DEBATES

From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa

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The Great Day
HURRAH for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.
— W. B. Yeats

Following the events at the time of writing during early 2002 in Zimbabwe, the above lines from a poem created in another time and context seem to suggest that certain mechanisms and processes of societies in transition show similarities even in very different circumstances. Having said this, it is also clear that the following reflections do not characterise patterns of genuine — in the sense of exclusively — ‘African’ nature. They happen to be reproduced under the current set of circumstances in parts of Southern Africa as an aftermath to decolonisation processes emerging from a certain structural constellation shaped by a historic legacy. Nothing more, but nothing less. But enough to justify a critique of dominant political cultures and to question patterns of rule.2

With the gaining of political power by liberation movements in the previous Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990, the final decolonisation of the African continent took its course. In 1994, a democratic political system under a lawfully elected ANC government was established in South Africa. The change from internationally ostracised minority regimes to sovereign state structures legitimised under international law had finally been completed. During this process the main goal was to obtain the right to self-determination, while the democratic reform of the countries’ societies was given not the same priority. Against this background, this contribution will not claim to provide any recipes or ‘democratic solutions’, but seeks to offer some thought-provoking input to further reflections on the current socio-political environment and its constraints in terms of good governance issues.3

Prologue

There is no need to re-invent the wheel for the purpose of this article. It merely suggests that the post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges
already described earlier on by various open and thereby critically minded scholars and writers on the continent. One of them, who had done so convincingly by means of what is in many ways a revolutionary novel has been Artur Carlos Maurício Pestana. He published the notes he collected in 1971 during his participation in the guerrilla war in the rainforest (the ‘mayombe’) of the Cabinda front in Angola for the MPLA under his nom de guerre. As a narrative it offers a remarkable degree of sensitivity and insight into the complexity (and limits) of social transformation subsequent to a situation of armed resistance against foreign occupation. During its course, the commander of the guerrilla unit (‘Fearless’) explains to the political commissar (‘New World’), for whom he ultimately sacrifices his life in battle, in a revealing dialogue:

We don’t share the same ideals, (...) You are the machine type, one of those who is going to set up the unique, all-powerful Party in Angola. I am the type who could never belong to the machine. (...) One day, in Angola, there will no longer be any need for rigid machines, and that is my aim. (...) what I want you to understand, is that the revolution we are making is half the revolution I want. But it is the possible. I know my limits and the country’s limits. My role is to contribute to this half-revolution. (...) I am, in your terminology, adventurist. I should like the discipline of war to be established in terms of man and not the political objective. My guerrillas are not a group of men deployed to destroy the enemy, but a gathering of different, individual beings, each with his subjective reasons to struggle and who, moreover, behave as such. (...) I am happy when I see a young man decide to build himself a personality, even if politically that signifies individualism. (...) I cannot manipulate men, I respect them too much as individuals. For that reason, I cannot belong to a machine. (Pepetela 1996: p. 197 and 198)

This conversation is more than fiction. It sets the parameters and social constraints for several post-colonial societies in Southern Africa with a history of armed resistance against settler colonialism.

The transformation of political rule

Governments were formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements, which had indeed been far from non-violent. They took over control of the state machinery and reorganised themselves as political parties. They claimed their legitimacy to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation process as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then, with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further organised physical violence, as the case of Matabeleland illustrates most prominently), they have been able to strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state. This is true even if, as in Zimbabwe at present it can be seen that these governments will not last forever.

The social transformation in these Southern African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand, however, can at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to changed control and is hence similar to processes that took place elsewhere on the continent (see for their characterisation Ottaway 1997). The result is a ruling new political elite operating from commanding heights
shaped in and based upon the particular context of the post-Apartheid societies by selective narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence constructing or inventing new traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces (see Kriger 1995 and Werbner 1998b for Zimbabwe; and Melber 2002 for Namibia). The mystification of the liberators plays an essential role in this fabrication. Hence, as Werbner (1998a:p. 2) reasons: ‘The critique of power in contemporary Africa calls for a theoretically informed anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities. The need is to rethink our understanding of the force of memory, its official and unofficial forms, its moves between the personal and the social in postcolonial transformation’.

The situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion in terms of the postcolonial national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that the declared notions of national reconciliation and the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ are not always receiving the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and permissiveness. Politically correct identity is instead defined increasingly by those in power along narrow lines of (self-)definition and (self-)understanding. As Yap has remarked in the case of Zimbabwe: ‘whilst power relations had changed, perceptions of power had not changed. The layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and memory, continued to operate. .... actors had changed, however, the way in which the new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of “citizens” ruling the “subjects” are repeated and reproduced’. (Yap 2001: p. 312-313; original emphasis)

This is reflected in a dichotomy of polarised perceptions along the we-they divide. If you are not with the liberator (as represented by the movement now party and state), you are considered to be an enemy. Given the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a factual one-party system subordinating the state (see McGregor 2002 for Zimbabwe) and the growing equation of the party being the government and the government being the state, any opposition or dissent is considered to be hostile and branded as an enemy to the people and the national interest.

The goal of the struggle was national liberation defined as political independence in a sovereign state under a government representing the majority of the previously colonised people, who were excluded from full participation in society through the imposed Apartheid system. The power of definition concerning the post-colonial system of political governance was exercised during this process mainly by the national liberation movement in interaction with the international system represented by a variety of competing actors under the polarised conditions of superpower rivalry during the 1970s and 1980s. This also implies that the struggle had clear dimensions of exile politics and took also place in terms of international diplomacy. In her comprehensive analysis,
Dobell (1998: 23) proposes that ‘Namibia provides a particularly fascinating case study of the gradual dismantling of a century of colonial rule, and its ultimate replacement – through democratic means, and monitored by external powers – by a movement which, some would argue, had in certain respects come to resemble the forces against which it had originally struggled’.

The independence process resulted first and foremost in an internationally monitored and legitimated transfer of political power. That the political power exercised by and large met the definitions and expectations of a democratic political system was a desired result but not the main goal. After all, the democratically elected representatives of the population should have the discretion and power to decide themselves upon the character of the political system. The liberation struggle was understood and perceived foremost as the right to self-determination of the population on the basis of free and fair general elections. Once achieved, the task of formulating further specifications was left to those policy makers who emerged as representatives of the electorate as a result of such elections. It was therefore not democratisation, which was the priority on the agenda, but decolonisation. From a logical point of view this is an understandable approach, since there is no democracy under colonialism. Hence only a decolonisation process provides the necessary framework for democratisation.

Both formal independence and a similarly formal democratic system have been achieved to some extent in a parallel process at the same time. But it is important to note that the goals are neither identical nor necessarily congruent. One might argue that the principles agreed upon by the parties prior to the elections undertaken in the cases of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1989) and South Africa (1994) were a prerequisite for the implementation of a joint conflict resolution process and served as an agreed framework and point of departure for the foundations of the newly established state authority. They were in all three cases characterised by a notion of plural democracy. Others might counter-argue, however, that the democratic notion was designed to maintain a status quo under a controlled change in terms of securing the existing property relations and former privileges by those who benefited from the minority rule. Along these lines, Dobell (1998:p. 104) suggests for Namibia, that ‘the nature of the transition process itself should be treated as an independent variable, which served to institutionalize democratic political structures (...) while simultaneously helping to construct perhaps insurmountable obstacles to the extension of political democracy to social and economic institutions’.

But what has been maintained with reference to the subsequent changes in the South African neighbour country, applies as much to the original scenario in the Zimbabwean and Namibian case: ‘South African society, with its massive inequalities, racial and ethnic sensitivities and authoritarian legacies, is hardly an ideal environment for textbook liberal democracy. However although South Africa may not have the democracy it deserves, it may well
have the democracy that it can sustain’. (Schrire 2001:p. 148) The word of
warning from Hyden needs also to be kept in mind (2000:p. 19): ‘Applying the
principles of good governance to post-conflict situations is taking them to a
new frontier, where the unknowns prevail’. He therefore urges for caution and
prudence as salient attributes of any approach by the international community
to promoting reconciliation and democratisation in post-conflict situations.
This touches at the same time upon the aspect of democratisation as ‘a transi-
tional phenomenon involving a gradual, mainly elite-driven transformation of
the formal rules that govern a political system’. This process is thus ‘not an
end-game; rather, it is a means to an end, which is democracy’ (Gros 1998:p. 2).

Liberation without democracy?
The post-colonial politics of the ruling parties often displays a blatant lack of
democratic awareness, together with forms of neo-patrimonial systems. A
recent case study on Mozambique suggests that notwithstanding the three elec-
tions conducted between 1994 and 1999, ‘they have not been accompanied by a
steady institutionalisation and “Mocambicanisation” of democratic values,
norms and rules”. Instead, since 1999, the country endures a permanent politi-
cal crisis’. (Braathen/Orre 2001:p. 200 and 201). Trends of an erosion of demo-
cratic values and norms despite the existence of institutions and a canon of
virtues as enshrined by the Constitution are visible in the Namibian context (see
Melber 2000 and 2001a) – though not yet with similarly devastating results.
Tendencies to autocratic rule and the subordination of the state under the party,
as well as politically motivated social and material favours as a reward system
for loyalty or disadvantages as a form of coercion in cases of dissent, are obvi-
ous techniques. The political rulers’ penchant for self-enrichment with the help
of a rent- or sinecure-capitalism goes with the exercise of comprehensive con-
trols to secure the continuance of their rule. Accordingly, the term ‘national
interest’ means solely what they say it means. Based on the rulers’ (self-)per-
ception, individuals and groups are allowed to participate in, or are excluded
from, nation-building. The ‘national interest’ hence serves the purpose ‘to jus-
tify all kinds of authoritarian practice’ and allows that “anti-national” or “unpa-
triotic” can be defined basically as any group that resists the power of the ruling
elite of the day’ (Harrison 2001:p. 391). Such selective mechanisms of the
exercise and retention of power have little or nothing to do with democratic
principles, but much in common with the commando structures that emerged
during the days of the liberation struggle, especially in exile. As a South Afri-
can political activist summarised the sobering experiences (Kadali 2001):
‘Many of my former comrades have become loyal to a party rather than to prin-
ciples of justice. (…) Unfortunately it is true that those who have been
oppressed make the worst democrats. There are recurring patterns in the behav-
ior of liberation parties – when they come to power they uphold the most
undemocratic practices.’
In the meantime, in view of the sobering experiences which followed the initial euphoria over attaining sovereignty under international law, critical voices are mounting, including among those who followed and supported the liberation struggles with great sympathy or even as active supporters (Saul 1999, Melber 2001a). There is a growing tendency to analyse critically the processes by which victims in the role of liberation fighters became perpetrators (cf. Lamb 2001). Breaking the taboos in this regard is necessary in a debate, which deals increasingly with the content of liberation, and reflects (if not questions) the concept of solidarity of past years and marks the end of the cultivation of ‘heroic narratives’ (cf. Harrison 2001:p. 390 and Kössler/Melber 2002). The much-celebrated attainment of formal independence is no longer being equated with liberation, and certainly not with the creation of lasting democracy. There are increasing attempts to investigate the structural legacies, which in most cases set far too narrow limits to realising societal alternatives in the post-colonial countries. There is a growing insight that the armed liberation struggles were in no way a suitable breeding ground for establishing democratic systems of government after gaining independence. The forms of resistance against totalitarian regimes were themselves organised on strictly hierarchical and authoritarian lines, otherwise they could hardly have had any prospect of success. In this sense, the new societies carried within them essential elements of the old system against which they had fought. Thus aspects of the colonial system reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions. They share the binary view of the colonial discourse of the past (Ashcroft 2001:p. 21).

The result of such general conditions is that the new system has little transparency. Those in power are at best prepared to be accountable only to themselves as a new elite in the making, which cares more about external support and little about a notion of popular democracy (Good 2002). There is a lack of critical faculties and extremely limited willingness to accept divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed publicly. Nonconformist thinking is interpreted as disloyalty, if not equated with treason. But the marginalisation or elimination of dissent limits drastically the new system’s capability for reform and innovation. A culture of fear, intimidation and keeping silent reduces the possibilities of durable renewal at the cost of the public weal. In the long term, this means the rulers are themselves undermining their credibility and legitimacy.

The former liberation fighters also have an expiry date (at least biologically). That applies not only to the groups themselves but also to their potential clientele among the people, as the example of Zimbabwe shows. So cultivating the myth of the liberators is not enough for orderly conduct of government business. Thus the rulers’ restriction of their coteries to their own groups of functionaries from the days of the liberation struggles, as still can be seen today, is
counterproductive. It is motivated primarily by the wish to reproduce kindred spirits in a cosy and familiar milieu. As a criterion for classification this has less to do with the concrete political-ideological persuasion of the party-liners than with their similar perception of politics, which is based on common personality structures and features of an authoritarian character. In this context, resolute democratic outlooks and convictions are hardly to be recommended.

**Does power corrupt?**

Similar mechanisms can be seen in many other societies around the world that are regarded as democratic states. That power corrupts is by no means a solely African truism. Nor that giving up power – even in democratically anchored and regulated conditions with a long tradition – is difficult for many once they have had a taste of it.

Nonetheless, it might be more than a coincidence that it was precisely in Southern Africa that the ‘Third Term Movement’ founded by Namibia’s President Nujoma arose. True, Zambia’s President Chilubaba was unable to continue it, but Malawi’s President Muluzi can be seen as another brash aspirant for a third term. A principle enshrined in the country’s constitution which limits tenure to two terms of office is to be repealed by means of a parliamentary majority. In formal terms, such a procedure can be regarded as legal. But legitimacy also has moral and ethical dimensions, which require respect as part of the lasting consolidation of democratic rule: ‘Legitimacy without morality’, as Seepe (2002) recently titled a critique of the South African government, ‘subverts democracy’.

The argument used to support extending the mandate of heads of state armed with sweeping executive powers – that only an incumbent can maintain the continuity of reasonably stable political conditions – unintentionally signals a lack of democracy. In reality, a sustainable democracy calls for the consolidation of socially institutionalised and legal frameworks, which enable the process of open political communication regardless of the persons in power (Abbink 2000:p. 7). The challenge lies exactly there. The real test of a democracy is how peacefully and constitutionally a country carries out a change in its political leadership (Hughes/Mills 2001).

More than forty years ago, the Martinique born psychiatrist and political revolutionary, Frantz Fanon, who had joined the Algerian liberation struggle, described in his manifesto *The Wretched of the Earth* presciently the internal contradictions and limits to emancipation in anti-colonial resistance and organised liberation movements. Writing at a time when the Algerian war of liberation had not even ended Fanon prophesied the abuse of government power after attainment of independence and in the wake of establishing a one-party state. In a chapter entitled ‘The Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ he predicted that the state, which by its robustness and at the same time its restraint should convey trust, disarm and calm, foists itself on people in a spectacular way, makes a big
show of itself, harasses and mistreats the citizens and by this means shows that they are in permanent danger (Fanon 2001:p. 132). He continues by criticising the abuse of power exercised by the party, which ‘controls the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline. (...) The political party, ... instead of welcoming the expression of popular discontentment, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen and forbids such ideas’. (Fanon 2001:p. 146 and 147) The growing blending of party, government and state among the ‘liberation movements in power’ indicates a very similar development in the post-apartheid era of Southern Africa.

The specific constellation based on the use of force to gain liberation from undemocratic and repressive conditions like those that prevailed in the colonial societies of Southern Africa was hardly favourable for the durable strengthening of humanitarian values and norms. As part of abolishing anachronistic, degrading systems of rule it created new challenges on the difficult path to establishing sound and robust egalitarian structures and institutions, and in particular to promoting democratically-minded people. But independence without democracy is still far from being liberation.

As Fanon (2001:p. 165) further argued: ‘The national government, if it wants to be national, ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts. No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government, before concerning itself about international prestige, ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein’.

**Challenges to civil society actors**

The governments of the post-Apartheid states – at this stage of writing at least in Namibia and South Africa – are, in contrast to the previous minority regimes, beyond any doubt broadly legitimate. In the context of a political culture claiming to be committed to the values and virtues of pluralism in a liberal or even popular democracy, critical voices should however not automatically be associated with disloyalty to the existing system. After all, this has been one of the aims of a struggle against the totalitarian regimes previously in place – to abandon the intolerant authoritarianism shaping the colonial societies under minority rule and to allow for a variety of views. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the common and accepted understanding of many of those in control of political power in post-Apartheid societies, who seem to feel mainly ‘accountable to themselves’ (Good 1997). While the existing political orders are able to claim in contrast to the preceding minority regimes a democratic legitimacy among the overwhelming majority of the population, they often fail to recognise the
difference between a formal and a moral legitimacy. In other words, the mere fact that one is formally entitled to take certain decisions and actions on behalf of others without further consultation, does not always justify such decisions or actions from a moral or ethical point of view.

As part of the historical legacy, those who were fighting against institutionalised discrimination and oppression under totalitarian structured societies tend to resort to similar mechanisms of control once in power themselves. They are tempted to marginalise those who beg to differ or are perceived as different from the accepted norms under the newly imposed discourse of nation building. Regarding the background to this disturbing phenomenon, the Managing Editor of the South African daily Business Day has characterised intolerance as one of post-colonial Africa’s most chronic diseases. Malunga (2000:p. 7-8) states that ‘It is always going to be difficult for people who were oppressed for almost five centuries not to be paranoid and think that every criticism of them is fanned by the erstwhile oppressors’. But notwithstanding this difficulty, he concludes ‘If Africa is to outgrow the quagmire caused by paranoia about criticism, which rears its head with monotonous regularity, it first needs to do a rigorous interrogation of itself before pointing outside. We should throw out the mentality that says, “If you are not with us, you are against us”.’

None less than the charismatic leader and elder statesman Nelson Mandela (2001) could afford to explicitly support such a permissive and open minded approach towards enhancing a vibrant civil society in an interview with the Mail & Guardian: ‘We must welcome differences of opinion. They will always be there. One of the most effective weapons in dealing with different opinions is tolerance—the ability to take criticism and not personalise it, even if a prominent individual is specifically identified and becomes a target for criticism. Tolerance is one of the best ways to solve major national issues’.

The then Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town argued in her address to a graduating ceremony at the Faculty of Humanities in December 2000 strongly in support of a position that defines loyalty as an identification with values and norms. ‘Responsible citizenship is not just about the observance of laws, it is about protecting the foundations of democratic society. There must be a culture of robust open and public debate, tolerance of different viewpoints and people with the courage of their convictions to express their views, even if these might not be popular’. According to her, ‘courage is the most important virtue, the foundation that underlies and gives reality to all other virtues and personal values. Without courage we become conformists’. (Ramphel2000) This understanding reminds us of the powers of civil courage and civil disobedience as a relevant engine for social change. After all, it could well be argued that without non-conformity Apartheid might still exist. On the other hand the end of Apartheid is not the end of history. While the challenge today is not to overthrow legitimate political systems and structures by illegitimate means, the task remains to improve society in favour of more justice,
equality and humanity. There is wide scope in any given society of this world—
including those in Southern Africa— for such efforts.

Epilogue

In Namibia’s capital Windhoek, the Robert Mugabe Avenue starts at a corner
of Nelson Mandela Avenue. It later crosses the Laurent Desiré Kabila Street
(probably the only one, at least outside of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in this world). The Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe Avenue are
both intersected by the Sam Nujoma Drive. This unique constellation of a
remarkably symbolic road network is a tempting scenario for a diversity of
interpretations. It might be enough here to simply conclude, however, that it
illustrates the variety of options current political leaders—particularly in the
(Southern) African context—have at their hands with regard to the ultimate
course of their careers.

Notes

1. I am grateful to my colleague Bawa Yamba who made me aware of this verse.
2. I take the liberty of doing so not from the position of a ‘fence sitter’: In 1974 I had
joined SWAPO of Namibia as a son of German immigrants and was subsequently
banned from entering Namibia and South Africa until 1989 and 1993 respectively.
3. By doing so, I take the liberty to ‘recycle’ arguments previously presented in vari-
ous other contributions (see Melber 2000, 2001a, 2001b and 2002) in a modified
context.

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