trade freely anywhere... Indeed, the total integration of the African economy on a continental scale is the only way in which the African states can achieve anything like the levels of the industrialized countries.14

It took African leaders 30 years to hammer into place the African Economic Community (AEC) in Abuja in 1991. The political vehicle on which this was to ride had been constituted amid contestations between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups earlier in 1963.

The post-independence ideals were in consonance with those in the pre-independence days. The only difference was that post-
independence African leaders, as opposed to their pre-independence counterparts, had the vehicle - state machinery - at their disposal to bring to reality what existed in theory and in the minds of the early Pan-Africanists. It could be stated that whereas the ideals expressed conformed to human security in its current and prevailing usage, they did not completely ignore human security in the classical form. Human security appears to be the core of the ideas of Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. The welfare of man was at the core of Kaunda’s political ideals termed humanism. A man-centred ideology would imply an ideology that implicitly has human security as its fulcrum. To what extent were the pre- and immediate post-independence notions of Pan-Africanism reflective of human security in Africa? The dimensions of human security discussed below demonstrate the extent of its conformity or otherwise to the ideals of Pan-Africanism of both the pre and post- independence eras.

**Pan-Africanism and Human Security**

The quest for freedom, racial identity, the regeneration of economic development, a belief in a non-exploitative mode of economic production, rejuvenation of African moral virtues and cultures, belief in democracy as the most desirable mode of government based on the principle of ‘one man one vote’ etc., by Pan-Africanists could be seen from the human security perspective in its current usage. Such quests conform to the primary roles of the state, which is ‘to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside’. The primary or traditional security threats were assumed to emanate from other states in the international system that had aggressive or adversarial plans. Consequently, traditional security issues were examined in the context of state power where ‘the protection of the state... its boundaries, people, institutions and values... was the responsibility and objective of the state. People were presumably assured of their security by the shield of the state’. The OAU Charter talks about maintaining territorial integrity, which implied the protection of the nation state from internal and external attacks. Thus the classical notion of human security whereby the security of the people was
deemed to be assured if the physical territory is well defended or protected was not alien to the immediate post-independence Pan-African leaders. However, Naidoo points out that states and by implication governments must no longer be the primary referents of security because in the post-Cold War era, ‘governments which are supposed to be the guardians of their peoples’ security have instead become the primary source of insecurity for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country’.  

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been effectively shorn of its militaristic connotation. The classical usage that implied state security and territorial integrity (at times at the expense of the human beings who inhabit the state) has given way to a broader conceptualisation. In the view of Chowdhury, ‘For most people of the world, a sense of insecurity comes not so much from the traditional security concerns, but from the concerns about their survival, self-preservation and wellbeing in a day-to-day context’. For these people, ‘security meant protection from the threat of diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental degradation’. This new conceptualisation brings under the fold of human security the variegated interests of the people. Economic, social, health, and political well-being have all been incorporated in the broader modern day concept of human security. This does not mean that nations are lax on national security construed in terms of military alertness and defense of the motherland. That still remains a noble pursuit but it should not, under any circumstance, be at the expense of broader human security.

The importance of human security is incontrovertible. Human security implies development and development should in reality assure human security. Arguably, the struggles of Pan-Africanists were geared toward socio-economic development that would enhance the living standards of the people. Freedom, which formed the original basis of the thinking of the early Pan-Africanists in the diaspora, is an aspect of development. I have yet to see a developed polity in which people’s freedoms are restricted. So if it was an ideal in pre-independent times and still is an ideal, then it is because human security is coterminous with development and an enhanced mode of human existence.
The relevance of human security in the current global situation underlines its central role in the policy orientation of some international organisations and developed countries. ‘Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the United Nations’ cardinal mission’.\textsuperscript{20} For instance, human security has steadily and perceptibly become the cornerstone of the foreign policy orientations of Canada, where foreign policy has been geared ‘more toward protecting human beings than defending the power of the state’.\textsuperscript{21} It appears then that the current underpinning of Canadian policy is more towards human centredness as enjoined by Kenneth Kaunda’s man-centred approach to development. Human security is a package which according to Metta Spencer and others concerns itself with human rights, the establishment of an international rule of law, and the advancement of literacy, food security, health care, political representation and the well-being of the weaker members of the human family.\textsuperscript{22} In this light, any acceptable conceptualisation of human security for African countries should ‘link human security with human development’.\textsuperscript{23} because human development is one important means to create human security. Development was perceived as the only means through which the security of the people could be assured. As noted, both concepts are ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing. Without one, the other becomes difficult, if not impossible’\textsuperscript{24} to achieve. Human development, just like human security, is also people-centred, multidimensional and is defined in the space of human choices and freedom. As such, both share a conceptual space. Even though both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security ‘has a systematic preventative aspect’. In a more explicit sense, ‘while human development aims at growth with equity, human security focuses on downturn with security’.\textsuperscript{25} In other words, human security should not be sought only in times of abundance and enhanced economic growth. It is where poverty is biting hard that the search for human security must be intensified.

Pan-Africanism could not have been motivated solely by nationalistic fervour for freedom. Freedom in itself is meaningless if it does not lead to the protection of human dignity. Human dignity is assured where the people are guaranteed food security, health care, education, and effective representation. In the absence of the general
well-being of the people, one cannot meaningfully talk about human security. I believe the early Pan-Africanists and those who followed thereafter were not so naïve as to think solely in terms of African freedom from colonial rule for its own sake. The belief was that political freedom would facilitate rapid economic development that would enhance the living standards of the people. The cries for freedom and racial identity were equally cries for emancipation from economic servitude, degradation, and despicable living standards.

From the onset of the Pan-Africanists movement the question of democracy was never marginalised. Democracy formed an important aspect of the whole struggle. It was obvious that Africans lacked representation in their own countries. They were subjugated politically and economically. Since democracy assures effective representation of the people through the principle of one man, one vote, Pan-Africanists embraced democracy. We have to admit rather sadly that most of the emergent Pan-African leaders veered from this conception of representation that could have assured the people the needed confidence in the government of their countries. Many tinkered with the familiar notion and planted one party states - an affront to democratic governance. Countervailing voices that are known to be crucial to development and governance were stifled, some forever. This clearly was a contradiction of Pan-Africanism.

In all, however, the synergies between Pan-African ideals and human security are very obvious. The mere acceptance of the concept of democracy was in tune with the concept of human security in current usage. Human security could be assured where the people have well defined democratic rights. Modern concepts of human rights, human security and development could all be distilled from the variegated ideals propagated by the early and later-day Pan-Africanists. What has incontrovertibly eluded Africans and has never been manifested to the satisfaction of Pan-Africanists is economic growth and development. Pan-Africanists upon assuming the mantle of leadership in individual African countries had no illusions about the need for rapid economic development, equity, and rule of law, human rights and many others. To a large extent, parts of the ideals have been attained save economic development that can guarantee enhanced living standards of the people.

Several Pan-Africanist-influenced economic development
strategies have been applied by individual countries in addition to several continent-wide development paradigms. These development strategies have run the gamut of African socialism to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Earlier development paradigms had clearly socialist pretensions. Strains of socialism in various forms adopted by several independent states made inroads into continental development strategies such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980-2000) and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989). The failure of these programmes was due basically to a lack of financial resources to pursue the desired policies, and since the underpinning ideology contradicted the development philosophy of donors, most of the programmes became stillborn.

Direct external intervention in Africa’s development process after independence was reflected in the sponsorship of several structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Structural adjustment programmes had to be adopted against the backdrop of change in the ideological underpinnings of global development processes. Management practices that extolled an inherent socialist approach to management had to be jettisoned for a new paradigm and a way of thinking - neo-liberalism - that was not kind to state management of economic productive activities. The adoption of neo-liberal economic management strategies has been a great challenge to Pan-Africanists and the ideals they have been championing before decolonisation. Given the nature of Pan-Africanist thought, how do these neo-liberal ideals subsumed in economic globalisation conform to or deviate from Pan-Africanist ideals on human security in its current usage? Is neo-liberalism the antithesis of Pan-Africanism?

**Neo-Liberalism and Pan-Africanism: Strange Bedfellows?**

If neo-liberalism aims at rapid national economic development and growth, then it cannot under any circumstance be said that its ideas conflict with those of Pan-Africanism. However, if the components
of the neo-liberal creed undermine the broader conception of human security in current usage, then arguably it contradicts the aspirations of Pan-Africanists. What then is neo-liberalism? Neo-liberals welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the market principle over state power. While neo-liberals had served a useful historic function of questioning the viability of existing forms of state intervention, they have failed to provide an intellectually successful and workable programme for comprehensively rolling back the state, and achieving their vision of a ‘brave new world.’

Neo-liberal political economy rests on the assumption that African development depends, to a large extent, on the downsizing of the state in economic activities. Thus neo-liberalism abhors state intervention in the development process. The neo-partimonial and rent-seeking pretensions of the state in Africa run counter to development, and the statist approach to development distorts markets through misguided policies such as protectionism, non-tariff barriers, overvalued exchange rates, price controls, subsidies, and state monopolies. Indeed, the statist approach of the past has been termed ‘wasteful authoritarian intervention’ but this is in line with current conceptions that approve a minimalist state and frown upon anything that amounts to statism. the hegemonic political discourse in the post-Cold War era has been strongly neoliberal in both its economics and its politics’. If the state is retrenched from participating in economic activities, The market will find its level to the advantage of national development. An efficiently retrenched state will end in the strengthening of civil society and associational life, which will be to the betterment of African development. The phases of structural adjustment programmes were meant, among others, ‘to “thicken” civil society and thereby generate interest at the level of society in how the state is governed’. Democratic centralism, which also meant state control of national economic activities, propelled policy choices in most post-independent African states. The Pan-Africanist leaders were convinced that state participation was sufficient to assure equitable distribution of national resources apart from facilitating full employment and the enjoyment of other economic goods in developing economies. The race towards one party states was equally propelled by the felt need to incorporate all in the development process irrespective of
political creed or thinking. However, this interventionist role of the state came under strenuous attacks in the 1970s when neo-liberalism found its feet. ‘From being the cornerstone of development, the state now came to be seen as the millstone holding back a system of market-led development’. The failure of state interventionist policies appears to have been amplified by neo-liberal advocates in order to strengthen the basis for advocating the pursuit of minimalist state policies.

Neo-liberals demand a high degree of economic freedom even though ‘some evidence suggests that statist intervention in direct support of more equitable growth, including restraints on pure market forces, restrictions on certain property rights, and state-guided rather than radical, trade liberalization’ have been more beneficial than the neo-liberal model. By implication, state interventionism, which conforms to the development paradigm favoured by the immediate post-independence Pan-Africanist leaders, proved to be more development orientated than the neo-liberal model, which is clearly anti-state. One writer puts it bluntly that the much-extolled rapid development of the Asian tigers ignores the fact that those East Asian countries were long on aggressive development policy through state intervention and short on democracy.

Neo-liberalism is an attack on big government and bureaucratic welfare state ‘with a policy mix based on free trade and the establishment of an open economy’. The components of the neoliberal model include the following: economic liberalisation or rationalisation characterised by the abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate, the freeing up of controls on foreign investment; the restructuring of the state sector, including corporatisation and privatisation of state trading departments and other assets, ‘downsizing’, ‘contracting out’, attack on unions and abolition of wage bargaining in favour of employment contracts; and finally, the dismantling of the welfare state through commercialisation and individual ‘responsibilisation’ for health, welfare and education. Education and health become mere services and products to be traded in the marketplace.

Given the ramifications of neo-liberal economic policies one could argue that their strict implementation has been a great disservice to Africa and has undermined Pan-African ideals. Such
neo-liberal policies call for reductions in public expenditure on services, including education (a sector where massive support is required to assure effective national participation in the global information technology). The concept of privatisation, which is one of the pillars of the neo-liberal ideology, has provided the rationale to reduce the size of the state. As Le Grand and Robinson point out, ‘... any privatization proposal involves the rolling back of the activities of the state’.\(^{34}\) Basically it involves three main activities that also constitute the modes of state intervention: a reduction in state subsidy; a reduction in state provision; and a reduction in state regulation.\(^{35}\)

Pan-Africanists expected a lot from the state in assuring the economic development and growth of the state itself and the well-being of the citizenry. One rationale for the statist policies adopted by the Pan-African leaders was the equalisation of opportunities. The state is deemed apolitical and not likely to discriminate unduly in the disbursement of state largess to the people. Even though this assertion would seem to ignore the fact that human beings with peculiarities operate state institutions, it was believed that inequities emerging from state management of economic resources would comparatively be minimal.

To all intent and purposes, Pan Africanist ideals found a better expression in the statist policies adopted by the immediate post-independent African leaders than in the prevailing neo-liberal model. The dogged pursuit of structural adjustment policies represents the implementation of neo-liberalism in its classic form. The failure of adjustment that engendered recourse to mechanisms that would ameliorate the extreme negative outcomes of the programme such as the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Consequences of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in Ghana is just one example of the failure of neo-liberalism and thereby the need to temper such policies with the views and insights of Pan-Africanist thinkers.

The 1980s was the halcyon decade of neo-liberalism as a political philosophy and structural adjustment programmes became the empirical barometer. It was a decade that witnessed unbridled governmental support for the modernising influences of neo-liberalism geared towards state exposure to global economic competition. However, the neo-liberal zeal ended in damaging
several sectors such as education and health, thereby compelling Pan-African leaders to reconsider their unmitigated adherence to the doctrine. As pointed out by Peters, the apparent failure of neo-liberalism in the 1980s led to a turn around in the 1990s but ‘this time towards a realization that the dogmatism of the neo-liberal right had become a serious threat to social justice, national cohesion, and to democracy itself’.\(^{36}\) In effect, neo-liberal policies could not guarantee social justice, national cohesion, national development, democracy, and enhanced standard of living. That being the case, the neo-liberal model must be infused with Pan-Africanist ideals that extol some level of state intervention, if not absolute statism, especially state ownership of key industries, and state support for education and health, in addition to the provision of the necessary conditions that will assure human security. That is to say that a blend of neo-liberalism with sound Pan-Africanist ideals that perceive man as the centre of all political and economic initiatives will augur well for African development and human security than is the case through the instrumentality or the zealous implementation of classical neo-liberal orthodoxy.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that there is some level of coherency and consistency in Pan-Africanist thought and ideals over the years. Pan-Africanist viewpoints on issues such as economic growth and development, human security, human rights, general national aspirations, and so forth are unambiguous. Embedded in several statements or pronouncements by past and present African leaders or Pan-Africanists was the need for concerted continental, and indeed, global actions to deal with diseases, poverty, ignorance or illiteracy, environmental degradation, governmental transparency, accountability, full employment etc. etc. That most African countries, after over a decade of neo-liberal economic management practices, are still basket cases makes this call for global action more compelling than ever. The political future of Africa is tied more or less to the economic well-being of the generality of the people. As it stands now, the synergies between Pan-Africanism and
neo-liberalism are few while the contradictions are legion. There is, however, a perfect agreement between Pan-Africanism and human security in its current usage. All that remains is to ensure concerted global and continental actions that will strengthen and, indeed, enhance human security whilst minimising the negativities of neo-liberalism. It does not appear, as the experiences of the last two decades show, that neo-liberal economic practices will fulfill the aspirations of Pan-Africanists of the past, the present and the future. In other words, what matters most in the face of the apparent failure of neo-liberalism is adjusting neo-liberalism to suit Pan-Africanist legacies of the past and the requirements of the present as well as expectations in the future.

Notes

2. Colin Legum, op.cit., p.29.
12. Ibid. 116.
13. Ibid. 136.
19. Ibid. See also UNDP Human Development Report 1994. The background paper to the report conceptualizes human security as the ‘security people should have in their daily lives, not only from the threat of war but from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards’. Human security was thus defined as ‘safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’. The UNDP identified seven types of security as components of human security: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal (physical) security; community security; and political security.
22. Ibid.
24. Walker Dorn, op cit., p.3.
25. Sabina Alkire, op cit., p.3.
27. Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Crisis Management and the Making of


29. Ibid. p.16.

30. Ibid. p.16.


33. Ibid.


35. Peters, M. op.cit.