Development and Peace in Africa

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Abstract

Development is not often regarded as a function of peace in both development theory and development discourse. In the context of post-colonial Africa, both internal security and external security should be crucial considerations in the pursuit of development alternatives. The reason for considering development and security is that part of Africa’s development impasse can be attributed to internal political terror since the Cold War. While development theory and discourse from modernisation theory to global neo-liberalism have dominated ‘development’ strategies in Africa and produced an Africa bereft of development, political terror has systematically undermined both development and security. Political terror, as sponsored by foreign forces and signified by collateral damage, not only produced extensive fear and destabilisation, it hit at the very core of development – human resources, political establishments and economic order. The end of the Cold War has not seen an end to political terror in Africa, but it has features that need to be considered for Africa’s development alternatives. Some of the features are the reduction in Africa’s foreign aid, disarmament, and the re-invention of the philosophical foundations of the state in Africa. This calls for a transition from a military state towards a developmental state with citizens participating to curb internal conflict and face the external challenges of the new post-Cold War global system.

Résumé

Le développement n’est pas souvent considéré comme ayant une fonction de paix, aussi bien dans la théorie du développement que dans le discours sur le développement. Dans le contexte de l’Afrique post-coloniale, la sécurité interne et externe doit constituer des éléments cruciaux à la poursuite d’alternatives

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de développement. La raison pour laquelle le développement et la sécurité doivent être pris en compte est que l’impasse dans laquelle se trouve actuellement l’Afrique peut être attribuée à la terreur politique interne qui a eu lieu depuis la Guerre Froide. Tandis que les théories et le discours sur le développement, de la théorie de la modernisation au néolibéralisme mondial, ont dominé les stratégies de « développement » en Afrique et produit une Afrique dépourvue de développement, la terreur politique, elle, a systématiquement sapé à la fois le développement et la sécurité. La terreur politique, sponsorisée par les forces étrangères et symbolisée par divers dégâts collatéraux, n’a pas uniquement conduit à la peur et la déstabilisation, mais a également frappé au cœur même du développement (ressources humaines, institutions politiques et ordre économique). La fin de la Guerre Froide n’a pas mis fin à la terreur politique en Afrique, mais présente des caractéristiques qui doivent être considérées pour les alternatives de développement africain, parmi lesquelles : la réduction de l’aide extérieure du continent, le désarmement et la réinvention des fondements philosophiques de l’état en Afrique. Ceci exige une transition de l’état militaire à un état propice au développement où les citoyens contribueraient à diminuer les conflits internes, et relèveraient les défis externes du nouveau système mondial post Guerre Froide.

Introduction

Development theory and practice as characterised by the underpinnings of modernisation theory since the 1950s have been criticised as being at an impasse (Coetzee and Graaff 1996). Theories, concepts and processes such as imperialism, colonisation, dependency, globalisation and deconstruction have been used to demonstrate the limits of development theory and practice as underpinned by modernisation theory as conceptualised by Rostow’s (1960) linear stages of economic development. Haydé (1994: 315) outlines and periodises the shifts in development theory in terms of structural functionalism (1955–1965), neo-Marxist political economy, neo-liberal political economy (1975–1985) and New Institutionalism (1985-). He concludes that it is still too early to assess the impact of New Institutionalism on development theory and practice. However as I will show later in the paper, the period after New Institutionalism is characterised by global neo-liberal ‘development’ which, like all other development theories, still retains the residual underpinnings of modernisation theory which equates development with economic growth and thus neglects human development and fosters inequalities.
The shifts in development thinking have, however, added some insights into the process of development. Holton (1992) reminds us that development is not a linear and neutral process, but it is rather characterised by spatial relations of power during the growth, development and expansion of capitalism. These spatial relations of power are partly demonstrated in the global capital relocation in which production is shifted from developed countries to both underdeveloped and developing countries. Some of the consequences of this process have been that ‘Multinationals can exert power through control over the terms of trade under which raw material are sold on the international markets. This form of control is especially burdensome where less developed economies are dependent on the export of only one or two commodities’ (Holton 1992: 141).

Moreover, the spatial relations of power are also indicated by a skewed global distribution and accumulation of wealth in which developed countries enjoy a relative net gain in global trade at the disadvantage of underdeveloped and developing countries. Khor notes:

Developing countries are simply no match for the gigantic planning and negotiating machinery of the North. There is thus a gross inequity in the WTO, because negotiations and the formulation of rules (and the defence of a country’s compliance or non-compliance with its obligations) is at the centre of the WTO’s activities. Given the gross imbalance in bargaining and negotiating capacities between North and South (as well as the manipulative devices that the major industrial countries have mastered), the rich nations normally had their way in GATT and now have it in the WTO (Khor 2000: 16).

The relations of power in development practice have also been noted in Africa since independence with the experience of economic and leadership crisis:

The real weakness of their [African bourgeoisie and its leadership] situation is that they are themselves victims of circumstances over which they have little control. They have inherited an economic system managed by imperialism and a political structure fashioned out for them by the departing colonial powers. Even radical leader such as Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Nyerere, Samora Machel and Mugabe have discovered that the economic and political structures left behind by the existing colonial powers have heavily circumscribed their freedom to create their own policies (Tandon 1987: 48).
In the present context of neo-liberal globalisation and the collapse of communism, development remains an issue. It is an issue particularly within the perspective of the global capitalism model as outlined by Sklair (1999). A proponent of the global capitalism model observes:

As part of national economies became embedded more deeply in global enterprise through commodity chains, they weakened as national units and strengthened the reach of the global economy. This situation was not unique to the 1980s, but the mechanisms of the debt regime institutionalised the power and authority of global management within states’ very organization and procedures. This was the turning point in the story of development (McMichel 1996: 135, cited in Sklair 1999: 15).

Whereas much has been written about the aspects and character of development, there is little research on the aspect of development as related to peace and violence. I say peace and violence because Hansen (1987) observes that while peace partly implies the absence of violence, violence is seldom used and justified to maintain peace. Thus one needs to understand what people mean by peace. From the perspective of this paper, peace means the absence of violence and non-violent measures to justly secure and maintain peace. This implies that ‘Peace presupposes the suppression of both direct and structural violence; but on the basis of a clear distinction between wars of aggression and wars of resistance and liberation’ (Nnoli 1987: 217).

This paper tries to argue that there is a relationship between development and peace, and that one of the negative factors with regard to economic growth and socioeconomic development is conflict in the form of political terror, violence or war. The relationship between development and peace is explored by using Mamdani’s (2004) analysis of the Cold War’s shift into southern Africa in which political terror was a direct and deliberate consequence. The first section summarises some points in Mamdani’s book *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. The second section outlines political terror in southern Africa during the Cold War. The third section outlines the impact of the Cold War’s collateral damage on development with reference to human capital, political establishments and the economy. The fourth section outlines the impact of military states on development. The final section gives reasons why disarmament, peace and security should be preconditions for development.
Mamdani’s book tries to analyse how the small Islamic ideological movements led by intellectuals turned into extremist political Islam often characterised by terrorism. He observes that part of the answer lies in understanding America’s use of terror to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. He argues that US state terror bred non-state terror and that political Islam is a non-state terror reacting to US state terror.

Mamdani (2004) also tries to demonstrate how US foreign policy has been responsible for political terror and burgeoning political Islam. He demonstrates these aspects through an interplay of ideological struggle between the imperatives of capitalism and the expansion of socialism, and the US conception of good and evil through the cultural talk of bad (primitive and fundamentalist) Muslims and good (modernised and secularised) Muslims.

Although the book deals with the roots of political Islam through US Cold War political terror, the interest of this paper is in the Cold War in southern Africa. The interest is of importance for three reasons. Firstly, one of the themes that runs through Mamdani’s book is violence against civilians during political terror. Secondly, if one has to rethink development in Africa, then violence should be included among the factors that need to be considered to attain peace, security and socioeconomic development. Finally, as I will argue later, collateral damage in the context of the Cold War’s focus on southern Africa, has been partly a negative factor regarding economic growth and socioeconomic development in Africa.

**The Cold War and Political Terror in Southern Africa**

Mamdani notes that ‘1975 was the year of the American defeat in Indochina, and of the collapse of Portuguese rule in the colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, the last European Empire in Africa. In retrospect, it was the year that the focal point of the Cold War shifted from South East Asia to southern Africa. The strategic question was this: Who would pick up the pieces of the Portuguese empire in Africa, the United States or the Soviet Union?’ (Mamdani 2004: 63). The shift of the Cold War’s focus to southern Africa meant that the region was caught in the hostile ideological struggle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Communism) and the United States of America (Capitalism).
During the Cold War, one country in southern Africa that was terrified of communism was the white minority-dominated South Africa. When the Cold War turned to Africa after the Second World War, South Africa had its Portuguese empire allies in Angola and Mozambique and also in former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). With the fall of the Portuguese empire, South Africa lost its neighbouring anti-Communist allies. However, with the support of the USA, South Africa practised covert proxy wars against Angola, Mozambique and other governments deemed threatening to the interests of the United States and South Africa.

Of particular detrimental economic impact was the activities of the two terrorist movements, RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. These two groupings, with military assistance from South Africa and covert financial assistance from the USA, destabilised Angola and Mozambique causing losses of about $30 billion and $15 billion respectively by 1988 (Mamdani 2004: 91).

Caught in this process of destabilisation were human casualties. The intention of the American proxy wars was to intimidate and murder civilians so that terrorists could gain political power, to pursue the capitalist interest of the USA and to ensure that southern Africa did not turn into a socialist region. As Mamdani asserts:

Political terror had brought a kind of war never before seen in Africa. The hallmark of the terror was that it targeted civilian life: blowing up infrastructure such as bridges and power stations, destroying health and educational centres, mining paths and fields, and kidnapping civilians – particularly children – to press gang them into recruits (Mamdani 2004: 91).

The shift of focus by the US from Asia – after its defeat in Indochina – to southern Africa was thus characterised by political terror in the form of US proxy wars in countries such as Angola and Mozambique. One of the interesting points about the proxy wars was that what is normally classified as collateral damage was now the very target of violence. These targets – human capital and the economy – are the basis for economic growth and development. Hence they justify special attention as part of factors that need to be considered in rethinking development in Africa.

**Collateral Damage and Development**

Political terror in Africa, as described by Mamdani (2004), brings to the fore the problem of collateral damage – the unintended negative
impact of war on society. It distinguishes between the targets and victims of an attack. The target is an intended object of attack and the victim is the unintended and regrettable consequence, hence collateral damage. Whereas collateral damage is understood as being unintentional, in the case of the proxy wars in Africa Mamdani (2004) observes that collateral damage was never a by-product of the war but the very point of terrorism.

When political terror attacked the post-colonial political establishment, infrastructure and civilians, then it undermined the entire process of development. The consequences of turning victims into targets were three-fold. The first consequence was the erosion of political establishments. Basing my argument on Martinussen (2004), I think political terror in Africa has indeed undermined the entire process of development. Martinussen (2004) agrees that the role of the state in socioeconomic processes should be to promote development, regulate participation of the citizens in decision making, and ensure national security (Martinussen 2004: 276). Proxy wars in southern Africa during and after the Cold War destabilised political systems, denied the establishment and growth of participatory civil society, and undermined national security by making it vulnerable to both internal and external threats. These consequences are observed by Cawthra when he states:

Many conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere are characterised as ‘new wars’... These wars are often fought for private gain (sometimes of an individual or a small group of people), usually involve ethnic mobilisation, are often supported by diasporas and are intrastate but not ‘civil’... They are often characterised by extreme brutality towards civilians, and usually involve disparate groups of state and non-state actors such as warlords and criminal gangs, making them extremely difficult to end (Cawthra 2004: 31-32).

The second consequence of turning collateral damage into victims is the assault on human capital which is part of the factors of production in any economy in the world. Depressingly, Smith (1994: 3) notes:

Most estimates suggest that, in all, rather more than twenty million people have died in war since 1945. Wars active during 1993 may have killed a cumulative total of four to six million people. In all, counting internal displaced person as well as international refugees, as many as thirty million people may have been forced to flee from their homes through the impact or the fear of war.
Linked to the assault on human capital is the third consequence, namely, the creation of a conflict economy. According to Kamphuis (2005) conflict economies arise as a consequence of the interruption of production and trade, the erosion of the capital base, and the migration of human capital due to war. In a post-conflict war the following four intertwined economies are identifiable: the international aid economy; the criminal economy; the informal economy; and the formal economy.

The international aid economy comprises of individuals from aid organisations who demand office space, housing and luxury consumer commodities. The criminal economy comprises of organised crime syndicates. The informal economy is based on subsistence farming. The formal economy accounts for a small fraction of economic life.

Within the conflict economy, the power of the central government is limited to economic activity in the capital. The rest of the economy is controlled by criminal opposition forces and survivalist entrepreneurs. During this period the new government is too weak to intervene and is vulnerable to groups that benefit from the status quo. The situation is thus characterised by a lack of security, a lack of law enforcement and the presence of aid agencies, giving rise to profitable opportunities in the conflict economy (Kamphuis 2005: 187). For example, the lack of security is beneficial to warlords and foreign security firms who loot and provide privatised security respectively.

Similarly, in observing the impact of the war in Mozambique, Chingono states:

The most direct impact of the war on the state [has] been to undermine its capacity to manage the economy. As the state survival was at stake, security, and not development, became the overriding policy concern. The maxim that ‘production is the best defence’ was ignored, as resources were diverted to the war effort (Chingono 1996: 10).

Such a situation can by no standard be considered a healthy economy that can sustain growth and socioeconomic development. Thus in Mozambique, the conflict economy (as Kamphuis calls it) or the grassroots war economy (as Chingono calls it):

Generated social revolt and protest in ideas, values and behaviours which took many forms; innovative economic enterprising; increased political activism and militancy; religious revivalism; unorthodox feminine politics and youth subculture(s). In doing so the dispossessed have indeed been active agents in shaping the institutional structure of their society and
strengthening the embryonic civil society and weakening the state (Chingono 1996: 11).

Hence it is imperative that rethinking development in Africa should take into account the impact of war on economic growth and socioeconomic development and also recognise that negotiating peace settlements is one of the preconditions for a development alternative in Africa. The present situation in the western Sudanese region of Dafur is a typical situation of violent conflict against civilians and the hindering of humanitarian efforts to alleviate the already chaotic situation which will of course have dire socioeconomic consequences.

On the subject of collateral damage and development, there is also the paradox of victim and villain when one considers the position of children. Children as a group are among the most affected victims of war, both as victims of collateral damage and the villains thereof. On one hand child combatants are forced to kill during war, on the other hand civilian children are killed too. Moreover, in a post-conflict situation child combatants are not rehabilitated. For example, Ismail (2002) observes:

Despite these grim statistics, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the plight of child combatants in the post-war period. As such, their rehabilitation has not been ‘securitised’ (that is linked to post-war stability) and the threat posed by partially rehabilitated child soldiers to post-war security and development has not been properly discerned. This issue is even more pertinent following the resumption of military activity in July 2000 by the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Movement (Ismail 2002: 125).

**Military States in Africa**

There are multifaceted reasons for conflict in any part of the world. Junne and Verkoren (2005) list the following clusters of reasons for conflict:

- External/Internal: colonialism, the Cold War, globalisation;
- Characteristics of the State: strong (resistance) or weak (self-protection by civilians);
- Characteristics of society: ethnic cleavages, competition for resources, nationalism;
- Individual orientations: Cold War ideologies, different cultures.
Since the Second World War, the nature of conflict in some parts of Africa has been characterised by at least one of these clusters. For example, the civil war in Rwanda was primarily characterised by ethnic cleavages and competition for resources; the attacks in Mombasa in 2002 were part of global terrorism; and the political terror in Mozambique was a result of Cold War ideologies.

Part of the legacy of the Cold War is that it has left most African states with militarised states and dictatorships whose justification was partly to secure internal political stability and peace. In the 1980s, South Africa itself was a highly militarised state in its quest to maintain racial domination and to destabilise neighbouring countries in southern Africa (National Union of South African Students 1980). Whereas South Africa was perpetrating terrorism partly with the help of America, some African countries were fighting to counter terrorism partly with the help of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Beri (1996) notes,

> Between 1981 and 1988, the Soviet Union dominated arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa. It provided a total of $18.9 billion worth of arms, as compared to just less than $1 billion for the US. Soviet involvement in Africa, with its substantial arms transfers to Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, was aimed mainly at regaining some of the influence it had lost in the Middle East and its failures in the global competition during the 1980s (Beri 1996: 4).

In Table 1, Beri (1996) presents the cost of the arms that were delivered to sub-Saharan Africa between 1987 and 1994. ‘Considering the growth of the armed forces in sub-Saharan countries, the US Arms Control and Disarmament agency found that they grew marginally at a rate of 0.3 percent annually during the decade 1983 and 1993, and declined by 3.2 percent annually between 1989 and 1993. While the relative size of forces is one of the indications of military balance, soldier-to-citizen ratio indicates the investment of human resources in the military power of a state. In Africa, the figure for soldiers per 1,000 people declined from 2.7 in 1983 to 2 in 1993. This is one of the lowest force ratios in the world, second only to South Asia with a figure of 1.7’ (Beri 1996: 1).

With so much conflict going on in Africa (Algeria, Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Angola), it comes as no surprise that Africa is also the major recipient of illicit small arms from Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and China (Graduate Institute of International Studies 2001: 170).

Table 1: Cost of Arms to sub-Saharan African countries, by supplier country, 1987–1994 (US $millions)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other European countries</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,430</td>
<td>2,323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Beri (1996:1).

Towards Security and Development

I think three processes are necessary to achieve peace in African states that are ravaged by continuous acts of violence and also to lay the foundation for rethinking development in Africa. They are: disarmament, economic reconstruction, and peace talks. Himmelstrand (1994) reminds us that development theory should take into account the specific context and history of African societies. Thus the suggestions that I list below are no panacea for every African country but rather constitute a framework for dealing with development and security.

These three processes are some of the preconditions for economic growth and development for the following five reasons.

Firstly, Martinussen (2004) states that economic activity can be a source of conflict. This is exemplified by Chingono (1996) with regard to the conflict economy in Mozambique. So, development programmes need to be prudent on the point of economic reconstruction.

Secondly, Sen (1999) observes that substantive freedom means that civil society, states and markets should co-operate to support citizens of
developing countries to participate in economic activity. That means in the post-conflict context governments should channel resources to productive and developmental capital to boost the reconstruction of a war-torn economy. This process could borrow such mechanisms from the Marshall Plan after the destruction of Western Europe economies in the Second World War. A particularly important lesson that could be learnt is the role of the state in rebuilding industries that were the driving engines of the economy before the war. This calls for African governments to overlook the Cold War ideological underpinnings of the Marshall Plan and rather learn the economic validity of the plan in the context of redressing poverty and promoting human development.

Thirdly, as neo-liberal globalisation continues to produce economic crisis and the widening global and local inequalities, there is mass dissatisfaction among the poor and sporadic unrest and dissent (Seddon and Walton 1994: 8). The recent violent clash between the defunct Normandy Gold retrenched workers and the police in the Tano North District of the Brong Ahafo Region in Ghana is one of many examples of the dissatisfaction of poor people (particularly workers) with neo-liberal economic policies. In South Africa there have been sporadic incidences of vandalism by angry residents complaining about inaccessible and poor service delivery at local government as a result of privatisation of such services and the ANC’s ideological shift from the social democratic Redistribution and Development Programme to a neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution. It is thus imperative that as Africa tries to rethink development, it takes into account the impact of global neo-liberalism on internal conflict.

Fourthly, rethinking development as a function of peace requires both intrastate and interstate dialogue. Maloka (2002) acknowledges the contributions of the Organisation of African Unity, the African Union, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development and other structures that have been trying to foster peace and development in Africa since independence. Even the G8 Gleneagles Communiqué (2005) on Africa does recognise:

Peace is the first condition of successful development. We support Africa’s efforts to build a peaceful and stable Africa. We will help Africa’s fragile states to emerge successfully from crisis and conflict. We support African initiatives to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts and consolidate peace, in the spirit of the UN Charter.
However, Maloka (2002) expresses concern that much of the efforts by Africa to foster peace and development have been rather declaratory instead of being pragmatic. He argues that it is time that declarations are turned into practical interventions. It is therefore imperative that efforts such as those of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in fostering peace in Côte d’Ivoire be strengthened in the light of different views, factors and solutions towards conflict in that country.

Finally, the end of the Cold War has left Africa in deeper economic crisis and with weak political institutions, and most importantly in competition with post-Communist countries for foreign aid as they try to move away from the ‘necro-economy’ (‘dead’ economy) towards a ‘vita-economy’ – a globally competitive market economy (Papava: 2005). The implication for this observation is that as Africa rethinks development, it should also think of ways of competing for global resources, not exclusively foreign aid, but rather also in the form of strengthening regional economic co-operation like the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union.

Way Forward

A crucial step towards rethinking development and security is to recognise four considerations. The first one is that the existence and experience of peace is one of the preconditions for development. This experience requires efforts such as calls and action towards military youth disarmament in the Niger Delta, and disarming civilians in countries such as Kenya and Angola. The second consideration is the paradoxical nature of security. Cock (1998) observes:

Rethinking security involves confronting a powerful paradox: that the military – the institution meant to ‘protect’ and ‘defend’ – in reality represents a threat to security ... This paradox is clearest in the growing body of evidence on the disastrous environmental impact of military activity, including research, development, weapon production, testing manoeuvres, the presence of military bases and the disposal of toxic waste, in addition to the direct impact of armed conflict (Cock 1998: 5).

What these considerations add towards rethinking development is that peace is one of the preconditions for economic growth and economic development. Moreover, because peace does not imply the termination
of the military, the operations of defence need to take into account their impact on sustainable development. Thus development becomes a function of peace and security, and peace and security need to operate within the framework of development itself.

The third consideration is global terrorism. In the light of the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, global terrorism and the war against terrorism have become another development threat to Africa. Kikaya (2005) argues that the 9/11 attacks had a negative economic impact on some African countries and that the US has used the attacks as an excuse to push the African agenda to the bottom of global priorities. The implications for these developments is that while Africa is struggling with civil wars and terrorist attacks such as those in Mombasa in 2002, it should also understand that the responsibility of peace and development is entirely upon its governments and citizens. This consideration is linked to the fourth one.

**Table 2: Focus of Organisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Emergency Help</th>
<th>Long-term Development</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities</td>
<td>End and prevent violence; stimulate better understanding between different groups of the population</td>
<td>Satisfy basic human needs (water, food, shelter, health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Mediation, dialogue, mass communication, and education</td>
<td>Technical, medical, logistical and organisational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Locks parties into conflicting identities and can perpetuate cleavages</td>
<td>Undermines build-up of government activities and institution building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final consideration towards rethinking development is recognising both the advantages and challenges of involving international aid agencies and foreign government interventions. While it is commendable and necessary for foreign agencies and individuals to assist in war-torn countries, there may be problems in this regard. Junne and Verkoren, (2005) point out some of the post-conflict development challenges. The following grid summarises these challenges.

This grid indicates the types and examples of aid organisations that usually assist during conflict in parts of the world. It also characterises them according to their focus, priorities, experience, blind spots and risks in the process of their developmental aid to war-struck countries. Junne and Verkoren (2005) explain, for example, that Oxfam’s focus is on creating structures to sustain long-term development and that it is experienced in agricultural, economic and technical institutional building. However, they add that organisations such as Oxfam run the risk of creating new forms of conflict as people contend for resources that are generated by the organisation’s structures. On the other hand, organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières are temporary and only help in emergency services and basic needs. Such organisations run the risk of creating a culture of dependency and thereby hinder the institutional capacity of the state.

The implications of these observations are that international aid agencies and individuals should take into account their roles in enhancing and hindering post-conflict development. Moreover, the government of post-conflict countries should also take into account the challenges that are posed by the unintended consequences of international aid in trying to foster development. In short, rethinking development also means thinking of development as both a value and a goal. It is a value because we all agree it is a good thing. It is a goal because we need to work towards it through trial and error.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have tried to argue that there is a relationship between peace and development. Insecurity in the form of political terror is a stumbling block to economic growth and development. The Cold War in southern Africa is an example of how human capital, political establishment and economic order were destroyed by US proxy wars, civil war and terrorism. Thus, rethinking development in Africa needs the
incorporation of disarmament and other peace-promoting initiatives as preconditions of development too. Moreover, the demands of the Cold War on Africa and potential consequences of the 9/11 events should also be taken into account.

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