# Strategies for Minimising Failure of Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects in North Central Nigeria

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The global adoption of the public-private partnership (PPP) concept has been driven by the growing demand for public infrastructure. However, many PPP projects have faced challenges and yielded unfavourable outcomes such as failures, delays, and concession revocations. This research paper aims to investigate the key factors influencing private investments in PPP markets in developing countries like Nigeria. The study employed an empirical questionnaire survey, collecting data from PPP experts involved in six PPP construction projects in northern Nigeria. Based on previous research, a set of 19 success factors and 21 failure factors were identified and used as the basis for quantitative data obtained. The data were analysed using the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methodology. The findings of the study revealed that three critical failure factors (CFFs) played a role in the varying degrees of failure in the studied PPP projects. These factors include public sector corruption, lack of competition and transparency in procurement processes, and political interference during project implementation. On the other hand, six critical success factors (CSFs) contributed to the success of the PPP projects to different extents. These factors encompassed the availability of suitable financial markets, a favourable investment environment, appropriate risk allocation, competition in the procurement process, a comprehensive and realistic assessment of costs and benefits, and trust among stakeholders. The results of this study can serve as a valuable reference for PPP stakeholders seeking to minimize failure in the implementation of PPP infrastructure projects.

Keywords: Infrastructure projects, Procurement, Public Private Partnership, Critical Success Factors, and Critical Failure Factors

### INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the private sector's involvement in financing and constructing public infrastructure in Nigeria, particularly in the North Central region, as a means to address the infrastructure gap (Leigland, 2018). Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been utilized in Nigeria, specifically in the North Central area, for the development of public infrastructure projects. Examples of such projects include the concession of the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, infrastructure provision concession in the Katempe district of Abuja, the housing project concession for Minna Airport City in Makunkele, and the construction of the Minna Five Star Hotel. Despite the increasing popularity of PPPs in Nigeria, particularly in the North Central region, there have been instances of disputes, failures, delays, and concession revocations (Itu & Kenigua, 2021).

Numerous studies have been conducted in both developed and emerging countries to identify the CSFs of PPP projects (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017; Kavishe & Chileshe, 2019; Debela, 2019; Muhammad & Johar, 2019; Nguyen *et al.*, 2020; Chileshe *et al.*, 2020; Mulyani, 2021). Similarly, several studies have identified CFFs that are believed to contribute to the

failure of PPP projects. As noted by Zhang and Tariq (2020), the lack of success and failure assessment in PPPs can result in substantial economic losses. Despite the significant failures encountered in the implementation of PPP projects, there is limited stakeholder-based strategy to minimize project failure in Nigeria. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate the critical failure factors that contribute to the failure of PPP.

## LITERATURE REVIEW CFFs in PPP Infrastructure Projects

Trangkanont and Charoenngam (2014) identified Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) as risks in PPP projects. Cheung et al. (2010) stated that assigning risks beyond the capacity of the involved parties resulted in the failure of PPP infrastructure projects. Insufficient legal frameworks and high processing costs led to the abandonment or discontinuation of many PPP projects before contracts were signed (Trangkanont & Charoenngam, 2014). Research by Li et al. (2005), Sanghi et al. (2007), and Trangkanont and Charoenngam (2014) found that both the public and private sectors contributed to the failure of PPP projects. Flaws in government PPP policies and strategies led to poor procurement incentives and a lack of cooperation among government departments. Corruption and the

lack of experience, organization, and commitment in government agencies hindered effective implementation of PPP projects. On the other hand, the private sector lacked the necessary expertise and knowledge to handle legal, technical, financial, and managerial challenges that arose during project execution, leading to project suspensions and terminations. Public opposition, driven by concerns about the profit-making motives of the private sector, and a lack of transparency in contract awarding also caused delays or terminations of PPP infrastructure projects (Li et al., 2005; El-Gohary et al., 2006). Other studies by Xenidis and Agelides (2005), and Iyer and Sagheer (2010) highlighted uncontrollable factors like changes in laws, unexpected requirements, fluctuations in PPP policies due to political instability, and inflation rates impacting project costs as reasons for PPP project failures.

# **Critical Success Factors of PPP Infrastructure Projects**

Critical success factors (CSFs) are essential criteria that, when fulfilled, contribute to the success of a project (Frefer et al., 2018). Failure to properly manage these factors can result in project failure. CSFs represent a limited number of crucial actions within an organization that have the potential to enhance performance and ensure success (Kwak et al., 2009). They can be described as "a small number of critical areas of activity in which favourable results are absolutely necessary for a specific manager to achieve his goals" (Bullen and Rockart). CSFs have been widely utilized in research to identify the variables that impact the performance of PPP infrastructure projects. Continuous monitoring of CSFs is necessary throughout the lifecycle of a PPP project (Robinson et al., 2010). The findings of Ram and Corkindale (2014) support the notion that organizational success requires ongoing and diligent attention to CSFs by management. The concept of "important success criteria" was popularized by John F. Rockart of the MIT Sloan School of Management in the 1970s through an article published in the Harvard Business Review (Chen et al., 2014). CSFs have been extensively employed in research to identify the variables that influence the performance of PPP infrastructure projects. Ongoing monitoring of CSFs is crucial throughout the course of PPP projects (Rowlinson, 1999). Ram and Corkindale (2014) further highlighted the significance of continuous attention to CSFs by managers in achieving organizational performance.

#### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The objective of this research was to analyse the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) in selected Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects in the North Central region of Nigeria, and how they contributed to project success and failure. CFFs can be seen as risks associated with an activity or decision-

making process, where the outcome or consequences are unclear and require human action to mitigate the problem. On the other hand, success factors are drivers or activities that enhance decision-making and lead to successful partnerships. The research utilized a mixed methods approach, but this paper focuses on the results obtained through a quantitative survey using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire used in this study was adapted from previous works by Ameyaw (2014) and Trangkanont and Charoenngam (2014). It was expanded and modified to include factors relevant to the socio-political and economic context of developing countries like Nigeria. The original questionnaire mainly focused on Ghana and Thailand, so additional factors were incorporated to account for country-specific considerations. To ensure the clarity, appropriateness, and applicability of the factors identified, the modified questionnaire was tested in a pilot study involving six international PPP experts with extensive research or industry experience in PPP project implementation. The feedback and suggestions provided by these experts were incorporated, resulting in a final list of 19 success factors and 21 failure factors.

Six (6) PPP case studies in North Central Nigeria were the subject of quantitative data collection using structured questionnaire. A total of 24 important stakeholders directly involved in those projects were chosen, including representatives from the public and private sectors (i.e., Ministries, Departments, and Agencies) as well as consultants, concessionaires, local lenders/banks, and contractors who had a direct hand in the chosen six case studies. Chief Executive Officers and senior staff members of the respondents' respective organizations who were directly involved in the PPP infrastructure project case study came from both the public and private sectors. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Technique was used in the design of the questionnaire; the respondents were required to provide information on each of the twenty-one identified failure factors and the nineteen identified success The respondents then completed the factors. questionnaire by scoring each of the factors to determine the criticality of the identified failure and success factors in each case study. To analyse the quantitative data from the six PPP case studies, the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique was used.

The manufacturing sector has made extensive use of the FMEA technique. In the construction sector, particularly in construction management and PPP studies, the implementation of the FMEA technique has not drawn much attention. The method has only been used a few times by older scholars while researching product innovations in the procurement process for construction industry, Murphy (2008), for instance, adopted the FMEA technique. Murphy *et al.* (2011) used the FMEA

technique to investigate a framework for assessing building innovation limits through project stakeholder management. Murphy (2008) goes on to claim that the FMEA method is a suitable instrument for subjective case study evaluation that generates empirical values for statistical analysis. Also, Babatunde (2015) adopted FMEA in identifying the criticality of success factor for developing a conceptual framework for stakeholder organisations capability enhancement in PPP infrastructure projects in Nigeria.

In order to evaluate the criticality of the twenty-one failure variables and nineteen success factors found in the six PPP case studies, the FMEA technique was used in ranking the data into three groups, Occurrence (O), Severity (S), and Detection (D) which leads to the calculation of FMEA (see Tables 2 and 3). The following are the FMEA scoring criteria in this context: (i) Occurrence (O): On a scale from 1 to 10, how likely or frequently each failure or success criteria will occur. (ii) Severity (S): Rates the severity of each factor's impact on the project's failure or success on a scale of 1 to 10. FMEA is calculated by multiplying each of the twenty-one failure factors and nineteen success variables found in each case study by their incidence (O), severity (S), and detection (D). The resulting value, known as the "risk priority number" (RPN), makes it possible to order the actions. The failure and success criteria that have greater RPN values are viewed as crucial in the context of this study. For instance, the decisional rule states that a failure or success component is considered essential if its RPN value is more than 750. The CFFs and CSFs that determined whether the six PPP project case studies examined in this study were successful or unsuccessful were determined using the Table 1: Respondents' background

RPN value. Since occurrence (O) is multiplied by severity (S) is multiplied by detection (D), the RPN values vary from 1 to 1,000.

#### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 shows the qualifications of respondents from the public and private sectors in terms of the organizations they work for, their titles, and the number of years they have been in the workforce. The table shows that 24 respondents (representing four (4) in each case study) were top management from the public and private sectors. Their professional years of experience ranging from seven (7) to twenty-eight (28) years, and they had participated in one (1) to thirty-five (35) PPP projects. Additionally, the respondents had a direct hand in the PPP project case studies from start to finish or up until this stage. The results from the six FMEA-based PPP infrastructure project case studies were divided into two sets as follows:

- 1. Physical infrastructure/civil and engineering PPP case studies
- 2. Social infrastructure/Building work PPP case studies. The concession of engineering infrastructure for Katempe District Phase II FCT Abuja's road project; the concession of Shiroro Hydroelectric Power Plant, Niger State's (Energy); the concession of Doma Dam, Nasarawa State; and the concession of Omi-Kampe Dam, Kogi State were among the physical infrastructure PPP project case studies examined (case study 1-4). While the concession of the Garki hospital in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (case study 5) and the concession of the Debt Management Office in Abuja were among the social infrastructure case studies examined (case study 6).

| No  | Respondents' organisation                   | Respondents'             | of professional |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| 110 |   | designation              | experience      | PPP projects involved in |
|     | Case Study 1: Concession of Katempe Distr   | rict Phase II, Abuja     | •               |                          |
| 1   | Private sector: Consultant                  | Project Manager          | 21              | 7                        |
| 2   | Private sector: Concessionaire              | Manager                  | 25              | 8                        |
| 3   | Private sector: Financial Institution       | Manager                  | 12              | 6                        |
|     |   | Chief Engr Mass          |                 |                          |
| 4   | Public Sector: FCDA                         | Housing/PPP              | 21              | 7                        |
|     | Case Study 2: Concession of Shiroro hydro   | electric power plant, Ni | ger State       |                          |
|     | Public Sector: Federal Min. of Power, works | Director, Power &        | 6               |                          |
| 5   | & Housing                                   | Energy                   | 21              | 8                        |
|     | S   | E.D Engineering          |                 |                          |
| 6   | Private Sector: Concessionaire              | Services                 | 28              | 8                        |
| 7   | Private sector: Concessionaire              | Director, Dams           | 14              | 4                        |
| 8   | Private sector: Financial Institution       | Manager                  | 12              | 6                        |
|     | Case Study 3: Concession of Doma Dam, Na    | e e                      |                 |                          |
|     | Public Sector: Federal Min. of Power, works |                          |                 |                          |
| 9   | & Housing                                   | Head of Dept. Dams       | 25              | 12                       |
| 10  | Public Sector: ICRC                         | Deputy Director          | 21              | 8                        |
| 11  | Private sector: Consultant                  | Partner                  | 19              | 2                        |

| 12 | Private sector: Contractor               | Project Manager       | 15 | 2  |
|----|--|-----------------------|----|----|
|    | Case Study 4: Concession of Omi-Kam      | pe Dam, kogi state    |    |    |
|    | Public Sector: Federal Min. of Power, wo | orks                  |    |    |
| 13 | & Housing                                | Chief Engr.           | 25 | 5  |
| 14 | Public Sector: Concessionaire            | Director              | 14 | 4  |
| 15 | Private sector: Consultant               | Principal Partner     | 21 | 8  |
| 16 | Private sector: Contractor               | Managing Director     | 15 | 2  |
|    | Case Study 5: Concession of Garki Hos    | spital, Abuja         |    |    |
| 17 | Public Sector: FCTA                      | Director              | 27 | 35 |
| 18 | Private sector: Concessionaire           | General Manager       | 25 | 5  |
| 19 | Private sector: Consultant               | Consultant            | 13 | 3  |
| 20 | Private sector: Financial Institution    | Manager               | 20 | 3  |
|    | Case Study 6: Concession of Debt Man     | agement Office, Abuja |    |    |
| 21 | Public Sector: DMO office                | Director Projects     | 19 | 1  |
| 22 | Private Sector: Concessionaire           | General Manager       | 14 | 4  |
| 23 | Private sector: Financial Institution    | Manager               | 7  | 5  |
| 24 | Private sector: Consultant               | Chief Architect       | 14 | 4  |

Table 2 reveals that the delays and failure of Katempe District Phase II, Abuja were caused by the public sector's corruption, a lack of openness, and a lack of competition in the procurement process (i.e. case study1). High transaction costs, drawn-out contractual agreements and bidding processes, political interference during implementation, mistrust among stakeholders, and a lack of a PPPs-enabling environment were all listed as "rather major" failure causes. Additionally, corruption in the public sector, a lack of openness, and a lack of competition in the procurement process are crucial reasons why the Shiroro hydroelectric power plant concession in Niger State failed (i.e. case study 2). Similarly, in case study 2, lack of public sector appreciation for partnerships in a PPP environment, political involvement at the project implementation level, mistrust among stakeholders, a lack of an environment that facilitates PPPs, and difficulties obtaining credit from banks were all deemed to be "somewhat critical" failure factors.

The results of Case Study 3, which is the Concession of Doma Dam in Nasarawa State show that public sector corruption was a major obstacle to the PPP project's realization. Poor regulatory agencies, inexperienced and uncommitted public agencies, an absence of transparency and competition in the procurement process, inconsistent risk assessment and management, political involvement at the project implementation level, and a lack of an environment that facilitates PPPs were identified as "somewhat critical" failure factors. Table 2 also shows that the institutional structure for PPP is complicated and burdensome. High transaction costs, a weak legal system, and a public sector that does not value partnerships in the PPP context governmental agencies with less experience and dedication Public sector corruption, a lack of competitiveness and openness in the procurement process, inconsistent risk

management and evaluation, Cost and time overruns, varying inflation rates, Government policy changes and political instability, participation of politics in project implementation, public resistance/opposition, The implementation of the Omi-Kampe Dam in Kogi State was hampered by the lack of PPPs-enabling environment and distrust among stakeholders, which were both deemed to be "rather major" failure reasons (case study4). In the concession of Garki Hospital (case study 5), political interference at the project implementation level was found to be the major cause of failure, and ignorance of PPP laws and regulations was also a major issue. Public sector underappreciation of partnerships in a PPP setting Failure factors that were identified as "quite crucial" were public sector corruption, a lack of an atmosphere that encouraged PPPs, and difficulties obtaining bank finance. The results of Case Study 6, the Concession of Debt Management Office, Abuja show that corruption in the public sector was the primary cause of the PPP project's failure. Additional factors include the PPP institutional framework's complexity and burden, high transaction costs, an ineffective legal system, weak regulatory bodies, inexperienced and uncommitted public agencies.

Table 2: Summary of the assessment of criticality of failure factors using FMEA technique in physical and social infrastructure PPP project case Studies

|                | animary of the assessment of entireatity of                          |        |         | STUDY      |                          |        |         | E STUDY    |                          | CASE STUDY 3 |         |            |                          |
|----------------|--|--------|---------|------------|--------------------------|--------|---------|------------|--------------------------|--------------|---------|------------|--------------------------|
|                | FAILURE FACTORS  | Public | Private | Total      |                          | Public | Private | Total      |                          | Public       | Private | Total      |                          |
| S/N            | FAILURE FACTORS  | RPN    | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  | RPN    | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  | RPN          | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  |
| FFP1<br>FFP2   | Complex and cumbersome of PPP  | 448    | 482     | 465        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 120    | 643     | 382        | Less critical            | 424          | 482     | 453        | Less critical            |
|                | High transaction costs   | 810    | 347     | 579        | critical                 | 504    | 463     | 484        | Less critical            | 415          | 347     | 225        | Not critical             |
| FFP3<br>FFP4   | Ineffective legal framework  | 336    | 302     | 319        | Less critical            | 378    | 375     | 277        | Less critical            | 405          | 302     | 354        | Less critical<br>Somehow |
| FFP5           | Poor regulatory authorities<br>Lack of awareness on PPP laws and     | 150    | 801     | 476        | Less critical            | 392    | 623     | 508        | Less critical            | 350          | 801     | 576        | critical                 |
| FFP6           | regulations Lack of public sector to appreciate                      | 84     | 472     | 278        | Less critical            | 240    | 294     | 267        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 238          | 472     | 355        | Less critical            |
| FFP7           | partnerships in PPP environment Communication constraint between the | 160    | 501     | 331        | Less critical            | 720    | 546     | 633        | critical                 | 380          | 501     | 441        | Less critical            |
| EEDO           | public and private sector  | 504    | 377     | 441        | Less critical            | 560    | 326     | 443        | Less critical            | 365          | 377     | 371        | Less critical            |
| FFP8           | Inexperience and less committed                                      |        |         |            |                          |        |         |            |                          |              |         |            | Somehow                  |
|                | public agencies  | 448    | 476     | 462        | Less critical            | 392    | 460     | 426        | Less critical            | 530          | 476     | 503        | critical                 |
| FFP9           | Corruption in public sector  | 630    | 933     | 782        | Critical                 | 720    | 833     | 777        | Critical                 | 600          | 933     | 767        | Critical                 |
| FFP10          | Lack of transparency and competition in procurement processes        | 800    | 768     | 784        | Critical                 | 900    | 777     | 839        | Critical                 | 490          | 768     | 629        | Somehow critical         |
| FFP11          | Lengthy bidding process and  |        |         |            | Somehow                  |        |         |            |                          |              |         |            |                          |
| FFP12          | contractual arrangements Inconsistent risk assessment and            | 1000   | 289     | 645        | critical                 | 336    | 272     | 304        | Less critical            | 555          | 289     | 422        | Less critical<br>Somehow |
|                | management   | 384    | 540     | 462        | Less critical            | 120    | 373     | 267        | Less critical            | 600          | 540     | 570        | critical                 |
| FFP13          | Cost overruns  | 120    | 579     | 350        | Less critical            | 120    | 687     | 404        | Less critical            | 240          | 579     | 410        | Less critical            |
| FFP14          | Inflation rate fluctuation   | 30     | 462     | 246        | Not critical             | 30     | 312     | 171        | Less critical            | 71           | 462     | 267        | Less critical            |
| FFP15          | Political instability and change in Government policy                | 60     | 523     | 292        | Less critical            | 120    | 464     | 292        | Less critical            | 290          | 523     | 407        | Less critical            |
| FFP16          | Political involvement at the project                                 |        |         |            | Somehow                  |        |         |            | Somehow                  |              |         |            | Somehow                  |
|                | implementation level   | 700    | 767     | 734        | critical                 | 720    | 733     | 727        | critical                 | 548          | 767     | 658        | critical                 |
| FFP17<br>FFP18 | Public opposition  | 384    | 324     | 354        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 336    | 296     | 316        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 291          | 324     | 338        | Less critical            |
| FFP19          | Distrust among stakeholders  | 810    | 360     | 585        | critical<br>Somehow      | 567    | 576     | 572        | critical<br>Somehow      | 545          | 360     | 453        | Less critical<br>Somehow |
|                | Lack of PPPs enabling environment                                    | 648    | 678     | 663        | critical                 | 560    | 652     | 606        | critical                 | 372          | 678     | 525        | critical                 |
| FFP20          | Land acquisition problems  | 252    | 225     | 239        | Not critical             | 175    | 249     | 212        | Not critical             | 326          | 225     | 291        | Less critical            |
| FFP21          | Difficulties in securing credit facility                             |        |         |            |                          |        |         |            | Somehow                  |              |         |            |                          |
|                | from banks   | 432    | 357     | 395        | Less critical            | 648    | 491     | 570        | critical                 | 266          | 357     | 312        | Less critical            |

Note: FMEA- Failure Mode & Effect Analysis; RPN- Risk Priority Number; Criticality Scale: 1-250-Not Critical; 250-500-Less Critical; 500-750-Somehow Critical; 750-1000-Critical

|       |   |               | CASE STUDY 4   |                     | 4                   |               | CASI           | CASE STUDY 5        |                  |               | CASE STUDY 6   |                     |                     |  |
|-------|---|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| S/N   | FAILURE FACTORS   | Public<br>RPN | Private<br>RPN | Total<br>AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS             | Public<br>RPN | Private<br>RPN | Total<br>AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS          | Public<br>RPN | Private<br>RPN | Total<br>AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS             |  |
| FFP1  | Complex and cumbersome of PPP                                       | 800           | 430            | 615                 | Somehow critical    | 3             | 547            | 275                 | Less critical    | 448           | 554            | 501                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP2  |   |               |                |                     | Somehow             |               |                |                     |                  |               |                |                     | Somehow             |  |
|       | High transaction costs  | 720           | 306            | 513                 | critical<br>Somehow | 392           | 422            | 407                 | Less critical    | 810           | 621            | 716                 | critical<br>Somehow |  |
| FFP3  | Ineffective legal framework   | 800           | 292            | 546                 | critical            | 5             | 395            | 200                 | Less critical    | 648           | 580            | 614                 | critical            |  |
| FFP4  | Poor regulatory authorities   | 576           | 261            | 419                 | Less critical       | 1             | 502            | 252                 | Not critical     | 576           | 557            | 567                 | Somehow<br>critical |  |
| FFP5  | Lack of awareness on PPP laws and regulations                       | 810           | 184            | 497                 | Less critical       | 900           | 368            | 634                 | Somehow critical | 720           | 187            | 454                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP6  | Lack of public sector to appreciate partnerships in PPP environment | 900           | 295            | 598                 | Somehow critical    | 504           | 792            | 648                 | Somehow critical | 336           | 530            | 433                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP7  | Communication constraint between the public and private sector      | 720           | 265            | 493                 | Less critical       | 336           | 511            | 424                 | Less critical    | 392           | 343            | 368                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP8  | Inexperience and less committed public agencies                     | 810           | 343            | 577                 | Somehow critical    | 80            | 590            | 335                 | Less critical    | 576           | 464            | 520                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP9  | Corruption in public sector   | 1000          | 341            | 671                 | Somehow critical    | 294           | 933            | 614                 | Somehow critical | 720           | 833            | 777                 | Critical            |  |
| FFP10 | Lack of transparency and competition in procurement processes       | 900           | 353            | 627                 | Somehow critical    | 64            | 642            | 353                 | Less critical    | 252           | 967            | 610                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP11 | Lengthy bidding process and contractual arrangements                | 576           | 325            | 451                 | Less critical       | 100           | 590            | 345                 | Less critical    | 336           | 550            | 443                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP12 | Inconsistent risk assessment and management                         | 810           | 214            | 512                 | Somehow critical    | 72            | 365            | 219                 | Not critical     | 392           | 506            | 449                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP13 | Cost overruns   | 1000          | 182            | 591                 | Somehow critical    | 18            | 541            | 280                 | Less critical    | 720           | 442            | 581                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP14 | Inflation rate fluctuation  | 1000          | 52             | 526                 | Somehow critical    | 45            | 346            | 196                 | Not critical     | 336           | 364            | 35                  | Less critical       |  |
| FFP15 | Political instability and change in Government policy               | 900           | 258            | 579                 | Somehow critical    | 2             | 341            | 172                 | Not critical     | 250           | 582            | 416                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP16 | Political involvement at the project implementation level           | 900           | 309            | 605                 | Somehow critical    | 810           | 697            | 753                 | Critical         | 140           | 703            | 422                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP17 | Public opposition   | 800           | 357            | 579                 | Somehow critical    | 60            | 387            | 224                 | Not critical     | 288           | 241            | 265                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP18 | Distrust among stakeholders   | 720           | 348            | 534                 | Somehow critical    | 60            | 666            | 363                 | Less critical    | 448           | 641            | 545                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP19 | Lack of PPPs enabling environment                                   | 810           | 378            | 594                 | Somehow critical    | 448           | 738            | 593                 | Somehow critical | 640           | 678            | 659                 | Somehow critical    |  |
| FFP20 | Land acquisition problems   | 640           | 219            | 430                 | Less critical       | 378           | 424            | 401                 | Less critical    | 343           | 296            | 320                 | Less critical       |  |
| FFP21 | Difficulties in securing credit facility from banks                 | 810           | 167            | 489                 | Less critical       | 378           | 651            | 515                 | Somehow critical | 384           | 563            | 474                 | Less critical       |  |

Note: FMEA- Failure Mode & Effect Analysis; RPN- Risk Priority Number; Criticality Scale: 1-250-Not Critical; 250-500-Less Critical; 500-750-Somehow Critical; 750-100-critical

Table 3 identifies four critical success factors: access to suitable financial markets, a favourable investment environment, stakeholder trust, and appropriate risk allocation and sharing. These factors contributed to the level of success achieved in the concession of engineering infrastructure for the Katempe district in Abuja phase 2 (case study 1). The FMEA results for case study 2, the Shiroro hydroelectric power plant concession, highlight that a favourable investment climate and stakeholder trust were the two critical success factors enabling the project's success in Niger State.

Table 3 also reveals that case studies 3 and 4, the Doma Dam concession in Nasarawa State and the Omi-Kampe Dam concession in Kogi State, lacked essential success factors and consequently were abandoned. Several factors were categorized as "somewhat critical" success

factors, including transparency in the procurement process, project technical viability, favourable investment environment, stakeholder trust, competition in the procurement process, availability of suitable financial markets, favourable legal and regulatory frameworks, good stakeholder relations, appropriate risk allocation and sharing, and stable macroeconomic conditions.

Furthermore, Table 3 demonstrates that a thorough and realistic assessment of costs and benefits was a crucial success factor contributing to the success of case study 5, the Garki Hospital concession in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. The presence of competition in the procurement process was highlighted as a critical success factor in the concession of the Debt Management Office in Abuja (case study 6).

Table 3: Summary of the assessment of criticality of success factors using FMEA technique in physical infrastructure PPP project case Studies

|       | •   |        | CAS     | SE STUDY   | 71                       | •      | CA      | SE STUDY   | Y 2                            |        | CASE STUDY 3 |            |                          |  |
|-------|---|--------|---------|------------|--------------------------|--------|---------|------------|--------------------------------|--------|--------------|------------|--------------------------|--|
|       | SUCCESS FACTORS   | Public | Private | Total      |                          | Public | Private | Total      |                                | Public | Private      | Total      |                          |  |
| S/N   | SUCCESS FACTORS   | RPN    | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  | RPN    | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                        | RPN    | RPN          | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  |  |
| SFP1  | Transparency in procurement process Thorough and realistic                        | 810    | 656     | 733        | Somehow<br>critical      | 648    | 559     | 606        | Somehow<br>critical            | 650    | 518          | 584        | Somehow<br>critical      |  |
| SFP2  | assessment of the cost and benefits   | 504    | 547     | 526        | Somehow critical         | 448    | 571     | 510        | Somehow critical               | 360    | 416          | 388        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP3  | Project Technical feasibility   | 900    | 384     | 642        | Somehow critical         | 420    | 657     | 539        | Somehow critical               | 485    | 531          | 508        | Somehow critical         |  |
| SFP4  | Public participation /Consultation with end-user's Clear project brief and client | 160    | 637     | 399        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 576    | 394     | 485        | Less critical                  | 143    | 235          | 189        | Not critical             |  |
| SFP5  | requirements Availability of suitable   | 810    | 372     | 591        | critical                 | 168    | 488     | 328        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 293    | 364          | 329        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP6  | financial markets Favourable legal and  | 900    | 715     | 808        | Critical                 | 648    | 683     | 666        | critical                       | 440    | 552          | 496        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP7  | commercially oriented laws<br>and regulations<br>Good stakeholders                | 720    | 427     | 574        | Somehow critical         | 720    | 673     | 697        | Somehow<br>critical<br>Somehow | 526    | 430          | 478        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP8  | relationship Favourable investment  | 392    | 377     | 385        | Less critical            | 560    | 528     | 544        | critical                       | 326    | 428          | 377        | Less critical<br>Somehow |  |
| SFP9  | environment   | 900    | 760     | 830        | Critical                 | 800    | 713     | 757        | Critical                       | 610    | 500          | 555        | critical<br>Somehow      |  |
| SFP10 | Trust between stakeholders Appropriate risk allocation                            | 900    | 765     | 833        | Critical                 | 810    | 870     | 840        | Critical<br>Somehow            | 534    | 576          | 555        | critical                 |  |
| SFP11 | and sharing Competition in procurement  | 800    | 780     | 790        | Critical<br>Somehow      | 336    | 666     | 501        | critical                       | 444    | 480          | 462        | Less critical<br>Somehow |  |
| SFP12 | process   | 640    | 720     | 680        | critical                 | 810    | 786     | 798        | Critical                       | 472    | 855          | 664        | critical                 |  |
| SFP13 | Technical innovation and<br>technology transfer<br>Contract specifications and    | 150    | 224     | 187        | Not critical             | 100    | 213     | 157        | Not critical                   | 180    | 224          | 202        | Not critical             |  |
| SFP14 | measurement Well-organized and  | 252    | 376     | 314        | Less critical            | 540    | 282     | 411        | Less critical                  | 192    | 504          | 348        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP15 | committed public agency Strong and good private                                   | 175    | 376     | 291        | Less critical<br>Somehow | 245    | 322     | 284        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 247    | 252          | 250        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP16 | consortium Stable macroeconomic   | 441    | 624     | 533        | critical<br>Somehow      | 576    | 514     | 545        | critical                       | 387    | 168          | 428        | Less critical<br>Somehow |  |
| SFP17 | condition   | 640    | 633     | 637        | critical                 | 360    | 624     | 492        | Less critical                  | 330    | 688          | 509        | critical                 |  |
| SFP18 | Political support   | 504    | 451     | 478        | Less critical            | 504    | 428     | 466        | Less critical                  | 348    | 532          | 440        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP19 | Contract flexibility  | 630    | 367     | 499        | Less critical            | 64     | 323     | 196        | Not critical                   | 522    | 161          | 342        | Less critical            |  |

Note: FMEA- Failure Mode & Effect Analysis; RPN- Risk Priority Number; Criticality Scale: 1-250-Not Critical; 250-500-Less Critical; 500-750-Somehow Critical; 750-100-critical

|       |   | CASE STUDY 4 |         |            |                                |        | CA      | SE STUD    | Y 5                            |        | CASE STUDY 6 |            |                          |  |
|-------|---|--------------|---------|------------|--------------------------------|--------|---------|------------|--------------------------------|--------|--------------|------------|--------------------------|--|
|       | SUCCESS FACTORS   | Public       | Private | Total      |                                | Public | Private | Total      |                                | Public | Private      | Total      |                          |  |
| S/N   | 0000255 11101025  | RPN          | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                        | RPN    | RPN     | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                        | RPN    | RPN          | AVG<br>RPN | REMARKS                  |  |
| SFP1  | Transparency in procurement process Thorough and realistic assessment of the cost and | 810          | 388     | 599        | Somehow critical               | 720    | 702     | 711        | Somehow critical               | 210    | 440          | 325        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP2  | benefits  | 392          | 230     | 311        | Less critical                  | 900    | 665     | 783        | Critical                       | 336    | 528          | 432        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP3  | Project Technical feasibility   | 1000         | 253     | 627        | Somehow critical               | 648    | 797     | 723        | Somehow critical               | 294    | 620          | 457        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP4  | Public participation /Consultation with end-user's Clear project brief and client     | 720          | 267     | 494        | Less critical                  | 336    | 431     | 384        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 240    | 416          | 328        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP5  | requirements Availability of suitable   | 640          | 150     | 395        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 720    | 492     | 606        | critical                       | 504    | 215          | 360        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP6  | financial markets Favourable legal and  | 720          | 281     | 501        | critical                       | 150    | 414     | 282        | Less critical                  | 336    | 441          | 389        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP7  | commercially oriented laws<br>and regulations<br>Good stakeholders                    | 810          | 418     | 614        | Somehow<br>critical<br>Somehow | 504    | 450     | 477        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 60     | 765          | 413        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP8  | relationship<br>Favourable investment   | 1000         | 208     | 604        | critical<br>Somehow            | 810    | 466     | 638        | critical                       | 120    | 652          | 386        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP9  | environment   | 720          | 327     | 524        | critical                       | 294    | 533     | 414        | Less critical                  | 80     | 607          | 344        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP10 | Trust between stakeholders Appropriate risk allocation                                | 576          | 381     | 479        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 392    | 741     | 567        | Somehow<br>critical<br>Somehow | 224    | 723          | 474        | Less critical<br>Somehow |  |
| SFP11 | and sharing Competition in procurement  | 729          | 277     | 503        | critical<br>Somehow            | 567    | 645     | 606        | critical<br>Somehow            | 640    | 727          | 684        | critical                 |  |
| SFP12 | process   | 720          | 427     | 574        | critical                       | 480    | 757     | 619        | critical                       | 900    | 870          | 885        | Critical                 |  |
| SFP13 | Technical innovation and<br>technology transfer<br>Contract specifications and        | 576          | 331     | 454        | Not critical                   | 320    | 378     | 349        | Less critical                  | 140    | 277          | 209        | Not critical             |  |
| SFP14 | measurement   | 630          | 187     | 409        | Less critical                  | 392    | 557     | 475        | Less critical                  | 504    | 306          | 405        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP15 | Well-organized and<br>committed public agency<br>Strong and good private              | 720          | 135     | 428        | Less critical                  | 192    | 363     | 278        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 192    | 515          | 354        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP16 | consortium Stable macroeconomic   | 720          | 260     | 490        | Less critical<br>Somehow       | 648    | 618     | 633        | critical                       | 288    | 394          | 341        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP17 | condition   | 1000         | 217     | 609        | critical                       | 405    | 531     | 468        | Less critical                  | 512    | 284          | 398        | Less critical            |  |
| SFP18 | Political support   | 392          | 285     | 339        | Less critical                  | 630    | 568     | 599        | Somehow critical               | 441    | 659          | 550        | Somehow critical         |  |
| SFP19 | Contract flexibility  MEA- Failure Mode & Effect Analysis                             | 512          | 154     | 333        | Less critical                  | 378    | 373     | 376        | Less critical                  | 72     | 285          | 179        | Not critical             |  |

Note: FMEA- Failure Mode & Effect Analysis; RPN- Risk Priority Number; Criticality Scale: 1-250-Not Critical; 250-500-Less Critical; 500-750-Somehow Critical; 750-100-critical

### CFFs and CSFs emanating from the case studies

Based on the evaluation of the criticality of the identified failure and success factors using FMEA in the six PPP case studies as previously discussed in (Tables 2 and 3), the results identified a total of three CFFs that caused the case studies to experience varying degrees of failures. they are as follows: i. Corruption in the public sector ii. Lack of transparency and competitiveness in procurement processes iii. Political interference at the project execution level

Similar to this, the FMEA results for the case studies of the PPP projects described above (i.e., studies 1-6) found a total of 6 CSFs that were accountable for varying degrees of success of these case studies of the PPP projects. These CSFs are as follows:

- i. Availability of suitable financial markets
- ii. Favourable investment environment
- iii. Appropriate risk allocation
- iv. Competition in procurement process
- v. Thorough and realistic assessment of cost and benefits
- vi. Trust between stakeholders

#### **CONCLUSION**

This study examined the Critical Failure Factures (CFFs) and Critical Success Factors (CSFs) of PPP infrastructure projects in North Central Nigeria with a view to minimizing the failure of PPP infrastructure projects in North Central Nigeria. Similar to the previous study, this research utilizes the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) method to identify, classify, and understand the reasons behind the failures of PPP infrastructure projects in Nigeria's North Central region. It identifies Critical Failure Factors (CFFs) and Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can enhance project success. The identified CFFs include political interference during project implementation, lack of transparency and competition in procurement processes, and corruption in the public sector. These factors contribute to the failure of PPP infrastructure projects. Similarly, six CSFs were identified as factors that contribute to the success of the PPP project case study to varying degrees. These factors include the presence of well-functioning financial markets, a favorable investment environment, appropriate risk allocation, competitive procurement processes, comprehensive and realistic cost and benefit assessments, and stakeholder trust. The identification of CFFs assists stakeholders in making informed decisions, planning ahead, and effectively managing the execution of PPP infrastructure projects. The identified CSFs have a positive impact on the formulation of PPP policies and the collaboration between stakeholders from the public and private sectors in the construction of PPP infrastructure projects. The study suggests that the major stakeholders involved in PPPs should give utmost consideration to the identified CFFs and CSFs in order to promote the more successful execution of PPP infrastructure projects.

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