Defining New Development Options and New Social Compromises in the Context of Reduced Political Space: Reflections on the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire

Introduction

The situation of violence which prevails in Côte d’Ivoire is the expression of a complex set of factors which may be analysed at different levels and from complementary perspectives. While the political and military dimensions of the crisis are the most visible aspects and those to which the media and diplomatic initiatives have drawn attention, the turn of events in Côte d’Ivoire may also be seen as the result of a very deep social and economic crisis which in many respects was foreseeable and which is most likely to spread and erupt elsewhere in Africa if it is not addressed in these terms. It is on certain of these underlying issues that this contribution will focus.

In order to develop this line of argument, the paper proposes to draw attention to the links between the current political and military crisis and the reshaping of political space on the one hand, and the manner in which economic reforms were introduced into the country over the last twenty years on the other. It will be argued that this perspective is essential to understanding the implications of past measures of liberalisation for existing modes of social and political regulation and the redefining of political practice and space. For rather than contributing to the renewal and redefinition of past modes, the adjustment process appears to have been quite compatible with their continuation. Among the consequences however, the reduction of the scope of state patronage was to entail a narrowing of the internal base of political legitimacy. But there is more. Political processes have tended to be reduced to technical administrative procedures. The result has been to contribute to a ‘de-politicisation’ of political processes that denies the legitimacy of a wide range of political objectives, notably government initiatives to put forward re-distributive policies aimed at promoting greater social equity and cohesion among the ingredients essential for building eventual national unity. Consequently, the manner in which the process of economic liberalisation was introduced conditioned the manner in which political issues and demands could be formulated, the scope for the redefinition of social, economic and political objectives and hence may be seen as one among other sets of factors, in the context of decreasing legitimacy, to have helped reshape forms of state intervention and political practice.
To develop this line of argument, the paper proposes to recall very briefly certain political dimensions of the ‘Ivorian miracle’, of the adjustment process and of the transition period, in order to argue that the present crisis is among other things, deeply rooted in the nature of the reform process introduced into the country over the last two decades, and the collapse of the former economic model which has led to per capita income being halved. If lasting political solutions are to be found based on the emergence of new social compromises which permit the rebuilding of social cohesion rather than the contrary, it appears essential that conditions prerequisite to the shaping of longer term development strategies capable of reversing present trends of social marginalisation and exclusion also be addressed.

The 1960s and 1970s

While a great deal has been written about the early post colonial period of Côte d’Ivoire, notably about the manner to best characterise the ‘planter base’ of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) regime, it is striking to note that such debates went on very much in abstraction for the most part, of other salient more global aspects which help explain the specificity of the Ivorian experience. (Fauré and Médard, 1982). Among the most important dimensions were undoubtedly the following three:

(a). The prolonging of the very close political and economic relations with the former colonial power as illustrated by the unlimited right to repatriate profits, the high percentage of imports and exports concentrated on France, etc.

(b). The decision to base the Ivorian economy on the continued production of export crops (wood until this product was depleted, cocoa and coffee, etc.), following the orientations introduced during the colonial period including the access to large supplies of labour, notably the use of forced labour during the colonial period.

(c). The policy of openness of the country to its neighbours which supplied up to 80 percent of salaried labour for the plantation sector during the first decades of independence. In return for their contribution and to encourage their presence, the first regime (1960-1993) had guaranteed this population from neighbouring Sahelian countries access to health services, to education, to land and the right to vote.

Attention to the very rapid rates of economic growth for which the ‘Ivorian miracle’ came to be known and the role played by the country as a success story and model of the ‘ideology of growth’, diverted attention from the need to scrutinise the conditions on which rested its ‘political stability’ and the growing contradictions between the latter and the specific conditions permitting growth. Interestingly, among the studies which drew attention to the pending difficulties was that of the World Bank which pointed to the declining rates of growth
in the early 1970s and certain potential pitfalls of the growth model. Among these which it characterised as ‘upcoming constraints’, the Report noted the existence of differences in incomes between rural and urban areas, between major rural zones (north and south) and between occupational and educational groups. It underlined as well the country’s heavy reliance on foreign factors, foreign labour and capital. The study concluded that the amounts of foreign production factors ‘cannot continue to grow disproportionately’, and consequently argued for ‘the need for policy change’.

By the end of the 1970s, the limits to the model and its very costly nature were detailed by close observers and notably by Louis Gouffern, (Gouffern, 1982) who drew attention to the links between the pattern of growth and forms of reproduction of power. Gouffern described the latter as a highly asymmetrical mode of social, political and economic regulation in which the state acted in this post-colonial rent economy driven by export-crop production, as the locus and agent in a pattern of selective redistribution which was disconnected from the sphere of production. This type of process had numerous characteristics but central among them was a pattern of income distribution which had little bearing on productivity. This aspect was made possible in large part through the existence of multiple sources of parallel accumulation or ‘coulage’ in the shadow of the state and to the benefit of those who in principle were there to serve it.

At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, rather than restrain the growing gap created by this very costly pattern of growth, the country embarked on a spiral of borrowing which was to make it one of the most indebted, with one of the highest debt rates per capita in Africa by the early 1990s.

The adjustment experience of the 1980s and the 1990s

What is particularly striking is the extent to which the different phases of the adjustment experience (from the standard phase 1981-1987, through the social dimensions phase, to the so-called ‘national’ phase of the early 1990s) failed to address the deeply embedded causes of the structural disequilibrium of which the fiscal crisis of the state was only the most visible manifestation. (Campbell, 2002, 1985). Most interestingly, the measures of stabilisation and adjustment failed to address the constraints identified by the 1978 study commissioned by the World Bank, namely the issue of growing inequalities between regions, the outward flow of resources, the need to intensify agriculture and to reinvest in the plantation sector, etc.

The social and political implications of the adjustment experience were to prove critically important in setting the stage for the political ‘derive’ which was to become increasingly apparent in the 1990s and give rise to the events of 1999. While only some attention has been given to the social dimensions of the adjustment experience, even less has been accorded to its political dimensions.
From the very beginning, the Ivorian adjustment experience has always been an eminently political process in that it has shaped and continues to condition in a narrowing sense, the choice of development strategies open to the country and the means by which these are to be implemented in the domestic sphere, namely the timing and manner in which policies of liberalisation and privatisation were introduced. Ultimately, through these strategies which were largely predetermined by multilateral financial institutions, the adjustment process has conditioned the possibility of the prolonging and renewal of particular modes of social, political and economic regulation.\

In this regard, there appears to have been an interesting correspondence during the first fifteen years of adjustment, between the type of measures proposed and the conditions under which they were introduced on the one hand, and the capacity of those in power to short-circuit them and consequently, their capacity to reproduce and prolong existing forms of political and economic management, on the other hand.

In fact, the capacity to prolong practices which kept critically important circuits of public finance outside of budgetary control was one of the most central characteristics during the first twenty years of the Ivorian adjustment experience. In view of the manner in which the political system operated, the existence not only of economic but also of tight political constraints was to condition the adjustment experience from the beginning. If the hypothesis of the prolonging of a specific mode of political and economic regulation based on selective redistribution is correct, it would contribute not only to explaining in a more satisfactory manner what has been labelled the ‘lateness’ or the ‘failure’ of Ivorian adjustment, but also certain characteristics specific to this process which were all too often described as distortions, dysfunctions, or pathologies and most importantly but largely overlooked, the narrowing of the political base of the regime.

As an example, one could cite the case of the selectivity with which austerity reforms were introduced over the first 15 years of adjustment. This was done in such a way as to leave certain key institutions in the complex circuits of Ivorian public finances unbudgeted (the Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles (Caistab), the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale, the Caisse de Péréquation, etc.), or maintain the ‘non-transparency’, to use L. Demery’s term in his 1994 study of Côte d’Ivoire for the World Bank, as he described the manner in which thirty or so privatisations of public enterprises were undertaken between 1987 and 1989.

With regard to the circumventing of the measures ostensibly introduced to reduce the role of the public sector, Fauré and Contamin have persuasively argued that ‘...there was in fact a convenient coincidence between the need to reduce the scope of state patronage and a political agenda aimed at redistributing the opportunities which remained whilst renewing presidential power. This did not mean that the President was slavishly following a World Bank
agenda; on the contrary, as a close analysis of the fate of the reforms during the 1980s shows, the President in fact spent the decade evading or circumventing the logic of the structural adjustment programmes. Many of the parastatals which were supposed to be abolished under the restructuring programme in fact survived through reintegration into the public service as EPN (Établissements publics nationaux). (Fauré and Contamin, 1990 : p. 37).  

Such a perspective helps to explain the success of the strategies for maintaining power on the part of the dominant alliances until the 1999 coup d’État - in spite of the persistence of patterns of the redistribution of economic resources which appeared rather incompatible with the objectives of economic renewal and financial reform, and this, in spite of the formal broadening of the political arena as of 1990 which, as will be seen, did little to increase public scrutiny.

Over time however, the insistence on the part of multilateral financial institutions for further liberalisation of certain strongholds of the former Bédié ruling faction and notably the circuits of selective redistribution provided by such institutions as the Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, represented an increasingly direct challenge to the past modes of social, political and economic regulation. The growing constraints imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions on those in power are undoubtedly important factors which permit contextualising the “dréve autoritaire” and also political discourse in Côte d’Ivoire during the decade which preceded the military uprising in December 1999.

**Multiparty politics in the context of narrowing political space**

The introduction of multiparty competition as of the 1990s in the absence of clarification of the question of citizenship and constitutional reform, impeded the development of an increasing connectedness of citizens to the decision making process. Related to this key aspect was the apparent disconnection between the severity of the social and economic consequences of adjustment on the one hand, and the formal political discourse which accompanied the electoral campaigns ushered in with electoral competition. During the 1990 campaign for example, in spite of the extensiveness of the liberalisation programmes which led to the halving of official cocoa and coffee producer prices between 1988-89 and 1989-9010, political debates focussed above all on whom would succeed Houphouët Boigny. Beyond the formal level of discourse, what was clearly at stake was the capacity of those in power to retain it, in the context of a weakened capacity to rebuild cohesion due to the narrowing and gradual erosion of their internal power base. In the absence of debates over issues, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) was pushed by the PDCI into looking like an ethno-regional party, agitating over local grievances. As the 1990 campaign developed, according to Richard Crook the FPI’s attacks on the ruling
elite took on a ‘tribalist’ character as the PDCI was portrayed as nothing but a cover for unfair domination by the President’s ethnic group, the Baoulé.\textsuperscript{11}

A very direct challenge to the ruling factions within the PDCI was to come in the form of the threat posed by A. Ouattara’s reform programme of the state’s core patronage system including the leading parastatals such as the Caisse and the companies dependent on state contracts. For over time, the process of liberalisation and privatisation was gradually to open up the possibility on new economic alliances with foreign interests which did not depend on those traditionally in power (Losch, 1999). Consequently, right from the beginning, the ‘politics’ of political liberalisation concerned not so much substantive issues concerning policy objectives, many of which were in fact predetermined by the reform process, but served as a forum of arbitration for control over the management of resource flows among competing political factions. In this regard, although the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) presented itself as being in the real tradition of ‘houphouëtisme’, its claim to resources was based on the political and neo-liberal economic reform programme implemented by Ouattara during his three years in power. Similarly, when the 1995 election campaign took place over March-September of that year, the Front républicain (an alliance among the FPI, the RDR and the Union des forces démocratiques (UDF) of Bamba Moriféré) did not at any point enter into a debate about the merits of its own programme for government but seemed to assume that the supposed exclusion of Ouattara from the election was sufficient justification for people to support the opposition. (Crook, 1997).

During that election, to make things worse for the opposition, not only did the economic situation take a momentary upturn after the devaluation (1994), when coffee prices increased, but also, and not to be discounted, new international credits were made available.

In the absence of substantive debates over issues, the 1995 campaign was based, according to Crook, on the exacerbation of division. To illustrate this, the same observer noted that the FPI’s newspaper \textit{La Voie} adopted the practice of publishing the names, addresses and places of work of the relatives, sons and daughters of Ministers and policemen, presumably as an intimidation tactic and as a guide to its mobs.

Konan Bédié’s continuation in power after the completion of Houphouet-Boigny’s mandate (1993-1995), did nothing to break with the former political logic – quite the contrary.\textsuperscript{12} As Losch notes, the escape route of ‘ethnonationalisme’ and the introduction of the notion of ‘ivoirité’ as a political tool were to significantly narrow the remaining terrain for political debate and renewal:

The President’s lack of political legitimacy that is linked to the absence of electoral competition in the 1995 elections – because of the first exclusion of Ouattara and the boycott by the opposition – the questioning of the economic bases of political power through liberalisation and the disengagement of the State, and the end of the Cold War,
resulted in an ideological drift ('fuite ideologique') of the regime towards ethno-nationalism. The focusing of the political debate on the theme of 'ivoirite', by favouring a repli identitaire (a retreat into identity), has drastically reduced the possibilities for adjustment to the new challenges.\(^\text{13}\)

A further aspect of the introduction of multiparty politics is worth noting. According to Crook and as he demonstrates statistically, it is clear that by February 1996, the combined effect of the exclusion of foreigners from voting, the boycott, the opposition’s disarray and failure in the legislative elections had been to reduce interest in the local elections even below the normal level of apathy, notwithstanding the usual differential between low urban and high rural turn out.\(^\text{14}\)

Against this background of the growing social and economic consequences of the adjustment process, of the subordination in the political arena of substantive issues to divisive electoral strategies which were in fact the expression of the rivalry among competing political factions for power and finally, the tendency towards a certain disaffection on the part of the electorate regarding political processes, two additional characteristics were to mark the political landscape. These were, first, the increasing ‘technicisation’ of the terms in which key social and political issues were to be framed as a result of the nature of the reform process, and second, the increasing instrumentalisation of existing cleavages regarding identity for political ends.

**The 1999 coup and the ‘dérive politique’**

While obviously complex and involving many aspects, it has been argued here that the ‘dérive politique’ has also had among its origins the incapacity of the Ivorian mode of political and social regulation to renew itself. In this regard, although the intransigence of the Bédié government ushered in its overthrow, the contradictory imperatives behind its intransigence remained in place after its fall. Rather than usher in a renewal of political processes, the institutional reforms accompanying the period of political transition, formulated above all in terms of the efficient management of resources and consequently in essentially technical terms, appeared singularly incapable of enlarging the space for political debate. As developed elsewhere in more detail, in spite of the terms in which it was framed, the process of institutional reforms introduced by the Bretton Woods institutions was to have important political implications.\(^\text{15}\)

Political processes have tended to be treated to technical administrative procedures. The result has been to contribute to a ‘depoliticisation’ of political processes which denies the legitimacy of a wide range political objectives, notably government initiatives to put forward redistributive policies which might contribute to promoting greater social equity, cohesion and hence unity.

The consequences of such reforms in situations of political transition take on particularly sensitive implications because of the institutional weaknesses or even political vacuum which characterise such historical processes. Conse-
sequently, while it is in no way the intention here to suggest that the role of international financial institutions (IFI’s) represents the single most critical, or even dominant explanatory factor in accounting for the ‘dérive autoritaire’ which characterised the Ivorian transitional experience, it appears important to draw attention to issues which seem to have been very much overlooked. For certain aspects of the institutional reforms which seek to achieve good governance by treating political institutions, procedures and rules as manageable and essentially technical issues, may well have in fact contributed to the narrowing of political space and to the formalisation of politics. More generally, such an approach may well have contributed to a shifting away from a pluralist model based on a participatory ideal of politics, to a more authoritarian one accompanied by potentially divisive forms of intervention which draw their legitimacy with reference to technocratic ideal.

Two illustrations will be given below to show that such treatment of political issues was in fact a central characteristic of the Ivorian transition period.

First however, it is useful to recall that the tenure of constitutional debates during the transitional period of 2000 was in fact characterised by intense electoral competition between different parties and leaders, the object clearly being that of gaining access to the presidency. Consequently, the different positions taken during the debates over constitutional matters, whether concerning the eligibility of candidates to the presidency or the issue of the distribution of ‘cartes d’identité’ appeared often as the expression of electoral competition in which it became difficult to distinguish ideological differences from political tactics.

Beyond this electoral character which clearly translated an intense struggle for power, a further aspect of debates during the transition may be noted. In the context of considerable economic austerity and very severe financial constraints on public spending, political debates during the transition period appeared oriented not so much towards the results or outcomes to be achieved through public policies, but rather towards the issue of the management of resources. The two examples which follow are quite striking of a broader phenomenon – the technicisation and hence the de-politicisation of the manner in which social and political issues increasingly became cast.

In late April 2000, the transition government’s Minister of Youth and Sports, General Mathias Doué, announced that in the future, his policies would rest on three priorities: communication, transparency and accountability. In view of the absence of public funds, he favoured “developing new partnership between the state and the private sector in which the latter would progressively take the relay in the financing and promotion of sports, while the State would limit itself to instituting the regulatory framework and providing the necessary incentives”. What was striking in this declaration was the extension of the language of good management of public affairs and a call for the privatisation of responsibilities which formerly rested with the state, applied as well to other
social and economic issues such as social exclusion and poverty. For, according to the same source, ‘The eradication of the phenomenon of street children is among the expected results of this reform. Because’, continued the General, ‘we do not want any more begging’.17

The issue at stake here is that the absence of necessary resources, of a margin of political manoeuvre, debate and popular scrutiny over decisions concerning issues as deeply rooted as the origins of children begging and child poverty, appear as important factors helping to shape the formulation and the nature of state interventions adopted to resolve them. This example appears to illustrate the possibility of using the language of good governance in an attempt to justify interventions aimed at making the symptoms of deep social problems disappear notably, by introducing repressive measures, rather than attempting to deal with the origins of such problems.

In this regard, the role of multilateral financial institutions in shaping the conditions for political transition merits underlining. Throughout the transition period, in spite of mounting social difficulties, these organisations and notably the IMF maintained policies of extreme austerity while calling for good governance and budgetary discipline.18

A second, quite different example may also serve to illustrate the apparent narrowing of the political space or the ‘informalisation’19 of political issues which appears to result from the attempt to treat these as essentially technical matters. It concerns the critical issue of Ivoirian identity or the notion of citizenship in this country.

During the constitutional debates of 2000, it came as a surprise to certain observers that the leader of the Front populaire ivoirien, Laurent Gbagbo, should side with President Guéï in adopting a restrictive notion citizenship (and potentially a very politically divisive one), as illustrated by the criteria for candidates to the presidency. Again, L. Gbagbo was to side with President Guéï in endorsing the new Constitution during the July referendum rather than calling for a boycott of this event.20

The FPI’s position on issues of citizenship and immigration was summarised in an interview with L. Gbagbo. Responding to a question in which he was asked whether immigration was an advantage or a handicap, the leader of the FPI who came to power after the presidential elections of October 22nd, replied:

As in all countries which have had immigrants, it is first an advantage and today, it is a handicap. We are going to create an office of immigration which will have a technical role for it is not a problem which concerns politicians (‘un problème politique’).21 (My translation).22

The point in citing these two examples is not to debate the merits of the position taken by a particular party or political leader concerning a particular question but to draw attention to the adoption of the language of management in addressing highly political issues. The more general question which must be asked is why there occurred such a drastic narrowing of political space and why such a
specific and restrictive pattern of political transition was to come about? How can one explain the narrowing of political channels or places for debate beyond those essentially devoted to electoral competition and a managerialist approach to political process? How can one explain the process of the informalisation of politics, of pushing politics on to the streets or underground?

Far from wanting to suggest that there are simple answers to these questions, this contribution has attempted to suggest the need to take into consideration the multiple dimensions specific to the Ivorian political and economic heritage. While these are complex and include, as suggested in the introduction, the impact of the country’s continuing strong political, military and economic ties with France, notably throughout the post independence period, the country’s position in the region, and the key role of the multilateral financial institutions as of the 1980s, what has been emphasised here, is the importance of contextualising developments since the 1990s within this broader heritage and particularly in the light of the process of economic and institutional reform which has brought such profound changes to the country.

Concerning the latter, the manner in which the reform process has been conceptualised by the Bretton Woods institutions over the last decades, namely in terms of a technical approach aimed at improving the efficiency of the management of resources, contributed to reducing the possibilities for a renewal of public debate permitting the emergence of a badly needed consensus around common values and objectives and hence, the re-appropriation of debates concerning the goal of the reform process itself.

More precisely, the notion of political process put forward by multilateral financial institutions as being synonymous with multiparty electoral competition, and the essentially functionalist and instrumentalist notion of the state, introduced the problematic idea that organisational changes of an institutional nature would of themselves improve efficiency and the performance of government. In this context, political processes are reduced to technical administrative procedures. The result becomes a ‘depoliticisation’ of political processes, which denies the legitimacy of a wide range of political objectives, notably government initiatives to promote redistribution, social equity, national unity and to advance human rights, including economic and social rights of their citizens. For as J. Coussy suggests:

The assertion that there exist ‘indisputable’ norms which flow inevitably from economic theory, is the principal rhetorical method used by foreign advisers to dispossess states of that which explains the very essence of political power (that is, their capacity to undertake negotiations and to propose compromises depending on the objectives pursued and existing relations of power).33 (My translation).

With regard to the silence over political issues, it is of note for example, that the poorly managed liberalisation of the cocoa sector, characterised as such by external sources (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Côte d’Ivoire, 1st Quarter 2000) and which provoked the anger of farmer growers who went as
far as to go on strike, did not become a very central object of political debates or demands during the key period of political transition. In the absence of political space and necessary resources permitting a break with past modes of social, economic and political regulation and in view of the constraints on the emergence of alternative approaches to the management of the country’s key resource base, the political arena remained the site of struggle among competing factions for control of power. The emphasis on such forms of electoral competition not only stifled debate over more fundamental issues but in so doing, impeded the possibility of the renewal of the social and political compromises and coalitions constructed around the notion of common interests and the broadening of the social and political basis of power. The resulting process of fracturing – of which the potential ingredients were apparent many years before – exacerbated by the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s in the absence of constitutional reforms with regard to such key notions as that of citizenship and the electoral code, contributed to the ‘derive’ the consequences of which are now all too well known, pitting northerners against southerners, ‘foreigners’ against ‘nationals’, etc.

Conclusion

While the issues raised here are complex, multi-faceted and clearly require much more work in order to deepen our analysis concerning their nature and interrelation, this contribution has tried to suggest that a key element to understanding the current ‘dérive politique’ is the need to reset the analysis of the deep and growing rural and social crisis which has characterised the last two decades of Côte d’Ivoire and the legitimacy of the unanswered demands to which it has given rise, within the perspective of the fundamental redefining of political space and processes in the post colonial period and particularly over the 1990s.

To summarise all too generally, the latter transformations have entailed the distancing from a situation of relative internal political legitimacy which the first régime drew from its leadership in the colonial struggle and notably that to end forced labour and in which issues were formulated in political terms. There appears to have occurred a gradual narrowing of political space as the legitimacy of development options, formulated in increasingly technocratic terms, came to rest increasingly outside the country and on external resources and in which the political arena remained the locus for the competition among rival factions vying for the control over resource flows. The result appears to have contributed to the de-politicisation of key issues (poverty and citizenship) that were increasingly treated as issues of good management, pushing politics into the backrooms and onto the streets.

It is against such a background of political transformation and increasing discontent arising from an unresolved social and rural crisis, factors which together produce propitious conditions for potential instrumentalisation of
legitimate political demands along divisive lines, that the current ‘dérive politique’ must be set. Consequently, if lasting political solutions are to be found based on the emergence of new social compromises which permit the rebuilding of social cohesion rather than the contrary, it appears essential that conditions prerequisite to the shaping of longer term development strategies capable of reversing present trends of social marginalisation and exclusion must also be addressed.

Notes

1. Among the recent exceptions to such a perspective is the work of Bruno Losch and his use of the notion of ‘complexe’. See ‘Le complexe café-cacao de la Côte d’Ivoire. Une relecture de la trajectoire ivoirienne’, 2 volumes. Thèse doctorale, Université de Montpellier 1, December 1999.


5. This argument is developed in Campbell, B. (2002). ‘Political Dimensions of the Adjustment Experience of Côte d’Ivoire’, in Critical Political Studies: Debates and Dialogue from the Left, Edited by Abigail Bakan and Eleanor MacDonald, Montréal, McGill-Queen’s Press.


7. ‘Public enterprise reform changed gear in the 1987-91 period, with greater emphasis placed on divestiture, and not simply on restructuring. Between 1987 and 1989 almost 30 public enterprises were privatized. Several divestiture techniques were used, usually involving direct negotiations with potential buyers. These privatizations were conducted with little transparency, and little strategic study was pursued prior to privatization. In short, the privatizations were not well managed’, Demery, Lionel (1994), ‘Côte d’Ivoire : fettered adjustment’, in Adjustment in Africa, Vol. 2, Lessons from Country Case Studies, (ed.). U. Husain et R. Faruquee, Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 101-102. When the privatisation of Energie Electrique de la Côte d’Ivoire took place in November 1990 and the Compagnie Ivoirienne d’ Électricité was created in which 51 percent of shares were to go to SAUR, a subsidiary of Bouygues, it would appear that certain members of the government sub-committee responsible for privatisations were directly involved in the purchase of shares via certain investment committees. This inci-
dent suggested to certain British observers the existence of an ‘Old boy network’ actively in place in the distribution of shares and goods which had previously belonged to the public sector. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Côte d’Ivoire, Country Report, no. 4, 1991, pp. 14-15.


9. In view of the generalised nature of the haemorrhaging of public funds, the pervasive nature of such practices which were to continue throughout the adjustment period, were a secret to no one and consequently could hardly have been unknown to the country’s principal bilateral and multilateral creditors. In the months following the 1999 coup, in the context of the visits organised by President Guéi, the Ivorian press revealed the state of advancement of the Herculean construction projects undertaken by former President Bédié in his native village, Daoukro, in 1997, in the very middle of the country’s financial crisis and estimated the cost at approximately one hundred billion CFA francs. The press also underlined the size of the home of the former Minister of the Economy and Finance, Niamien N’Goran at Pépréssou. Fraternité Matin, Abidjan, No. 10653, 29-30 April-1 May, 2000, p.2.


12. B. Losch has argued that the ‘dérapage politique’ in the Côte d’Ivoire may also be as interpreted as a belated manifestation of the pressures built up during the years of solitary rule of the country’s first President. As this observer notes, the alliance with French colonial interests in the 1950s, the elimination of opponents as of 1958, the instituting of a single party régime as of 1960, the arbitrary use of disgrace and rehabilitation, are at the origin of a ‘logic de cour’ which made impossible the emergence of debates concerning the alternative forms of government and the future of the country. The same author argues that up until 1990, Ivorian political life was essentially characterised by in-fighting aimed at conquering or consolidating positions of power within the ruling party, the Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). The latter served as the ‘passage obligé’ in order to hold public office, be it a high rank within the civil service or in a state owned company. Bruno Losch, ‘L’impasse ivoirienne’, Annual 2000 Report of the Observatoire permanent de la Coopération française, Paris, Karthala, 2000. pp.201-212.

13. Ibid. p.208.


17. Ibid., p.12.

18. According to a press release of AFP dated September 8, 2000, further to its meeting on July 12th, the Administrative Council of the IMF made public the following communiqué concerning the situation in Côte d’Ivoire: ‘Les membres (du Conseil) regrettent vivement l’accumulation d’arriérés (sur la dette) et ont souligné la nécessité de normaliser les relations avec les créanciers aussi vite que possible’. Le FMI a pour l’instant suspendu le versement d’une deuxième tranche d’un prêt au titre de l’ajustement structurel accordé en mars 1998. Le Conseil d’administration ‘a noté avec préoccupation que les conditions économiques et financières de la Côte d’Ivoire se sont considérablement aggravées dans un climat de tension politique et sociale.’ Le FMI regrette notamment les ‘dérapages importants dans l’application de politiques, notamment en matière de gouvernance et de discipline budgétaire’.


20. ‘Laurent Gbagbo, principal opposant ivoirien, mais rallié au gouvernement de transition: L’armée veut nous conduire au piège’, in *Libération*, Paris, September 26, 2000, p.14. One possible interpretation of the FPI’s position rests on electoral considerations which suggest that, just as for General Guéï, approval of the new Constitution would exclude A. Ouattara, the leader of the RDR from the presidential race.

21. Ibid.

22. Interestingly, this position is in striking contrast to the much more inclusive approach to national identity based on cultural diversity which one finds in the FPI’s political programme published in 1998 and prefaced by Laurent Gbagbo: ‘La culture nationale désigne deux choses en même temps: la somme de toutes les cultures locales ou ethniques, la communauté des valeurs, des institutions et des pratiques qui font l’unité, réflétie et assumée propre aux Ivoiriens et reliant le présent au passé. Enfin, pour que cette culture nationale, moderne et africaine, participe du socialisme démocratique, il faut que participe à sa création, à son épanouissement et à sa consommation toute la société de telle sorte que la société à majorité inculte, assujettie et pauvre, devienne, à terme, une société à majorité cultivée, libre et riche parce qu’aisée sinon opulente’. (In italics in the text).

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Other publications:


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