

Politics in Schooling: Linguistic Challenge to African Philosophy

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Abstract

Post-colonial curricula in African Universities continue to dislocate the Africans under the school coated politics and infected benevolence of education. It remains the bearer of the Euro-American stamp which makes Africans the 'natural' followers of the stamp owners and define themselves in the language written over the stamp. The system teaches Africans to ignore the values of their languages which in turn pushes them to the periphery of knowledge production and true epistemic communication. It continued to teach them to hate themselves and to over-value 'foreign ideas and values' in the schools. TOFFEL and ILETS are remaining legitimate vehicles of the system and above all the litmus test for non English intelligence. African children, among others, continue to stay on the margins of real communication and knowledge production. The worst thing is, however, African intellectuals are contributing to this discriminating politics in schools and this is nothing short of self-denial of one's own access to oneself in the epistemic space. In this paper, I will discuss how imposed languages undermine the Africans from the academic and epistemic points of view.

Keywords: *Knowledge production, politics, linguistic challenges, epistemic communication*

Introduction

In this essay I discuss politics in schooling as a power driven linguistic superiority of the European academic position and its epistemological, axiological and metaphysical consequences upon the subordinate side of

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African education. The discussion goes beyond a sheer intention of bothering about 'why the hitherto medium of education in most African countries remain in exoglossic or foreign languages to the philosophical analysis of the relics longstanding impact upon the Africans. I felt this worthy of rethinking since such a trend continued deflecting the Africans from the possibility of gaining comprehensive and hermeneutical self-understanding. Since our historical encounter with Europe, we used to face challenges in which various generations of us, are simply remembered with much experience of daunting difficulties some at the conceptual levels and others, at the intellectual implementation and its utility.

Here is a question central to my discussion; 'why does Africa remain a hub of academic experimentation' regardless of what the Africans have been longing for, viz. freedom in all aspects. I see 'reason' for this reviving behind a 'veil of politics,' when considered from historical and philosophical analysis, i.e. when I rethink of: the purpose of education, its origin, whom it stands for, how it is to be done, and so on. This takes me to politics in schooling which prevails through languages that promote conceptual superiority and exclusive interest of the language owners. Language for education means so many things for humankind so long as it involves production, definition, determination and dissemination of knowledge. Besides such foundational and epistemological functions, languages play axiological role in which we hardly deny them occupying centers of historical heritage as repository of the history of humanity. Unfortunately, the Africans have been deprived of this, throughout the history of post-colonial education, where we see school children learn to despise their past, ignore their present and look for their future baked by those who are teaching them from the exogenous experiences of life. This is largely due to the fact that their 'thinking' is done through colonial languages such as English. In most cases, English, which was initially a colonial language, continued surviving as a political language with which many scholarship granting institutions used to measure academic competence and excellence of non-English speakers. African scholars like Ngugi wa Thiong'o related this to colonial mentality that sees English, the language of imperialism as the only medium for intellectual and academic discourse. This hinders humanity from learning and sharing from and among each other.

The essay identifies politics in schooling with its polarization of humanity over the issue of education and its concealed ideological utilities in the schools. It argues that the Europeans created socio-linguistic based chain of 'educational commands' in which they continued pegging up to their super ordination to the Africans' subordination. The trend reflects the Africans' side as a 'subordinate stance' in which we constantly learn that the Africans are basically lacking something that the Europeans compensate for them by schooling. Cognizant of this, therefore, the essay calls for the need of African languages, not as alternatives, but rather as imperatives to liberate the youth from a linguistic colonial mindset. This is a soul searching endeavor that enables a kind of conceptual re-engineering so as to rescue the present self-despising and desperate youth in schools. The approach is emancipatory, at least from a philosophical point of view, since it awakens us from the desperate state of socio-linguistic dependency and scientific inferiority. The essay poses this as an imperative via which we overcome politics in schooling and our groundless hope in the epistemological validity and its practical utility coming from knowledge that we have known little.

Linguistic Challenge in African Education

Before I venture into 'politics in schooling as linguistic challenge and above all' as a challenge to African philosophy, I want to explain the considerable role of languages in doing philosophy. P. Hountondji says thatⁱ, 'Philosophy' requires special conceptual ability on the part of the practitioner, i.e. terminologies, vocabularies and conceptual apparatus bequeathed by philosophical, tradition which one can never do without but must, on the contrary use with profit if we want to be authentic philosophers (Hountondji 1996: 74). Thus Philosophical communication of knowledge in general and producing this knowledge in particular, would inevitably lead us to a daunting task as long as it basically involves conceptual difficulties which are hardly possible without reasonable language ability. If we consider 'philosophizing' from this point of view, we may understand that languages in philosophizingⁱⁱ go beyond the daily languages we often use for communication, which is barely enough to discuss the 'restriction' I'm focusing on. Firstly, the nature of human

knowledge, contents and extents are all determined by our ability in the languages. Language, in this regard, helps individuals not only to deliver ideas but also to deliver mental contents inherent in realities queued up behind the practitioner's life dialogueⁱⁱⁱ. I think H. G. Gadamer has already put this point in saying that "No one will deny that our language influences our thought. We think with words. To think is to think something with oneself; and to think something with oneself is to say something to oneself" (2004: 547). Here comes the point that I want to underline, i.e. doing philosophy, in this context, is a critical, rational, analytical and conceptual practice without which one's own mental contents remain deaf to the self. This point underlines philosophizing, not only as a process of communicating knowledge but also a critical reflection on production of knowledge, producing knowledge itself, without imposed conceptual and linguistic rules. Indicating that Knowledge is the spiritual assimilation of reality essential to practical activities, as Cornforth argued, theories and concepts are created in the process of such assimilation, which has creative aims, actively reflects the phenomena, properties, and laws of the objective world and has its real existence on the form of linguistic system (Cornforth 1974: 208). Initially, this was emphasized by the exponents of logical positivism right from their premise that even scientific knowledge can be interpreted only by the linguistic means of formal logic or by reduction to the language of observation (Cornforth 1974: 207). One's failure to recognize this due to a forced way of thinking would in turn let him/her trap himself/herself in others' conceptual spaces.

Coming back to the issue of linguistic challenges, therefore, it needs to be discussed from the understanding that doing philosophy indicates a point of departure from the view of the practitioner, which I think enables the practitioner discern his/her own conceptual take off. Here by conceptual take off I mean a kind of linguistic approach towards things/situations in focus in one's own right guided by his/her inner conception. Originally, such a linguistic approach is our essential and social concern from which I think personalities like Rousseau put that it is as soon as one man was recognized by another as sentient, thinking being similar to himself, the desire one needs to communicate his feelings and thought made him seek the means to do so (in Eze 1997: 109). Accordingly, here I want to say that linguistic challenge refers to a situation in which one is deprived of basic

linguistic access through which he/she communicates with all the possible realities around. It is also a conceptual encirclement which causes philosophical restriction. But the question I want to address is; how is this issue connected to politics?

The above question takes us to the history of African philosophy, particularly in the postcolonial era, in which we often see that African philosophers are limited to borrowing selected concepts and re-appropriate them in searching for their own realities. At this stage, for instance, heavy metaphysical concepts such as space and time would remain conceptually impossible for those who are linguistically restricted and conceptually dislocated. Thus, linguistic denial in schooling is a politics which causes professional alienation and self-annihilation of intellectuals. Ali Mazrui, who underlined the idea that intellectual and scientific dependency in Africa is inseparable from linguistic dependency, wrote as follows:

It is because of this that the concept of an African physicist who is not also westernized, modern surgeon who does not speak a European language, modern chemist, zoologist and economist is for the time-being a socio-linguistic impossibility. This need not apply to a Chinese or Japanese physicist, where it is possible to engage in a scientific conversation at a sophisticated level without the explicit mediation of a foreign language (Mazrui 2003: 10).

Given these, therefore, I would like to say that linguistic challenge in the present curricula is a main symptom of the politics in schooling. For one thing, this politics hides itself in the curricula and formalized itself through policies. It is a kind of the politics of assimilation which now continues to be observed among Africans who have good command of European languages. Thus, letting the external influence to the extent that it denies the others having access to themselves in the schools is politics. It is a politics which makes the others focus on imitating the external model of thinking and award the best imitators. It has been throughout such a model that the African intellectuals have been denied of what others called linguistic disquotational^{iv} statements. Accordingly, it would be an obvious denial if it deprives others of the right to put the fact that 'fire burns' without quoting somebody or thinking in accordance with others' linguistic implications. Wiredu indicated this when he said that African philosophers

think philosophically in English or French or German or Portuguese or some such languages (Bell 2002: 19). Thus, given such conditions, the only thing (if any) that the African intellectual is doing is that he/she thinks in her/his own language and creates/philosophizes through the conceptual scheme of others which I think unduly distorts creativity and philosophizing. In this case, however, what is forced to be adjusted to the others' life style and mode of knowledge production is not only the African ways of thinking, but also the whole philosophy that one engages in. The present European pervasive campaigns to educate and feed us encourage this act of displacement. Accordingly, the Euro-American curricula given to the Africans are not pure academic in their purpose. Secondly, as Robert Phillipson put it, postcolonial educational systems, particularly due to the influence of the World Bank in recent decades, have tended to give priority to the former colonial languages and a marginal status to the local languages (Ricento 2006: 349). Thus, Europeans legitimized and standardized their authority first in language. This is clearly linked with political authority which lets us remain their conceptual, political and socio-cultural victims.

Furthermore, the politics in schooling has so many things to do with the very ambivalent claim that written language would be valued more highly than spoken languages. In his *Of Grammatology*, J. Derrida has worked out that the opposition between oral and written languages belongs to the European way of thinking (Kimmerle 1991: 44). Although they even claim that their preferred written languages are more valued, they equally know that writing in those languages simply speaks about their own realities. This attests to the system's political aspect. Thus throughout such a system, the restricted segment of humanity continues to be disadvantaged while imitating the center being at the periphery. And whatever does this discrimination to some segments of humanity is politics no matter what and how we name it in the curricula. Because, language users (as Ricento said) have a conception of language and language use; conception of quality, value, status, norms, functions, ownership and so forth (2006: 241). I think that it has been from such a consideration that some scholars clearly argue that linguistic assimilation of societies into that of another group threatens its collective existence, since 'language is truly the archive and synthesis of

human group's main historical experiences that have gradually been deposited in and incorporated into its vocabulary and structure^{iv}.

The sad thing in the politics of schooling is, however, that the West is systematically continuing the project in various systematic and ambivalent ways. The continuity can be understood from many socio-political conventions and various instrumental covenants in which they often use ambiguous, mischievous and ambivalent concepts. In her piece on "Language and Human Rights", Tove Skutnabb-Kangas underlined one of those critical (inherent) human affairs which The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) fails to recognize^{vi} in its paragraph on education (article 26) (Ricento 2006: 74).

Besides, in the postcolonial era, the systematic continuity of this legacy replicates itself in views of the exponents of contemporary European philosophy in general and continental philosophy in particular. It is a paradox that we are forced to learn from selected texts and in their languages yet their philosophy (that is continental philosophy for instance) remains a clear designation found exclusively in English speaking countries (Eze 1997: 184). As we are forced to choose what is not our choice, we learn to restrict ourselves to their few texts, sources and individual thinkers even to deal with 'African philosophy' courses. Okot p'Bitek wrote "Our universities and schools are nests in which black exploiters are hatched and bred, at the expense of the taxpayers, or perhaps heart payers" (Okot p'Bitek 1967: 47). This insinuates that the Europeans tried a lot to produce Africans with such a mentality in their education. That is why I consider Euro-American linguistic policy to Africa as a mere historico-political and philosophic-conceptual restriction on African thinkers in general and education in particular. Perhaps, it is from such a conception, in the "the imperialism^{vii} of English" (1997) that Van Dic noted that the language barrier has become a more general scholarly and cultural barrier... the main obstacle to linguistic diversity, also in scholarship, however, is the arrogance of linguistic power in Anglophone countries, and especially the USA (Quoted in Robert Phillipson 2003: 350).

The Original project of the politics in schooling is becoming a critical challenge to African philosophy from within. This has been largely transplanted by some African authors who unconsciously embraced the project. Accordingly, African philosophy of education which is initially displaced by the Europeans is now facing big challenges from the European

trained Africans. Historically, such an orientation goes back to the emergence of colonial mentality in many parts of Africa. In this regard, I think, it is good, just to look back to some of the historical indications through which such a mentality started to penetrate arguments of politics in schooling. Leopold S. Senghor once argued that:

We express ourselves in French since French has a universal vocation and since our message is also addressed to French people and others. In our languages (i.e. African languages) the halo that surrounds the words is by nature merely that of sap and blood; French words send out of rays like diamond (quoted in Thiong'o 1981:19).

In addition, to speak from my own experience; in denying the very concept of African philosophy, one of my philosophy professors^{viii} (in fact black like me) expressed the incompatibility of some languages in understanding the nature of 'philosophy' and to philosophize, i.e. in his expression: "It is impossible to do philosophy in languages such as Afaan Oromoo and Amharic since in them we cannot find metaphysical expressions like the 'is of is'^{ix} and 'is of is not' that we find in Greek language within concepts such as ousia"^x. Here, I would like to earnestly show my readers to understand that my concept of linguistic challenge is not limited to such a mentality alone, but rather it goes to some 'critical African thinkers', who unfortunately fail to escape this influence and continue to do philosophy via the European system of doing thinking. Ngugi wa Thiongo indicated this problem in his discussion of the concept of "impact of politics on languages'. Here the point is, therefore, that most writers, who should have mapped paths out of the linguistic encirclement, came to define themselves in the limited context of languages of imperialists. Thus from these two mentalities, i.e. colonial mentality^{xi} and the one with slight modifications, I understand 'linguistic challenge' as some other thing more than 'mere linguistic restriction' so long as it determines the level of our self-examination and knowledge production. Such a linguistic challenge ends in a conceptual limitation in which one loses his/her mental spaces by the exclusive model of thinking of others. It is, therefore, from this point that I continue to feel that African education is missing a basic thing without which knowledge production appears an impossible project.

Cognizant of the system's long standing impact, some African scholars have been rethinking this and calling for mental decolonization. Among few, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has repeatedly indicated the negative outcome of such foreign languages. In my understanding of Thiong'o, the displaced and replaced African language has so many things to do with the post-colonial Africans' mental occupations. In his book, "*Decolonizing the Mind*," Thiong'o argued that language is inseparable from us as a community of human beings within specific form and character, specific history, specific relationship to the world (Thiong'o 1991: 16). In fact, in the light of Thiong'o's argument^{xii}, African languages are leading in revealing the African realities and respond to imperialistic prejudices. Thus, it would hardly be possible to think of genuine African philosophy of education in a situation where African languages are dislocated and replaced by other languages.

Realizing this, I consider African languages as proper tools to deal with the African realities. For one thing, the absence of African languages has an unparalleled power to deflect the Africans from seeing realities of their life dialogue through which they would engage in meaningful relationships^{xiii} with others. The one who is cut-off from his/her respective life dialogue would misunderstand his/ her life-dialogue and eventually be entangled by estrangements. The message delivered by Habermas' concept of impoverishment of the life-world, for which he blamed people's restrictions to particular expertise or specialists, has a similar tone with this argument. In Habermas' view, it involves a conceptual game in life which lets a person lose two^{xiv} very important things. Such a person loses consensus and influence in his/her life which would not fail short of deprivation from being human. Although it did not benefit the Africans, post modernism has been focusing on the significance of this issue, i.e. it suggests significant concerns about language policy and planning which Penny Cook put as follows;

First it raises important questions about how power operates in relation to the nation-state, and in particular how governance is achieved through language, second, it urges us to rethink the ontology of language as a colonial (modernist) construct, third, it raises questions about the grand narratives or sweeping epistemologies of imperialism, language rights, or language access,

and fourth, it points towards local, situated, contextual and contingent ways of understanding languages and language policies (quoted in Thomas Ricento 2006: 64).

However, in calling for the Africans' rethinking of African languages, I would like to clearly indicate my intention that linguistic liberation itself is not enough to tell us what African philosophy of education is all about. Rather I am indicating that, knowledge production would hardly be possible without such a basic freedom. This has to be considered from the very concept of Philosophy in the process of knowledge production. Although the substance of knowledge does not lie in the vernacular, conditions of unfreedom like linguistic challenge unduly determine the content, scope, quality and originality of our education. I think, Wiredu was right, in saying that doing philosophy in your own language does not mean that you immediately become more insightful (Wiredu 2002). However, still this view does not undermine the fact that language is a critical and indispensable means via which human beings experience philosophical freedom and freely broaden the horizon of their mental spaces. Above all, since knowledge production involves formulation of conceptual apparatus and critical vocabularies, we need to have our proper means and conceptually free to provide possible translations and alternatives.

Furthermore, if we understand and acknowledge the merit of cross-cultural communication and possibility of transcultural understanding, we would first appreciate our benefit from linguistic reality as part and parcel of humanity at its cross road. However, this does not mean that linguistic freedom makes total understanding possible, but that it helps us to foster our conceptual environments in which we present alternatives without negating others. It might be for the same concern that Wiredu and Kaphagawani presented alternatives^{xv} which focus on the examination of important epistemological concepts as it appears in two different languages. In addition, language related problems, in searching for complex veracities of humanity at crossroads goes beyond such a conceptual (terminological) confrontation^{xvi} to some basic principles of languages. It would be wrong to impose specific principles of one language

upon other languages. George Berkeley, in his *“Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge”*, argued as follows;

...the communicating of ideas... is not the chief and only end of language as it is commonly supposed. There are other ends as the rising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the former (communicating ideas) is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted when this can be obtained without it. As I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language (quoted in Irving M. Copi and Karl Kohen 2005: 71).

Accordingly, restricting the language and rule of African philosophy of education to the European calculative reasoning clearly displaces realities of African life dialogue. It is, a pedagogical restriction which conceptually compels^{xvii} us to accept Western logic (Aristotelian formal logic), which for sure jeopardizes the essential meaning of philosophy in general and African philosophy in particular. This linguistic compulsion bears a message that African languages are insufficient to describe reality. I think, Wiredu disproved such a predilection in his study of the Akan language. He argued that in the Akan language we have no such statement form as ‘p’ if and only if ‘q’ and [if (p then q) and if q then p]’ and hence, this logical principle is not universal (quoted in P. H. Coetzee and P. J. Roux 2000: 242). However, in contemporary African philosophy we are forced^{xviii} to take this principle in the logic course. I think this by itself is restriction and displacement as long as we consider it as an imperative while it should be seen as an option. Accordingly, as I have been discussing, Euro-American educational policy is a singular occidental model of dislocating the Africans in the world of knowledge production. T. G. Wiley put this singular and exclusive model as follows:

The colonizer’s model has been particularly resilient over time as it pertains to Western notion of language and literacy. In its more recent manifestations, some historians and historical anthropologists have attempted to determine the cognitive and societal effects of literacy. Western standardized language of literacy provides the models for corpus and status planning or intellectualization (quoted in Ricento 2006: 144).

Likewise, Rostow related this asymmetric relation to the very formulation of post colonial states in his conclusion that many of their prescribed models for language planning and policy formulation follow in the footsteps of successful Western nations and resemble universalistic models that assume a linear path to economic and national development (Rostow 1960, quoted in Ricento 2006:188). If we consider this from Oruka's conception of African philosophy, then the issue of linguistic bondage would clearly entail that African philosophy itself is in bondage because philosophy is not an activity done in vacuum but a response to social conditions, which I think, European projects forced us to ignore. Thus, in this case, I understand the European style of language planning as conceptual restrictions on the Africans since they systematically deny them access to the process of knowledge production. Focusing on the works of philosophers, who engage in comparative philosophical studies, G. Blocker recommended practitioners ; "If European, or European-trained scholars are the speakers or writers, then, at least at the beginning^{xix}, they must use their language (with the standard meaning of words, terms and concepts) to talk about (and judge) non-European thought systems" (Blocker 1999 : 8).

Conclusion

Post-colonial African curricula denied Africans access to the process of knowledge production. This project has been bracketing the Africans from the epistemic space of indigenous knowledge production. The project has been largely carried out through the linguistic displacement which challenges Africans in the process of education. Thus, right from the school children to the higher level intellectuals, Africans have been challenged to engage in genuine education through what basically they understand.

Reversing this school politics needs 'open-mindedness' towards linguistic plurality and the existence of epistemic diversity. That is, if we accept that there is no one tradition and framework of thought alone which is adequate for knowledge production, then issues of language would be clear to be thought of in the same way. Here, I mean that in the world with

varieties of reasons and truths, we should understand and acknowledge possibilities of similar varieties of means of communication. Thus, the very existence of such varieties of reasons tells us that there is no one language that could be justified to be appropriate for a cross-cultural communication and transcultural understanding. In this regard I accept Peter Winch's view on face value; i.e. seriously to understand another way of life is necessarily to extend our own (Bell 2002) and would like to recommend others in repeating the same assertion of Jasper, i.e. we must restore the readiness to think against the tendency to have everything prepared in advance and, as it were, placarded in slogans

Notes

ⁱ Here I think Hountondji did not explicitly call for African native languages to do philosophy. However, (even in his rejection of ethno-philosophy) due to his conception that tribal thought cannot be a legitimate source of philosophy) he is not totally against such native languages but rather he wanted to place major qualification on their usefulness for philosophy (Richard Bell 2002: 5).

ⁱⁱ Heavy and serious metaphysical concepts such as space and time would remain conceptually uncertain on the side of those who are linguistically restricted and conceptually dislocated. A person such as J. Mbiti would have kept himself from a dangerous conclusion about African concept of time had he considered the fact that concepts hide more than they reveal (for instance, the concept of dooms day in his argument). Hence, on my part, I believe that it is only through an unrestricted use of language that we may recall the past, understand the present and foresee the future.

ⁱⁱⁱ The very concept of 'life dialogue' indicates the necessity of one's free conceptual, philosophical, metaphysical and spiritual engagement with human and non-human conceivable, memorable and predictable environment (see Doyo 2011). Thus, linguistically life dialogue is a process of communicating and communicating with both human and non-human aspects of nature.

^{iv} Quoting Putnam (Theory of Disquotationality), Eze indicated that this concept holds that any true reference is reducible to a statement whose conditions meet assertability. It implies that one has a basis, and therefore, entitled, to assert something as true by learning the meaning of experience (Eze 2008: 119). Accordingly, in my discussion, I understand that African philosophers (in post colonial era) are forced to quote the Europeans even in statement like ‘snow is white’.

^v J. A. De Obieta-Chalbaud, 'Self-Determination of peoples as a Human Right', *Plural Societies*, XVI, 1 (1986), p. 63.

^{vi} Here she indicated that there are preferences to the full development of human personality and the right of parents to choose a kind of education that shall be given to their children, which however does not include the right to choose the language in which this education is given.

^{vii} Phillipson argued that the concept of linguistic imperialism resonates with the historical facts of empires as socio political structures have risen and fallen over three millennia, and with the analytical exploration of the role of language in the empires that dominated the world scene in recent centuries. Thus linguistic imperialism entails unequal exchange and unequal communicative right between people of all groups defined in terms of their competence in specific languages with unequal benefits. It is also a feature of colonial empires with a deeper degree of linguistic penetration among others (see Robert Phillipson in Thomas Ricento 2006: 348).

^{viii} My professor is measuring African realities with the European biased gauge just like our European conquerors and those with colonial mentality in Africa used to do. Moreover, given a particular historic-politically, and socio-religiously ‘situated life dialogue’, I encountered most people of my kind changing even their names to the language of religiously dominant and politically hegemonic system, that I came to consider as unconscious legacy of colonial mentality entrenched in us.

^{ix} I think this by itself may not be equivalent to the Greek expression that my professor used, i.e. to ti en einai (perhaps, to mean the this being a being). I think one can analyze the African concept ‘Ubuntu’ in the same metaphysical way, i.e. questioning why Ub- (the prefix) evokes the idea of being in general in its

orientation towards untu? Or muntu, which I think, the English language may not exhaust its metaphysical meaning.

^x It is a Greek concept. I think various languages may have their own equivalent concepts from which we may understand that my professor's claim holds no water.

^{xi} According to Wiredu, this is a mentality which makes a formerly colonized person over-value "foreign things" coming from his erstwhile colonial master. He indicated that "things", here is to be interpreted widely to include not only material objects but also modes of thought and behavior. Wiredu considers this as a psychological penetration of colonialism. This mentality induced our people during colonial time (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992:62).

^{xii} The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to people's definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe. Hence language has always been at the heart of the two contending social forces in the Africa of the 20th century (Thiong'o 1981: 4).

^{xiii} Without this relationship, I strongly believe that reasonable contribution is hardly possible. That is why personalities such as Alan Woods and Ted Grant argued that only through language is it possible to establish a really human form of communication with others, to share one's "inner life" with them (see, Alan and Grant: 305). I consider any communications which ignore such an inner life as superfluous and philosophically devoid of genuine veracities lie with a particular life dialogue. Thus, it would be a colossal leap for Africans to give a considerable attention to African languages in order to engage in philosophical activities as a soul searching endeavor.

^{xiv} These are consensus and influence. Consensus and influence are, in this context Habermas' concepts through which he talked about 'verstaendigung'. This concept is loosely translated as or refers to linguistic understanding and to the process of reaching the agreement. He referred to such a use of language as the use of language oriented towards consensus (C. Maev 1994: 9).

^{xv} Wiredu and Kaphagawani proposed this during their discussion on the old-existing problem of generality versus specificity. Here, the point is truth and meaning must be seen as relative intentionality opinion or point of views so as every originally offering view is legitimate source of knowledge (Masolo 1995: 208).

^{xvi} This is worth attention, even appropriate response to Mbiti's denial of African concept of future time; Wiredu indicated that, if a concept is incoherent with a given language, it does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with it, for it may be that the language in question is expressively inadequate (Wiredu 1996: 313). And hence I consider it as Mbiti used the European concept 'dooms day' in searching for equivalent concept in Africa, but mistakenly concluded that something (the future) is absent in Africans' notion of time.

^{xvii} It is at this point, that, I came up with my own conception that our academic policy and curricula is simply a reaffirmation of Levy Bruhl's prejudice that characterizes the Africans with prelogical mind, which he described as 'unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradiction'.

^{xviii} Here I am speaking from my experience in which we have been academically and conceptually compelled to accept European logic, language and conceptual framework.

^{xix} Likewise, Blocker argues that if Indian or Chinese intellectuals had begun discussion, talking and writing about European thought traditions, exactly the same principle would apply – the Indians and Chinese would use their own languages, with their concepts, in to which they would try as best they could fit European concepts (ibid).

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