

Reinventing the World? Trans-modernity's Emancipatory and Communicative Possibilities

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Abstract

Modernity as a philosophical project seeks to lay the foundation for human emancipation in developing critical discourses of reason. The tool of critical discourses is to construct a logical power that banishes all obstacles which prevent from the Enlightenment conditions of humanity. At the outset of Jürgen Habermas' critical social theory, priority is given to human emancipatory potentials to reach into a universal consensus while positively organizing instrumental as well as hermeneutic interests. If emancipation is human, then it requires rational as well as ethical discourses of approaching human global problems. In line with this argument, it must be an urgent task to introduce a new trend that can understand and potentially solve the real questions of [global humanity]. What are the fundamental causes for and in contemporary global social crises and distractions? Most of us would accept Habermas' core argument that describes modernity as an unfinished project and its emancipative themes are not fully realized. But we need to go beyond the Habermasian perspective to identify human problems in which modernity faces globally. Thus, this article traces key emancipatory and communicative possibilities of trans-modernism (Dussel 1993).¹ Trans-modernity as a critical paradigm aims at human liberation although its starting juncture is the concealed philosophical traditions of the colonized societies by using their lived and felt experiences.

Key words: Trans-modernity, Pluriversality, Exterior/Alterior, Face-to-face Communication, Pauper, Polylogue

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Introduction

Critical social theory tries to work in a particular context of emancipation providing a deep philosophical inquiry into the social catastrophes of the modern world. But controversies appear in understanding human problems of the contemporary world. Among other things, we have a debate on the proper identification of the social challenges of modernity which can be analyzed systematically in a “pluriversal” (see Dussel 2008:11-14)² and contextual sense. Many proponents of critical social theory attempt to point out some historically obvious social turmoil of modernity like the Holocaust industry, totalitarianism, economic exploitation, and racism, giving a narrow ethnocentric (i.e. Eurocentric and later Western epistemic) point of departure. This can be easily and clearly seen in both modern and postmodern critical social thoughts. Because of this narrow epistemic outlook, most human problems of the non-Western societies were hidden in the critical understandings of the modern world. In other words, the philosophical discourses of modernity and postmodernity failed to see modern human global problems which include colonialism, imperialism, harsh economic dependency, poverty, immature death, various genocides, and other inhumane acts of oppression and exclusion, that mostly exist in the Third-world. Thus it is quite important to have a truly global mind-set to identify the misconceptions and distortions in the project of modernity.

Additionally, there is a failure in both modern and postmodern critical social theories to provide broad socio-historical solution(s) to the global crises of modernity. Postmodernists are chiefly concerned with explaining modernity in relation to the irrational aspects of destruction and domination. Despite the postmodernists’ performative contradiction, thinkers of modern critical discourse insist that it is through reason that the unfinished business of human emancipation can only be achieved. That is why Habermas claims that modernity is a project which evolves, a system retaining its continuity in a rational communicative action of the present generation. When Habermas says modernity is an uncompleted project, politically he would like to propose an ongoing democratic reflexivity of liberated citizens. He writes in *The Postnational Constellation*, present modernity should be developed by liberated subjects using intersubjective discursive talk (2001:155-156).³ This claim of modernity is basic to maintain the ground for human liberation in communicative rationality and action.

The increasing realizations that there are modern problems for which modernity and postmodernity fail to ponder points towards the need to move beyond the paradigm of a narrow Eurocentric outlook. This is only possible in a trans-modern ethical reinvention of the world that demonstrates exterior critique of the underside of modernity. To deal with the Enlightenment of the underside is

one progressive stage to liberate the “Other” from existential alienation and dehumanization. This “Other” includes all human beings who are exposed to the sacrificial irrational myth of modernity, which is the colonized in colonialism and imperialism, and excluded from contemporary Eurocentered capitalist communicative rationality and action. It is in this new philosophical current that the metaphysical and practical liberation of the underside of modernity transcends the occidental cosmopolitan understanding of contemporary global human problems and their solutions. This is a liberation theory and practice that employs both phenomenological relational ethics and hermeneutics to negate the modern system of marginalization and subjugation by developing a solidaristic-critical study into the underlying socio-historical realities of the present world through a new approach, i.e. what liberationists call trans-modernity.

The central focus of this article is the critical views of the Philosophy of Liberation which deals within a trans-modern perspective as a way of questioning the historical horizon of global coloniality and calling for the emancipation of the marginalized and the suppressed. According to the Philosophy of Liberation, colonialism empirically began in the last decade of the fifteenth century with the European “invention,” expansion, domination and exploitation into the New World, Latin America, Africa and Asia. This refers to the first phase of colonialism that imposes economic, military, and ideological order. This is followed by the second phase of global epistemic and cultural coloniality. The second stage of coloniality operated through the so-called rational-scientific-technological discourses and social institutions that are the inventions of capitalism and its liberal ideology. In the Philosophy of Liberation, therefore, we need to ask core ontological-ethical-political questions, such as how the majority global population (82% according to the UN 1992 report) becomes poor, oppressed and excluded.

Enrique Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy attempts to develop the possibility of disclosing and communicatively enriching the philosophical traditions of the underside of modernity. As he argues, this possibility is seen in the phenomenological and hermeneutic understanding of the “Other” and its hidden critical cultures and other markers of identity. One might ponder that using the two methods will open a new consciousness or ethical reinvention of the world. His Liberation Philosophy can be taken as a revolutionary path that promotes a rational communication of pluriversal philosophies of the world. In this essay a chief concern is given to the two entirely linked trans-modern claims for the reinvention possibilities of the world. But before that, in the following section let us see the ethical move from the oppositional faces of the modern project.

From the Two Sides of Modernity to Trans-modernity

To begin with, modernity contained both rational and irrational aspects in the course of its historical development. The rational contents are still important to maintain the emancipatory interest given that still all human beings in the age of globalization are in an existential space of Enlightenment. Most Eurocentric epistemic claims asserted that the modern project originated in the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment, advocating human liberation, the socio-political questionings of the people of France, and a road map of material production dominated by the central European industrial revolutions. Though the above listed revolutionary cases are seen as modern, there is more on the supplement of a new starting point by revisiting and deconstructing the Eurocentric demonstrations of world history. One of the Eurocentric analyses of modernity is an attempt to see colonialism as an exterior thing which has no link with the modern projection of the world. The reason for this seems to be the absolutism and rationalism of modernity; its absolutism appears to conceal the historical, and thus to assure the mask of neutrality, the rationalism and to dismantle the irrational and mythic components of modernity. Here the reconstructive position of modernity in Dussel and some other liberation scholars seems to me to deconstruct the hidden irrational aspects and some other reformulations. Thus, this reconstructive approach seeks to show the fundamental difference between liberation theory and postmodern philosophical discourses.

One of the central arguments of Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation is that modernity as a world phenomenon appeared in 1492. He believes that this time is the point at which Europe commenced its physical power and "centrality" by dominating other parts of the world. As a matter of fact this centrality of Europe is established in the dialectic relation with the "Other" or the periphery (Dussel 1996:20)⁴. In this respect world modernity expressed itself through a dialectical power relation of Europe with the "Other". This power relation can be viewed simply as the colonization of the world; Europe as the colonizer and the "Other" as colonized. For liberation thinkers, modernity in its global sense began empirically to appear in 1492 when the invention and naming of the new world was announced by the Europeans within a context of the motto, 'might is right'.

The first physical domination by Europe over the periphery later manifested itself in the epistemic and cultural imposition of Eurocentrism to construe the powerlessness of the "Other" on racial, sexual, and class grounds. So Dussel says that, this "Other" is the dominated being of the world on the basis of Europe's centrality to the world in terms of race, man's centrality in terms of sex, and the bourgeoisie's centrality in terms of class. Politically speaking, the "Other" could be seen as the one who is governed by a Eurocentric-phallographic-oligarchic order.

For Dussel, the “Other” has been historically subjugated to European power instruments which lead into cluster brutality. In other words, for him the “Other” is objectified to the European domination of the world, i.e. “the genocidally murdered Indian, of the African slave reduced to merchandise, of women as sexual objects, of the child pedagogically dominated” (ibid:21).⁵

Dussel asserts that his Philosophy of Liberation starts with an identification of the original link between the present turmoil of human “globality” and the irrational aspects of modernity. In his assertion, the origin of modernity is not only tied with rational conceptions of the modern self and her or his values of liberty, equality and the like, as described by many Western thinkers, but also compounded by irrational sacrificial myths. He says that the myth of modernity is irrational, since aggression, domination and exclusion are its manifestations: “... 1492 is the moment of the “birth” of modernity as a concept, the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, it also marks the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European.” ibid. pp. 2-3⁶

Modernity then serves to explain that its project constitutes a foundation for emancipation as well as repression. Dussel wants to eliminate a Eurocentric interpretation of modernity as essentially a European phenomenon. Rather he wants to situate it in a dialectical relation with what he calls in economic terms the “center” or Europe and the “periphery” or the “Other”. The dialectical relation is a historical thesis and antithesis of Europe, and later on the West with the non-Europeans or those who are known to be today as Third-World nations.

The new trans-modern positive perspective as a philosophical trend oriented towards the future, attempts to reexamine the historical and dialectical factors of the development of conceptions like global modernity and its emancipatory delineation, universal human development, rationality and others. Seen from this constructive understanding of modernity, Dussel’s explanation of the myth of modernity seems obvious and reasonable: an analysis of history as well as philosophy which is inevitably done in the phenomenological and hermeneutic points of departure. It is from these points of departure, for Dussel, which one can know the existential condition of twenty-first century’s global periphery, and the relevance of Liberation Philosophy for human development:

The reality out of which such a philosophy emerged is today more pressing than ever before in its continuous and maddening spiral of underdevelopment: the misery, the poverty, the exploitation of the oppressed of the global periphery (in Latin America, Africa, or Asia), of the dominated classes, of the marginalized, of the “poor” in the “center,” and the African-Americans, Hispanics, Turks, and others, to whom we would have to add women as sexual objects, the “useless” aged gathered in misery or in

asylums, the exploited and drugged up youth, the silenced popular and national cultures and all the “wretched of the earth,” as Franz Fanon put it, who wait and struggle for their liberation (ibid: 3).⁷

Dussel thus notes how the majority of people in the world are subjugated and excluded. To give a general description of those who are the dialectical products of modernity giving in conditions of domination and exclusion in the contemporary world, he takes the language of Emmanuel Levinas, concerning the “Other”. This term of Levinas permits Dussel to develop his Liberation Philosophy in relation to the practical crises of contemporary global world caused largely by the political and economic structural adjustment of capitalism. So it is important to develop a practical philosophical approach in order to address the present predicaments of global humanity. In addition to Levinas, Dussel employs Martin Heidegger’s ontological concern, Karl Marx in a newly constructed form to expand capital from its normal interpretation, and hermeneutics. All these are incorporated critically to show the methodological prism of Liberation Philosophy. Dussel in his Liberation Philosophy reexamined Habermas’ theory of communicative action to provide a practical ground for communicative rationality and action.

Hence by reconstructively incorporating these methodologies and concerns, Dussel’s Liberation Philosophy announces itself as a trans-modern critical social theory. This makes his approach different from both modern and postmodern discourses. Eduardo Mendieta in his editorial introduction puts the idea of trans-modernity as follows:

The term trans-modernity underscores that Liberation Philosophy is not about either negating modernity or blithely accepting it, but about transcending it anadialectically; that is, to think the couplet modernity and post modernity not just from within, but also, and especially from the perspective of its reverse, its underside, its occluded other (ibid :xxii).⁸

There are some people who simply regard Dussel’s approach as a postmodern one. In fact his Liberation Philosophy implies the disastrous and mythic appearance of modernity. This seems postmodern. Nevertheless Dussel equally discusses about the rational development of modernity. And he also accuses postmodernists that they are more modern than proponents of modernity. In simple terms what we may argue here is that his Philosophy of Liberation is different from both modern and postmodern perspectives since it starts with the other side of modernity. Accordingly, the novelty of his approach lies in critically reflecting on both the positive and negative sides of modernity from the

philosophical and historical position of the “Other.” The aim of Liberation Philosophy is to understand the cause for current global suffering of humanity and nature (i.e. “wretched of the earth”), and then to employ his emancipative theory as a means through which the historical exteriority of the “Other” could be problematized and solved in an ethical inventory process.

Revolutionary Disclosure of the Underside

A) Phenomenological and Hermeneutical Openness

The concern of human emancipation can be shown in the necessity of self-identification as both a particular and universal being by means of *methodic politicization*. The politicization enlarges the philosophical scope to deeply reflect on power, identity, justice, equality and recognition that the self possesses vis-à-vis others. In our case, since Dussel’s assiduous fixation of the “Other” in a privileged position is maintained, we need to concentrate more on the politics of otherness in the Philosophy of Liberation. For that sake the discussion in this part will be on the phenomenological and hermeneutic understandings of pluriversal constitution of identity and globality. Dussel’s justifications for the reconstruction of the theory of communication on the basis of dual emancipation is one; that is the liberation of the underside as primary, and the liberation of human in general which is its end.

For the question, how does the European man or the White man maintain the power of domination and universal model of humanity we can find two basic historical responses of Dussel. The first is the military domination of Europe’s “*ego conquer*”, and the second is the intellectual rationalism and scientism of Europe’s “*ego cogito*”. For most Western thinkers the principle of the *ego cogito* precedes the *ego conquer*. But for Dussel *ego cogito* develops one century after the cruel application of the “I conquer” over the Indians, Africans and Asians. His argument says:

The “I”, which begins with the “I conquer” of Hernan Cortes or Pizarro, which in fact precedes the Cartesian *ego cogito* by about a century, produces Indian genocide, African slavery, and Asian colonial war 1. (ibid: 20)⁹

Rene Descartes attempts to provide a philosophical justification for the scientific dichotomization of the “I” and the “Other”. His *ego cogito* argument implies that “... I think hence, I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist” (Descartes 1970).¹⁰ Now taking this scientific treatment of the identity of

the “I”, Descartes affirms that the modern self reaches the knowledge of things and then ontology. In other words, the “I” thinks and by that knows what is true. But not only this, the “I” also presupposes his existence in such evidential thinking. The “I” does exist if and only if he thinks, and this logic determines the identity of the “I” to be permanently conceived only within the thinking substance.

The crucial point, then, is the “who” of the “I” and the “Other” in Descartes’ hierarchical dichotomization. Gabrielle Hiltmann, in her article “Accounting for the Other: Towards an Ethics of Thinking”, goes on to accuse the paradigm of consciousness in Descartes from the logical view of what she calls “relational ethics”. Based on her relational ethics, then, Descartes’ bifurcation of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* can be problematic in four political categories; namely authoritarianism of the “I” and domination, destruction and exclusion of the “Other”. Here is her point about Descartes’ ego cogito argumentations:

1) the tendency to hypostasize the I as an absolute, autocratic and self-sufficient legislator of reason, 2) the hierarchical subordination of the other to the I, 3) the negation of the otherness of the other, 4) the exclusion of the manifold by focusing on the one (Hiltmann 2007:5).¹¹

In relational ethics the “I” always makes his identity in relational link with the “Other”. Hiltmann says the identity of the “I” equally coexists with the logical identity of the “non-I”, that is the “Other”. The “I” of Descartes though presupposes an absolute sovereign power holding; it actually affirms a dialectical relation to the “Other” in the negative sense. In other words, Descartes’ “I” must have a necessary relation with its “non-I” in order to exercise the hegemonic power of domination and exclusion.

Hiltmann wants to employ Arendt’s intersubjective understanding of personal identity, and phenomenological treatment of the “who” of the “I” and the “who” of the “Other”. Here she states that Arendt’s philosophy of interpersonal identity will consider the equality of the “I” and the “Other”. But as she underscores, it is really significant to use the phenomenological conceptions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty about the primacy of intercorporality in an intersubjectivity to reject the Cartesian principle of authoritarian ego over that “Other”. Let’s look at this argument of Hiltmann about Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation into her relational ethical theory:

Merleau-Ponty’s inter-relational understanding of the human person necessitates a new conception of the body-soul-consciousness relation. The separation of the body, soul and consciousness is the reason why idealistic

philosophies cannot account for another which is not constituted by the I. Instead, M. Merleau-Ponty does not start with thinking, but rather with the perceptual experience of the other in 'being in and towards the world (etre au monde). In this relational ontology, the person is always already and necessarily open towards the other. Due to this constitutive openness, the self is always already in a (potentially ethical) relation to the other and to itself (ibid:10).¹²

The problem of the philosophy of subjectivism as far as Hiltmann's relational ethics is concerned, is that the thinking of the self always places itself in a closed system that is not only separated from the "Other" but also from itself. To put oneself in a closed system means to remain in absolute isolation and a non-changeable identity of the self. Nevertheless as Hiltmann claims the identity of humanity is always in flux, and hence, there has to be a potential disclosedness of the self to the other and to itself to constitute an ethical wholeness. "It is not the body, nor the soul, nor consciousness, which would ground the identity of a person, but rather the unlimited process of intertwinement which is constantly opened towards the "Other" (ibid).¹³

The openness of the self to the "Other" and to itself, in the views of relational ethics is mediated through the principle of love. For Hiltmann the meaning of self-preservation, self-development' and self-consciousness can only be secured with love's relation and attunement of the self to the "Other" since she argues that, "without the love of others, no self even emerges"(ibid:11).¹⁴ Taking up the critical attitude of relational ethics the problem of the philosophy of subjectivism is the denial of a friendship, a love relation of the "I" and the "Other" in building a closed distant cage of an 'enlightened self'. Trans-modernists underscore that the realistic openness of face-to-face communication creates an opportunity to develop humanistic solidarity of the global population. So it could be nice to reconstruct the Enlightenment program of universal democratic rationality or epistemology with the new global ethical response of the human condition. And this can only be developed through harmonious interactions of different identities and their philosophical traditions.

Many phenomenology thinkers argue that the relational ontology of the "I" and the "Other" manifests through a perpetual openness by being-in-the world as being-with. In addition to what we have seen in Merleau-Ponty, one of the great philosophers of the twentieth century Martin Heidegger in his famous work, *Sein Und Zeit (Being and Time)* states that being-in-the world as Dasi-en-with-others:

By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one

does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too. This being-there-too [Auch-da-sein] with them does not have the ontological character of a Being -present-at-hand-along-'with' them within a world. The 'with' is something of the character of Dasein; the 'too' means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned Being-in-the-world. 'With' and 'too' are to be understood existentially; not categorically. By reason of this with-like [mithaftend] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with-Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others(Heidegger 1985:154-155).¹⁵

In such a phenomenological understanding Heidegger is arguing that, the "I" and the "Other" are equally thrown into the world and they existentially identify their being or identity within a with-world.

Drawing upon the spirit of post-structuralism, V.Y. Mudimbe constructs the relationship between discourses of power and knowledge of otherness in the European invention to colonize the non-European people and their culture. He tells us about the structural order of colonialism that reveals the core of difference of the *logic of invention* from the *logic of discovery* by its conscious arrangement of organizational architecture and imposition. This is Mudimbe's concept of the invention of the "Other", of the colonized people of non-European areas, of Africans in particular, in which Europe made a systematic construction of its power/discourse (see Mudimbe 1988, 1994)¹⁶. This view is analogous to what Dussel said concerning the invention of the New World. Both Mudimbe and Dussel argue that, in colonialism Europe, as the one that possessed the historical political power of the world, designed and determined the identity of the "Other". In other words, colonialism describes how Europe invented its Cultural horizon to be universally true placing other cultures in periphery. In fact one can see here the rational in which Europe needed the non-European to posit itself as the antithesis of the "Other."

Mudimbe claims that the notion of otherness structurally established with the anthropological discourses of Western epistemic locations by a method of dichotomization between invented markers of non-Europeans and Europeans: "traditional versus modern; oral versus written and printed; agrarian and customary communities versus urban and industrialized civilization; subsistence economies versus highly productive economies" (ibid: 4).¹⁷ We can also add closed versus open socio-cultural structures. These odd combinations are constructed in the anthropological and later on philosophical discourses to show that Europe is superior over the non-Europeans. This can be understood in the Hobbesian hypothesis of the state of nature. Accordingly, the "Other" is primitive,

poor, ahistoric, uncultured, and so on. For such a picture of the Other, Mudimbe argues that, the epistemological organization, structure and power have created the means of alienation and objectification of colonized people.

Another philosopher of the South, Messay Kebede deals with the invention process of the “Other” during colonialism as necessarily and entirely linked with the systematic invention of what he calls the “*myth of the white man*”. In this respect Kebede’s claim is that the invention is dual; both of the “white man” and the “Other”. In his analysis the “Other” is invented with markers of primitiveness and prelogicality based upon another mythic invention of the identity of the white man as rational, scientific, and civilized in the religious and secular texts of the West.

... the justification for subjugating non-Western peoples instead of engaging in free economic exchanges emanates from the perceived otherness of these people, which otherness justifies the hegemonic position of the West. The myth of the “white man” calls for the attribution of otherness to non-Western peoples, and subjugation constitutes its validation following the scientific criterion of successful practice as a confirmation of truth. While anthropology establishes the otherness of non-Western peoples, conquest confirms materially the superiority of the “white man” (Kebede 2004:10).¹⁸

There are Western and African philosophers who tried to describe the feature of primitiveness and prelogicality in relation to the popular understanding of African philosophy as ethno-philosophy. But Paulin J. Hountondji severely refuted the ethno-philosophical trend for its *dogma of unanimism and self-imprisonment* (1996:55&56,62)¹⁹ According to him philosophy lacks the quality of creativeness and critique if it is determined by the sense of unenlightened public property, which is primitive unanimity like folklore, proverbs, sayings, etc. In short, the sense of unanimity develops from the mythic picture of African philosophy which is made by both Western and African writers.

For Kebede the myth of the “white man” gave the light for the anthropological sciences to draft the otherness picture of non-Western peoples. Such hypothetical figuration of the “Other” had the legacy of the Greeks even though in the age of modernity the power of the West expanded itself assuming a global order by dominating the non-Western world more in the spheres of politics, of economy and politics of discourse/science.

Frantz Fanon focuses more on the colonial psychological hegemony of the white man over the black in his two famous works: *Black Skin White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon, in his first book, talks about the invention of blackness not by the black man himself, instead by the white man as Kebede

insisted: “white civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro. I shall demonstrate elsewhere that what is often called the black soul is a white man’s artifact” (Fanon 1967:14).²⁰ The Negro or the black human because of the psychological disaster of colonialism, according to Fanon, thinks that the white humanity is the real human who is absolutely free.

Fanon reminds us, the colonized people of the Third-World still remain under a neo-colonial order in which Western capitalism constitutes a world system of military and economic domination which claims to be a just and democratic system. “The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity.”(Fanon 1967: 252) ²¹ In parallel with this, Dussel states that the majority, that is three-fourth of the world humanity, are treated as the other of Europe economically and politically because of the system of capitalism. The capitalist system is therefore the major means for the domination and exclusion of the majority of the human population of the world.

Dussel accepts most of the claims of otherness discussed so far by thinkers of the south in the context of the ontological, cultural, political, economic and psychological hegemony of Europe. For him, since modernity of the world is constructed primarily by the European expansive political establishment it is reasonable to look at the historicity of the power of asymmetry between Europe as the center and the “Other” as periphery of the center. The asymmetry of power produces injustice in addition to the power differences between Europe and the non-Europeans. In fact Dussel underlines that, Europe enlarges itself as a “Western” power which consists of the United States of America and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus the center of modernity in the contemporary age is the Western world while the rest of the world is reduced to its periphery.

To transcend modernity from its ethnocentric tendency, Dussel places the “Other” in a political position that holds the responsibility of achieving human emancipation. This seems odd for most of us for the reason that for centuries the “Other” has been subjugated, and asserted to be non-human, irrational, primitive, etc...So how could one say this “Other” is now responsible to attain human liberation while she herself is not free? Or, in what logical sense can the tasks of human liberation be secured by the colonized being of capitalistic colonialism? The Dusselian trans-modern project asserts that the revolutionary activities of the “Other” are largely based in the praxis of the theory of communication.

Liberation of the oppressed seeks to differentiate the rational and progressive aspect of modernity from that of irrational sacrificial myth contained in its modern project. Western domination through colonialism is still perpetuated in another form within the system of globalization, capitalism, liberalism, and “world

democratization". To end the system of domination, not the mere idea of freedom echoed politically since the second half the eighteenth century, but the praxis of liberation is important. Since colonialism continues in the Western philosophies of homogenization, democratization, development strategy and the like we need to be very critical of liberation practices that could be employed in the world.

One of the key tools for liberation of the "Other" is *revolutionary violence*. Fanon talks about the role of violence, which is a revolutionary development of the colonized people which strives for the creation of a new human history:

It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe's crimes ... racial hatreds, slavery, exploitation and above all the bloodless genocide which consisted in the setting aside of fifteen thousand millions of men. So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation. If we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries (ibid:254).²²

Here Fanon's analysis of a new history of humanity recognizes the political and ethical responsibilities of the Third-World people to struggle for human liberation. In this sense the political violence of the "Other" can never be seen as ethically wrong, since it aims at the destruction of dehumanization.

Anthony Bogues tries to conceive the revolution of the "Other" as a quest for a "*new beginning*" (Bogues 2010:57).²³ For Hannah Arendt, revolution is a new beginning because the question it brings is fundamentally determined by the problem of novelty in relation to the status quo, or in Khunian terms the "normal" functions of science but in relation to the existing political system. As far as Bogues is concerned, the name "revolution" is given if and only if a thought or an action bears with new beginning(s) or problem(s). Bogues would like to enlarge his idea of revolution to the invention of existence in the human world. In this enlargement his main target, like Fanon, is the dialectical invention and discovery of a new humanity by those parties who are capable of defending the actual liberation of the people of the world. This can be taken as a re-worlding construction of our contemporary human world. As Bogues underlines, freedom has to be rooted in radical liberation as the abolishment of dehumanization and injustice. In a similar manner, Dussel articulates his Philosophy of Liberation not as a utopian map, but a praxis which works for not one or some selected races, but

for humanity. In so far as the humanity of the world is dominated and excluded in reality, liberation ought to be grounded in praxis and not in a utopia.

When the Praxis of liberation of the oppressed opens a new structure of the world it is through the “Other” that human oppression, exploitation and exclusion will be overcome by the sense of critical abolitionism. In the Philosophy of Liberation therefore, the “Other” is a political and ethical subject whose core interest is philosophically analyzed to be the negation of negation as the new order. But this negative dialectic of the Philosophy of Liberation is not held to be a total negation of the “normal” system of modernity, rather a way in which the “Other” takes a position of emancipating humanity from the irrational, sacrificial political status quo of domination and exclusion. Just as in postmodernity, the Philosophy of Liberation goes beyond the structural domain of modernity’s project to find out organic solutions from the excluded indigenous philosophies of the non-Western world. However, in addressing both the problems of marginalization and domination the “Other” is a responsible and rational agent to end the negative orderings of the system of modernity.

When “critique” departs from the exteriority of the exploited and excluded poor (excluded from distribution of life), from women as sexual objects and so on (that is, from the “positivity” of the reality of the Other, who is non-being for the system, the one who is negated), the critique and the praxis that precedes it and is its concomitant, it is not only the negation of the negation (negative dialectics) but also the affirmation of the exteriority of the Other (Dussel 1996:6).²⁴

Dussel’s argument about the exteriority of the “Other” is related to the identification of one’s identity. His basic insight here is to give an answer to the question *who the “Other”* in the phenomenological sense is. He raises the question as follows: humanistically and existentially who are we? This is purely the question of *identity*, or the “*who*” of a person as Arendt would perceive it. Concerning the issue of identity, Arendt argues that etymologically and existentially it has different meanings. The etymology is derived from two Latin terms “idem” and “ens” which mean that “the same” and “being”, respectively (Hiltmann 2007:43)²⁵. Etymologically therefore, identity means the permanent, never changing being of a thing or a person. However existentially, Arendt says that the identity of the person undergoes influx that is the identity of a living personality or “be-ing” (Ramose 2002:121)²⁶ who is thrown into life where there is a course of natural social changes (Hiltmann 2007:43).²⁷ Dussel seems to be developing the existential notion of identity to respond for who the “Other” is

culturally. His answer would be the “Other” is the other in terms of its existentiality not of absolutely the same of the universal beyond its humanity.

In current globalization or homogenization colonialism largely revolves around Western cultural domination. Westerners use discourse as an instrument to expose the idea that non-Western cultures are premodern, unenlightened. This Western understanding is claiming the lack of scientific and technological thinking in the indigenous thoughts of the colonized people. From this we may affirm that, there is an epistemic coloniality in the Western imposition of a technical occidental rationality. In order to systematically deconstruct the epistemic coloniality of cultural domination of the West, Dussel wants to incorporate Paulo Friere’s psychological thought. In the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* Friere develops the point that the Western epistemic colonialism evolves in a dehumanizing system. As a result of this, the liberation theory Friere is concerned with a communion revolutionary act of the oppressed and oppressors to abolish any system domination. That is why in his work he mentions the revolution of the oppressed as fundamental tool to fulfill human emancipation:

[S]ooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it) become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather of the humanity of both (Freire 1972:21).²⁸

Dussel thinks that his Philosophy of Liberation struggles against the hegemony of Western epistemic, political, economic and other traditions insisting that humanity exists in a diverse or what we call a pluriversal condition. His attempt is not to construct a new hegemony of the “Other” as in a Foucaultian point of view, rather creating a political condition in which different or plural identities of the world “*polylogically*”²⁹ (Wimmer 2002:79) take place in the abolishment of domination and exclusion. Put differently, the goal of the Philosophy of Liberation is not to replace the hegemony of the West by the oppressed-mainly Third-World, but to struggle with all internal and external factors of dehumanization.

With respect to hermeneutical stance, Dussel emphatically argues his liberation theory with regard to Marx’s thought is a re-reading different from standard Marxism, scientific Marxism, or even the dominant Western understanding of Marxism. He says, in his project of Liberation, Marx’s technical or economic reflections of capitalism should be hermeneutically understood as a moral-practical refutation of the capitalist system. Two justifications appear to this hermeneutic analysis of Marx’s philosophy in Dussel’s thought. First, Marx considers all of his views are oriented towards a revolutionary change of the world

adopting a new *practical-critical-activity* in its discourse. Second, Dussel claims that the most important economic ideas of Marx in his famous works are not about pure economics but rather are of philosophical [“practical-critical”] concern, which demonstrate a strong ethical and political criticism of capitalism. The ethical critique of capitalism that Marx developed according to Dussel is an emancipative or “liberational” practice in relation to the actual problems of the global capitalist system from the logical points of view of an ideal community. For Liberation Philosophy, then, the philosophical economics of Marx articulated through an ethical project which critically observes the real estranged individuals in the capitalists’ community of producers.

For Liberation Philosophy, Marx is a classic of “economic philosophy” (in addition to being an economist for the economist), a philosophy which was developed as a critique of a capitalist life world whose fundamental structure (and not only as a system) are obstacles to the reproduction of human life. Therefore, Marx departs in his critique from an ideal community of producers, out of which a real alienated society of producers (capital) is deconstructed. For Marx the essential is not subject of labor/object-nature, but the relation subject/subject as a practical, ethical relationship. His economics is the critique from the perspective of an “ideal community” of a capitalist “real society (Dussel 1996:220).³⁰

This crucial position of Marx is perhaps associated with his strong criticism of capitalism. The system of capitalism undergoes with fantasy that causes human estrangement. Marx is then strictly refuting the estrangement laws of capitalist mode of production. This is Marx’s ethical-economic criticism of capitalism’s estrangement:

The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. The devaluation of the human world grows in direct proportion to the increase in value of the world of things. Labor not only produces commodities; it also produces itself... the object that labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer... In the sphere of political economy this realization of labor appears as a loss of reality for the worker objectification as loss of and bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, as alienation (Marx 1975:223-224)³¹

Marx develops this idea of alienation in line with how capitalism is mainly concerned with profit maximization at the expense of the workers' life. He underlines that capitalism reveals itself as a system of dehumanization of the worker. The principle of commodification entails the fact that the worker becomes a slave of his object of production. In fact the estrangement of the worker appears at four levels; estrangement from the product, the production process, species-being and others (ibid: 327-330).³² The first two alienations clarify more the objectification principle in which the worker loses his value at the cost of the production and its entire activity. The last two explain the fantastic solitary existence of the worker that has separated him from his fellow workers as well as his own essence. For liberation philosophers who accept Marx's critique of capitalism, his political economy and *Capital* should be interpreted as making a great contribution to our understanding of ethics and economics in the existential capitalists' domination across the world. In fact, Marx's philosophy is significant from the perspective of human emancipation, not the liberation of one section or the other.

Through developing both phenomenological and hermeneutic instruments, in the Philosophy of Liberation the primary task is the abolishment of the political arrangement and system of colonialism. But the end objective is like the theory of communicative rationality insuring the liberation of the world of humanity which could only be attained through an intersubjective recognition and communicative consensus.

B) Face-to-Face Communication and Ethical Reinvention

Habermas is concerned with upholding the Enlightenment values of freedom, democracy, individuality, autonomy, criticism, and rationality; with analyzing their interconnections; with understanding how they have been threatened by development within modernity; and with demonstrating how these values can be anchored in actual social institutions through advancing existing forms of "communicative action". The rationality that informs such action is based on raising and evaluating validity claims within an intersubjective context oriented toward achieving rational consensus over social values and policies (Best 1995:148-149).³³

Here we can see not only Habermas' serious support of the Enlightenment principles of reason and liberation. In his critique of postmodernism he opposes social and critical discourses that work beyond the scheme of linguistification and intersubjective communication. Put differently, Habermas' communicative theory functions as the critique of both modernism in relation to its metaphysical

assumptions and postmodernism for its abandonment of the power of reason in accomplishing the goal of human emancipation.

Habermas maintains that the emancipatory interest is still the critical task of the unfinished project of modernity. For him, Enlightenment discourses essentially shaped his critical social theory except for that their reduced concern for reason and human communication. Robert P. Badillo notes:

For Habermas the will to reason is understood in an enlightened sense as signifying the will to reason free from dogmatic and ideological influences. The actual employment of critical reflection may be required only to remedy systematically distorted communication, though it resides as a telos in the structure of human communication (Badillo 1987:120).³⁴

For Habermas, it is only through reason that humanity can achieve its emancipation, and thus the role of communicative critical social theory lies in the abandonment of irrational constraints towards the goal of the Enlightenment.

Indeed, Dussel accepts the general positive understanding of reason of Habermas. But Dussel attempts to show that in the historical development of modernity, the reason of humanity was not treated in its plurality since the reason of the “Other” was subordinated to the hegemonic *occidental rationalism* of Europe. He states:

Modernity is born when Europe (the peripheral Europe of the Muslim and Ottoman world), begins its expansion beyond its historical limits. Europe arrives in Africa; in India and Japan, thanks to Portugal; in Latin America, and from there to the Philippines, thanks to the Spanish conquest. That is to say, Europe has become itself “center”. The other races and cultures now appear as “immature”, barbarous, underdeveloped ... modernity is inaugurated, no longer as an emancipatory rational nucleus but as a irrational sacrificial myth(1996:51-52).³⁵

Dussel’s point is that modernity has contained both rationality and irrationality in its project of the Enlightenment. Of course his critique is not only given to the European physical conquering of the other parts of the world, but also to the hegemonic suppression of the cultures that may contain their own diverse rationalities, to provide a priority for occidental rationalism.

The Philosophy of Liberation, parallel with Habermas’ communicative theory, admits that reason is the key for human emancipation. Dussel suggests that the Levinsean notion of the “Other” [*Autruí*] incorporates ethical and political human relations as well as responsibility in the “Face-to-Face” engagement, or

communicative rationality and action. In this respect today's revolution of the oppressed and excluded has to be understood as a rational call of the world demanding justice. The question of justice in the Philosophy of Liberation is seen from an exterior-interpellation, or in simple terms, justice is Other-oriented. When we say the interpellation of the "Other" it is to imply from an "external" and "prior" condition that the justice of discourses and actions is maintained. Dussel tries to show where the difference lies between the interpellation of the "Other" and interpellations "from inside" using Marx. For Marx, he says:

Bourgeois "morals," or "right," justifies "from inside" that which applies to its own principles. Slavery is unjust for the bourgeois or socialist order; it is just for the slavery order. Salaried labor is unjust for Marx or in the socialist regimes, insofar as it is an institutionalism which steals from the worker part of product of his labor (Surplus value). In this case, the ethical criterion is "external" and "prior" to capital as such; it is the living labor, the dignity of the person of the worker ante festum (ibid:21).³⁶

This sounds like the way we look at something from inside always tries to justify the entire principle of its own given system. If a communicative process starts within the current socio-cultural political and economic order, i.e. approaching "from-inside", then "x" is right in so far as it is stated to be right in the world system. Instead of such communicative practice, Dussel argues that the "external" and "prior" ethical interpellation of the exploited and marginalized is necessary to enlarge the sphere of the communicative process. This is his new construction of Habermas' communicative theory from the point of view of the oppressed and excluded:

Participants in a peripheral communication community, where the experience of exclusion is an everyday starting point that is to say, an a priori, and not an a posteriori, we must find "philosophical room" from our experience of misery, poverty, difficulty to discuss (due to lack of resources), uncommunicativeness, or merely not "being part" of the hegemonic communication community (ibid: 24).³⁷

As far as Dussel is concerned, the historical condition of the Africans, Latin Americans, Asians, poor Workers of the Capitalist world, women, the youth and aged of the periphery, and some others that commonly share a value of otherness, is in an exterior position in relation to Europe's centrality to the modern world and its systems. In this respect, the communicative theory of Habermas states the possibility of the inclusion of the "Other" reinforcing into the hegemonic

communication community of the world by denying the asymmetry of power in globalization. It is because of this asymmetric power relation that the voice, reason and sovereignty of the oppressed have been disregarded. Thus, communicative action should be reconstructed considering the power and rationality of the “Other”, i.e. the reason and interpellation of the dominated, exterior to the system of industrial capitalism of the West.

Here it is good to analyze some of the common grounds of postmodernists and trans-modernists. For example, in the context of Theodor W. Adorno’s idea of negative dialectic the “Other” as a self politically has the possibility to search for a reciprocal position in relation to the manipulative and exclusionary capitalist system in which the West is structured. In a similar development, Gayatri C. Spivak underlines that the subaltern that includes sexed subject and ethnic other historically objectified to the life of estrangement, and thus, the subaltern is not speaking. Now mere dismantling of the system and its discourse of traditional critique must be replaced by a kind of interpellation of the “Other.” In fact, Spivak’s philosophy is critical to the extent of radicalizing the language and logos of the subaltern identity. Her postcolonial philosophy emphasizes more on the strategic essentialism of liberation of the subaltern.

... the emergence of the “Third World” as a privileged signifier within radical criticism to the tendency “to think of the Third World as distant cultures, exploited but with rich intact heritages waiting to be recovered, interpreted, and circularized in English translation.” (1992:171)³⁸

Another postcolonial thinker, Edward Said argues that, in Western philosophical project the identity question of the “Self” and the “Other” was resolved in the system of imperialism. Imperialism as a politico-economic tool assumes the hierarchical supremacy of the West as the “Self” over the non-West as the “Other”. For Said it is necessary to develop a postcolonial critical discourse as an exterior critique of the system of Western domination and exploitation (ibid: 237-241).³⁹

Europe and North America (Western hegemonic power) are controlling and managing almost all activities of the world. In the name of rationality the West colonized other parts of the world to fulfill its political and economic interests. As a result of this, today we can think about a real communicative theory if our emancipatory interest enlarges deeply into the socio-political and economic problems of the status quo. The emancipatory interest must be aware of the relationship between the economic technical interest and the ethical practical interest.

Yet, Dussel says that the “Other” in a communicative process should not be subordinated, rather directed to the intelligibility of meaning in rationality and action. “The Other, not as “other” than reason but as the “reason” of the Other is the other reason which “interpellates” and from where one may show norms to be invalid or statements to be false”. Habermas keeps everything internal to the communicative system whereas Dussel is now pondering the necessity of freeing the reason of the Other which is ulterior to the totality, or the system, and ethically strong enough to provide critical reasons and justifications of righteousness and wrongness, truth and falsity. In a mere abstraction Habermas idealizes of the equality of participants is his life world. But for Dussel we need to differentiate the authority of reason and the authority of control.

Different from Habermas, Dussel’s liberation theory recognizes the ethical consideration of the corporal suffering of global humanity due to the economic system of capitalism. This move of Dussel is abhorrent to Habermas’ communicative theory that sees language as the foundation of integration and social evolution. Unlike Habermas, Dussel conceives labor not primarily in its “economic” meaning, but in ethical sense. That is why he would like to interpret Marx’s *Capital* as an ethical critique of the capitalist mode of production. Based on this, Dussel’s hermeneutic reading of Marx’s *Capital* from the perspective of an ethical challenge to capitalism underlines the relation of labor and language, and the logical position of the poor or[pauper] in Marx’s term, that is the “Other” in creating a new just order of humanity from an exterior rationality and interpellation.

The interpellation is an originary speech act, with which the pauper erupts into the real community of communication and producers (in the name of the ideal), and makes them accountable, demands a universal right, as a human being-part of the community; and, in addition, expects to transform it by means of a liberation praxis (which is also frequently a struggle), into a future, possible more just society. It is the excluded one who appears from a certain nothing to create new moment in the history of the community. He/she erupts, then, not only as excluded from the argumentation, affected without being-part, but as excluded from life, from production and consumption, in misery, poverty, hunger, and imminent death (Dussel 1996:24).

All this would seem to point to the inevitable interpellation and reason of the “Other” as necessary to liberate human beings, both dominator and dominated, from the system of domination and exclusion. Habermasian communicative theory derecognizes to see the suffering, poverty and death of the “Other” (Africans,

Latin Americans, Asians and so on) in relation to its task of fulfilling the unfinished interest of modernity. One might say, his critical social theory fails to see the injustice of capitalism. On the contrary, the Philosophy of Liberation affirms that more than three-fourth of the world population is in economic danger. Thus, a new order should be established through the logical position of the “Other” to create a new moment of human history based on global justice.

The present globality requires an openness of culture and reason in the world. In the past globality, the world system is built through Europe’s domination over other areas, and thus Liberation Philosophy accepts the fact that other cultures and rationalities are forcibly marginalized. It is within this past-present temporality that one can see the rational and irrational aspects of modernity. From the perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation, present global scholars should work to disclose the irrationally excluded cultures of the past, and differentiate the rational or positive aspects of modernity from the irrational ones so that a transformation could be made into the new future, that is a trans-modern globality.

Dussel asserts that the past and present political, cultural, social, economic, and philosophical drawbacks of global modernity can only be addressed by going into a trans-modern globality. Trans-modernity insists on the need for trans-capitalist philosophical traditions of the world. Accordingly, the future globality is all about the possibility of a just democratic world through a trans-modern polylogue between the diverse philosophies of the planet: “a trans-modern pluriverse (other than universal and not post-modern) appears on the horizon. Now “other philosophies” are possible, because “another world is possible.” (1993:76)⁴¹

The new opening into the philosophical traditions of the world does not assert a new ethnocentrism, but rather a mutual enrichment of critical conversation (i.e. polylogue) and solution to the global problems. Opening to the philosophical traditions of the world according to Dussel, will bring a change in the mode of production. In other words, his trans-modernity tries to solve the socio-economic problems of capitalism, transcending exploitation, alienation, and the injustice justified on the working class. In his hermeneutic reading of Marx’s *Capital* we concluded that an ethical criticism of capitalism is important to show how the economic system is a core aspect of critical social theory. Most of the present global problems are products of the world system which started in the fifteenth century by West Europeans. To have a just global system therefore we need a creative, ethical, and critical reinvention of the present human world. Dussel writes,

The fulfillment of modernity has nothing to do with a shift from the potentialities of modernity to the actuality of European modernity. Indeed,

the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process. The transmodern project is the mutual fulfillment of the “analectic” solidarity of center/periphery, woman/man, mankind/earth, Western culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, different classes. It should be noted here that this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but rather by subsumption from alterity (2000:473).⁴²

If our philosophy seeks the emancipation of global humanity, we need to see the real causes of the social sufferings, sicknesses and immature death of peoples in the Third-World. We must confront the unemployment, massive poverty, homelessness, cultural coloniality, dangerous and destructive proliferation of nuclear weapons in the globe as a way of looking at the world from the perspective of the victims of all these. We think these revolutionary thoughts and feelings provide a promising ground for a just world. From this it seems possible to argue that, the role of Liberation Philosophy is to change contemporary globalization into a trans-modern globality of the future which strives for a better world. Needless to say, a trans-modern globality develops from a pluriversal horizon of difference so that philosophical communication could reach towards mutual understanding and the development of a truly human value.

Conclusion

It is clear by now that according to the Philosophy of Liberation, present globalization historically appeared with the expansion of European power into other parts of the world to insure that the center, Europe, rules the periphery. This system is modern in the planetary sense. It was the original force that united the world within a single system. The philosophical crux of the problem claims that particular European values are made universal and human in the context of the “rationality” of modernity. In this respect, Dussel argues that the problem is a philosophical one in which the crises of global modernity originated because of Europe’s deliberate act of universalization of its particular political as well as philosophical projects.

Revolutionary ethical reinvention must preserve the socio-economic and political anomalies of the world (poverty, oppression, exclusion, the imperial developmental fallacy, et cetera), to make a change from the perspective of the exterior. In short, most of the social sufferings of global humanity have to be rearticulated in ways that will bring an end to dehumanization and injustice. In a pluriversal trans-modern globality human beings are organic agents for the

recreation of new socio-economic and political histories. In relation to theory of communication, Liberation Philosophy stresses that solidarity and justice are basic ideas to develop organic critique of the ongoing asymmetric power relations in the political and economic, cultural and racial spheres of local and international societies. The reason and interpellation of the “Other” is revolutionary if and only if a critical path of an economic and political philosophy is taken as a major part of contemporary critical social discourses. This is a new path of developmental democracy that arises from the socially manipulated, oppressed and dependent aspects of the modern system.

But there still are fundamental questions that one can raise in relation to trans-modernism. One of the questions is the extent to which Liberation Philosophy is realistic in unifying the emancipatory interests of the oppressed and global humankind. We may also ask a question as to how trans-modernism levels its epistemological power in the sense of revolution that has a new approach of addressing social problems of the modern world. I think here the postcolonial critiques of both Spivak and Said are important. The critiques of these two thinkers may help us to elucidate the meaning, nature and power of social critical discourses. In addition to this, does the Philosophy of Liberation as a subaltern critique of modernity maintain its strong challenge to the ongoing politico-economic structural horizon of globalization?

Acknowledgement

I am thankful to Bekele Gutema (PhD) for his invitation to write to this Journal. I am also grateful to Mr. Daniel Smith for discussing most of the issues raised in this paper.

Notes

1. Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt school,” *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America* (Autumn, 1993), p.76. Dussel offers a trans-modern perspective to solve the political, economic, ecological, epistemic and fetishist conventional problems of modernity by going beyond the hegemonic politics of domination and marginalization. This is a new perspective that

- recognizes plurality of social realities and critical exploration towards the wretched of the earth.
2. This idea of “pluriverse” discussed by liberationists to assert an organic entrance of different identities/cultures of the world into communication action underlying the necessity of global mindset eruption in discursive discussion. See Enrique Dussel’s article, Dussel “A New Age in the History of Philosophy: The World Dialogue between Philosophical Traditions” (Seoul, Korea, August 2, 2008), p. 11-14, and some related reflections of Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, (New York: International Publisher, 1975), p.121
 3. Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 155-156. In relation to this important points raised in the works Steven Best, *The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, Habermas* (New York and London; The Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 148-149, Simon Clarke, *From Enlightenment to Risk: Social Theory and Contemporary Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.61
 4. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 20
 5. *ibid.* p. 21
 6. *ibid.* pp. 2-3
 7. *ibid.* p. 3
 8. *ibid.* p. xxii
 9. *ibid.* p.20
 10. Rene Descartes, *a Discourse on Method: Meditations and Principles*, T. Sorell (ed.), (London: Guernsey Press, 1970). In *Discourse on Method*, Particularly on the *first part* he talks about the mathematical foundation of his philosophy, that he is “delighted with mathematics” including arithmetic and geometry, “on the account of *certitude* and *evidence* of their reasoning”. For him the logic and method of mathematics governs all hard sciences and philosophy of modernity.
 11. Gabrielle Hiltmann, “Introduction: Accounting for the Other: Towards an Ethics of Thinking,” in *the Other: Feminist Reflections in Ethics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.5
 12. *ibid.* p.10
 13. *ibid.*
 14. *ibid.* p.11

15. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, E. Macquarie and Robinson (trans.), (London: Blackwell, 1985), pp.154-155
16. See V. Y Mudimbe's analysis of the relationship between power and otherness most importantly focusing on the primitivism, functionalism, evolutionism, Marxism and other anthropological Eurocentric and ethnocentric discourses. But concerning the invention of Africa in the colonial discourse/power it is more important to ponder the first page of his *Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian. University Press, 1988), and *The Idea of Africa*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian. University Press, 1994) specifically section II, i.e. Which Idea of Africa?
17. *ibid.* p. 4
18. Messay Kebede, *Africa's Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonization* (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2004), p.10
19. Paulin J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. viii, 55 & 56, 62
20. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, Charles Lam Markmann (trans.) (New York: Grove Press, Inc. 1967), p.14
21. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Constance Farrington (trans.), (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), p.252
22. *ibid.* p. 254
23. Anthony Bogues, *The Empire of Liberty: Power, Desire, and Freedom* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2010), p. 57
24. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p.6
25. Gabrielle Hiltmann, "Introduction: Accounting for the Other: Towards an Ethics of Thinking," in *the Other: Feminist Reflections in Ethics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.43
26. This notion of "be-ing" is discussed by Professor M. B Ramose to insist the point that every philosophical reflection evolves in a rigorous search of the everydayness pluriversal cultural experiences concerning humanity in general. See his article, "I Doubt, therefore African Philosophy Exists", in *South African Journal Of Philosophy*, (Pretoria: PSSA and the Faculty of Humanities, 2002), p.121

27. Gabrielle Hiltmann, "Introduction: Accounting for the Other: Towards an Ethics of Thinking," in *the Other: Feminist Reflections in Ethics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.43
28. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Myra Bergman Ramos (trans.), (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 21
29. Franz M. Wimmer develops the notion "polylogue" to explain a new dialogical communication in intercultural practice. Polylogue takes place among various participants from diverse philosophical traditions. Franz M. Wimmer, *Essays on Intercultural Philosophy*, (Chennai: Satya Nilayam Publications, 2002), p.79
30. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p.220
31. Karl Marx, *Early writings of Marx*, (London: penguin Books Ltd, 1975), pp.223-224
32. *ibid.* pp.327-330
33. Steven Best, *The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, Habermas* (New York and London; The Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 148-149
34. Robert Peter Badillo, *The Emancipatory Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics* (Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series 1. Culture and values, Vol.13, Washington, D.C; 1991), p.53, Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2 Life world and System: A Critique of Functionalism Reason*, Thomas McCarthy (Trans.), (Boston; Beacon Press Books, 1987), p.120
35. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), pp.51-52
36. *ibid.* p.21
37. *ibid.* p.24
38. Asha Verdharajan, *Theorizing the Subject: Theodor W. Adorno, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Contemporary Critical Discourse*, [Thesis for the Degree of Philosophy in the Department of English] (Saskatoon, University of Saskatchewan, 1992), p. 171
39. *ibid.* pp.237-41
40. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), pp.24

41. Enrique Dussel, "Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt school)," *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America* (Autumn, 1993), p.76
42. Enrique Dussel, "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism: The Semantic Slippage of the Concept of Europe," (Nepantia: Duke University Press, 2000), p.473

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