US-Iran Relations and its Implications on International Peace and Security

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Abstract

This piece analyses stages of friendly as well as ferocious relationships between United States of America (US) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper identified unhealthy struggle for dominance and the attendant use of surrogates by the countries to achieve their aims. The paper objective centres on ascertaining the causes of the multi-decade sour relations between the states. With the aid of descriptive approach, data obtained from text books, journals, mass media (of international repute), and internet resources were sourced and analysed. Theoretically, Morgenthau’s political realism, with emphasis on interest defined in terms of (political, economic, military and other corollaries) of power was adopted to unravel the relation between the variables. Findings show that US and Iran were allies before a military coup that unseat the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers to the Shah in 1953. There was a trilateral relation amongst Iran, US and Israel; the relationship, necessitated by the fear of Soviet expansion into Middle East by all parties and amplified by Iran’s strategic position between Far-East and Indian Ocean and the need to protect multiple US economic interests in Iran, instilled fears and suspicion among Sunni majority of the region. The paper, also, traces the non-Arab cultural, linguistic, and historic Judeo and Persian national identities distinct in an otherwise predominantly Sunni-Arab region. Also that a US-Iran war portent the ability to suspend the fragile peace in the Middle East and further wreck the relations between US and host of Iranian super allies. Thus, the paper recommends among others that, there is need for the two sides to maintain their border of influence to allow peace and stability of the international political system though anarchically laden.

Key Words: Military Capability, Middle- East, Saudi- Arabia, US- Iran, Relations, War.


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Introduction

Palmer and Perkins (2010, p.640) opined that the United States (US) has been a very busy actor in international politics. “By history, and by experience”, “by temperament and by inclination, Americans are prepared to accept the heavy responsibility and commitment in international affairs which their country assumed in recent years”. However it remains to be seen, in the course of this paper, if this liberal-public good assumption applies in terms of US-Iran relations as it makes or mar international peace. US active participation in world politics assumes a spacious dimension after the first World War between 1914 – 1918 and before, during and after 1939 - 1945 2\textsuperscript{nd} World War (LOC, nd).

The sudden paradigm shift from keeping a safe distance from the pre-world wars Euro-centric transnational relations, and the speed with which episodes “accelerated too rapidly, for” the institutionalisation of an ideal long term foreign policy that led US officials to assume a “goddess of liberty” status for their country on one hand, and the painting of the same self-acclaimed international police (Cartey, 1997) as heavy-handed statist or ego centrist imperialist by the communists world. Also, the profiling and counter-profiling indicate that US has, indeed, became a centre of attraction in the world politics. The duo, Palmer and Perkins, rightly concluded that the above expressions about US “are stereotypes”. It is significant not to understand these characterisations in terms of misrepresenting or obscuring the materiality (reality) about the US; rather, the characterisations should be understood or appreciated in terms of testimonies to the unique nature of the foreign policy.

The following dynamics, in the other divide, are essential to understanding Iran’s centrality in US foreign relations: Iran largely represents nothing but a real threat to US interests in the Gulf region and in the Middle-East. The Shiite state is the vigorous, if not the only threat to US best ally of necessity - Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia - in the region (Wehrey, Karasik, Alireza, Ghez, Hensell and Guffey, 2009 and Henderson, 2016). Albeit, the Ishmaelites (Merriam-Webster, 2019) states of the region are not in friendly terms with their Israelites neighbours, Iran represents the worst of the threats to the former which enjoys US protection and support in all ramifications of State’s endeavours. The conspicuous romance between Iran and US’s major and,
perhaps, the only contemporary economic threat: China, in a sense, and the explicit defence alliance that exists between the theocratic guardianship democracy (Moodles, 2006) and the US leading military rival - the Russian Federation – in another sense, adds impetus to the soured relations between US and Iran (Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers & Price, 2017).

The aforementioned dynamics could be deduced to: Iran-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) relations; Iran-Israeli relations; and Iran and the super five (5); and finally, though not discussed above, what Ochmanek, Wilson, Allen, Meyers and Price (2017 p.62) termed the “criticality of the strait of Hormuz” to global energy industry/sector. Hormuz is a narrow waterway through which a minimum of sixteen (16) million barrels of Brent Crude pass on daily basis. Iran, possibly, enjoys 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) status over the waterway or passage forms part of its territorial waters. Should this happen, US, being one of world leading crude oil consumers, stands to pay a very serious price. This also explains, asserts Ochmanek (2017), the continuous presence of US military in the region.

Literature Review

Thematic attempt shall be made in navigating the extent of scholarly contributions at understanding US – Iran relations and its attendant implications on international peace and security. As such, the paper attempts review of US Foreign Policy, Iranian Foreign Policy, and US and Arab World.

(i) US Foreign Policy

While the question of what foreign policy should US adopt after: September 11, 2001, ugly incidents in Manhattan, New York and Pentagon, Washington DC; the withering away of balance of power arrangement, the rise of new actors in international politics (terrorists); the proliferation of Weapon of Mass destruction (WMD); and availability of materials as well as technology for development of WMDs agitates Evera (2006). Halidu and Silas (2022) attempted a brief historical overview of the North American giant’s foreign policy. They rightly submitted that after the WW II, US shifted from politics of “Non-interventionism to interventionism” in the affairs of other states. Prevention, deterrence and reduction of the threat of WMDs on the
American citizens and military personnel; survival of US allies and an enabling conditions for the allies’ contribution in shaping the international system that suits US culture; prevention of emergence of substantive hostile powers that could disrupt US – styled international trade; and establishment of “product relations” were identified as “shapers” of US foreign policy. Like Evera, Halidu and Silas were conspicuously short of words in explaining how US intends to implement the foreign policies without violating the concept of sovereignty.

A rather critique of US foreign policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) (2020) decried the former benign hegemony’s foreign politics for gaining more than necessary attention to “primacy” on international stage while abandoning its middle class in a rather precarious state. The project rightly submitted advocated for: a link between middle – class anxieties and foreign policy; a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class; and rebuilding the trust between policy makers and the middle – class among other agitations. Ates (2022) establishes a nexus between US foreign policy on one hand and international trends and domestic political institutions and processes on the other. Yes, most states’ foreign policies are, partly, response to systemic (international system) trends; however, it is quite erroneous to underemphasise the same in favour of internal factors. It is instructive, however to take note of the differences in submissions of CEIP (2020) and Ates (2020): while CEIP accuses the makers of US foreign policy of gross insensitivity to the middle – class (an internal factor), Ates dwells on such internal factors as state institutions.

(ii) **Iranian Foreign Policy In Perspectives**

Institutions and personalities (idiosyncrasy) play great roles in formulating foreign policies of states. In the case of IranWastnidge (2020), opines that, the institutions responsible for formulating Iranian foreign policies are largely religious and cultural institutions. The religious institutions, as rightly observed, are responsible for establishing the link between transnational link between Shiites worldwide and the Iranian authorities. Golmohammadi (2018) identifies “a variety of trends and developments” “within a framework of basic principles” and fundamental institutions in Iranian foreign policy development and application. This assertion strengthens and supports Wastnidge’s submissions as regard roles of institutions in formulating the Islamic
state’s foreign policy. Golmohammadi rightly avers that a chance for change in Iran’s foreign policy is very unlikely.

Messous (2014) traces the history of “Persia” to more than 2,000 year before 1935 and tries to establish a correlation between Iran’s unique history and country’s ambition to become and or atleast maintain regional major power status with nuclear arsenals. The study rightly maintains that understanding Iran’s foreign policy must be precipitated by understanding “history, national identity, political actors” and geo-political trends in the region. Lowy Institute for International Policy (2015) x-rayed Iranian foreign policy under President Rouhani, which paid much attention to ending the country’s regional as well as international isolations. The Institute rightly submitted that Rouhani achieved de-isolation interest by striking a nuclear deal with world powers and allayed the fears and suspicions of the Gulf neighbours.

(iii) **Us Foreign Policy And Arab World**
Powerful states often compete for relevance in Africa and Middle-East, as such Byman and Moller (2016) attempted an examination of the “interest, risk, and costs” of US foreign policy towards the Middle-East in the after -mat of Cold War. An informative comparison of US relation with Europe, on one hand; and US relation with the Arab World, on the other, reveals a Gulf in trade, and cultural ties with US in the case of the later (Arab World) as against the former (Europe). In terms of security relation, however, US maintains a plethora of “agreements, basing, and access rights, the prepositioning of equipment, and other hard forms of cooperation” with the Arabs. They, confusingly, averred that the US has been making a tacit and explicit commitment to the myriad of allies in Arab World. While Byman and Moller assesses the risk and cost US foreign policy towards the Arabs, Williams and Popken (2012) established a nexus between US foreign policy and Arab Spring. The article identifies “Ten Short – Time Lessons learned” by the US. First, that US had learned to be “willing to consider policy options beyond ‘MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO’” – by lessen its devotedness to any Arab State in favour of democracy. The article successfully cited instances of the paradigm shift in the cases of Egypt (an ally) and Libya (a sworn enemy) where in the case of the former, President Barrack Obama was reported to have said; “the status quo is not sustainable” as President Mubarak had ruled Egypt for three
consecutive decades and in latter’s case, Obama advised Gadhafi to step aside. Although there is merit in authors’ submission, however, they were short of citing examples of several other Arabian Monarchies/dictatorial regimes with which US is still maintaining the status quo. The second lesson, which is rather instructive, revealing and germane, is that the Shiite minority emerged winners of the spring as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) had formed government in Egypt and, possibly, the situations in Yemen and Syria. The Third and Fourth lessons being; the strengthening of Arab League as evidenced in its role in regional conflict resolutions and institutionalisation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The Fifth lesson is the exposure of the fact that Brazil and India are not in support of “Arab Spring pro-democracy” That, the pro-democracy movement leaders were not prepared to take over the mantle of leadership; and emergence of “justice” as “a top demand” were identified as the Sixth and Seventh lessons from the spring. Possibility of counter – revolution/spring proved to vey high; “rebels must be media – savvy”; and that Arab Spring is a brain child of what transpired in Iraq and Southern Sudan are the Eight; Nineth and Tenth lessons learned.

**Theoretical Exposition**

In other to articulate the essence of this paper, therefore, the need for the use of an academic amplifier becomes inevitable. Since the independent variables - US and Iran – in the context of this paper do not share a geographical border (to warrant border conflict and the attendant need to protect an interest which may be defined in relations to protection of territorial integrity), nor do they, symmetrically, compete for economic hegemony either on regional or global scale, the only rational explanation to their conflict should be centred around “interest defined in terms of power”. Incidentally, however, the main thrust of the theory of political realism is “interest defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 1978). Interest, viewed from either of the divides, can be defined in terms of “lust” for un-parallel military, political, and economic power at global level or at least the need to maintain the same, in one hand; and the “lust” for regional power status or at least the need or desire to lead the Islamic world, on the other hand. These two, rather non-crisscrossing, interests meet and clash as the US prioritizes the leadership of another state(s) when Iran aligns and identifies with Russian federation and China.
(1) An Overview of the us-Iran Relations before
And after 1979 Revolution

From the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Iran’s Prime Minister in 1953” writes BBC.Com (2014) “to a phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani and possibly direct talks on Iraqi’s security” to current confrontations between US and Iran, perspectives on war (though indirect) and peace (as necessitated by “Iran (and) six world powers – Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia China and the United States (Mousavian&Mousavian, 2018) are discernible from the bilateral relations between the two. The self-styled international Police (Cartley, 2017) and “goddess of liberty” (Palmer and Perkins, 2010) and her best ally, the UK facilitated a military coup that unseat the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored full political powers to the Shah. Although BBC, a UK state agency, is conspicuously silent on the role of the Kingdom’s intelligence agency – a co-plotter (ALJAZEERA, 2009) – and emphasises on CIA’s role claiming that the “agency’s documents acknowledged its role in Iran’s 1953 coup” that terminated what the two preach. However, the factually established involvement of CIA and of the Kingdom’s spy apparatus in the orchestration of the Persian coup d’etat points to the extent to which powerful states (having appropriated the major ingredient of international politics – power to dictate to others) could go in propagating their culture and or norms and extending their interests which are defined in terms of civilisation and or abasing the same culture and norms by defining it in term of roughness. Just a year earlier, in his attempt to amplify the third item of his six principles of political realism, Morgenthau (1978, p.4-15), asserts thus:

Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's
remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests.

Also, Morgenthau (1965, P.192) in Ochim (2011, p.108) asserts thus:

*Men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power and the fruits of power. He speaks of ‘animus dominandi’ i.e the human ‘lust’ for power. The quest for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage, but also for secure political space within to maintain oneself and exert considerable influence, free from the dictates of others.*

Eventually, the human ‘animus dominandi’ inevitably brings men and women into conflict with each other, that ultimately creates conditions of power politics’ (in Ochim 2011, p.108). This theoretical exposition clearly explicates the variables surrounding the Iran-US relations.

The US and UK action in Iran clearly buttresses Morgenthau’s submission as the action has succeeded in culturing us to believe that it is not democracy, in itself, that the western powers are trying to sell to the other parts of the globe. What they want is, actually, using democracy to achieve their interests. A state can practice any form of government and still become US friend so far as it opens off its economic borders for US firms to operate freely (Aljazeera, 2019). A non-democratic and authoritarian state, that transacts lucrative business with the former benign hegemon, can do everything to its citizens, as well as to other sovereign states and still go free. This submission is anchored by the way US handle’s Saudi’s “role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil war” (Hannah, 2019).

US, Iran, and Israel, before the coup d’état and the attendant revolution that transformed Iran into an Islamic Republic, were tri-lateral allies that dominate the Middle-East affairs. The trilateral alliance, opine Parham and Kraemer (2015), necessitated “counter-natural” shifts loaded with unexpected corollaries. First, the discontent and suspicion from the Sunni Muslims that are of enviable majority in the region as the US and Israel choose to align with and empower Shiite minority that nurse the ambition of ruling the Sunni majority Muslim world and, above all, the regional disintegration. The duo, however, assert that while the trilateral relation lasts, it was noteworthy in the following pragmatic aspects:
Discernible from the above are: The shared protective interests against the then expansionist Soviet; US had multiple interests in Iran; the Israeli need for a periphery as an ally in the Muslim dominated region; and Iran was once a major oil supplier to Israel and also a major regional market for Israeli goods and services. On the significance of the quoted items, as promoted by Parham and Kraemer (2015), while the first item common “concern of Soviet expansion” could hold water as of significance to all, levelling the second item as “significant” tends to be one sided as it favours only the US-Israeli side. On the third item, the two were right to have positioned the “alliance of the periphery” under the rubric of the merits of the trilateral relations. This is so as while the Israeli interest was, and still, is to have a regional power as its periphery ally, Iran also needed, and still needs, a nearby power with stronger international connections as an ally. If this, a rather idealistic assumption, were to materialise, the international tensions emanating from middle-east would have been reduced from a tripartite dimension of Sunni-Shiite – Israeli-Iran – Arabs-Israeli, on one side, to a single dimension of Arabs-Israeli clash of interests in the middle-east, on the other side. Henceforth, scholars will conclude that the US-Iran relations impact positively on international peace.

Apart from the significance and or otherwise of the forenamed dynamics of the Gulf, this piece also observes that, the issues have a combined potentiality of conditioning an idealist to conclude that Iran and Israel - the major US ally in the middle-east - would, in the near future form a formidable alliance due to their similarities (see item four: Judeo and Persian national identities). A realist visage of the situation tends to service a rather diametric conclusion. The latter’s
assumption enjoys an ability to stand the test of rationality if we take into cognisance, the following arguments: the two countries are aspiring (in an otherwise manner) to lead the region in terms of technological and military capabilities with Israel having an edge over Iran and is determined to maintain and expand the lead; the Khomeinists show no sign of reneging or backing out (El-Ghobashy & Sly, 2019) on achieving their national interests – defined in terms of overtaking Israel -, the Zionists, with the support of the west would certainly do everything possible (including enlisting the support of the Sunni majority through US-Saudi ties) to maintain the status quo. In a nutshell, neither Iran nor Israel, as sovereign States, seems to renege, in the foreseeable future, on its mission to be top of issues in the region. This takes us back to Morgenthau’s assertion that “the only bond of union that endures ‘among nations is’ the absence of all clashing interests”. Another indicator to the unlikelihood of Iran-Israeli holy alliance is the religious extremity. The Jews considers all but themselves as second class and unfavoured children of God (Pet therapy, n.d.) in relation to the Shiites’ doctrine of “Taqiyya” “a kind of hypocrisy allowed in their religion” (Global Security, 2019) renders the situation akin to that of the two proverbial bulls that will always find it difficult to drink, at the same time, in the same bucket; Also seems to support the latter submission is the Sunni Shiite dichotomy that always avails itself to offer a myriad of alternatives to US and Israel.

Back to the significance of the trilateral relations, as argued by Parham and Kraemer (2015), item four has been addressed by Morgenthau’s submission that the only alliance that possess the ingredients of endurance is that surrounded by dearth of clashing interests. On the issue of “near exclusive oil provider for Israel”, the assumption cannot hold water as there are pro-west or west-friendly states in the Gulf now than ever before. While extant literature proves to be insensitive of pre-Mossadeq Iran-US relations, a large volume of literature on the countries’ relationship point to a bleak picture of this bilateral relation from 1951 to date. A tabula presentation of the relations looks thus:

Table 001: Selected incidents in US-IRAN Relations from 1951 to 2019
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>YEAR/MOTHER</th>
<th>ISSUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>A statist Mohammed was nominated and elected, by the members of the lower chamber of Iranian parliament as Prime Minister (PM). He immediately nationalised Iranian oil company, an action that set him against the west.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The Shah refused to allow the PM to appoint some of his elected cabinet members, an issue that led to the PM’s resignation. The PM’s resignation resulted in a five days intense rioting and lawlessness leaving the Shah with no option than to reinstate the PM and concede to his demands. Between this period and July, 1953, PM Mossadeq passed several reforms that took away Shah’s “unconstitutional powers”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>The US and UK intelligence agencies facilitated a military coup against the PM, deposed him and restored powers to the Shah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Iran became a signatory to Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) a US-backed Baghdad pact and a facsimile of NATO which was convoked to contain Soviet expansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>A religious leader and ferocious critic of the Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was forced to exile in the neighbouring Iraq. He spent 14 years in exile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The US-backed Shah was forced to flee to Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Khomeini returned from exile and grasped political power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Iran was proclaimed Islamic Republic under Theocratic Guardianship and terminates its membership of the US-Sponsored CENTO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Iranian students took 63 US citizens into hostage at the US embassy in Tehran and demanded the extradition of Shah to Ira. This, forces US to, unilaterally, impose sanctions on Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>US-backed Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. An action that led to a close to eight (8) years war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 11  | 1958 /1956  | Few hours after former US President Jimmy Carter left office, the remaining 52 hostages, having spent 444 days in captivity,
were released.

12. 1985 US, via Israel, sold weapons to Iran in exchange for Iranian facilitation in freeing US hostages from Hezbollah. The transaction which violates terms and conditions of the November 1979 sanctions was without the approval of the congress, hence it became illegal. The illegally raised funds were use by the White House to sponsor Nicaraguan rebels – Contra. Hence the term “Iran-Contra scandal”.

14. 2019 Iran threatens to resume work on Uranium enrichment.

Source: Aljazeera,(Retrieved) 10thJune, 2019

(2) Us-Iran Relations: Measuring Military Capabilities

Research shows that there are several and, perhaps, conflicting standards and criteria for measuring military capability of a state (Giegerich, Childs & Hackett, 2018; GEF, 2019; WEF, 2018; & Reuters, 2019). The structure of the force, level of modernisation, the degree of readiness of individual units, and extent to which the enemies’ armies can sustain an onslaught are some of the required efforts a state is expected to, persistently, put in place for measuring of its armed forces in relation to its enemy (Dunn, 2014). Generally, the measures are, mainly, “input measures” that takes into cognisance what goes into the making of an effective national military capability and how such effectiveness can be compared across countries in “a comparative-static sense without” doing any military balance analysis or pretending that it can explain how any given “force-on-force” encounters will actually turn out in practice. Another criterion is the “output measures” which considers the amount of resources a national military receives in form of defence budget translate the same into “war fighting capabilities” (Pet
therapy, n.d.). Thus, the following tabulations potent the capability to guide us to measure the military capabilities of US and Iran:

### Table 002: General indices / capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N.</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>GFP Rank</td>
<td>14 of 137</td>
<td>1 of 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>83,024,745</td>
<td>329,256,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Manpower Availability</td>
<td>47,324,105</td>
<td>144,872,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fit-for-Service</td>
<td>39,842,164</td>
<td>199,664,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Reaching Military Age</td>
<td>1,394,476</td>
<td>4,188,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Active Personnel</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>1,281,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Reserved Component</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Total Military Personnel</td>
<td>873,000</td>
<td>2,141,9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Defence Budget</td>
<td>6,300,000,000 (US$)</td>
<td>716,000,000,000 (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>External Dept</td>
<td>7,995,000,000 (US$)</td>
<td>17,910,000,000,000 (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Foreign Reserve</td>
<td>120,600,000,000 (US$)</td>
<td>123,300,000,000 (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Purchasing Power</td>
<td>1,757,500,000,000 (US$)</td>
<td>19,850,000,000,000 (US$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** GFP, Strength in numbers, 12th Jun, 2019

### Table 003: Air Force Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S./N.</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>521</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Total Aircrafts                           509                                  13,398
2. Fighters / Interceptors                142                                   2,362
3. Attack Aircraft                          165                                   2,831
4. Transporters                              89                                    1,153
5. Trainers                                    104                                   2,853
6. Helicopters                               126                                    5,760
7. Attack Helicopters                    12
8. Serviceable Airports                 319                                     13,513

Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12th Jun, 2019

Table 004: Ground Forces Capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S./N.</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tank Strength</td>
<td>16,34</td>
<td>6,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Armoured Fighting Vehicles</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>39,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Self-Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rocket Projectors</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>11,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12th Jun, 2019

Table 005: Naval capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S./N.</th>
<th>Total Naval Capabilities</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Destroyers 0 68
5. Corvettes 3 15
6. Patrol Crafts 88 13
7. Mine Warfare Craft 3 11
8. Merchant Ports Strength 739 3,611
9. Major Ports & Terminals 3 33

Source: GFP, Strength in numbers, 12th Jun, 2019.

Table 006: Other capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S./N.</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Force Strength</td>
<td>30,500,000</td>
<td>160,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil Production (Barrels/day)</td>
<td>4,469,000</td>
<td>9,352,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil Consumption (Barrels/day)</td>
<td>1,870,000</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proven Oil Reserve (Barrels)</td>
<td>158,400,000,000</td>
<td>36,520,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roadway Coverage (Km)</td>
<td>172,927</td>
<td>6,586,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Railway Coverage (Km)</td>
<td>8,442</td>
<td>224,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Waterway Coverage (Km)</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>41,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Coastline Coverage (Km)</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>19,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Shared Boarders (Km)</td>
<td>5,894</td>
<td>12,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Square Land Area (Km)</td>
<td>1,648,195</td>
<td>9,826,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GFP, Strength in Numbers, 12th Jun, 2019.

These tabulations are lacking in nuclear capabilities of the countries in question. However, Palmer and Perkins (2010, p 738-762) assert that US posses highest number of nuclear warheads globally. Russian Federation and UK are the second and third most senior “members of the nuclear club”. In essence the August 6th, 1945 incident where a US B-29 military aircraft “dropped a single bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima”, signals the inception of another pace of strategic thought. The single dropped claimed and or wounded “some 150,000” lives and decimated almost 755% of the total buildings in the city. This Japanese incident, in particular,
and such other factors as economic hegemony and control of certain international regimes, among others, earned the North American former UK colony a special in world affairs. Iran, comparison, commands respect for it specialty in asymmetric and rather unconventional naval warfare. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) naval unit specialised in using unmanned submarine craft to plant mines. In an event of war, and if IRGCN succeeded in planting such mines, it will take US and other international powers with commercial interest in the Gulf several years to demine the Sea (Ochmanek, et al.,2017).

(3) THE IMPLICATIONS OF US-IRAN RELATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Having navigated, very briefly, the mentality behind the US behaviour in the comity of nations, the centrality of Iran to US foreign policy, the US-Iran sweet and sour relationships from 1951 to 2019, and compared the military and related capabilities of the two states, it is consequential to assess the implications of the aforementioned variables on international peace and security. One of the security implications of US-Iran tension is its ability to “disrupt fragile peace”. An event of war between US and Iran can, with certainty, actuate clashes within Iraq. The influential Muqtada Al-Sadr, a cleric that commands a deadly militia warned that an attempt to involve Iraqi in any US-Iran conflict will be viewed in terms of direct assault on the country. The political situation in Iraq is “still defined by zero-sum, battle-for-survival politics” (Alaaldin, 2019).

Another implication of US-Iran conflict on international peace is its ability to set, once again, Washington on an impingement with Beijing, New Delhi, and Ankara and Japan and South Korea. The trio are, at present, the major buyers of Iranian crude – the sole target of US renewed sanctions (Gross, Hass, Madan, Maloney, &Feltman, 2019).

Again, the US-Iran relations potent the ability to impact on international peace and security when viewed from the opinion that Iran commands a cluster hit organisation within the Middle-East region. Ali Vaez, an Iran specialist with the International Crisis Group, hints at the possibility of Iran using its “pretty strong hands” that, also, potent capabilities to “exact cost on US and its
allies in the region”. This piece, however, agrees with the above assertion. The damaging of the Saudi and Emirati ships in the Gulf and the landing of a Katyasha rocket close to the vicinity of US embassy in Baghdad which Iraqi officials blamed on one, the Iranian hands – Iranian-backed militias in Iraq – and to cap it all, the submission of a Lebanese based pro-Hezbollah newspaper that the “attacks were messages from Tehran” to Washington sent through the Abu Dhabi’s and Riyadh’s “mailboxes” support the submissions (El-Gobashy, et al., 2019). If Iran continues to hit back by arming and aiding these groups, the implication on international peace is that, the Shiites in Sunni-ruled states will continue to strike, hence creating another dimension of conflicts in the fragile region. Or, in another sense, a Libya-Nigeria issue will recreate itself. This means that there is a high possibility of proliferation of light firearms to other relatively peaceful countries around the globe.

The soured relationship has another implication of moving-up the number of nuclear armed nations globally and the number of states that violate their responsibility to maintain nuclear-free middle-east from one to two. Historically, the Iranian nuclear programme started in 1957 when it signed an agreement with the US under Eisenhower’s “Atom for Peace” initiative. The US built the Iranian first nuclear facility – Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) – in 1967 with 5-megawatts reactor fuelled by “highly enriched uranium”. Between 2006 and 2010, three different sanctions were imposed on Iran in an attempt to force the Persian state to abandon its nuclear programme. Paradoxically, however, Iran uses the western impose hibernation and alienation during the period to increase the capacity, volume, and centrifuge of its uranium enrichment. For instance, it increased the level of enrichment from the initial 5% to 20%; increased the stockpile from a “few hundred” kg to 8,000 kg; and the number of centrifuges sky-rocketed from 3,000 to 22,000. The point being made is that, whenever Iran is under a sanction, the level of its nuclear programme increased, and that the withdrawal of US from the JCPOA may only succeed in helping Iran to consolidate on the programme. And if Iran succeeded in becoming a member of the global nuclear club, the number of countries that violated the provisions of Middle-East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) may, automatically raised from one (Israel) to two (Israel and Iran) (Mousavian&Mousavian, 2017; Yee, 2019).
Conclusions

US-Iran conflict - in relation to the latter’s nuclear enrichment policy - has proved to be one of the longest conflicts of 21st century. Spanning a period of two decades, the conflict defied negotiation efforts during the first decade of its emergence (2003-2013). The failure is not unrelated to the static positions adopted by the direct parties – US and Iran. While the North American state insists on its maximalist demand for zero uranium enrichment; zero centrifuges; zero plutonium; and zero Intercontinental Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) development, the Persian state, on the other hand, insists on exercising its rights, as conferred by Article III (1,2,3&4) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The article empowers both nuclear and non-nuclear state signatories to the treaty to enrich uranium for civil/non-military purposes. Within this era of bilateral non-compromise and regimes of sanctions, Iran had, successfully, built three ICBMs: The Shaab-2 (500 km) which can range to as far as Turkmenistan, Georgia, Russian Federation and more than half of Caspian Sea in Eastern Europe, parts of Turkey, Iraq, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Afghanistan in middle-east; Ghadr (1,600 km) that can deliver hell to Yemen, more than half of the Red Sea, parts of Egypt and Mediterranean Sea, more than 80% of Turkey and Black Sea, parts of Ukraine, Russian Federation and India, the entire Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, and a tip of Peoples Republic of China; Sajjil (2,000 km) with the capacity of messaging Iranian anger to the countries of Horn of Africa, Egypt, Ukraine, Russia, China, and Sudan. The Imameeyah extremists were, also within the same scope of ten years, able to move its nuclear programme to an alarming height.

Reversely, as evidenced, during the triumph of negotiation efforts (2013-2015) that was necessitated by the 6 and 1 – Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and US; Iran – the Persians copped out on their determination to join the nuclear club. This development, understandably, was a result of the paradigm shift from US policy of zero enrichment to “no nuclear bomb”, after emergence of Barrack Obama and Hassan Rouhani as US and Iranian Presidents respectively, and above all the US recognition of Iran rights under NPT.

From our discussion, so far, it becomes factual that the US-Iran relations were originally sweet and only became sour after Shah and revolutionists’ introduction of statist political economy
policies and “third worldism” precipitated on anti-America, Shiite Islamic Theology. The results of comparative military capabilities of the two favours, largely, US and Iran portents a capacity to use “long hands” in the region in the event of war.

Recommendations

The paper therefore recommends that Iran and US stay off each other area of influence to prevent an escalation of tensions and eventual war, for peace and security of the region and world, and;

Above all, the US-Iran relation has a bleak implication on international peace and security as China and Russian Federation are likely to openly or covertly help Iran. It will also have negative impact on the global energy industry, especially the major consumers; thus, US-Iran should manage their relations and interest with utmost care to avoid breaking the walls that may lead to conflict and war. The gains of peaceful co-existence are far greater than the ruins and effects of war, a caveat.

References


