Civil Society Organisations and Democratic Consolidation in Uganda

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda. It argues that civil society organisations (CSOs) play an important role in building democratic governments but also questions whether the CSOs can live up to the theoretical expectations of building democratic governments. This paper, based on case study evidence from Uganda, attempts to bridge the gap between theory and reality by offering a realistic assessment of CSOs’ capabilities as regards democratic consolidation. Because of Uganda’s political history, political activism and political advocacy have not been widely embraced by CSOs. Negative political experiences have created some apathy and wariness resulting in many CSOs maintaining that they are apolitical. As a result, CSOs have failed to mark distance from the NRM government in a manner that affirms their autonomous and independent growth. Ultimately, such a posture has undermined the CSOs’ cause and has confined them to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo.

Résumé

Cette contribution s’intéresse au rôle des organisations de la société civile, en tant qu’agents de la consolidation démocratique en Ouganda. L’on y affirme que les organisations de la société civile (OSC) jouent un rôle important dans le processus de construction de gouvernements démocratiques. La question posée ici consiste à savoir si les OSC sont à la hauteur des attentes théoriques en matière de construction de gouvernements démocratiques. Cet article est basé sur des faits tirés d’une étude cas ougandaise, et tente de combler le fossé entre théorie et réalité, en offrant une étude réaliste des capacités des OSC en matière de consolidation démocratique. Du fait de l’histoire politique de l’Ouganda, l’activisme politique n’est pas suffisamment pris en charge par les OSC. Les expériences politiques malheureuses ont provoqué une certaine apathie et une certaine méfiance, qui ont poussé un

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grand nombre d’OSC à se présenter comme apolitiques. La conséquence en est que les OSC n’ont pas réussi à se démarquer du gouvernement NRM, de sorte à affirmer clairement leur maturité autonome. Une telle situation a fini par endommager la cause des OSC et les a limitées à intervenir sur des questions qui ne remettent pas vraiment en question le statut quo établi.

**Introduction**

Even if there is scepticism about the applicability of western conceptions of civil society in the African context, increasingly a number of African scholars are affirming the importance of CSOs for democratisation and governance. It is widely believed that a thriving civil society can widen democracy by promoting pluralism, and it can deepen democracy by embedding the values and institutions of liberal democracy within society at large, not simply at the same level. This paper argues that civil society organisations in Uganda have failed to mark distance from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in a manner that affirms their autonomous and independent growth. Ultimately, such a posture has undermined the CSOs cause and has confined them to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo.

In the first part of this paper we have the introduction, the second part looks at the key concepts of the paper, Civil Society Organisations and Democratic Consolidation, and the third part is an assessment of civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda under the NRM government and lastly conclusions and recommendations.

**Civil Society Organisations**

The term ‘civil society’ has a long history in political philosophy, and its definition has altered with Roman, Hegelian, Marxist, and Gramscian interpretations long before it was resurrected in the 1990s (Kumar 1993). The Latin notion of *civilis societas* referred to communities, which conformed to norms that rose above and beyond the laws of the state. For many centuries, theorists did not clearly distinguish ‘civil society’ from the ‘state’ and often use the two terms interchangeably (Kean 1988: 35).

The concept civil society, therefore, is characterised by contradicting and inconsistent definitions. Many scholars, however, focus on the autonomous and voluntary nature of CSOs. For example, Larry Diamond conceives civil society as the realm of organised social life...
that is voluntary, self generating, self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.

Write argues that the use of civil society ‘implies a certain power relationship between state and society such that there are limitations on the state’s capacity to pervade and control society, and a certain power on the part of members of a society to insulate themselves from, and exert influence upon, the state.’

Drah argues that civil society is not entirely ‘separate’ from the state and identified two conceptions of the relationship that civil society can have with the state, namely corporatist and voluntary-pluralist. With regard to the ‘corporatist’ type, the institutions of CS, which usually have a proven constituency that they can deliver and hold to certain agreements, are ‘incorporated’ into decision-making processes and institutions by the state. These are strategically placed groups, such as business and labour, and as a result the state ‘has gained greater social control in return for giving functional representation to such groups in economic management.’

According to N. Steytler and G. Hollands, the voluntary pluralist type of CS is the classic liberal model where voluntary associations of individuals operate at a greater distance from the state, and ‘implies a strong sentiment of “anti-statism” – disillusionment with parliamentary democracy, the welfare state, and the alienation engendered by vast government bureaucracies.’ This means that citizens should be effectively empowered, especially through collective action and solidarity in pursuit of shared values.

To draw up a comprehensive list of the types of associations which make up civil society would be futile, as by their nature these organisations are interest-based and as such many are volatile and fluid, forming and disbanding around different issues which are important at the time. Atkinson makes what she calls a broad distinction between ‘profit making’ and ‘non-profit’ organisations. The former refers to the private business sector. The latter are those organisations distinct from this sector. They are associations of professionals, workers, women, students, employers, journalists and consumers, religious organisations, recreational and cultural clubs, human rights groups and, some would add even political parties.

Therefore, the concept of civil society can be defined to include, free associations such as churches, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political parties, trade unions etc. and other organisations not controlled
by the state, which are self-organising. A civil society organisation (CSO) is a political community, which can organise and co-ordinate its activities for the purpose of influencing state policies. All in all, a civil society may be defined as a society in which there are autonomous groups which aggregate the views and activities of individuals and which act to promote and defend the interests of those people, including against the state.

This implies that there is the public discussion of issues, with questions of public policy being debated widely within the community rather than being decided solely by regime elites. It is through this public discussion of issues in part that autonomous groups act to defend the interests of their respective constituencies. Crucial for the existence of a civil society is that both state and civil society recognize the legitimacy of the other, and acknowledge the right of the other to act unimpeded within certain defined spheres of competence.

**Democratic Consolidation**

Debates about democratic consolidation in low-income countries are often discourses about the meaning of consolidation itself. Any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process. Democracy is the indispensable starting of democratic consolidation (in form of a ‘consolidating democracy’) and its hopeful outcome (in form of a ‘consolidated democracy’). Therefore, it does not make any sense to speak of the ‘democratic consolidation’ of an authoritarian regime.

Scholars have increasingly adopted broader definitions of consolidation in which the criteria include the legitimization and institutionalization of democratic practices over time, buttressed by the widespread adoption of democratic values and others even argue that the emergence of a democratic political culture is an essential component of consolidation. A widely used definition of consolidated democracy refers to a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase ‘the only game in town,’ behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. ‘Behaviourally’ means that no significant actors attempt to use non-democratic means to obtain their goal, ‘attitudinally’ implies that democratic procedures and institutions are considered by the vast majority to be preferred way of organising politics, and ‘constitutionally’ signifies that actors—governmental as well as non-governmental, are subject to the laws and institutions of the democratic proc-
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ess. In other words, consolidation is the more or less total institutionalisation of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict.

Other definitions range from simple mechanistic tests such as whether a country has experienced two successive and peaceful transfers of power. Although a change in government is often used as criteria to evaluate to what extent democratisation has become consolidated, it would be unreasonable to claim that a system could not be democratic if there was not turnover in government. All in all, democracy is consolidated when a reversal to authoritarianism is impossible and civil society can help consolidate democracy in a number of ways.

What is civil society supposed to do?
A strong civil society is considered one of the prerequisites for democracy. Diamond identifies at least six functions of civil society in shaping democracy:

1. Civil society is a reservoir of political, economic, cultural and moral resources to check the power of the state. Civil society can play a role in checking, monitoring and restraining the exercise of power by the state and holding it accountable. This function can reduce political corruption, which is pervasive in Uganda. It can force the government to be more accountable, transparent and responsive to the public, which strengthens its legitimacy.

2. The diversity of civil society will ensure that a few groups do not hold the state captive.

3. The growth of associational life will supplement the work of political parties in stimulating political participation. Civil society organisations can encourage people to get involved in politics especially as voters in elections. Political participation strengthens the legitimacy and the institutionalisation of democratic government, which are essential for consolidation.

4. Civil society will eventually stabilise the state because citizens will have a deeper stake in social order. Further more, while civil society may multiply the demands of the state, it may also multiply the capacity of groups to improve their own welfare.

5. Civil society is a locus for recruiting new political leadership. Those who are involved in the activities of such groups learn how to organise and motivate people, publicise programmes, reconcile conflicts and build alliances. This teaches people to deal efficiently with political challenges and can mould competent political leaders.
6. Civil society resists authoritarianism.
The performance of civil society organisations in consolidating democracy in Uganda remains to be seen.

_Civil Society, Political Transition and the NRM Government_

Like other African countries, building democratic institutions and democratic politics remains a major challenge in Uganda. Indeed, in Uganda, one of the major challenges facing the country is how to consolidate democracy. Historically, modern state structures in Uganda were designed as the pivot for development processes, resulting in the construction of authoritarian state institutions. Civil society was never seen as playing any partnership role and instead was always viewed with hostility because the colonial and postcolonial states did not desire competitors. Under colonialism, civil society in Uganda was marginalised and conscripted into the state machinery to contain the African majority, which was completely excluded from any institutional role in governance.

As Uganda moved closer to independence, the institutions of civil society were weakened to the point where political parties battled each other rather than advancing the common cause of democratic participation. Independence saw the complete demise of these institutions of civil society. Most were either incorporated into the state machinery or severely restricted in their operations.

Even after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under President Museveni came to power in 1986 on a ticket of democratisation and the strengthening of popular participation, many institutions of civil society did not wake up from the slumber of containment adopted by the British and perfected by the post-independence regimes. Against the backdrop of the several decades of misrule and economic destruction, the NRM ascendancy to power witnessed a mixed context for the operation of civil society.

There are very many CSOs in Uganda (e.g. NGOs, private sector associations, community-based groups, religious organisations, media etc.) which bring together activists around common issues such as health care, education, children, youth, disability, gender issues, human rights and democracy, income generation and other economic issues, religion and culture. Among these are professional and business associations
such as those of lawyers, journalists, accountants and economists, traders and industrialists. Umbrella networks to co-ordinate and encourage collective action by CSOs in the same field also exist. The NGO forum tries to bring all NGOs together under one umbrella to have a collective voice when speaking with government and for self-regulation.

**Non-Governmental Organisations**

It should be noted here that civil society is not synonymous with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) however they may be defined and despite the frequent temptation to collapse the one into the other. NGOs comprise only a segment of what may be considered as civil society, albeit an important section of it.

The phenomenon of NGOism has had a considerable effect on the growth and character of civil society as well as the state. NGOs however, are seen to some extent as the ‘flag bearers’ of CS and its associated values. NGOs are viewed as a sub-component of other organisations within civil society, which are characterised by four attributes. They are voluntary, independent, not for profit and not self-serving16. In order to be regarded as ‘legitimate’, NGOs, in addition to their non-profit character, are required to demonstrate their accountability to a genuine constituency. These constituencies are identified by some degree of need of marginalisation, which the state cannot fully address. NGOs are, therefore, expected to prove that they act ‘in the public interest’.

But the NGO explosion has been primarily in the area of social and economic welfarism, a sphere of operation in which the state feels little challenge and indeed often welcomes the filling-in of the breach that NGOs carry out through their multifarious activities. NGOs are consequently praised by agents of the state for their ‘facilitative role’ in the alleviation of poverty, improving conditions of health and education and proselytising on the environment.

Mamdani, as cited in Oloka Onyango and J.J Barya’s article, is of the view that one must greet the growth of civil society in Uganda with some caution. Reflecting on the particular issue of NGOs, Mamdani puts his ambivalence eloquently:

> NGOs, in my opinion, are a mixed blessing whose main effect is to worsen our dilemma. On the positive side, the proliferation of NGOs has liberated middle class entrepreneurial talent; but on the negative side, it has
left NGOs wholly unaccountable to the people at home. An NGO is not like a co-operative. In a co-operative, members have the right to hold their leaders accountable. The intended beneficiaries of an NGO are not its members. They receive a charity, not a right. An NGO is accountable not to the people it intends to benefit, but to those who finance it, the overseas donors.

Indeed, the continued dependence of the majority of NGOs, particularly on foreign sources of funding puts a greater challenge on the question of ownership and legitimacy. In addition, internal governance of NGOs is dominated by personalities and lack of democratic culture. In other words, the influence and the role of founders and leaders is overwhelming. Without adequate internal democratic culture, dialogue, and participation, NGOs could not be expected to play a positive role.

As NGOs have attained prominence in the economic and political life in Uganda, the NRM government is determined to control them. The government of Uganda has proposed or enacted legislation designed to strengthen official authority over NGOs, usually under the guise of developing a national regulatory framework for associations. Relationships between NGOs and government are characterised by suspicion and confusion about roles and rights. And the existence and activities of NGOs are subject to stringent legal restrictions. All NGOs in Uganda must be approved and registered by a government appointed board composed mostly of government officials, including security officials before they are allowed to operate. The Board has used its powers to delay and deny the legal registration of some NGOs that it deems too controversial. Three very prominent cases—the de-registration of the Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Center (UHEDOC) and the delay and almost denial of registration of National Organization for Civic Education and Election Monitoring (NOCEM) and National NGO Forum (NNF) illustrate regime intolerance to any ‘political’ activities of NGOs and served as warnings to other NGOs that the regime would not tolerate anything ‘political.’

In numerous instances, some NGOs have withered or changed character as key leaders have taken posts in the government. The Movement regime (1986–present) has co-opted NGOs into its national development strategy, so that NGOs are vehicles of development inspired and led by the Movement. This detracts from the ability of NGOs, particularly indigenous NGOs, to provide an alternative source of influence or accountability to the regime.
Therefore, NGOs are tolerated and, for the most part, embraced as partners of development. Yet, many NGOs hesitate to become politically active. The NGOs get co-opted by the regime, which uses the NGOs for legitimacy building and social gap filling. These NGOs do not challenge the state; as a consequence, their ability to link the empowerment of the powerless with the development of a democratic society and polity is limited. That is why many NGOs in Movement-rulled Uganda prefer to remain apolitical and, presumably, on good terms with the Movement regime. The movement has been able to maintain a fairly non-confrontational policy with regards to monitoring and controlling NGOs, but this has been due mainly to the non-confrontational and apolitical approach of the NGOs.\(^{20}\)

Perhaps the most dramatic growth of any sector in civil society in Uganda has been witnessed in the women’s movement. However, there are significant problems in the fashion in which the women’s movement has grown and developed. This is true of the fact that the movement has failed to mark distance from the NRM in a manner that affirms its autonomous and independent growth. In other words, the women’s movement considers that it owes the advances made for women to the NRM.\(^{21}\) Ultimately, such a posture undermines the women’s cause and confines the development of the movement to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo. This was evident in the run up to the Presidential elections in 1996 and 2001 when women organisations conducting civic education were accused of campaigning for President Museveni.

**The Media**

The media can play a big role in consolidating democracy. The media has the ability to provide citizens with electoral and other kinds of social choices related to the provision of information about political candidates and events. The media can be vigilant against corruption practices and tendencies and can keep public figures accountable in the public realm. The media should scan information and set the agenda for politicians and citizens in the domestic and international arena. Lastly, the media can open communication channels and organise a dialogue among the various elements of society concerning everyday problems, chiefly with respect to the protection of ethnic and minority rights.
As regards the media in Uganda, more than twenty newspapers have sprouted since 1986. The broadcast media has been freed of state control and monopoly, and political commentary over virtually any issue is widely tolerated. Yet at the same time, at least 40 journalists have appeared before the courts of law charged with a variety of criminal offences since 1986; new laws governing the media have been enacted enshrining several questionable provisions, and punitive economic measures (increasing taxes on news print) have been deployed with the intent of curtailing the operation of the free press. Private newspapers also fear losing much-needed revenue from government advertisements and will engage in self-censorship rather than displease high officials. Private media in Uganda is emerging but most of it is in the hands of people close to the political regime or individuals who do not necessarily have the ambition of improving the performance of democracy, but are primarily profit-driven, and hence have mainly commercial ideas in mind.

**Religious Organisations**

Churches appear to suffer the fewest organisational and financial handicaps. Their large memberships, strong, complex, and capable national organisations, politically sophisticated leaders, considerable financial security and independence, and international contacts allow them to maintain their autonomy from government. These strengths, combined with civic-mindedness, make Christian bodies important parts of Uganda’s civil society, capable of breaking the ‘culture of silence’ imposed by years of authoritarian rule.

Yet in the context of democratic consolidation, religious bodies in Uganda have suffered underlying weaknesses. Nationalists view them with suspicion because of their colonial origins. They often compete fiercely among themselves (or with other religions such as Islam) for state support and recognition, thus compromising their non-partisan credibility and moral authority and maybe for reasons of innate caution and self-preservation, these established religious bodies tend to prefer ad hoc rather than prolonged involvement in national politics.

Currently, the debate is raging in the country on the role of the church in politics. When the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) declared their stand on the political transition in Uganda, some elements of the system took it as a personal attack on the ruling movement government. Consequently, the President himself has attacked
the church and its supporters saying that Christians have nothing to do with politics. Except for the Catholic church, other churches appear to be silenced by President Museveni’s stand.

Politicians in the present Museveni government seem to suggest that religion has no business in political issues. The problem is that when church leaders say what the government supports it is okay, but when they say what the government leaders do not like, it is a problem. These are double standards. In fact, political actors in the search for legitimacy have strategically used religion. More and more politicians attend religious ceremonies or finance religious activities by contributing to building or renovation of religious centres especially a few months before the elections.

In addition, the explosive growth in Uganda of ‘independent’ or millennial Christian churches\(^\text{24}\) and new age religions appears to present a threat to the political influence of the ‘orthodox’ Christians and their organisations. Ultimately, the willingness of these newer churches and their leaders to align with governments for reasons best known to themselves could undermine the work that ‘Orthodox’ Christian groups do to counter governmental hegemony.

It is also important to mention that rivalries still persist among churches despite the apparent unity of the Christian community. In fact, churches still compete among themselves in the search for additional members. Most of the churches are also so fragile and affected by the conflict of their members over financial and leadership issues, resulting sometimes in the creation of new rival churches from the initial ones.

**Political Parties**

There is general agreement among political analysts that democratic consolidation would be impossible without the effective participation of political parties. However, on the NRM assumption of power in 1986, political party activity was proscribed ostensibly on the grounds that it was a significant contributory factor to the chaos of the past several years. As a consequence, political activity since 1986 has been dominated by the NRM, the traditional political parties being relegated to a state of political limbo.\(^\text{25}\) Uganda has what is described as a ‘no-party’ democracy implying that full political contestation is restricted. Notwithstanding the restriction on political party activities, the Human
Rights Chapter of the Ugandan 1995 Constitution provides a solid framework within which civil society in Uganda can operate. Article 29 (1) (a), (d) and (e) guarantees rights of expression, assembly and association. However, it should be noted that, in cases where there are autonomous groups but a restriction on political activity exists, where autonomous groups can act in defence and furtherance of their members’ interests but not politically and cannot place restrictions on the government, those groups constitute civil society forces rather than civil society as such.26

**Concluding Remarks**

It is therefore a truism, to say that the NRM has allowed the enhanced growth and evolution of civil society, and at others operated as a barrier to its free expression and development. In Uganda, the personalisation of political power and its use for private gain has made politics a high stake, in which President Museveni is desperately defended and challengers desperately attacked. Decades of authoritarianism have left behind a culture of incivility in politics.27 In Uganda, politicians call their opponents ‘murderers’ or ‘bastards’ and have threatened to kill them. In such a highly charged atmosphere, civil society organisations fear to take on the state in fear of being branded enemies of the state.

One of the reasons for the slow development of Ugandan civil society has been the lack of a strong private economic sector. Vast swaths of the working and middle classes are still tied to government through employment, and the private sector is still acutely dependent on government for contracts, subsidised credit, foreign exchange, and protection from foreign competition. As a result, key social groups and their organisations are ultimately dependent on government and vulnerable to governmental arm-twisting.

Private businessmen, fearing the loss of profitable government contracts, may not place advertisements in private newspapers that the government sees as insubordinate. Therefore, business groups in Uganda are also not in the best position to support democratic consolidation. This is because some of the business groups tend to avoid confrontation with the state or involvement in politics, as they are state-funded or state-created. They find themselves confined to behind-the-scenes lobbying on behalf of their own, narrowly defined interests.
It is also important to note that Ugandans are still emerging from the shadow of repressive rule. They still fear to take on the state. Because of Uganda's political history, political activism and political advocacy have not been widely embraced by CSOs. CSOs are timid and do not effectively call on government to account to their constituents. In fact, negative political experiences have created some apathy and wariness resulting in many CSOs maintaining that they are apolitical.

However, there are some rays of hope for civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda. Firstly, multilateral and bilateral donors are increasingly refusing to regard national sovereignty and borders as sacrosanct, which means a greater willingness to give direct assistance to local NGOs and pro-democracy civil associations. In the past foreign assistance went through the state, with disastrous consequences for the autonomy of civil society organisations in Uganda. The increasing amounts of aid coming from pro-democratic international NGOs could help to redress this imbalance. Secondly, the increasing trends toward political liberalisation and pluralism in Uganda are getting civil society its best ever opportunity to flourish and thirdly, new information and communications technologies as fax machines and computers can help civil society organisations handle many organisational challenges and end state-imposed isolation by networking through electronic mail.

All of these developments are encouraging, but taken together they are not enough to change the most likely prospect. African civil society, given the deep-seated and multifaceted problems it faces, is probably not going to lift itself out of its doldrums in time to play a key role as an agent of democratic consolidation. The feasible goal, in every case, should be to reduce the severe organisational, financial, legal and political constraints that presently burden civil society. That is a responsibility for all supporters of African democracy both foreign and domestic.

For a long time Uganda has had a one-party propaganda instead of real education for citizens. With the possible demise of the movement system of government in 2006, civil society organisations need to urgently establish a nation-wide structure for civic education. Civic Education including voter education should be carried out periodically, covering the entire country. This will ensure that the population is constantly aware of the issues at hand and knows how to exercise their obligations as free people. There is a need for civic education providers to agree on a broad based National Civic Education Framework through which fund-
ing partners can channel funding for civic education delivery in Uganda. This programme needs to adopt a rights-based approach that will highlight human rights, domestic law (including the constitution), regulations and principles of participatory government as mechanism for enforcement and the realisation of the values and priorities of the community.

Civil society organisations need to improve their knowledge of one another and deepen their collective awareness of the pivotal role that they must play in fostering democratic governance. This greater knowledge and deeper insight promise to bear fruit in the form of greater cooperation, assertiveness, confidence and perhaps efficacy. Civil society organisations need to evolve an internal culture of adherence to democratic process and respect for human rights before they can hope to effectively and genuinely contribute to the wider course on the same issue. They must devise means of being substantive and more participatory, and to relate more directly to the target groups they are designed to support by directly involving them in all stages of the planning and execution of their projects. In sum, the exercise of democratic rights must be given full expression. At the same time there is a great need for establishing and fortifying sustainable links with other actors in the arena, both those operating within a similar sphere of action, and those outside.

If CSOs were able to organise themselves into a representative body that could interact with government this would substantially increase their legitimacy. Because of this dis-unity amongst CSOs in Uganda it is very difficult for them to take on a unified position on specific issues. Under these circumstances many CSOs prefer not to speak at all. One idea is to have a designated APEX (or lead) institution working around particular issues or sectors that could prepare background information and ‘drive’ the debate forward. Such an institution would address the following problems:

- Disunity within the CSO ‘community’ resulting in the absence of a clear and more effective ‘voice’.
- Difficult working relations between CSOs, the Government of Uganda and other stakeholders.
- An ineffective and inefficient use of resources because of duplication of actions and activities between CSOs.
Notes

1 Being a Revised Paper of the East Africa Conference held in Addis Ababa Organized by CODESRIA on the 30-31 October 2003.
13 Samuel P Huntington’s “two-turnover test” which requires the winners of the ‘founding elections’ to be defeated, and the new winners to be defeated in turn. See the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Noran: University of Oklahoma Press.

See Definitions of NGOs and CBOs and Implications for Registration Procedures, Source, Uganda Gender Resource Centre.

E. Gyimah (1998) Civil Society in Africa: the good, the bad, the ugly.


In Uganda, the churches have formed the UJCC, which combines the Catholic, Anglican and Orthodox churches. They engage themselves in civic education of the population and are at the forefront of political and social issues of the country, especially election monitoring.

Museveni came to power in 1986 and the Constitution requires that he leave office at end of his current term in 2006. However, Museveni and his supporters are seeking to change the constitution to remove the term limit for him to stand for another term.

Pentecostal churches and others popularly known as Biwempe churches in Uganda.


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