Malls in Zambia: Racialised retail expansion and South African foreign investors in Zambia

Introduction

Urban areas in both the North and the South have always had some degree of minor retail element present in their residential areas, either in the form of the corner convenience store or the local spaza shop. However, since the 1960s, and primarily in the cities of the North, there has been the conscious development of planned retail and also business centres in suburban areas. This has come about in response to CBD congestion, traffic problems, the desire to be accessible to consumers, increasing affluence and new investment opportunities (Reimers and Clulow, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2004). What has been witnessed is the ‘phenomenal growth of ever-larger suburban shopping malls with more and more diversified selections and endlessly varied, upscale, and niche-targeted merchandise (which) has curtailed and severely diminished CBD retailing’ (Kaplan, et al., 2004, 143). From the 1970s, large, regional malls started to emerge in the USA and from the 1980s they started to acquire leisure and entertainment functions which once again often had negative effects on CBD areas (Pacione, 2001). Recent, more diversified retail and business centres have been describe by Hall (2001) as constituting a new phenomenon by becoming ‘edge cities’.

Despite the evident Northern bias, largely as a result of wealth differences, as Erkip (2005) notes, shopping malls now appear to be part of a global trend. In the cities of the South, there is evidence of decentralization and suburbanization, but it is not yet happening on a major scale (Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 1998). The increasing resurgence of the market mechanism/private sector in land markets of the cities of the South since the 1980s is clearly playing a role in this trend (Devas and Rakodi, 1993). While it does seem incongruous that in cities characterised by mass poverty that post-modern, up-market retail and leisure complexes are emerging, this is the reality of the commodification of urban space and services globally. In one of the most detailed critiques of retail decentralization in the South, Marks and Bezzoli (2001) offer a critique of the artificiality of the Century City complex in Cape Town which they see as occupying ‘fictitious space, insulated from the troubles beyond its borders’ (Marks and Bezzoli, 2001, 27), creating ‘a new city state within the city, a space of exclusion and privilege’ (Marks and Bezzoli, 2001, 37). Given the mass poverty which prevails in Cape Town, they correctly identify the existence of a ‘contradiction between public discourses on urban integration and equitable development and the reality of hard-nosed capitalism’ (Marks and Bezzoli, 2001, 43). Over time and with the bedding of fixed investment, it is inevitable that ‘through the production of fixed and immobile spatial configurations (transport systems, and so on)’ (Harvey, 2001, 327), greater levels of apparent inequality will be impressed upon urban societies in the South.
When the era of neo-liberal regionalism descended on Southern Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, a motley quilt of trading relations stretching across the region beckoned its reinvigoration from foreign investors. Active agents of this new wave of African ‘modernization’ were South African retail multinationals. Wittingly or unwittingly, the South African retailers followed the path of European colonial traders who inscribed the earlier geographies of retail in the region. Unlike the little trading stores of the earlier colonials, however, the post-Apartheid retailers brought in their wake a more recent retail phenomenon – the shopping mall. Extending these malls to fifteen foreign African countries, the South Africans superimposed these new centres on the decayed urban infrastructure of older African cities. The ‘cathedrals of consumption’ (Jaumain and Crossick, 1999) had arrived in Africa, catapulting the old department stores, the little trading shops and the larger state-owned wholesale stores into the competitive new global world of food retailing. Sporting these new retail conglomerations, African cities now unevenly mirrored the consumptive environments of the ‘North’. These shopping malls enmesh the region in Ferguson’s ‘African connect’, where foreign investments connect the continent to the global economy but do so in a ‘globe-hopping’ way, producing an extractive neo-liberalism that fails to effectively integrate most Africans into the world of goods and services (Ferguson, 2006, 49). The Southern African region has embraced a new kind of regional development, namely the expansion of South African retailing. However there have also been a variety of local responses that challenge the overwhelming presence of South African investors in African retailing since the 1990s.

What does this new era of retailing mean for Zambians and the region more generally? In this article we try to show that, while South African capital’s expansion is a powerful, regional manoeuvre that dispossesses as it accumulates; it is by no means rolling over the torpid remnants of a post-Independence battlefield. Class contestations shape and reshape the South African economic expansion in retail. Local entrepreneurs, investors, workers and farmers resist the imperial impetus in South Africa’s post-Apartheid regional expansion. Workers, farmers, local entrepreneurs and even local investors, in the form of minority share-holders, have contested the South African-led retail expansion. Regional and continental contestations around retail and other expansions abound, ranging from Nigerian local farmers who want to burn down Shoprite stores, to Egyptian retailers who eschew a company that will not play Arabic prayers during Friday prayer time, to the Shoprite workers who claimed equal status with their South African counterparts (Miller, 2005).

While the retail and shopping mall expansion helps to create an overwhelming South African presence on the continent, we suggest that the region is not South Africa’s to claim. Following on earlier work on Zambia (Miller, ibid; 2006; 2008), we explore the historical geographies of South African retailing, arguing that the post-apartheid region needs to be understood as a contested social space. What the region is and how accumulation proceeds, is shaped and made by these multiple class contestations. The second section in this paper examines the themes of race, region and multinationalism. The third section provides a brief account of trading patterns in colonial and post-colonial Africa, while the fourth examines the development of the city of Lusaka. The fifth section is an empirical overview of the new shopping mall expansion in Zambia. Two cases of local contestation and resistance (the Brait buy-out
and the Luangeni Partnership) by both Zambians and South Africans draw on accounts of people who have engaged or stopped the South Africans in their expansionary tracks are examined in the final section of the paper.

We conclude that the narrative of ‘South Africa in Africa’ is a flawed one: the region’s geographies speak of a region integrated since colonial times; of people who, for a long time, traversed the region with labour and goods even when Independence initiatives marked off regional political territories in the SADCC. New traders follow old traders. South Africa and Africa have interdependent historical geographies that shaped the region then and now. Post-Apartheid Southern Africa demonstrates new forms of regional class struggle that happen beneath the surface of FTAs and regional development initiatives such as SADC and SDIs (spatial development initiatives; for example, Roodt in this issue). Delineating the contours of post-Apartheid regionalism requires, indeed demands, an interrogation of these political-economic processes and the social relations that occur at the regional level. Such regional analyses, however, need to be informed by an understanding of how various social classes at the national level reshape regional relations. The story revolves around ‘South Africa and Africa’; but the post-Apartheid conceptual framework needs to be revised in favour of a more historically accurate, relational understanding of our region.

Race, region and multinational expansion

Post-Apartheid regionalism in Southern Africa has actively promoted investment by foreign multinationals. This active embrace of foreign direct investment has also helped to promote foreign retailers as African governments shifted away from state-owned industries. Regionalism and regional integration have been seen as state-driven policies (Lee, 1989; Davies, 1991; Gibb, 1997).

In an earlier article (Miller, 2004), Miller suggested that a society-centred approach to regionalism was necessary to break out of the overwhelming state-centrism in regional analyses of Southern Africa. She (Miller, 2004) pointed to Niemann’s (2001:67-72) revision of International Relations theory in which he provides a historical account of the production of spaces in Southern Africa since the 1800s and shows how a perception of the region as a coherent entity emerged through particular spatial practices. Out of a physical landmass at the southern tip of the African continent, a notion of a coherent geographic entity, a social space, emerges over time that is intimately tied into the contests for economic control. Race formed one crucial demarcation in representation spaces of the region, with a corresponding set of segregated spaces of representation.

Spaces were identified by the skin colour of those who were permitted to live through them. It was possible to read if the body of an individual was in the proper space and the pass laws of South Africa, the housing of labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later, manufacturing facilities all reflected this racialization of space in southern Africa (Niemann, 2001: 74).

The bounded national entities that dominate the regional space are contradicted by the spatial flows of commodities, people and labour that create mutual dependency amongst the different societies within South Africa. There is a porosity in the borders of the region’s countries that overflows the boundaries of nation-states and creates a
societal level of interaction. In this sense, the region is also a ‘counterspace’ to inter-state relations.

We can therefore imagine regions not only as spatial constructs which facilitate the exploitation of the subcontinent; we can also imagine them as counter-spaces, as sites of resistance to such processes. One such imagination is to think of ‘regions as spaces of rights’ rather than spaces of flows or spaces of places. A region so conceptualized constitutes an integrated space not because of trade flows or institutional apparatuses but because its inhabitants share a commitment to struggle for the same enforceable protections against abuses be they committed by states or corporations. To conceive of regions as spaces of rights represents a direct challenge to the hegemonic consensus of liberalism. Such efforts transcend the traditional spatial organization by insisting that rights of persons be recognized outside and independent of the national state. They reject the position of the state as the sole arbiter of the rights of ‘its’ citizens and therefore create new spaces of reference (Niemann, 2001:75).

While Niemann’s revision represents a critical widening of the debate on regionalism, understanding the region as a ‘space of rights’ both opens up and closes down different possibilities for understanding regionalism. Seeing regions as ‘spaces of rights’ ignores the spatial and scalar problems that regionalization poses for regional identities against particularistic identities. Attachments to place and localities or sub-regional identities can become stronger as spatial barriers crumble and local areas are subjected to global forces in a more direct way. While global forces seem out of reach and more difficult to control, communities attach more vociferously to local places (Harvey, 1996). Extending the discussion of ‘rights’ to the spatial claims of different social classes allows for a more expansive discussion of regionalism in Southern Africa.

To expand Niemann’s (2001) discussion, we need to present the region as a ‘space of claims’ by exploring the concepts of social scale and geometries of power. Scales are a basic way of differentiating human activity from the local scale, such as the household, the workplace, the city, the globe. In daily, lived experience, multiple scales exist simultaneously: ‘... scale is a set of abstractions through which we make sense of social processes making and remaking these material landscapes’ (Smith in Jonas, 1994).

Geographic spaces are produced by abstractions that form these entities into a particular scale-global, national, regional or local. Scale is also political, a way of ‘fixing power’ within institutions.

Scale distils emancipatory and oppressive possibilities of space and provides a distilled expression of spatial ideologies, racism, xenophobia ... The representation of scale lies at the centre of spatialised politics (Smith, 1990:173).

Limited by a specific geographic scale or level of accumulation such as the nation-state, a rescaling process ensues at the local, sub-national, multilateral regional or global scale, for example. Spatial representations and material practices exist in a dialectical relationship (Smith, 1990; Lefebvre, 1996; Harvey, 1996).

The social relations of capitalism invariably take on a geographical expression ... What is often less clear is the precise way in which spatial form is related to social forces (Wolch, 1989: 5).
In the same way that globalisation is a ‘societal construct’ (Keet, 1999), regionalism and the formation of regions is a social process, entailing institutional power, a shared geographic identity, regional labour markets, and is always relentlessly driven by capitalist accumulation and framed by the power and command of money. Who is to be integrated, how and on what basis is not simply a question of contractual regional arrangements but a question of the spatial ‘geometries of power’ (Massey, 1992). Shifting power geometries and their spatial representations are underpinned by the spaces of production and reproduction. Capital’s constant re-territorialisation and expansion is driven by over-accumulation (Harvey, 1999), and these internal contradictions have geographic consequences.

Regionalism invokes a claim over a bounded geographic space that is also a social space.

Bounding the region as a group of historically and economically tied countries that should act together for a particular economic strategy produces a spatially determined power structure that demarcates the region. As social power relations reconfigure, these changes and produce new meanings about a specific geographic scale, marginalizing some while thrusting others into centre stage.

What is significant here is not that inclusion and exclusion processes happen, but that these processes take spatial forms, and have spatial consequences. A new meaning is given to a particular social scale – the nation, the region, the global system – in line with shifts in power relations. Regions, then, are more than physical demarcations. They entail a social claim to a geographic space between the scale of the nation-state and the global system. Against the Euclidian notion of ‘space-as-container’ or space as fixed, regions are dynamic entities, not just static groups of contiguous states. Social space according to Lefebvre’s conceptual ‘triad’ is constituted by ‘the perceived, the conceived, and the lived’ (Lefebvre, 1991:39). The foreign investment of South African companies in post-Apartheid Southern Africa can be understood as a claim on the region. Capital’s ability to command power over space and social relations is a central dimension in the way that the region is integrated, how regional power is accumulated and which regional forces are marginalized. Geographic claims have important consequences for the way that the regional role of South African multinationals plays out.

South African-based or South African multinational corporations have played a central role in constituting South African as a regional entity. Much of this capital flowed through or from South Africa, allowing part of the regional surplus to fuel South African growth as well as enhancing the role of its multinational corporations as an important characteristic of post-Apartheid Southern Africa.

South African (or South African-based) capital historically, through the agency of the multinational firm, has integrated the countries of South Africa in an uneven way. South Africa’s ability to command capital and labour flows in the region through these powerful multinational corporations accelerated South Africa’s economic growth, creating tremendous regional unevenness. South African capital has established a
strong claim to the regional space of Southern Africa, both in the present and in the past. The historical geography of capital accumulation in Southern Africa has placed South African capital, through its multinational corporations, at the centre of these accumulation processes. Currently comprising 14 countries that are members of SADC (the Southern African Development Community), Southern Africa is dominated by South Africa, the region’s economic giant (Martin and O’Meara, 1995; Seidman and Makgetla, 1980). Capital accumulation develops the most profitable sectors of the economy to the detriment of other sectors, creating uneven capital flows. South Africa is a region of unevenness in regional flows of capital accumulation, generating $130bn of the region’s $160bn in output in 1998.

Global accumulation processes centred on South Africa have shaped the boundaries of the region.

If we are to understand how the social construct ‘Southern Africa’ came into existence, we must place it in the context of the cyclical rhythms of capitalist world-economy (Vieira, Wallerstein and Martin, 1992: 5).

The notion of Southern Africa as a coherent geopolitical entity can be traced back to the first ‘Scramble for Africa’. As cycles of world hegemony have evolved, Africa has been the site of renewed scrambles and reterritorialization of capital. South Africa’s regional domination goes back to the phases of early mining and finance accumulation under colonial expansion. The initial expansion that centred on South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia occupied a central place within this new formation. Combining with this territorial expansion were also the imperialist expansion of the capitalist type (Harvey, 2003: 33-36), entailing large investments in rail and road networks. This phase of Southern African accumulation coincided with the period of the Great Depression, initiating a new phase of capital’s reterritorialization in Africa (Vieira, Wallerstein and Martin, 1992).

The period from 1873-1920 saw the British, the global hegemon of the time, consolidate political control over the areas of mineral wealth in Southern Africa and form political boundaries that endure today. Gold mining in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Johannesburg’s Reef (South Africa), copper mining in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Kimberley’s diamond mining absorbed capital surpluses from London financial and commercial and corporation and commodity surpluses of British manufactures. Despite this regional economic integration through London and South African-based capital, political divisions inscribed regional fault-lines. White settler regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique were isolated internationally in the period during the two World Wars and after the World War II, bequeathing to the region a racially divided historical geography.

Ideas of developing intra-African export markets and ‘delinking’ from the dominant ‘North’ animated post-colonial Africanist programmes. The NIEO (New International Economic Order) perspective inspired many Africanist programmes in the 1960s and 1970s. ‘Collective self-reliance’ was a strong principle in the programmatic perspectives for Africa at the time. One example was the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1980 and proposed by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Throughout this period of national self-determination in some parts of Southern Africa, however, multinationals continued to use Apartheid South Africa as a base of their investment activities in
Southern Africa. Some of the capital surpluses that flowed through South Africa during this period were trapped in South Africa, partly through the protectionist policies of the Apartheid state, allowing South Africa’s economy to expand faster than other countries in the region.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a new scramble in Africa, this time led by the trans-national corporations who sought new sites of investments for over-accumulated capital. As countries became politically independent, South Africa was a stable launching-pad for investment into the region (Seidman, 1980:45). Protected by Apartheid, global multinationals formed joint ventures with South Africa companies. In the 1960s, eight of South Africa’s top eighteen industrial companies had major ties with transnational firms. (Seidman, 1980). Regional economic integration proceeded despite the political barriers. While political geometries demarcated the region into white settler states, on the one hand, and Frontline (independent) black states on the other, the territorial independence of African nation-states after national liberation struggles interrupted but did not halt continued capitalist expansion. Nationalization operated unevenly in economies that allowed multinational investment often via and from South Africa. These racialised patterns of regional development were replicated over time in the retail sector, as discussed below.

**Trading in colonial and post-colonial Africa**

One common element in the development of retailing in Africa was the colonial pattern of indigenous exclusion. During this period, credit extended more from the metropole to the European entrepreneur than to any other community. Combined with racial municipal legislation, white-run businesses dominated the formal retail market in many African cities. As settler cities grew in the 1930s and 1940s, central business districts (CBDs) expanded. African businessmen, however, were prohibited by municipal legislation from retail activities in the towns. African townships were typically served with cheap imitations of ‘white stores’ and confined to the ‘truck trade’ (Burke, 1995: 100).

Like other less-developed regions, retailing in Southern Africa is extremely diversified, ranging from informal street traders to small outlets with low turnover, to larger shopping complexes (Findlay et al., 1990). Limited purchasing power, low outreach and poor infrastructure are some of the common factors that have restricted the growth of retailing in poorer countries (Paddison in Findlay et al., 1990). In the twentieth century, retail infrastructure clustered in some places and failed to penetrate others, the urban-rural divide being the most graphic illustration of this uneven clustering of money and resources.

Race politics in retailing was not only along white-black fault lines. There was a lot of anti-semitism amongst the company officials from the controlling British Company of South Africa (BCSA). Racial politics manifested itself between Jewish traders and Chartered Company officials in these early days already. The district commissioner for Lealui in 1901 went on a tirade against the Jewish traders, calling them of ‘undesirable character’ (Findlay et al., 1990, 27). He charged that the Jewish traders were successful because they were willing to include ammunition in their deals with local. The dispute between European traders also caused a loss of prestige for whites, in the view of the commissioners.
There is I regret to say a certain insolence about the natives towards traders, other than Jews, making it difficult to maintain the peace and the respect for the white man is not what it should be (Findlay et al., 1990, 28).

Traders kept close relations with ruling group in order to keep their trading lines open. Competition amongst small traders with limited capital resources was vicious. ‘Legitimate’ traders were seen by a larger retailers like Susman – the founders of which came from the Baltic region – as those who operated from substantial stores and built large camps, unlike the small traders who traded from their wagons and operated with lower cost and profits. These small traders regularly undercut prices and moved their wagons to the nearest markets. ‘Hard work, good credit, efficient trading and a superior understanding of the market’ helped the Susman become the dominant traders in the area, argues Macmillan (ibid: 48). This was aided by the liberalization of trading licences by the colonial government which recognized their important commercial role.

King Lewanika summed up the racial politics of the time in the following way:

There are three types of whites: those of the government, traders and missionaries. Those of the government, fear them, they have the power; traders, eat them, for they have come to eat you. As for the missionaries they are ours, they are at home with us – chez nous (King Lewanika, 1898, p.52).

From 1910 the Susman brothers expanded outwards into Livingstone. The Susman used the cold storage facilities of the North-Western Rhodesia Cold Storage plants set up by the railways contracts, then under the Chartered Company. After the war, Werners was the main Copperbelt business of the Susman Brothers & the Wulfsohn Group. There was constant diversification in the Susman’s activities into the post-war years which included transport, timber, saw mills, textiles and expanding cattle sales as South African demand grew. This provided the basis for the Gersh and Susman brothers. In keeping with colonial practices, wages for their African workers were low and working conditions were poor. While the Susman brothers colonized the area north of the Zambezi, Apartheid-South Africa developed its own racial geographies. The lucrative central business districts were reserved for European and white South African companies like Stuttafords, Greatermans, John Orr’s and OK Bazaars. White consumers were the target shoppers in these towns.

As the cities grew, local white and foreign (mainly European) investors built shops, shopping centres and infrastructure in white suburbs and CBDs with government support. A host of racial municipal by-laws restricted the growth of African entrepreneurs and the retail sector in black residential areas. Local black consumers had to rely on informal trading markets and visits to white CBDs for their requirements. The poverty of black township residents and the lack of infrastructure development made these areas less attractive to retail property developers. Retail accumulation in the black townships and locations of Southern Africa was therefore stunted, with the growing underdevelopment of these areas restricting their market capacity. The geography of retail accumulation during the colonial phase became racially segregated in most parts of Southern Africa, favouring local white and Europeans investors (Colclough, 1989; Findlay et al., 1990).
Planning the segregated city: Lusaka 1929-2002

As with cities throughout the South, Lusaka, now the capital of Zambia, is a place of wealth contrasting with extreme poverty and deprivation. The harsh economic conditions which have prevailed since the 1970s in Zambia saw the city’s unemployment rising from 13.7 to 26 percent during the 1990-2002 period. In 1998, 52 percent of Lusaka’s population was rated as poor and 34 percent as extremely poor (Central Statistics Office, 2003). Lusaka, started from humble beginnings as a minor railway siding in 1905 and in 1913 was accorded Village Management Status. In 1931, Lusaka was selected as a new potential capital based on its altitude, underground water supply and transport accessibility and in 1935 became the capital. The initial plan provided for a city of only 13,000, primarily European people and was subsequently noted for its under-provision of land for African people (Williams, 1986). With its current population estimated at over 1.7 million (IDP, 2002), the contrast between the planned mini-capital designed for colonial officials and the reality of what is now a vast and often poorly planned metropolis, could not be more stark.

By the late 1940s, many of the oversights of the 1930s plan were becoming evident. These included the lack of provision for low density ‘sprawl’ and its associated costs, a failure to adequately accommodate the African population and the faster than expected economic and employment growth which had been experienced (Mulenga, 2006). As an initial response to the housing shortage for both dominant race groups, new European suburbs were laid out along the Great East Road and African housing was provided to the north of the city, with the Matero area following in 1951 (van den Berg, 1984). Despite being only 14 years before independence, it is remarkable the degree to which racial bias, prejudice and alien planning notions persisted and further shaped the pre-independence city form. The plan was based on the following principles:

- The ‘associated and parallel development of Europeans and natives’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 6).
- To cater for ‘a car-owning European population and an African population that would be walking’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 6).
- The ‘need to create for the European landscape as stimulating and vivid as that of his native land and to retain for the native something of his own background of sky and forest’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 9).

In terms of applied planning, the central focus on the government reserve at Ridgeway, and the planned Cathedral in particular was reinforced with the area being seen as ‘distinguished and somewhat classical in character’ (Jellicoe, 1950, 12). The urban boundary was delineated, separate residential areas were laid out and provided the basis for the now important eastern settlements areas, the current the road layout and associated traffic roundabouts (Williams, 1986). In 1951 the new development plan was adopted as a ‘Statutory Development Plan’ (as adapted in 1985), and with its inherent planning of a racially/socially separate city, it remained the basis for planning till 1978, well into the post-independence period. The focus on up-market developments to the east, since World War II and along the Great East Road transport corridor in particular laid the basis for what in the twenty-first century has become the zone of investment, privilege and social distancing, centred in recent years, on the new up-market retail centres which all lie to the east of the city. This plan led to the start of
major, segregated African housing developments at Chilenga, Matero and Kamwala (Williams, 1986), while ‘European areas continued to be laid out as “garden suburbs” at low densities, based on the reliance on the private car for transport, to accommodate ... a settler population’ (Rakodi, 1986, 208).

The legacy of the Adshead and Bowling plans remains the government and residential development along the ridge, scattered low density residential development to the north and high density residential development to the South (Rakodi, 1986, 207).

With racial segregation, this produced the basic urban form of Lusaka. Independence came in 1964, and as far as the city was concerned, the legacy of garden city planning, racial (now class) bias and the provision of a city in which wealth was concentrated in the centre and east were perpetuated, as previous urban planning legacies went unchallenged.

On a positive note, independence brought about a ‘new lease of life’ for the city with the construction of embassies, the university, airport and national assembly – however all of these were constructed to the east of the city, with all major developments being in the proximity of the Great East Road. In parallel with these changes, the population rose from 107,000 to 246,000 between 1963 and 1969 (Mulenga, 2006). Rapid housing development followed, both in terms of serviced sites and informal settlements – but there were no corresponding changes in the town planning schemes (William, 1986), leading to rapid peri-urban development, such that by the late 1970s, 80 percent of population were living in informal settlements (Rakodi, 1986; Mulenga, 2006).

In 2002 the Lusaka City Council commissioned an Integrated Development Plan (Lusaka City Council, 2002; Mukwato, pers comm., 2007). The plan was drafted by South African consultants called v3 Consulting Engineers, once again perpetuating foreign bias and dependence. At the time of writing, the plan had not been sanctioned, apparently because of problems of cost and restricted land access. The plan introduces what have become accepted principles in South African planning such as Local Economic Development and informal sector support. However, its support for nodal development and development corridors to concentrate development in a linear fashion along transport corridors (IDP, 2002) will reinforce class-based differences and decentralization to elite nodal areas, if it is applied. When shopping mall development therefore came to Lusaka, it was in a development pattern that reinforced past geographies of race and class. As Van den Berg observes:

"The town planning efforts of Lusaka have all along contributed to its racial segregation and excessive sprawl, by separating the old town from the new town, by usurping the space at the ridge and other attractive areas for urban growth and by ignoring space requirements for most African town dwellers (van den Berg, 1984, 18)."

South African retail expansion in Zambia

The new South African retail sector expanded as the regional hub grew, confronting the limits of Apartheid accumulation when excess cash for investment dammed up in the 1980s. This section traces this growth in the South African retail sector, showing that Zambian liberalization coincided with the liberation of South African capital from its Apartheid constraints with the elections of 1994.
In the mid-1960s, retailers in South Africa studied the Canadian model and saw the benefits of drawing a large number of consumers to the same place, where they became a critical shopping mass. Their shift away from the CBD and to the suburbs was also informed by the US model of highway development with shopping centres located at the interchanges of these highways. The target areas of new shopping centres in South Africa were the white suburbs. Enterprising white property developers began by opening Darragh Centre and Hyde Park Centre, both in Johannesburg. These white suburban shopping centres became targets for new financial accumulation by South African finance capital in the 1970s. As the interest rates rose, South Africa’s large MNCs such as Liberty Life, Sanlam, Old Mutual and the Eskom Pension Fund gobbled up the small-scale developers. The (largely women) shoppers were less important to them. What they really coveted were the blue-chip tenants and the high rentals that they paid. Soon, the mega shopping mall replaced the smaller shopping centre.

According to G. Fritz, Shoprite-Zambia’s General Manager at the time, the Shoprite group’s historical experience in Africa since the 1960s through their clothing chain, Pep Stores, and their supermarkets in the black-run, nominally independent ‘homelands’ of South Africa gave them some organizational advantages. This experience with black rural and working class consumer markets as well as their surplus capital and bold organisational leadership in the company’s upper echelons, positioned Shoprite to penetrate a consumer market perceived as high-risk and with low consumer savings. Their absorption of other retailers like OK Bazaars added to this sense of ‘African know-how’. Consolidation of the industry over the past few years, for example, Shoprite’s acquisition of OK, has narrowed competition to three large players in South Africa: Shoprite, Pick ‘n Pay and Spar (part of Tiger Foods).

Other retail multinationals faced with a similarly crowed market have employed expansion strategies in other global regions such as Europe and Australia. Losing market share in South Africa to large competitors like Pick ‘n Pay and Spar, Shoprite – along with other South African retailers like Game, Steers, Debonairs, Engen, ProFurn, the J. D. Group and Wimpy – opted for a ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey 1982) to address their crises of accumulation. As one of the largest retail multinationals in South Africa, Shoprite made R70 million available for reinvestment in Africa in 1999 (www.shoprite.co.za).

Shoprite now has stores in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa. In East Africa it has stores in Tanzania and Uganda, in North Africa it has stores in Egypt and in West Africa it has stores in Ghana and of late, Lagos, Nigeria. It has also opened up a store in Mumbai, India, its first foreign operations beyond Africa. The primary business of the Shoprite Group is food retailing. It claims to be the largest fast moving consumer goods retailer. Shoprite models its cross-border investments on its shopping centre developments in South Africa, featuring a Shoprite supermarket as an anchor store. These shopping malls change the local consumption and urban environments dramatically. Locally-owned internet stores and music outlets often make up part of this cluster. In a number of cases, the Shoprite Group establishes partnerships with a local group. For example, Egyptian Kuwait Holdings has a 30 percent share in the Egypt investment.
But for this foreign expansion to enjoy any success, it needed local markets in host countries. Consumer markets in Zambia, like many other countries, are highly diverse. Despite high levels of general poverty, white expatriate and black Zambian elites have significant savings and consumptive capacity, sometimes generated by earnings in foreign currency (dollars, rands). Such expatriates, government elites and middle class professionals are significant customers for the new supermarkets. Some of these internal markets have local peculiarities. For example, company management reported that Angolan diplomats and international community workers cross the border for olive oil, bakery items and other specialist items at the rural supermarket in Solwezi province, a market which Shoprite management in Zambia have learnt to cater for in this branch (Interview, General Manager, Zambia, August 2003). Trade unionists also argued that there was pent-up demand as there had no outlet as long as the retail and services sectors were run as poorly stocked, state-owned enterprises. People had money, but had to go to South Africa to buy commodities that they now can find inside Zambia at South African companies. (Interviews, NUCIW officials, Lusaka region, August 2002). Working class consumers have made use of Shoprite’s promotional activities to buy basic consumer items such as fish, oil, eggs, washing powder, rice, bread and milk (although these promotions appear to be less now as the company is more established and tax breaks for the company’s first years in both countries are over). The expanding tourist sectors have also boosted consumption capacity in the region.

The informal market sources some of its goods from Shoprite in Zambia, hence the conversion of one store in Lusaka into a primarily wholesale store, catering for small shop owners from rural areas as one of their key markets. In rural areas where Shoprite has outlets, informal traders buy from Shoprite and resell to local consumers, sometimes just outside of the company’s premises. In the Copperbelt province of Zambia, Anglo-American’s pull-out in 2001 led to smaller businesses going under and Shoprite’s capture of local market share that had previously gone to these competitors (Telephone Interview, Zambian Regional Manager, April 2002). While it may be more efficient in some ways if Shoprite adopted a style of wholesale stores rather than shopping mall supermarkets, Shoprite is wedded to its brand image and the new consumer environment that this brand creates in less developed African locales outside of South Africa.

In Zambia, nationalization policies attempted to restructure the racialised geographies of retail development. These efforts were reflected in the Africanisation initiatives of the government which created a tier of black Zambian management who were in charge of the state-owned wholesale stores. Larger economic difficulties restricted these efforts at restructuring for national economy, copper prices collapsed on the global market, dooming the prospects of the nascent nationalist experiment and a typical African debt trap ensued. In Zambia, Anglo-American was paid full compensation in American dollars for the state’s purchase of ZAMANGLO and with no restrictions of profits abroad (Innes, 1984: 24). Designed to trap profits for national development, therefore, nationalization often benefited MNCs through the large compensation paid to these companies by newly independent states when they expropriated the companies. A host of problems relating to nationalized systems of ownership and control, hampered commodity production and distribution, reducing
the retail sector to a stuttering system of tatty commodities by the time of Shoprite’s arrival in the late 1990s (Ariyo and Afeikhena, 1999).

Anglo used this money to establish MINORCO in Bermuda through which it became a major global player in mining in Latin America, Canada and the United States (Innes, 1984: 235, 236).

Reflecting the regional emphasis on FDI, Zambia’s democratic, union-led government embarked on a vigorous programme for attracting foreign investors when they took office in 1991. Since 2002 the country has recorded positive economic growth, averaging five percent each year. It was in the 1990s, therefore, that major sectors of the Zambian economy went up for sale to private investors, including the strategic copper mines. The government privatized more than 200 state-owned enterprises in the 1990s (Kolala, 2000:15). Like many other countries in Southern Africa, Zambia formed a Zambian State Privatization Agency to oversee the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA) established in 1992 by an Act of parliament carried out the privatization of inter alia dairy boards, parks, milling factories, sawmill assets, hotel and wholesalers. Multinational firms from the UK, Italy, Germany, China and India bought many SOEs and by 1997 over 200 of 326 parastatals had been sold (ZPA Privatisation Status Report, July 2002). No limitations or conditions applied to foreign investors and their capital exports from profit (Torres, 1998: 214). Critics of the state’s liberalization attribute the subsequent contraction of the Zambian economy to the privatization policies. During the period of intensified structural adjustment under Chiluba’s regime, the mining industry’s contribution to the overall economy declined while the service sector grew.

The Zambian economy only recently emerged from a decline of three decades, where per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased from $700 in 1970 to $390 in 1998. Since 1999 a 3.7 percent increase per year has been registered each year to 2003. Loans in Zambia are difficult to acquire for local capital with prevailing annual interest rates of around 28 percent and collateral of three times the loan size is required. Between 1980 and 2002, however, FDI increased from US$61.7m to US$197m. (African Inc. Report, p.6). Other investors have also taken advantage of the new environment.

An Investment Climate Assessment conducted in 2003 showed that areas such as services and tourism have been important for recent new Chinese capital in the country. There have been mixed responses to this growth in foreign investment in Zambia. Zambia is one of a number of African countries (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Uganda), that has no controls on outward FDI, making its economy more vulnerable. At some level there has been an improvement in Zambia’s links to global production and distribution systems; at other levels there has been evidence of asset stripping through foreign direct investment. FDI often displaces local capital and undermines the growth of local suppliers (Miller, 2008).

While state ownership placed nationalized retail out of private capital accumulation during Independence, the post-Apartheid region combined political change in South Africa with wholesale sectors became a new phase of retail development in Zambia and Southern Africa more generally. South African retailers
were the principle investors talking advantage of retail liberalization in Zambia. South Africa’s influence in the Zambian retail sector has grown significantly. South Africa is now the largest foreign investor, dominating 39 percent of the retail market (Zambia Investment Centre).

As part of Zambia’s privatization, the national state wholesale stores were sold off in a deal with SA’s Shoprite Holdings in 1999. Now, in an era of slow economic growth, global connections are being re-established, but such connections are based on wealth and privilege. As we illustrate below, creating zones of exclusivity in Lusaka is an expression of inequality, social distancing and privilege which is expressed spatially through the investment choices of local and international capital investment.

**Malls in Zambia and challenges to South African expansion**

From the preceding discussion it is clear that, at an economic level, there has been a fundamental socio-economic transition over the last 40 years in Zambia and in Lusaka more specifically. This has been from an era of imposed colonial/British town planning, investment and control, through a period of economic disconnection (Ferguson, 1999) to the present era of post- and neo-colonialism. The present is marked by increasing South African investment or at least the presence of their differing degrees of ‘connectedness’ to global capitalism, a gradually exploration of South African urban planning policies and an evolving urban form which, in the wealthier areas, is starting to mirror the retail decentralization of western and South cities, with the associated reinforcement of a zone of privilege. While the cause of this shift cannot be levelled solely against South African capital interest, as local entrepreneurs are in fact often key drivers in the process, the former none the less either directly through investment, or indirectly through franchising opportunities are influencing both investment and upmarket retail behaviour in Lusaka.

Since 2000, retail (and to some degree leisure) opportunities have been radically transformed for Lusaka’s upper income residents with the building of three new, large, out-of town retail centres. The three centres are Manda Hill opened in 1999, Arcades opened in 2003 and Crossroad opened in 2006 (Interviews: Banage, 2007; Ferrier, 2007; Mubita, 2007). In addition, the city’s first major decentralized business park was under construction at the time of writing. All four of these development are located in the wealthier eastern section of the city, three of which lie on the key Great East Road transport corridor. The third, Crossroads lies on a secondary transport corridor.

There are significant variations in the ownership profile of the three centres which reflect differing local histories and control. Manda Hill was initially established by Manda Hill Centre Limited, a property development agency with three local directors and one South African (Patents and Companies Registration Office, 1999). The complex was 20 percent owned by Zambia Venture Capital and 80 percent by Commonwealth Africa Investment. In 2005 Manda Hill Centre Limited were bought out by a South African (Manda Hill is currently owned by HBW Group consortium, Knight Frank Property Developers (Interview, Banage, 2007). The centre itself has South African and Zambian directors. Arcades was established by Arcades PLC formed by a group of local Zambian businessman. Crossroads is owned by Ganesh Properties which is under the sole ownership of a single Zambian businessman. Capital
may have been raised internationally but this has not been verified (Interviews, Ferrier, 2007; Interview, Mubita, 2007).

Only Manda Hill is South African owned – and then only since 2005, after six years of joint ownership with Zambian investors (Interview, Banage, 2007). Arcades, Crossroads and the new business park are Zambian-owned. The Zambian-led mall expansion also extends beyond the capital of Lusaka. Arcades PLC (Platinum Gold group) has just opened a shopping centre in Livingstone and is planning a major development in Kitwe on the Copperbelt (Interview, Mubita, 2007). The Shoprite supermarket in the Manda Hill complex is the largest of Shoprite’s 18 outlets in Zambia and also houses Shoprite’s Zambian headquarters. Spar is another key South African supermarket chain in Arcades which has provided competition to Shoprite since their arrival (Interview, Regional Manager, Shoprite, 2007).

Expansion continues at the malls, suggesting that the retail development in the city is not static. As noted above, a luxury hotel is being built at Arcades (Interview, Mubita, 2007); in April 2007 Manda Hill announced a multi-million dollar expansion plan to upgrade existing shops, provide a covered central retail area, a cinema complex and new parking facilities valued at US$30 million (Interview, Vassilopoulus, 2007). This will place Manda Hill in direct competition with Arcades for leisure market activities and will also significantly increase the size by at least 50 percent to over 30 000 sq. metres, double the current size of Arcades and in line with some of the medium to larger centres globally.

While at one level the development of the new shopping centres has expanded retail choice in Lusaka and diverted activity away from the congested CBD, it is inevitable that such centres provoke local responses, particularly in the case of the local workers employed by foreign corporates. Studies (Miller, 2005) have shown that South African shops place South Africa and their regional multinationals at the centre of a new post-Apartheid regional imagery. South Africa becomes a focal point for the claims of workers and farmers who deal with the major South African retailer, namely Shoprite. Fuelled by South Africa’s regional strength and dominance, worker and farmers locate their claims with the regional multinational given their disillusionment with their nation-states (Miller, 2008). If Zambian workers and farmers no longer trust their government, they will direct their claims at the strong multinationals which appear to be benefiting most from the country’s liberalization policies. In Chipata, a town in the Eastern Province of Zambia, for example, local farmers accused the new Shoprite in their town of the displacement of their local livelihoods and threatened to burn down the store (Miller, 2008). Fears of deindustrialisation and foreign pull-out have seen Shoprite workers resist the company’s proposed buy-out by a private equity fund, Brait, in 2007. This led to acrimonious exchanges and a court injunction, including resistance from South African minority shareholders that ultimately scuttled the deal. These examples indicate the relations with their country. These case studies of local resistance are discussed below.

Resistance has not only emerged from likely resisters around predictable issues – wage exploitation and the presence of workers at the foreign supermarkets. Two unanticipated sites of struggle have impeded South Africa’s retail expansion, emanating from two less likely quarters: shareholders in South Africa along with workers in Zambia, firstly, and secondly villagers in the rural Eastern Province in
Zambia. An attempt by South Africa retailer, Shoprite to sell off shares to a private equity fund, Brait Ltd., was resisted and ultimately failed. In the second instance, villagers in the rural province forced a supplier partnership on the company which did not succeed but provided an important example of an economic partnership between the South African multinationals and disempowered local communities.

In April 2006 Brait, a private equity fund, placed a buy-out offer before Shoprite. This deal involved restructuring the company and terminating its Johannesburg Stock Exchange listing. A new private subsidiary called New Retail and Shoprite Holdings would be liquidated. Shareholders could cash in or re-invest in New Retail. Shoprite motivated this private equity model as a move that would improve BBBEE (Broad Black Economic Employment) by allowing managers and workers a bigger stake in the company through share offers and the creation of a Shoprite workers’ trust. Brait had raised R6.1bn from local and overseas investors which it needed to spend within the ensuing five years (Interview, J. Gnodde, Brait Executive Director). After its initial offer was rejected by shareholders, Brait raised its offer by 7.7 percent from R13.2bn to R14.2billion and again to R15bn. Shareholders were dissatisfied with the way the bid was structured. In terms of the proposed buy-out, Brait would have become a majority shareholder in Shoprite. Coronation, as one of the larger shareholders, also challenged the deal. Ultimately, the deal fell through as the price that shareholders demanded was higher than Brait was willing to pay.

Like the Shoprite shareholders, Shoprite workers in Zambia were also not happy with the deal. They filed an interim court injunction against Shoprite (which trades as Africa Supermarkets in Zambia). There were 771 workers involved in the injunction led by an individual called Vasco Mainza. They wanted an assurance that the company’s assets and bank accounts could not be moved abroad until their terminal benefits had been settled.

They charged that the workers had R5 billion with the company and, in the light of the proposed buy-out, they wanted reassurance that their benefits would not be negatively affected. The Zambian manager of Shoprite, Stefan Krantz, argued that the company was not in the process of going into a voluntary liquidation. The proposal from Brait came through Maxwell 107 Investments. Krantz argued that the proposal that Shoprite Holdings change to New Retail would not affect the subsidiaries in any way. While top ownership structures might be affected, this would not extend to the subsidiaries. The Zambian operation would therefore not be affected in any way by the restructuring at the apex of the group. If there was any impact on workers’ conditions, provision had been made in the company’s accounts for this eventuality. The court injunction was granted on 27 December 2006. Both parties agreed that the injunction should be discharged after negotiations. In terms of the negotiation, Shoprite agreed to open a Citibank account with ESCROW in which they would deposited Kwacha 5,012,649,980.

In the case of the villagers from Chipata in the Eastern Province, University of Zambian students conducting research in the village of Luangeni, Chipata, had learnt that villagers were threatening to burn down the local Shoprite store. These local farmers claimed that their regular sales at the village market had been undermined by the presence of the new Shoprite supermarket. They needed cash for privatized services such as education and health care, and the village market was an important
source of such cash income for their vegetable crops. Shoprite dispatched their mangers to liaise with Luangeni farmers.

Partnership structures were set up which included non-governmental organizations operating in the area as well as the local Agricultural Extension Officer and representatives of the company and the farmers. Some donors stepped in and provided seed funding for the newly-formed Luangeni Cooperative Community Project (LCCP). A corresponding structure called the Luangeni Partnership Forum (LPF) was formed in Lusaka. This structure has five directors and a officer that liaised with the local supplier structures. The LPF was meant to function as a liaison between the village co-op and the company. Other similar initiatives were launched in the Chamba Valley region. The villagers agreed to supply the company with five vegetables – lettuce, tomatoes, green beans, onions, cabbages. Shoprite structured its supplier relationship with the villagers around a ‘green market’ that operated on a Saturday in a specially assigned venue adjacent to the Shoprite store. With the help of the donors, support was given to local farmers in the form of advice on farming method and the provision of seeds and fertilizers. Although improvement occurred, there were still several hurdles to overcome.

Conclusion
This paper has illustrated a number of key themes. These include the intersection of race, space and retail in the evolving manifestation and operation of retailing in Southern Africa over the last 100 years. In the case of Lusaka, Zambia, retail growth in recent years has been led by South African multi-nationals, who have grafted their spatial and retail planning on to the historically segregated profile of the city, reinforcing class division in the post-independence era. South African growth has not gone unchallenged as the case studies quoted above show. In addition, it is particularly noteworthy that retail growth in Lusaka is not solely a South African led phenomenon but rather it is an area in which local capital interests are taking an active part. Retailing clearly has become a point of class conflict, spatial differences and economic change in post-Apartheid Southern Africa.

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