DOUSING THE TENSION IN THE NIGER DELTA THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY: A PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION AS AN INTERVENTION REGIME

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ABSTRACT

In this study, we provide empirical evidence and analyses on the impact of NDDC as a development intervention regime in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta. Our sample was made of 345 out of 600 respondents representing the dominant oil producing areas (DOPAS) and peripheral oil producing areas (POPAS) respectively. We observed that there are no significant differences in expressed attitude towards NDDC on the following issues: NDDC and the provision of infrastructural and human resource development, conflict resolution in the Niger Delta and the commitment of both the federal government and oil companies towards the development of the oil producing area. Using survey research method and a before-and-after study evaluation design, the study concludes that because of systemic constraints arising from the hegemonic interests of the dominant coalitions in the Nigerian Social formation, NDDC is less likely to meet, the expectation of its initiators and the people of the Niger Delta. And no matter, the intrinsic methodological inadequacy of this study, our findings confirm that NDDC is a structure built on shifting ground.

INTRODUCTION

The use of distributive policy to address peculiar problems of disadvantage group in plural societies is now a dominant feature of all heterogeneous nation-states. In both developed and developing countries, distributive policy places all its efforts in actions and measures that have the greatest probability of benefiting disadvantage groups. Available evidence in many countries demonstrates that such policies are meant to generate more social equity and douse tension in the polity. The Mississippi Delta project in the United States of America and the Brazilian Agenda 21 are examples of how governments address problems of disadvantage minority groups.

In Nigeria, the use of distributive policy to address problems of disadvantage group dates back to the early 1960s. When the Niger Delta Development Board (NDBD) was established in 1961 to tackle the peculiar problems of the Niger Delta region of the country. Subsequently, many such regimes and ad hoc commission have been established to address issues such as poverty, unemployment, social services and infrastructural development at both national and state levels. The list includes but not exhaustive, National Directorate for Employment (NDE), Better Life for Rural Woman (BLW), Family Support Programme (FSP), Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP), National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and a host of others.

Of related policy includes the NDBD early mentioned, the Mineral Producing Areas Development Fund Committee, the Presidential Committee on the development of Oil Mineral Producing Areas and the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). These exclude many other intervention regimes established by NGOs and bodies like the FAO, UNDP and World Bank. In the light of the above, judging by the number of the intervention programmes, the use of distributive policy to tackle problems of disadvantaged group is acknowledged, but how effective has the been is now being debated with acumenous passion. There is also an increasing concern about the relevance of an ad hoc commission and administrative agency in tackling a purely political and constitutional problem. Indeed, one issue that critics of the strategy have continued to hammer at is the rationale of using an administrative agency to address the socio-economic and political problems of the Niger Delta (Suberu, 1996; Saro-Wiwa, 1995; Akpan, 1995; 2005; Okonta and Douglas, 1995; and Frynas, 2003). The literature on the Nigerian government intervention regime in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta is not extensive due to the fact that most political analysts and scholars focus more on the issues fueling the crisis in the Niger Delta than on the efforts made by governments, oil companies and NGOs to address the problems.

A leading study in this regard by Akpan (1995) on the impact of OMPADEC as a social-transformative agency is particularly relevant to the present study. Based on his field studies in the oil producing areas, he argues strong that because of systematic constraints arising from hegemonic interest of dominant coalitions in the Nigerian social formation, direct fiscal transfer of resources to oil producing areas rather than through OMPADEC was more likely to facilitate the provision of social services and infrastructures in the oil producing communities.

In analytical terms the federal government's attempt to address the developmental problems of the oil producing areas through OMPADEC in isolation from the structural and distributive problems inherent in the Nigeria federal system, which is at the root of the crisis in the Niger Delta accounted for nothing. Despite the failure of past intervention regimes to address the problems of the Niger Delta, the Federal Government has continued to make use of intervention regime approach to solve the problem. Its continuity has led to the establishment of NDDC.

This is the background against which we investigate the potency of using a purely administrative agency to solve political and constitutional problems in a multi-ethnic federal-system.

NDDC: Objectives and expectations

Primarily, NDDC is to embark upon physically and human development of the Niger Delta. Section 7(1) of the Act that established the commission states its objectives and powers as follows:

a. Formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area.

b. Conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger Delta area.

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in the field of transportation, including roads, jeties and wareways, health, education, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications;

2. Cause the Niger Delta to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development;

3. Prepare master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta area and estimates of the costs of implementing such master plans and schemes;

4. Implement all the measures approved for the development of the Niger Delta areas by the Federal Government and the member state of the commission;

5. Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta and assist the member states in the formation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta;

6. Asses and report on any project being funded or carried out in the Niger Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and any other company, including non-governmental organizations, and ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized;

7. Tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploitation of oil mineral in the Niger Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution;

8. Liaise with the various oil and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control;

9. Execute such other works, perform and publish other functions, which, in the opinion of the commission, are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region and its peoples (NDDC Act 2000).

Thus, the NDDC has the mandate for the development of the Niger Delta region. The two phases of development are short and long terms. The short term programme includes old OMPADEC projects, new strategies projects and human development, while the long-term includes a comprehensive and detailed master plan that will take about 18 months to develop and will cover a phrased development of the entire region (NDDC Profile 2000: 11).

**METHODODOLOGY**

In this study, we intend to find out the extent to which NDDC has met the expectation of the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta region. Primarily, NDDC is to embark upon both physical and human resource development in the areas. Thus everything NDDC has done would be tested against its main objectives. In this context, we shall adopt the before-and-after study evaluation design. According to Anderson (2003), the before-and-after study design compares the result of a programme after a period of implementation with the conditions existing prior to its inception. For a detailed discussion of the before-and-after study evaluation design, see Allen Puitt and J. Fred Spearin (1989), Carol H. Weiss (1972) qt in Anderson (2003) and Earl Babbie (1976). In this regard, we shall take a look at the period before-and-after the introduction of NDDC to critically examine NDDC’s intervention projects/programmes to see whether they have had any significant impact on the areas. By so doing, we shall examine whether NDDC has been able to meet the objectives it was established for or not. Equally too, we shall study and compare the occurrence and intensity of oil-related conflicts before-and-after the introduction of NDDC. This would enable us to evaluate the extent to which NDDC has been able to curtail oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta region.

**OPERATIONALISATION OF RESEARCH VARIABLES**

The variable "social infrastructure" and services as used in this study refers to all the programmes in the form of the work programme of the NDDC as contained in the NDDC profile, 2001. These projects are in the areas of water supply; rural electrification; roads maintenance and construction; jeties and shore protection; school buildings, health centre, land reclamation and bridging (NDDC 2001:12).

1. The variable "oil industry" as used in this study refers to the reactions of the inhabitants of the oil producing areas to fiscal neglect and environmental right abuses by both the Federal Government and multi-national oil companies. These reactions disrupt oil operations in all ramifications. It is also characterized by protest, agitation and environmental conflicts. This led to the establishment of the NDDC in 2000.

2. The variable "development" as used in this study refers to infrastructural and services and human resource development. This is spelt out in part II of the Niger Delta Development Commission Act, 2000.

**STUDY SAMPLE**

Fifty out of the one hundred and eighty-five Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the nine states covered by NDDC are administratively designated as oil-producing areas. The fifty LGAs are located in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Edo, Delta, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States. In arriving at an adequate sample frame, we divided the nine NDDC states into two heterogeneous groups, dominant oil-producing states/group (DOPG) and peripheral oil-producing states/group (POPG). This was done with the assistance of NDDC and NNPC officials. The DOPG are made up of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and River States, while Abia, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo states constitute the POPG.

The POPG share the following attributes: First, between 1990 and 2002 they have been the leading struggle against the fiscal neglect and environmental degradation of the oil-producing areas by both the Federal Government and Oil companies. During this period, a survey of national newspapers and weekly newsmagazines using content analysis reveals that, 302 out of 352 or 34.59% of paid advertisement from individuals, groups, organizations and communities jointly and/or severally deriding the situation in the Niger Delta region came from the DOPG. Second, the DOPG collectively produced over 95% of oil in the country. Thus, they are the worse hit in terms of the environmental and socio-economic dislocation as a result of oil production activities. This explains in part why despite the establishment of OMPADEC (now defunct) and NDDC the most subtle and intense protest against the fiscal and environmental degradation of oil-producing areas comes from this group. Third, the DOPG are also the leading vanguard of the vandalization and seizures of oil installations; and kidnapings of oil companies staff as a form of protest against environmental degradation and pollution of their areas.

The POPG share the following attributes: First, they have not significantly contributed to the plethora of protests against the fiscal neglect and environmental degradation of the oil producing areas. This does not mean that they do not support the struggle and demands of the POPG for a fair share of the revenues accruing from oil resource and a clean environment, but they are less vocal in terms of demanding for their rights. Second, the POPG collectively produced the lowest volume of oil in the country. Irrespective, they are less hit in terms of the environmental and socio-economic dislocation caused by oil production activities. This explains in part why there is less acrimonious atmosphere within this group in
terms of protests or grievances resulting from oil production activities.

To arrive at our study frame proper, a multi-stage sampling technique was adopted. The first consisted of the use of cluster sampling technique. Both the DOPG and the POPG were separately clustered and two states selected from each cluster. Consequently, Rivers and Akwa Ibom States, (from the DOPG) and Cross River and Ipo states (from the POPG) were selected, respectively. Coming to the second stage of sampling, a list of the actual oil-producing local government areas in each of the four states above was obtained from NDDC's office in each state. From each list, a random sampling technique, using the fish-bowel method, was adopted to select four local government areas from Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Cross River and Ipo states, respectively. The fish-bowel method followed this principle: the names of oil producing local government areas from the four states we selected were placed into four bowls labeled DOPG and POPG respectively. From each bowl, one LGA was selected: Eket (Akwa Ibom) Onelga (River), Bakassi (Cross River) Obaji/Epema (Ipo), respectively. The third stage of sampling was the selection of one community from each of the four LGA's listed above. A list of all the producing communities in each of the four LGAs we selected were placed separately and using the fish-bowl method as described above, we selected Ikot Udekon (Eket), Omuku (Onelga) Bakassi South (Bakassi) and Nmahu (Obaji/Epema) respectively.

It is important to note that this method was adopted in order to give each state, LGA and community within the Niger Delta region a fair chance of being selected since they all differ in geographical size, population and the volume of oil they produced. Otherwise the alternative methodology would have been to select our study sample frame from the data on the volume of oil production per state, LGA and community. But the available data are highly controversial. Hence, we had to rely on the earlier stated criteria above. It is also important to note that, we based the criteria on interviews with the state officials, industry and academic analysis of some national newspapers and weekly newsmagazines. This includes the Guardian, Punch and This Day. Others were Newswatch, Tell and the News Magazines.

ADMINISTRATION OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The researcher devised a technique of distribution and collection of questionnaires to 600 of supposedly "literate respondents" within the village communities covered by this study using purposive sampling technique. This technique was adopted to ensure that potential respondents are familiar with the problems identified by the study and could effectively respond to their needs. To ensure this, a pre-test of the questionnaires were carried out before the actual fieldwork. In this context, we used a stratified sampling technique to distribution questionnaires in person to community leaders, youth leaders, women leaders, church leaders; ward executives; leaders and members of socio-cultural organizations; political parties' 'stalwarts'; leaders of non-governmental organizations; and host of others. We assume that literate members of village communities could be located within these groups.

We distributed six hundred (600) questionnaires in the four communities covered by this study. One hundred and fifty (150) questionnaires per community were distributed in person with the help of research assistants. Out of 600 questionnaires only three hundred and forty eight (348) were returned on record time, representing a response rate of 58%. This was significantly high given the problems encountered in the field. At the end of the fieldwork, 126 or 36.21% questionnaires from Omuku, 93 or 26.44% from Ikot Udekon, 70 or 20.11% from Bakassi south and 60 or 17.24% from Nmahu respectively.

METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of the survey data relies on frequency distribution, percentages tables and the non-parametric chi-square test ($\chi^2$) for a significant independence or association between two or more variables. In our analysis, the alpha value is set at 5% (0.05). For each chi-square test in this study the corresponding ($\chi^2$) and p-value is provided. In addition, the entire decision rule associated with the chi-square test also applies to this study: for instance, accept $H_0$ (null hypothesis) and reject $H_1$ (the alternative hypothesis) if calculated value is less than table value; reject $H_0$ and accept $H_1$ if calculated value is greater than the table value. In addition, we crosschecked all empirical data with secondary data where available about any question of importance dealing with NDDC as a development intervention regime in the Niger Delta. We have also highlighted other standard errors associated with the survey research method throughout the data analysis.

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The analyzed and discussed data relate to 348 respondents out of 600, representing 58% of the entire sample drawn from all the areas covered by this study. The description and discussion of the sample will proceed through:

1. Gender composition of sample
2. Composition of respondents by group
3. Social infrastructure and service available in the communities before NDDC
4. The tense atmosphere in the Niger Delta
5. Test of hypotheses

Gender Composition of Sample

The Composition of respondents by gender reflects sex distribution between male and female respondents. Table I below is a representation of the gender composition of the sample: the male respondents represent 56.61% or 151, while female respondents constitute 151 or 43.39% of the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork

There was no intention to compare responses to each question of importance that relates to this study with the gender of our respondents. Even though table I shows a marginal difference between the two sexes – male and female – it has no implication on the result of the study.

Composition of Respondents by Group

According to the information on table I, 218 or 62.64% represents respondents from the dominant oil producing states/group (DOPG), while 130 or 37.36% represents those from the peripheral oil producing states/group (POPG). As earlier mentioned, the initial plan was to draw an equal number of respondents from each group. This was impossible at the end of the fieldwork due to problems encountered in the field, such as the inability of some respondents to meet the deadline of returning their questionnaires. Since it is our intention to analyses the data of this study based on these two groups, we will discuss the implication of the marginal difference between the two groups in terms of their responses to any question of importance throughout the analysis.
Table II: Composition of Respondents by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Cf</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Producing Group</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>62.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dominant Producing Group</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>37.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork

Social Infrastructure and Services Available in the Communities before NDDC

The assumption here was that respondents' knowledge of what social infrastructure and services were available in their community before the establishment of NDDC will afford us a better chance of measuring their responses to any questions dealing with what NDDC has done for them. Thus, we asked the respondents, "Which of the following social infrastructure and services were available in your community before the establishment of NDDC?"

Table III: Social Infrastructure and Services Available in the Communities before NDDC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Cf</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potable water</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Centre</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>25.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>29.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canalisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Specific</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork

The above table indicates that 126 or 3.21% of the entire sample state that they had potable water in their community before the establishment of NDDC. 206 or 25.68% assert that they had health centre, 242 or 29.88% electricity and 178 or 9.63% roads. The remaining 256 or 31.60% of the sample aver that they had other types of social infrastructures and services such as schools, vocational training, etc. not listed in the research instrument, but represented by others specify. One of the fundamental inadequacies of the research instrument was that we did not ask the respondents to assess the quality of the social infrastructure and services in their community before NDDC. Thus, the above survey results may be misleading and inconsistent with what is on ground in these communities. To correct this flaw, the researcher relied mainly on physical examination of the existing social infrastructure and services in each community covered by this study. For instance, the 26 or 3.21% of the sample that said they had potable water in their communities before NDDC are mainly referring to borehole sunk either by the local government or through community efforts or oil companies but which had long ceased to function.

On electricity, the 242 or 29.88% who claimed that they had electricity before NDDC were mainly respondents from Omuku for obvious reasons. Respondents from Omuku represent 126 or 36.31% of the entire 348 samples. It is instructive to note that every community in Omuku has electricity provided by Agip Nigeria Limited. But in other areas covered by this study electricity is generated by generator provided by the state government and Senator Florence Ita Gwa for the Nigerian Army settled there.

On health centre, the 206 or 25.68% that said that they had health centers in their respective communities are actually referring to the structures, not functional and equipped health centers. This is what our physical inspection and oral interview reveal. This is also true of other social infrastructure and services such as schools, vocational training centers, roads and host of others. In sum, the conditions in these communities are deplorable.

The Tense Atmosphere in the Niger Delta Region

The relevant issue here is the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta. We wanted to establish the existence of oil-related conflict in the areas. Thus, we asked our respondents, "Have you had any oil-related conflicts in your community?"

Table IV: The Tense Atmosphere in the Niger Delta Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oil Related</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Cf</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>20.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork

The responses pattern among 348 respondents indicates that more than half of the respondents affirm that they have experienced oil-related conflicts in their community. A total of 272 or 78.16% of the entire sample affirm this, while 72 or 20.69% hold divergent view. The remaining 4 or 1.15% constitutes those who did not act in response to the question. It is important to note that what we intended to establish here was the pragmatism of oil-related conflicts in the four communities covered by this study. This is exactly what the above findings imply.

Test of Hypothesis:

Hypothesis I

The null hypothesis state that "direct fiscal transfer to the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta is less likely to facilitate the infrastructural and human resource development of the areas than through NDDC."

For the above hypothesis – direct fiscal transfer to NDDC or the oil producing areas and the infrastructure and human resource development are the main variables. Direct fiscal transfer to NDDC or the oil producing area is the independent variable. To test the hypothesis, we ask our respondents, "From past experience, do you think NDDC is more likely to facilitate the infrastructural and human resource development of your community?" The responses required were either 'yes' or 'no'.

Table V: Chi-Square Analysis Of Direct Fiscal Transfer And The Provision Of Social Infrastructure And Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOPA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(170.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(101.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork

\[ X^2 = \chi^2 (o-e)^2 \]

\[ \sum \epsilon(\epsilon) \]

\[ = 1 = 1 \]

\[ = (21-47.6)^2 + (197-170.4)^2 + (55-28.4)^2 + (75-101.6)^2 \]

\[ 47.6 \times 170.4 \times 28.4 \times 101.6 \]

\[ = 14.6 + 4.15 + 24.91 + 6.99 \]

\[ x^2 = 50.98 \]

D/F N=1 @ 0.05 = 3.84

DECISION

Since the calculated value is greater than the table value, we reject the null hypothesis. We are 95% confident
that was the right decision. However, as a rule, when the degree freedom is 1 the Yates corrections must be applied to further strengthen the result. In applying it to our hypothesis 1, the formula for the Yates correction is as follows:

\[ X^2 \text{ (Corrected)} = \frac{(O-E)^2}{E} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{1} \]

\[ = (121 - 47.61)^2 + (1193 - 170.4)^2 \]

\[ = 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 \]

\[ = 28.4 \]

\[ = 101.6 \]

\[ = 14.65 + 24.91 + 6.96 \]

\[ = \chi^2 = 50.88 = \text{Calculated value} \]

\[ \text{D/F N=1} \text{ at 0.05} = 3.841 \]

**DECISION**

Since the calculated value is greater than the table value, N=1 D/F at 0.05 = 3.841) we reject the null hypothesis that direct fiscal transfer to the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta is less likely to facilitate the development of the areas than through NDDC. We are 95% confident that is the right decision.

**Hypothesis II**

For this hypothesis, the null hypothesis maintains that oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta are more likely to be minimized by NDDC than through a direct fiscal measure to the oil producing areas.

In the above hypothesis, NDDC is the independent variable, while oil-related conflicts are the dependent variable. To test the hypothesis, we ask our respondents, "Would you agree that oil-related conflicts in your community are likely to be minimized with the establishment of NDDC?" Responses required were either 'yes or no'.

**Table V1: Chi-Square Analysis Of NDDC And Oil-Related Conflict In The Niger Delta Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOPA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPA</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = \frac{(O-E)^2}{E} \]

\[ = \sum \frac{1}{1} \]

\[ = (121 - 47.61)^2 + (1193 - 170.4)^2 \]

\[ = 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 \]

\[ = 28.4 \]

\[ = 101.6 \]

\[ = 14.65 + 24.91 + 6.96 \]

\[ = \chi^2 = 50.88 = \text{Calculated value} \]

\[ \text{D/F N=1} \text{ at 0.05} = 3.841 \]

**DECISION**

Since the calculated value is greater than the table value, we reject null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that is the right decision. However, as a rule, when the degree of freedom is 1, The Yates correction is apply to further strengthen the results. The formula for the Yates correction is as follows:

\[ X^2 \text{ (Corrected)} = \frac{X^2 (O-E)^2}{\sum E} \]

\[ \text{where} \]

\[ \sum E = 1 \]

\[ = (121 - 47.61)^2 + (1193 - 170.4)^2 \]

\[ = 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 + 707.56 \]

\[ = 28.4 \]

\[ = 102.8 \]

\[ x = 12.5 \]

\[ + 3.85 + 21.31 + 5.90 \]

\[ : \chi^2 = 50.88 = \text{Calculated value} \]

\[ \text{D/F N=1} \text{ at 0.05} = 3.841 \]

**DECISION**

Since the calculated value is greater than the table value, we reject null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that is the right decision.
\[ x^2 = 84.09 \]
\[ \text{D/F} = N - 1 = 4 \text{ at 0.05 } = 9.488 \]

**DECISION**
Since the calculated value \( x^2 = 84.09 \) is greater than the table value (\( \text{D/F} = N - 1 = 4 \text{ at 0.05 } = 9.488 \)), we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between oil companies’ contributions to the development of their host communities and violent disruption of oil operations activities in the Niger Delta. We are 95% confident that is the right decision.

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**SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The findings of this study relate to 218 respondents who represent 62.64% of the total sample described as POPG and the remaining 37.36% described as POPG. The summaries of the findings relate to data on the gender composition of respondents, data on the availability of social infrastructure and services before the establishment of NDDC, information on oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta and the test of the empirical validity of the four hypotheses adopted at the beginning of this study.

The data on gender composition of respondents’ show that majority of our respondents were male. This constitutes 197 or 56.61% of the entire sample, while the remaining 151 or 43.39% were female.

On the issue of available social infrastructures and services before the establishment of NDDC, our empirical findings suggested that the available ones were in deplorable conditions. Attitude of respondents towards the contributions of oil companies to the development of their host communities was found to be positive. 170 or 48.86% of the entire sample stated that their contribution after the Ogale uprising of the early 1990s were significant compared to the pre-Saro-Wiwa era.

The data on oil-related conflicts in the areas indicate that the communities where enmeshed in conflicts arising out of oil-related matters. 272 or 78.16% of the entire sample supported this view. The remaining 72 or 21.84% (excluding no response) did not. On the degree and intensity of these conflicts what our empirical findings suggested is that it varies from one community to another, but most importantly, they are higher and more intense in the POPG than in the POPG. Our empirical findings also suggested that the establishment of NDDC could not curtail these conflicts. 271 or 78.32% of the entire respondents supported this view. The remaining 75 or 21.68% indicated the contrary. What emerges from these results irrespective of the marginal differences is that NDDC is not structured or empowered by the Act that established it to tackle the issue fueling oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta. The findings of this study further suggested that NDDC is like giving a cancer patient painkiller that definitely would not alleviate the cancer.

Lastly, the précis of the four null hypotheses that guided this study were as follows:

Hypothesis I, the null hypotheses, which states that direct fiscal transfer to the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta, is less likely to facilitate the infrastructural and human resource development of the areas than through NDDC, was rejected after the chi-square test. The issue here is whether there is any significant relationship between direct fiscal transfer to oil-producing areas and the infrastructural and human resource development of the areas. At the end of the chi-square test, the calculated value (\( x^2 = 50.68 \)) was greater than the table value of (3.841); we reject the null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that a right decision has been made. In other words, direct fiscal transfer to the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta rather than through NDDC is more likely to facilitate the infrastructural and human resource development of the areas.

Hypothesis II, the null hypothesis, which states that oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta are more likely to be curtailed by NDDC than through a direct fiscal transfer to the oil-producing areas, was rejected after the chi-square test. The issue here is, whether there is any significant correlation between NDDC and the curtailment of oil-related conflicts in the oil producing areas. At the end of the chi-square test, the calculated value (\( x^2 = 43.69 \)) was greater than the table value (3.841), we reject the null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that a right decision has been made. In other words, oil-related conflicts in Niger Delta are less likely to be curtailed by NDDC than through a direct fiscal transfer to oil producing areas.
Hypothesis III, the null hypothesis, which states that there is no significant correlation between the federal government policy towards the development of the Niger Delta and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the oil-producing areas, was rejected after the chi-square test. The issue here is, whether there is any significant correlation between federal government policy toward the development of the Niger Delta and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the oil-producing areas. At the end of the chi-square test, the calculated value ($x^2 = 84.59$) was greater than the table value ($9.488$), we reject the null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that a right decision has been made. In other words, there is a significant correlation between the federal government policy towards the development of the Niger Delta and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the oil-producing areas.

Lastly, hypothesis IV, the null hypothesis, which states that there is no significant correlation between the oil companies' contribution to the development of their host communities and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the Niger Delta, was rejected after the chi-square test. The issue here is, whether there is any significant correlation between oil companies' contribution towards the development of their host communities and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the Niger Delta. At the end of the chi-square test, the calculated value ($x^2 = 253.21$) was greater than the table value ($9.488$), we reject the null hypothesis. We are 95% confident that a right decision has been made. In other words, that there is a significant correlation between oil companies’ contributions towards the development of their host communities and violent disruption of oil operation activities in the Niger Delta.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

After a circumstantial study of the impact of NDDC in the oil-producing communities, this study concludes that the problems of the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta cannot be resolved through an intervention regime like NDDC for the following reasons. First, NDDC is not structured or empowered by the Act that established it to address the issues fueling oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta. Second, the developmental needs of the Niger Delta cannot be addressed in isolation from the structural and distributive problems inherent in the Nigerian federal system. Third, the federal government and oil companies' contributions to the development of the Niger Delta are contingent upon violent disruption of oil installations and operation by aggrieved communities and militant youths in the oil producing communities. Fourth, the federal government is more receptive to the needs of oil companies than to the needs of oil-producing communities affected by the consequences of oil production activities.

This conclusion is reached based on the fact that the crisis in the Niger Delta is beyond the capacity of any administrative agency. It is purely a political and constitutional problem that requires a politico-constitutional solution. To a large extend, this is why OMPADAC failed and why NDDC is not succeeding. The abortive National Political Conference is the closest attempt any government has come to solving the crisis in the Niger Delta.

In this context, NDDC represents an ad hoc response to pressing socio-economic, political and environmental problems. Its nature (regime-type), trajectory and peculiar Nigerien Political environment set definite limit to the accomplishment of the developmental task envisaged by its initiators.

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