# AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DIVIDEND POLICY OF QUOTED COMPANIES IN NIGERIA

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study attempt to evaluate the observed dividend policy of a cross section of 27 Nigeria quoted companies using theories tested to explain dividend behavior of those firms. These theories which are several and varied; even contradict each other and considerable doubt exist as to which theory best represent the observed dividend behaviour of Nigerian firms; hence the need for this study. To carry out this study a more recent data for the period (1996 – 2006) were reviewed and a model with the necessary policy variables constructed. Factor upon which dividend decisions are based are identified and the magnitude of their effect estimated. Our estimation reveals that the traditional factors are significant in explaining and predicting their dividend decision within the period under review. The result provides strong support for the explanatory or predictive power of Lintner's model. Also, factors which attempt to explain variations in share market prices were identified, and the magnitude of their effect estimated. The result confirms that share market price is a representation of market valuation of dividends.

KEYWORDS: Dividends, Quoted Companies, Dividend Theories, Share Market price

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The finance profession has long struggled to develop a simple satisfactory model of dividend determination without much success. Modigliani and Miller (1961) show that in perfect capital market with no information asymmetry and predetermined investment decision, the value of the firm's is independent of the financing decisions. Hence, a firm's financing decision including dividends, have no effect on the value of the firm, nor the distribution of wealth between classes of security holders. However, in an imperfect settings, dividend can influence shareholders wealth by providing information to investors or through wealth redistribution among claimants.

With information asymmetry, Bhattacharya (1979) demonstrates that dividends provide information about the firm's future cash flow and thus the dividend decision can change a firm value. Fama and Babiak (1968) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated another potential real impact of financial decision transfer of wealth between classes of claimants can occur in the absence of imperfect priority rules. However, Kalay

(1982) finds that firms generally are under these limitations. The payment of dividends conveys to shareholders that the company is profitable and financially strong. An increase in payment ratio signals to shareholders a permanent or long-term increase in firms expected earnings. Accordingly, the price of share may be affected by changes in dividend policy. Dividend may offer tangible evidence of the firm's ability to generate cash, and as a result, the dividend policy of the firm affects the share price (Solomon, 1963). The market value of share is affected not because of the change in dividend but because of the information about changes in the future expected earnings conveyed through the payment (Pandey, 2000 pp.765).

It is contended that dividends are relevant because they have informational value. It is also believed that information content of dividend can go a long way to affect companies share market price by sending signals to prospective investors.

Some of the pertinent problems are: why do companies pay dividend? What actually informs the dividend policy? What are the constraints of paying dividends and what should be

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the form of dividend? Do dividend matters? Of all the theories of dividend policy, which of one them best predict dividend policy behaviour in a specific case e.g. quoted firms in Nigeria? Can the magnitude of the factors that influence dividend policy be used in predicting market share prices of the firms under review?

Answering these questions is absolutely not an easy task. Therefore, this study will seek to empirically analyse and evaluate, using conventional and non-conventional approach to investigate a number of factors related to these problems and seek how to evolve a long-term dividend policy and hence use the informational content of the dividend as declared by quoted firms.

The primary emphasis of this research work therefore is to identify the factors that influence the dividend policy of cross section of Nigerian quoted firms between 1996 and 2006 excluding 1998; to assess the stability of the result over time; and to test the relevance or applicability of dividend theories to share price behaviour in Nigeria.

## 2.0 THEORETICAL ISSUES AND LITERATURE REVIEW

investment and Financing, dividend decisions are the basic components of corporate policy. Financing decision requires an appropriate selection and combination of capital from available sources, investment decisions are concerned with the efficient deployment of capital funds while, decision involves dividend the periodic determination of proportion of a firms total distributable earnings that is payable to its shareholders. The larger the dividend paid, the less funds are retained for investment and the more the company will have to rely on other sources of long term funds (such as additional issues of equity and or debt capital) to finance projects.

In developed countries, the decision between paying dividend and retaining earnings has been taking seriously by both investors and management, and has been the subject of considerable research by economists in the last four decades (Lintner, 1956; Britain, 1964; Modigliani and Miller, 1961; Petit, 1976; Black and Scholes, 1974; Michael, Thaler and Womack, 1995; Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Amibud and Murgin, 1997; Chariton and Vafeas, 1998) as cited in Adelegan(2001).

In Nigeria, until 1972/73 when the first indigenization decree was promulgated most

quoted firms were foreign owned? With the promulgation of the First and Second indigenization decree, foreign participation was restricted to forty per cent of the share capital. However, presently a major percentage of the sample firms in this study have foreign affiliation or investors. There is a disagreement over what type of investor is most interested in dividend. The question is whether individual investors, local investors or foreign investors are more interested in dividend than each other. The argument centered on whether investors are expecting growth or cash flow.

According to Glen et al 1995, in many countries, management believes that local individuals and institutional investors are more interested in growth and re-investment of earnings than foreign investors who are more interested in dividend. Multinational companies pay out proportionately more dividend than wholly domestic companies (Adelegan, 2001).

Dividend decision involves a trade-off between the retained earnings and issuing new shares. Over the years, the relationship between dividend policy and the value of the firm have been advanced by two school of thoughts of dividend theories. Those that claimed that dividends do not matter and those that claim they do. In summary, these theories can be grouped into two categories viz: -

Theories which consider dividend decision to be irrelevant and Theories, which consider dividend decisions to be an active variable influencing the value of the firm.

The proponents of the dividend relevance school called the traditionalist or bird-in-hand propositions or rightists offered the first explanation for the relevance of dividend payment. Graham and Dodd (1934) founded the school. Later support was offered by Lintner (1956), Gordon (1959), Brittain (1964) etc.

The model adopted in this study is greatly influenced by John Lintner's (1956) "partial adjustment model/smoothing theory" as modified by Brittain (1964) and Chariton and Vafeas (1998).

## 2.1 Empirical Literature review

The earliest major attempt to explain dividend behaviour of companies has been credited to John Lintner (1956) who conducted his study on American Companies in the middle of 1950s. Since then there has been an ongoing debate on dividend policy in the developed markets resulting in mixed, controversial and inconclusive results.

This issues did not receive any serious attention among academic scholars in Nigeria until 1974 when Uzoaga and Alezienwa attempted to highlight the pattern of dividend policy pursued by Nigerian firms particularly since and during the indigenization period of and participation programme defined in the decree. Their study covered 52 company-years of dividend action (13 Companies for four years). They claimed that they "checked but found very little evidence" to support the classical influence that determine dividend policies in Nigeria during these period. concluded that fear and resentment seem to have taken over from the classical forces.

However, Inanga (1977) and Soyode (1975) commented on the work of Uzoaga and Alozienwa. Inanga concluded that the problem arising from the change in dividend policy can be attributed to the share pricing policy of the Capital Issue Commission (CIC) which seemed to have ignored the classical factors that should govern the pricing of equity shares issues. This in turn made companies abandon "all the classical forces that determine dividend policy". Soyode criticized Uzoaga and Alozienwa's work on the ground that it glossed over some important determinants of optimal dividend policy and questioned certain conclusions made in the study because they are inadequate or a mistaken evaluation.

Furthermore, Oyejide (1976) empirically tested for company dividend policy in Nigeria using Lintner's model as modified by Brittain. He disagreed with previous studies and concluded that "the available evidence provides a strong and unequivocal support for the conventional devices for explaining the dividend behaviour of Nigerian limited liability business organization."

Nyong (1990) conducted a study on dividend policy of quoted companies in Nigeria using the behavioural approach between 1983 –

1987, to determine the factors that influence dividend policy of cross section of Nigeria quoted companies and also to assess the magnitude of these factors in predicting the observed share prices of the companies, he observed among others that the conventional Lintner's model performs creditably well.

Adelegan (2001) in a more recent study of the impact of growth prospect, leverage and firm size on dividend behaviour of corporate firms in Nigeria between 1984 – 1997; observed that the conventional Lintner's model does not perform quite creditably in explaining the dividend behaviour of corporate firms for the period under review. Supports that factors that mainly influenced the dividend policy quoted firms are after tax earnings, economic policy changes (due to the partial liberation of the indigenization decree in 1989 and the subsequent simultaneous abolition of the indigenization decree of 1995), firm growth potentials and long term debts.

However, Adesola (2004) in his study of dividend policy behaviour in Nigeria using Lintner's model as modified by Brittan between 1996 – 2000 appears to agree with Oyejide and Nyong's view that there is substantial and unequivocal support for the Lintner's model.

## 3.0 METHODOLOGY:

Data are derived from secondary sources. Pool of data were extracted from publication of the Nigerian stock exchange(NSE) factbook 2001, 2005, and 2007 editions, Best shares selection guide various issues published by Flarmark and company, SEC annual reports. The sample data used contains all the one hundred and forty-five companies quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange as at 2007. However, only annual reports of 27 companies have all the data that is required for this study. Samples cover 15 sectors of NSE.

## 3.1 Model Specification

The following models were built for the study:

```
Dividend Payment Equations
(a)
         DIV_t = b_0 + b_1 EARN_t + \mu
                                                                                                 ı
1.
2.
         DIV_t = b_0 + b_1 EARN_t + b_2 DIV_{t-1} + \mu
                                                                                                 Ш
         DIV_t = b_0 + b_1GRT_t + b_2SZ_t + b_2CS_t + \mu
3.
                                                                                                 Ш
         Mean of Dividend Payment Equation
(b)
         MDIV = b_0 + b_1 MEARN + \mu
                                                                                                 IV
1.
         MDIV = b_0 + b_1MGRT + b_2MSZ + b_3MCS + \mu
2.
                                                                                                 ٧
                 Share Market Price Equation
(c)
         SP<sub>t</sub> =
                 b_0 + b_1DIV_t + b_2PBT_t + b_3EPS_t + b_4ASSET_t
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Where: GRT = Growth = Growth proxied by market value of equity divided by book value of Assets, SZ = Size = Size proxied by natural logarithm of total asset i.e. In (total Asset), CS= Capital structure = Debt divided by market value of equity

 $b_0$   $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are regression parameters, DIV<sub>t</sub> = Dividend payment in year t, DIV<sub>t-1</sub> = Dividend payment in year  $t_1$  EARN<sub>t</sub> = Total earnings in year t, GRT<sub>t</sub> = Firm growth in year t, SZ<sub>t</sub> = Size of firm in year t, CS<sub>t</sub> = Capital Structure in year t

MDIV = Mean value of Dividend Payment in (1996 – 2006)

MEARN = Mean value of Earnings in (1996 – 2006)

MGRT = Mean value of Growth in (1996 -2006)

MCS = Mean value of Firm's Capital Structure in (1996 – 2006)

 $SP_t$  = Stock price for year t,  $PBT_t$  = Profit Before tax in year t EPS<sub>t</sub> = Earnings per share in year t, ASSET<sub>t</sub> = Total Asset in year t DEBT<sub>t</sub> = Debt in year t. EQUITY<sub>t</sub> = Equity in year t

 $PBT_{t-1}$  = Profit before tax in year t<sub>-1</sub>  $EPS_{t-1}$  = Earnings per share in year  $t_{-1}$ 

 $ASSET_{t-1} = Total Asset in year t_1$  $DEBT_{t-1} = Debt in year t_{-1}$ 

 $EQUITY_{t-1} = Equity in t_{-1}$ 

#### 4.0 PRESENTATION. **ANALYSIS** AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

#### 4.1 **Presentation and Analysis**

Sample data used covers the period 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006; and the 27 companies covered span 15 sectors namely: Automobile and Tyre (Dunlop Nigeria Plc), Banking (Access Bank Nigeria Plc), Breweries (Guinness Nigeria Plc and Nigerian Breweries), Building Materials (Ashaka Cement Plc, Cement Company of Northern Nigeria), Chemical and Paints (Berger Paints Nigeria Plc), Conglomerates (Chellarams Plc, CFAO Nigeria Plc, John Holt Plc, UAC of Nigeria Plc, UNILEVER Nigeria Plc), Construction (Julius Berger Nigeria Plc), Engineering Technology (Nigerian Wire and Cable Plc), Food Beverages and Tobacco (Cadbury Nigeria Plc, Nestle Nigeria Plc, Nigerian Bottling Company Plc), Health Care (May and Baker Nigeria Plc, Neimeth International Pharmacy Plc. Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Plc). Industrial/Domestic Product (B.O.C. Gases Plc, Nigerian Enamelware Plc), Insurance (Law Union and Rock Insurance Plc, Niger Insurance Company Plc), Petroleum Marketing (Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc, Chevron Oil Nigeria Plc), Printing and Publishing (Longman Nigeria Plc) and Textiles (United Nigeria Textile Plc).

#### 4.2 **DATA ANALYSIS**

In this section therefore, we carry out the analysis of the estimated results. The analysis is on equation basis, starting with the dividend payment equation as below:

```
R^2 = 93.8\%
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Equation 4.1

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DIV2001 =
            -54083.4 + .00484EARN21 + 1.296DIV2000
                                          (14.349)*
              (-0.546)
                            (0.725)
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 $R^2$  (adj.) = 93% F-stats = 127.755 DW = 1.504

Equation 4.2

DIV2005 = 207648.5 + 0.004872EARN25 + 0.961DIV2004 (0.693)(0.528)(9.961)\*

 $R^2 = 88.6\%$  $R^2$  (adj.) = 87% F-stats = 54.330 DW = 2.642

Equation 4.3

DIV2006 = -26305.3 - 0.019EARN26 + 1.219DIV2005 (-0.063)(-1.908)\*\*\*

 $R^2 = 95\%$  $R^2$  (adj.) = 93.9% DW =1.244 F-stats = 85.261

Equation 4.4

SP2001 = 0.634 + 4.189E-06DIV2001 + 9.046EPS2001 (2.864)\*\*(0.302)(11.962)\*

 $R^2 = 90\%$  $R^2$  (adj.) = 88.9% F-stats = 89.544 DW = 1.801

Equation 4.5

-3.662 + 8.232E-07DIV2006 + 22.668EPS2006 SP2006 = (0.469)(12.040)\*(-0.440)

 $R^2 = 95\%$  $R^2$  (adj.) = 93.9% F-stats = 85.113 DW = 1.255 Equation 4.6 MDIV = -218471 + 276118.4MEPS - 0.032MEARN - 5100.005MGRT + 30970.07MSZ (-0.141) (2.205)\*\*\* (1.481) (-0.054) (0.265)  $R^2 = 18.6\%$   $R^2$ (adi.) = 3.8% F-stats = 1.255 DW = 1.461

the numbers in bracket represents t-value, while those one directly beneath the bracket represents the parameter estimates. \* Indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level of significance, \*\* Significant at 5% level while \*\*\* indicate Significant at 10%. For convenience in analysis, the regression results are presented in three parts reflecting the three dependent variables on which they are based. The first part deals with the explanations of variations in the level of dividend across companies in 2001, 2005 and 2006. The second part considers the explanations for the variations in share prices across companies based on pooled time series and cross-sectional data set (1996 -2006). The third part examine the explanation for the variations in mean of dividends across companies based on pool-time series and cross section data set from 1996 to 2006 to test the stability of the result over time.

## (a) Dividend Payment for 2001, 2005 and 2006

Here we use three regression equations i.e. equation 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 to explain variations in the level of dividend payment across companies in 2001, 2005 and 2006 as a case study. Equation **4.1** hypothesize that dividend payment in the year 2001 is a function of earning in 2001 (EARN21) and pervious year dividend i.e. dividend payment lagged one (DIV 2000). Testing the economic a priori, the constant term has a negative sign instead of the expected positive sign this implies that the autonomous leverage decrease when the explanatory variables are fixed. All the other parameters estimates are correctly signed in support of the priori expectation. The parameter estimate of previous year dividend payment i.e. DIV2000 is statistically significant at one percent level of significance this means that pervious year dividend payment exerts significant influence on current dividend payment and hence, this provide a strong support for the explanatory or predictory power of lintner's model. The coefficient of multiple determinations (R<sup>2</sup>) of 0.93 or 93% indicates that about 93 percent variations in the observed behaviour in the dependent variables is explained by the model. The remaining 7% may better be accounted for by other error term. The high R<sup>2</sup> indicated that the model fits the data well and is statistically robust; there is a tight fit of the model.

The F-statistic 127.755 is significant at the 1% level considering the table F-statistic ( $F_{0.01}$ , (2, 7) = 9.55). The calculated F-statistic is greater than the table F-statistic (i.e. 127.755 \( \) 9.55), therefore, it is significant at 1% level. This buttress the fact that the high  $R^2$ is better than would have occurred by chance. Another essential test is the second-order or econometric criteria: the DW-Statistic is 1.504, the table DW at 5% level indicates the following, given  $K^1 = 2$  (excluding the constant term) and sample size (n) equals 10; then dL = 0.697, du = 1.64), 4-du = 2.359 and 4 – dL =3.303. Based on the decision rule, the calculated DW of 1.504 lies between the lower dL (0.697) and upper du (1.641). There is inconclusive evidence regarding the presence or absence of positive first order serial correlation.

In equation 4.2, We regress DIV payment in the year 2005 on EARN for the year 2005 and DIV payment lagged one year that is 2004. The quantitative result shows that all parameter estimates including the constant term are correctly signed. Also, in this equation just like equation 4.1, the parameter estimate of previous year dividend payment i.e. DIV2004 is the only parameter that is statistically significant and is significant at 1% level of significance. Specifically, the DIV2004 comes out with an estimated coefficient of 0.961. This means that an increase of one percent in DIV2004 will increase the dividend payment in 2005 by 0.961. And hence, a strong support for the explanatory or predictive power of Lintner's model. The coefficient of multiple determination  $(R^2)$  of 87% shows that the proportion of dividend payment explained by the regression equation is quite high; the implication of this result is that the factor that enter into the decision calculus for dividend payment in the year 2005 is previous year dividend payment i.e. DIV2004. The Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> is equally significant at one percent level based on the result of F-statistic of 54.330 which is greater than the table F-statistic of 9.55 at 1% level of significance. Also based on DW-Statistics test, there is no serial correlation.

In equation 4.3, We regress DIV2006 on EARN26 and DIV2005. Testing the economic a priori, the constant term and the earning for year 2006 (EARN26) are negatively signed instead of the expected positive sign. Only dividend payment lagged one year that is DIV2005 is correctly signed. All parameter estimates in the quantitative

result are statistically significant except the intercept. EARN26 is statistically significant at 10% level of significance while DIV2005 is statistically significant at 1% level of significance, specifically the EARN26 comes out with an estimated coefficient of -0.019 while DIV2005 come out with an estimated coefficient of 1.219. This result also provides a strong support for the explanatory power of Lintner model. The proportion of dividend payment explained by the regression equation is quite high, being approximately 93.9 percent. The implication of this result is that the factors that enter into the decision calculus for dividend payment in year 2006 in order of importance include past year dividend followed by current earning. The F-statistic of 85.261 is significant at the one percent level of significance considering the table F-statistic of 9.55. i.e. (85.261 > 9.55) this supports the fact that the high R<sup>2</sup> of 93.9 percent did not occur by chance. The DW test result of 1.244 lies between the lower dL =0.697 and the upper du = 1.641 region which suggest based on decision rule that there is inconclusive evidence regarding the presence or absence of positive firstorder serial correlation.

## (b) Determinant of share market price

Two equations are formulated in this section to assist in explaining variations in share market prices. They go beyond the descriptive nature of Linter's model to provide motivations for the payment of dividend in the first place. The interpretations of the empirical result are as given below:

In equation 4.4, We regress stock price for 2001 i.e. (SP2001) on dividend payment in the same year i.e. (DIV2001) and earnings per share in the year i.e. EPS2001. The quantitative result shows that: The constant term has the right sign (positive) and conforms to econometric a priori criteria. This means that when the independent variables or explanatory variables are zero, other factors not specified in equation 4.4 will still cause SP2001 to increase at the rate of 0.634 per cent. The quantitative result also shows that the sign of the coefficient of DIV2001 is in agreement with Gordon Model and also signaling theory of This implies that the realized dividend policy. positive relationship between stock price in 2001 and dividend payment in the same year is in line with theoretical expectation. Also, worthy of note is that the t-value of 2.864 is statistically significant at five percent two tailed test level of significance. Our estimated result of earnings per share in 2001 also indicate the relationship to be positive and statistically significant at one-percent level of significant and hence a strong support for the explanatory or predictive power of Gordon Behavioral model and Bhattacharya's signaling theory model.

Equation 4.4 indicates that the best explanation for current share market price is current earnings per share (EPS2001) and current dividend (DIV2001). These two factors explain over 88 per cent of variations in share market price for the year under review. This is confirmed by the fact that the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> is statistically significant at one percent level based on the calculated f-statistic result of 89.544. The DW statistic (1.801) shows that there is no serial correlation in the residual of the model. Therefore, our estimates are reliable.

In equation 4.5, We postulate that stock price in 2006 is a function of Dividend payment in 2006 and earning per share (EPS2006) in 2006. The quantitative result shows that even though Dividend payment in 2006 indicate a positive relation, the t-value of 0.469 is not statistically significant. The implication of this is that DIV2006 has no significant influence on the determination of stock price value in 2006. Worthy of note is that our estimated result of earning per share in 2006 is statistically significant at one percent level of significance. This signifies that the most important factor in the decision calculus for stock price behavior in 2006 is earning per share. measure of the explanatory power of the regression equation using adjusted R<sup>2</sup> shows that 93 percent of the variation in stock price in 2006 is explained by the regression equation. This value of adjusted R<sup>2</sup> when tested with F-statistic is statistically significant at one per cent level of significance. The DW test for the incidence of serial correlation shows inconclusive evidence regarding the presence or absence of positive firstorder serial correlation.

## (c) Mean of Dividend Payment

For this section, we formulate one regression equation to determine the mean of dividend payment. In equation 4.6, we regress mean of dividend on mean of earnings per share (MEPS), mean of earnings (MEARN), mean of growth (MGRT) and mean of log of asset i.e. size (MSZ). The quantitative result shows that out of the four explanatory variables, it is only mean of earnings per share that is statistically significant, being significant at 10 per cent level of significance. The relevant implication of this result is that the influence of these three explanatory variables on the dependent variable is insignificant and could be considered as not accounting for

variations in the dependent variable. The value of the adjusted  $R^2$  of 3.8 percent implies that the equation does not give a good fit to the empirical sample data and the omitted variables might have performed better. The DW test shows inconclusive evidence regarding the presence or absence of positive first order serial correlation.

## 4.3 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The main findings of this study are:

- The dividend policies of quoted companies in Nigeria are significantly influenced by their earnings and previous year dividend and that because of the reluctance to cut dividends, companies only partially adjust their dividends to changes in earnings.
- Average earning per share is the significant determinant of Average dividend payment, which confirms the fact that the most important decision calculus for payment of dividend is the current earning.
- Growth prospect and firm size has no impact on the dividend behavior of quoted firms in Nigeria for the period under review.
- 4. That both current dividend and earnings per share or earnings are significant in explaining the observed differential share market prices of companies. The fact that the magnitude of the impact of earnings or earnings per share on share market prices is greater than that of dividend payment suggest that the main determinant of market share value for Nigeria firm is no longer dividend but earnings for This is inconsistent with recent data. findings by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle (1962), Nyong (1990), Adesola (2004) and this does not provide a strong empirical support for Gordon Models.
- The Nigerian market capitalizes the estimates of cash flows receivable by shareholders as dividend and hence that share market price is a representation of market valuation of dividends.
- 6. The empirical result of positive and significant effect of dividend payments on share market prices for the sample of Nigerian Companies indirectly cast some doubt on the empirical validity of Modigliani and Miller's preposition of Dividend irrelevance in the context of Nigerian business environment.

## 5.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion therefore, our empirical evidence indicates that the hypotheses of Lintner/Gordon as well as that of signaling theory of Bhattacharya performs remarkably well with respect to the dividend policy of quoted companies under review. this confirms previous result as cited in Nyong(1990),Adesola(2004) that

Average earnings per share or average earnings is still the most significant determinant of average dividend payment,

We also confirm that current dividend payment and earning per share are significant in explaining the observed differential share market prices of quoted firms in Nigeria. However, recent data reveal that the magnitude of the impact of earnings or earning per share is now greater than that of current dividend payment which used to be the most significant as reported in previous studies (see Nyong 1990, Adesola 2004).

Furthermore, we also confirm that growth prospect and firm size has no significant impact on the dividend behavior of corporate firms; and this is inconsistent with the findings of Adelegan(2001).

Based on the findings from the study, we recommend as follows:

- (i) That government should assist in improving the quality and availability of secondary data bank available for research in Nigeria
- That the result of this study has at least (ii) one policy implication. The fact that dividend is still an important determinant of share market prices means that companies may increase their share market price by increase in the rate of dividend paid. In order words, there is sufficient empirical evidence to believe that a liberal dividend policy will lead to a higher average market value of common stocks than will penurious dividend policies. In effect we suggest that corporate management should follow a dividend policy which will generous maximize the long term benefits to its stockholders.
- (iii) Firms should try all their possible best in improving their total earnings from each transaction year, since recent study reveals that it now has greater impact than any other factor in determining the market share value for Nigerian firms from year 2001 till date.

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**APPENDIX A: Sample quoted firms Variables** 

Company	Year	SP	DIV	EPS	PBT	ASSET	EARN	RETAINED EARNINGS	DEBT	EQUITY
	1000	2.22	227 222			252.224				400 000
	1996	6.00	235,200		436,581	858,934		683366	7,508	168,000
	1997	7.20	252,000	0.69	490,282	1,048,519	3,593,033	756,519	40,000	252,000
1.	1999	4.00		0.14	43,428	1,839,236	4,091,841	926,326	660,910	1,474,993
AUTOMOBILE	2000	3.91	90,720	0.28	161,290	1,212,121	4,394,247	37,098	786,832	1,546,528
AND TYRE	2001	3.36	90,720	0.35	204,743	1,289,733	5,439,725	79,360	533,347	1,667,478
DUNLOP NIG	2002	2.70		0.16	133,438	1,200,878	6,385,274	120,879	766,425	1,526,235
PLC	2003	2.30		-0.49	-276,101	903,975	4,994,848	-296,903	-179,655	1,292,525
	2004			-0.42	-407,551	587,948	5,217,774	-316,027	-1,307,723	1,090,301
	2005	2.76		-0.27	-207,953	3,935,349	5,150,388	3,557,349	-2,380,155	4,872,776
	2006	4.16		-0.88	-696,421	6,900,327	5,084,957	2,934,827	5,365,178	8,127,686
	1996	0.60	10,000	0.11	28,236	1,176,203	286,551	21,979	667,167	100,000
	1997	0.71	-	0.16	41,251	1,777,256	286,551	44,934	1,195,009	100,000
	1999	0.90	54	0.06	108,187	4,877,256	541,921	18,565	2,732,604	600,000
2. (BANKING)	2000	1.35	90,000	0.11	166,594	8,434,560	1,195,616	19,620	4,400,596	841,750
ACCESS BANK	2001	1.30	-	0.06	116,081	8,027,957	1,589,555	28,314	7,108,464	919,493
NIG PLC	2002	1.82	-	0.02	-17,947	11,352,941	2,604,378	-26,931	9,399,157	1,943,784
1410120	2003	3.00	135,000	0.21	810,639	22,582,040	4,367,887	146,606	20,216,683	2,365,356
	2004	3.42	300,000	0.21	951,750	31,341,507	5,515,086	27,198	28,638,677	2,702,830
	2005	2.99	-	0.06	751,033	66,918,315	7,494,855	-	52,846,391	14,071,924
	2006	6.96	-	0.05	1.119,449	174,553,866	13,360,358	442,289	145,659,980	28,893,886
	1996	8.15	432,000	0.46	586,787	4,579,887	8,948,361	5,894	426,871	270,000
	1997	7.60	710,467	0.76	1,462,682	9,414,217	9,235,373	16,453	-	250,734
	1999	20.00	1,274,336	3.70	3,894,179	9,285,698	11,854,024	1,343,212	-	353,982
3.	2000	30.45	-1,699,114	4.37	4,643,251	9,285,698	14,817,218	1,395,456	-2,087,137	10,681,154
(BREWERIES)	2001	34.45	-2,123,893	5.80	5,660,054	10,681,154	19,876,755	1,981,986	-2,366,338	12,663,140
<b>GUINESS NIG</b>	2002	44.00	-2,654,866	5.86	5,851,413	12,663,140	29,540,004	1,494,670	-2,138,282	14,157,810
PLC	2003	84.00	-5,604,717	9.37	9,901,668	14,157,810	38,103,096	1,031,618	-5,034,014	15,189,428
	2004	116.99	-6,194,687	6.69	11,687,494	15,189,428	47,508,486	1,718,816	-5,892,322	16,908,244
	2005	96.00	-3,539,821	4.12	6,276,167	18,227,442	47,030,812	1,319,198	-5,548,363	18,227,442
	2006	107.99	-4,719,762	6.31	11,436,771	20,947,782	53,651,781	2,720,340	-6,968,521	25,667,544
4.	1996	19.40	915,000	0.95	2,581,465	14,057,025	9,005,903	10,446,938	-	457,500
(BREWERIES)	1997	13.00	915,000	0.85	2,406,396	14,662,903	8,096,636	10,372,873	-	457,500
NIGERIAN	1999	16.30	2,287,500	2.28	5,268,116	16,779,413	12,033,111	10,372,873	-	16,779,413
BREWERIES	2000	24.51	2,985,330	2.25	6,256,916		17,679,355	1,269,446	12,822,406	
	2001	35.00	4,253,827	2.40	7,489,351	25,197,125	29,738,414	281,217	13,068,092	-25,197,125
	2002	30.20	-4,253,827	1.93	10,382,429	22,935,410	42,855,103	-644,082	-10,718,921	-22,935,410
	2003	63.10	-7,940,528	1.94	10,992,047	26,186,746	56,508,797	3,192,878	-16,752,267	-26,186,746
	2004	42.80	-4,159,409	0.67	9,148,138	28,253,944	73,594,134	2,061,378		-28,253,944
	2005	38.80	-4,915,666	1.09	12,897,746		80,130,968	3,338,891	-7,391,506	

1	2006	37.25	-9,075,075	1.44	16,436,255	36,249,393	86,322,075	1,825,449	880,854	36,249,393
	1996	16.70	107,000	1.26	783,814	1,854,526	772,792	1,540,285	3,827	292,500
	1997	10.00	118,700	1.01	916,983	2,304,850	889,810	2,033,456	3,827	292,500
	1999	5.80	176,700	0.64	882,330	2,981,799	6,073,696	2,679,299	3,121	2,784,799
5. (BUILDING	2000	6.88	567	1.47	1,334,592	3,525,848	7,220,297	990,697	-	3,287,435
MATERIALS)	2001	20.89	_	3.16	2,792,578	4,999,844	8,649,057	2,184,011	-	4,705,149
ASHAKA	2002	13.99	526,500	1.73	2,093,071	5,992,502	8,741,820	1,815,281	-	5,700,938
CEMENT PLC	2003	17.75	1,500,000	2.42	3,135,497	6,637,252	10,198,926	2,458,493	-	6,324,108
	2004	22.50	2,500,000	3.87	4,892,887	7,556,687	12,567,156	3,954,286	-	7,218,717
	2005	34.20	3,400,000	3.03	6,519,249	8,293,207	15,815,247	1,029,884	-	11,633,603
	2006	55.00	2,193,750	2.31	4,951,464	7,198,831	16,770,000	1,183,731	-	11,618,084
	1996	3.00	-6,111	0.07	10,026	193,152	110,135	128,487	100,000,000	43,651
	1997	2.50	-4,454	0.04	10,440	210,127	141,164	128,487	87,500,000	65,675
6. (BUILDING	1999	2.02	-	0.02	-74,887	621,298	702,136	640,089	41,666,667	678,479
MATERIALS)	2000	2.32	-	1.31	-488,778	288,807	537,635	-	-588,434	265,890
CEMENT	2001	3.07	-	1.46	-1,064,275	495,262	574,241	-	-1,329,414	195,262
COMPANY OF	2002	4.55	-	0.93	-668,380	1,170,114	1,913,906	-	-2,067,220	579,886
NORTHERN	2003	3.83	-	0.11	-93,351	995,645	3,305,812	-	-2,648,768	675,716
NIGERIA	2004	6.63	97,165	0.85	845,081	1,665,561	5,530,497	-	-3,508,387	1,406,438
	2005	7.95	108,326	0.10	375,886	1,606,914	5,920,000	-	-4,328,601	1,606,914
	2006	21.57	108,326	-	-		6,400,000	-	-4,328,601	1,606,914
	1996	4.70	43,920	0.52	76,320	57,508	163,746	780,517	116,553	6,418
	1997	3.60	43,920	0.67	93,492	73,993	177,334	771,104	146,626	115,003
7. (CHEMICAL	1999	4.32	56,629	0.18	54,513	34,940	1,065,774	1,065,774	120,514	2,098,077
AND PAINTS)	2000	2.92	18,917	0.11	37,879	420,958	1,125,447	121,974	23,109	1,569,923
BERGER	2001	2.60	65,210	0.41	135,921	464,938	1,543,146	147,126	38,718	227,089
PAINTS NIG	2002	2.40	71,131	0.40	130,835	521,968	1,453,188	161,248	81,538	439,323
PLC	2003	3.00	86,947	0.50						
					168,021	565,562	1,895,923	182,458	103,545	
	2004	4.85	65,210	0.47	166,411	605,310	1,841,134	218,310	106,961	496,385
	2005	4.85 4.03		0.47	166,411 -68,346	605,310 1,055,529	1,841,134 1,914,236	218,310 292,709	106,961 223,408	496,385 883,924
	2005 2006	4.85 4.03 3.85	65,210 - -	0.47 - 0.37	166,411 -68,346 110,386	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615	218,310 292,709 211,340	106,961 223,408 105,605	496,385 883,924 965,293
	2005 2006 1996	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50	65,210 - - 4,016	0.47 - 0.37 0.01	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805
	2005 2006 1996 1997	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50	65,210 - - 4,016 4,016	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417
8.	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50	65,210 - - 4,016 4,016 8,032	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,101
8. (CONGLOMER	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68	65,210 - - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,107 914,567
(CONGLOMER ATES)	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95	65,210 - - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,101 914,567 990,114
(CONGLOMER ATES) CHELLARAMS	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95 2.19	65,210 - - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049 12,049	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018 46,916	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867 1,029,440	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084 3,588,375	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166 561,300	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,10 914,567 990,114 1,009,370
(CONGLOMER ATES)	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95 2.19 1.93	65,210 - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049 12,049 18,073	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.24	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018 46,916 67,640	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867 1,029,440 1,201,941	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084 3,588,375 4,692,422	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166 561,300 586,464	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,101 914,567 990,114 1,009,370 1,037,103
(CONGLOMER ATES) CHELLARAMS	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95 2.19 1.93 1.71	65,210 - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049 12,049 18,073 27,110	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.55	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018 46,916 67,640 91,553	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867 1,029,440 1,201,941 1,548,049	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084 3,588,375 4,692,422 6,359,627	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166 561,300 586,464 681,582	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579 - - - -	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,102 914,567 990,114 1,009,370 1,037,103 1,437,195
(CONGLOMER ATES) CHELLARAMS	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95 2.19 1.93 1.71 0.83	65,210 - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049 12,049 18,073 27,110 27,110	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.55 0.18	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018 46,916 67,640 91,553 105,591	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867 1,029,440 1,201,941 1,548,049 1,631,562	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084 3,588,375 4,692,422 6,359,627 7,916,287	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166 561,300 586,464 681,582 623,862	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579 - - - - -	496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,101 914,567 990,114 1,009,370 1,037,103 1,437,195 1,458,788
(CONGLOMER ATES) CHELLARAMS	2005 2006 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	4.85 4.03 3.85 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.95 2.19 1.93 1.71	65,210 - 4,016 4,016 8,032 8,032 12,049 12,049 18,073 27,110	0.47 - 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.55	166,411 -68,346 110,386 859 19,783 36,097 31,810 38,018 46,916 67,640 91,553	605,310 1,055,529 1,145,445 389 13,943 29,397 923,703 1,009,867 1,029,440 1,201,941 1,548,049	1,841,134 1,914,236 2,300,615 548,246 750,460 885,570 1,883,509 2,461,084 3,588,375 4,692,422 6,359,627	218,310 292,709 211,340 418,785 976,725 1,479,498 560,370 572,166 561,300 586,464 681,582	106,961 223,408 105,605 508,821 186,460 284,579 - - - -	460,533 496,385 883,924 965,293 5,805 548,417 470,101 914,567 990,114 1,009,370 1,037,103 1,437,195 1,458,788 2,051,402 195,000

(CONGLOMER	1997	8.50	136,000	0.67	347,000	2,095,000	6,620,000	1,804,000	68,000	195,000
ATES) JOHN	1999	3.22	-	4.55	-1,628,000	432,000	9,489,000	172,000	82,000	367,000
HOLT PLC	2000	1.15	-	0.20	51,000	524,000	9,214,000	524,000	1,408,000	483,000
	2001	2.29	-	0.34		1,161,000	9,530,000	1,161,000	881,000	1,116,000
	2002	0.80	-	0.45	276,000	1,997,000	11,242,000	1,997,000	596,000	1,952,000
	2003	0.59	-	0.56	-133,000	1,988,000	12,071,000	1,988,000	868,000	1,971,000
	2004	0.99	39,000	0.18	245,000	2,603,000	16,385,000	2,603,000	863,000	2,603,000
	2005	1.47	-	-	15,000	2,224,000	9,200,000	2,224,000	503,000	2,224,000
	2006	1.21	-	-	376,000	2,311,000	11,930,000	2,311,000	1,005,000	2,311,000
	1996	7.40	318,000	1.23	1,158,400	7,842,400		244,900	20,400	868,400
	1997	10.50	272,600	0.87	584,600	8,584,200	12,861,200	126,800	25,000	817,700
	1999	3.01	-	0.03	-599,700	5,515,000		14,300	10,800	4,321,000
10.	2000	3.12	-	0.12	278,400	5,786,300	8,478,300	105,800	512,000	4,507,000
(CONGLOMER	2001	3.70	136,300	1.11	805,800	7,783,000	13,237,600	870,200	1,555,400	5,365,000
ATES) UAC OF	2002	4.10	318,000	1.28	1,460,500	8,916,900	17,519,000	848,200	1,562,600	6,429,000
NIG PLC	2003	10.20	545,200	2.41	1,548,100	11,242,600	20,843,500	1,639,400	1,835,600	7,920,000
	2004	14.17	971,000	1.37	1,902,100	14,684,100		599,200	1,671,200	11,150,000
	2005	17.00	1,284,600	1.27	2,918,400	17,215,300		345,300	2,069,400	14,180,253
	2006	26.45	1,284,600	2.49	3,058,300	19,890,000		1,919,000	1,200,000	16,099,218
	1996	20.20	958,436	1.34	1,919,179	4,407,742	8,569,072	2,107,012	56,863	504,440
	1997	1.50	-	-0.13	-92,223	4,330,714		2,107,012	56,863	504,440
11.	1999	6.95	423,730	0.36	594,046	4,118,301	9,365,245	1,853,204	332,112	3,659,733
(CONGLOMER	2000	16.38	847,459	0.71	1,294,780	3,484,765	11,215,045	6,533	332,112	3,484,765
ATES)	2001	27.30	1,259,082	1.79	1,585,738	4,109,065	15,203,511	905,032	984,844	4,109,065
UNILEVER	2002	16.15	1,513,319	0.52	2,053,089	4,167,664	19,003,356	58,599	1,222,697	4,167,664
NIGERIA PLC	2003	15.50	1,846,249	0.62	2,778,116	3,905,550	23,693,923	24,010	1,713,043	3,905,550
	2004	15.50	2,118,646	0.72	2,970,047	6,072,800		48,603	2,089,461	3,954,154
	2005	20.51	-	0.53	2,281,416	5,570,611	33,390,940	-	2,927,564	5,570,611
	2006	12.50	-		-	-	25,554,415	-	2,927,564	3,953,347
	1996	8.70	36,000	1.01	205,449		5,50,010	420,965	477,902	45,000
	1997	9.37	40,800	1.50	249,654	621,240	7,850,689	561,240	633,614	45,000
12.	1999	10.40	64,800	2.03	556,766	1,626,247	18,408,724	1,088,307	1,663,319	1,626,247
(CONSTRUCTI	2000	29.00	112,500	1.90	768,238	1,940,538		1,402,598	2,444,678	1,940,538
ON) JULIUS	2001	43.00	123,750	2.16	984,271	2,303,523	29,826,839	1,765,583	3,096,472	2,303,523
BERGER NIG	2002	20.00	56,250	1.69	888,142	1,917,600	26,478,352	1,379,660	3,014,280	1,917,600
PLC	2003	20.00	33,750	1.63	727,265	2,249,837	30,457,785	1,711,897	2,833,586	2,249,837
	2004	16.40	56,250	1.72	693,628	2,581,017	29,487,173	2,043,077	3,647,207	2,581,017
	2005	21.74	210,000	2.09	1,116,120	2,997,882	39,842,586	2,422,442	6,644,133	2,997,882
	2006	46.83	-	3.73	2,204,766	4,116,929	56,900,000	3,541,489	38,364,335	-
13.	1996	1.10	12,000	0.33	28,515	107,668		7,524	-	30,000
(ENGINEERING	1997	1.30	12,000	0.25	41,170	230,978	217,241	17,774	-	60,000
TECHNOLOGY)	1999	1.55	16,800	0.26	62,311	270,990	409,058	27,553	-	270,990

NIGERIAN	2000	1.72	25,200	0.30	75,541	296,070	619,218	25,080	230,315	296,070
WIRE AND	2001	2.17	25,200	0.38	94,369	333,979	751,172	37,910	271,886	333,979
CABLE PLC	2002	1.12	-	0.13	59,796	563,460	803,076	36,202	511,927	563,460
	2003	0.62	-	-	175,081	618,452	211,978	175,081	636,740	618,452
	2004	0.89	-	-	183,240	522,500	65,000	183,240	604,646	522,500
	2005	0.68	-	-	183,240	522,500	65,000	183,240	604,646	522,500
	2006	0.70	-	-	183,240	522,500	65,000	183,240	604,646	522,500
	1996	21.50	528,177	1.56	1,218,869	1,560,962	8,276,134	316,980	773,123	176,096
	1997	23.00	352,190	1.34	940,536	1,905,832	6,453,317	331,850	798,434	176,096
14. (FOOD /	1999	14.30	528,285	1.34	1,236,913	2,435,604	8,898,107	265,752	373,260	2,491,064
BEVÈRAGES	2000	19.70	581,114	2.01	1,637,205	2,622,077	10,144,899	418,265	430,053	2,616,681
AND	2001	32.99	959,230	2.49	2,405,720	3,308,469	13,246,408	688,021	2,830,425	3,302,398
TOBACCO)	2002	34.85	1,125,946	3.00	3,259,866	6,865,401	16,014,709	1,123,373	505,244	6,859,572
CADBURY NIG	2003	64.75	1,313,603	3.58	3,792,506	8,243,089	20,576,177	1,367,831	595,278	8,233,855
PLC	2004	55.00	1,601,345		3,849,273	9,459,727	22,152,651	1,207,344	1,086,759	9,446,559
	2005	65.52	1,303,154	2.71	3,853,094	10,868,170	29,454,185	1,401,333	6,932,062	10,848,768
	2006	39.74	-	-4.27	-	-	19,210,000	-	-	-
	1996	49.00	1,268,250	3.04	1,609,986	3,275,076	6,128,414	228,959	2,466,959	105,688
	1997	35.00	634,125	1.68	815,768	3,334,413	5,104,326	304,995	2,333,283	211,375
15. (FOOD/	1999	17.10	845,500	2.96	1,616,849	3,546,710	7,724,503	763,199	1,686,266	1,161,532
BEVÈRAGES	2000	49.90	1,585,313	3.80	2,227,348	4,666,674	10,027,714	809,527	2,645,870	1,288,009
AND	2001	64.00	2,325,125	5.98	3,625,493	6,764,401	14,146,932	,010,639	4,306,954	1,489,121
TOBACCO)	2002	87.00	3,170,625	7.52	4,683,388	8,829,843	19,578,894	961,250	5,629,279	1,492,576
NESTLE NIG	2003	125.00	3,699,062	7.20	5,846,923	11,910,016	24,631,949	1,103,817	8,005,041	1,597,628
PLC.	2004	149.62	3,699,062	7.26	6,100,281	13,399,870	28,500,000	1,242,648	8,464,422	1,734,059
	2005	187.01	5,284,375		7,907,848	16,875,084	34,335,891	1,261,726	7,233,743	1,752,812
	2006	235.00	5,284,375		8,197,897	18,908,215	38,422,782	5,874,750	7,325,189	6,360,492
	1996	28.70	343,456	2.74	1,856,283	4,900	17,913,483	4,365,288	1,284,273	241,870
46 (5000 /	1997	33.90	386,992	2.49	2,000,698	5,734,673	964,106	5,150,730	2,095,953	241,870
16. (FOOD / BEVERAGES	1999	11.40	-	0.88	-424,756	9,035,571	20,333,072	8,583,719	2,171,101	9,026,654
AND	2000	13.54	265,761	0.83	945,102	11,329,380	20,608,901	465,887	182,074	11,319,193
TOBACCO)	2001	26.99	974,458	3.06	4,170,158	12,224,637	34,943,856	2,008,847	417,226	12,212,954
NIGERIAN	2002	31.49	1,461,687	4.27	5,765,829	19,480,056	41,169,789	2,702,239	10,843,020	14,915,193
BOTTLING	2003	62.00	1,559,133		6,045,057	23,235,137	43,900,832	2,835,827	10,461,942	17,751,020
COMPANY PLC	2004	57.75	1,559,133	2.30	3,330,594	22,982,385	47,553,874	1,466,821	12,965,667	17,140,526
	2005	65.36	-	1.78	3,576,257	25,147,236	55,444,504	2,314,358	18,842,581	18,556,656
	2006	36.00	-	0.81	1,933,982	26,076,649	59,700,000	1,042,578	19,811,365	20,047,083
17. (HEALTH	1996	3.12	9,049	0.26	53,618	135,152	587,254	56,091	45,591	22,623
CARE) MAY	1997	4.10	40,721	0.42	82,071	401,183	676,744	72,861	42,633	67,869
AND BAKER	1999	3.35	47,508	1.15	178,588	554,035	860,947	191,816	76,530	477,505
NIG PLC	2000	4.40	20,361	0.34	60,586	503,702	937,884	-	104,590	503,702
	2001	2.50	45,246	0.64	169,593	573,450	1,055,219	-	90,802	573,450

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	2002	1.87	-	0.23	77,383	614,525	1,274,867	306,213	98,046	614,525
	2003	4.09	54,285	0.44	134,489	639,397	1,780,448	331,085	122,490	639,397
	2004	5.20	-	0.50	126,158	715,146	1,900,865	388,736	128,595	715,146
	2005	5.36	-	0.47	154,621	816,905	1,996,974	479,636	-	751,751
	2006	8.00	-	0.27	266,191	2,617,346	2,250,000	625,952	-	-
	1996	8.00	18,958	0.28	45,640	184,092	928,208	124,362	-	31,641
	1997	8.10	63,282	0.66	97,644	194,744	827,056	135,014	-	31,641
40 (11541 711	1999	5.44	-	-0.95	-97,920	216,322	1,143,367	28,154	-	56,288
18. (HEALTH CARE)	2000	5.44	-	0.15	30,043	2,333,331	1,143,367	-	32,489	216,322
NEIMETH INT.	2001	5.44	11,373	0.19	35,215	261,091	1,003,036	-	46,219	233,331
PHARMACY	2002	4.45	11,373	0.31	35,215	261,091	897,811	62,126	46,219	261,091
PLC	2003	2.62	16,689	0.37	72,386	208,461	950,804	97,521	45,794	308,461
	2004	2.94	24,631	0.36	89,155	418,994	1,002,024	132,065	532,450	418,994
	2005	3.23	37,010	0.53	153,602	540,919	1,241,949	193,482	469,304	540,919
	2006	3.26	82,228	0.13	124,592	1,510,586	1,203,530	210,296	432,338	1,576,000
	1996	8.44	166,094	0.53	390,875	3,208,250	2,927,583	68,552	19,973,332	781,823
	1997	3.95	199,313	0.57	532,666	2,792,476	3,089,973	132,088	1,566,046	860,375
40 (11541 711	1999	2.16	79,725	0.06	73,745	2,562,038	2,397,083	-29,580	1,128,449	1,044,078
19. (HEALTH CARE) GLAXO	2000	3.32	59,794	0.08	97,066	2,481,519	2,633,342	6,211	466,062	1,047,886
SMITHKLINE	2001	2.05	95,670	0.15	180,659	2,824,688	2,681,263	24,205	528,723	1,072,091
CONSUMER	2002	3.30	175,395	0.62	783,208	5,264,932	4,098,758	321,658	588,779	1,396,348
PLC	2003	8.02	239,175	0.86	1,062,765	4,819,560	5,672,213	445,152	508,060	1,841,499
0	2004	7.95	270,038	1.20	1,325,259	6,021,983	7,149,033	676,223	528,626	2,517,722
	2005	10.25	382,680	1.02	1,409,163	8,296,389	8,589,814	593,061	432,207	3,493,465
	2006	17.10	430,516	1.13	1,522,437	8,869,207	10,389,553	651,777	475,988	4,193,075
	1996	10.00	-39,312	0.20	104,033	159,168	394,065	41,790	-	32,760
	1997	10.50	-42,588	0.24	104,033	212,034	491,168	52,866	-	65,520
20.	1999	6.05	-85,176	0.92	160,263	307,391	671,644	35,309	-	307,391
(INDUSTRIAL /	2000	7.70	58,968	0.22	112,213	336,463	590,216	29,072	-	336,463
DOMESTIC	2001	4.36	58,968	0.20	104,359	301,088	728,351	20,757	61,742	301,088
PRODUCT)	2002	3.14	70,762	0.28	164,317	342,022	851,076	40,934	77,449	342,022
B.O.C. GASSES	2003	2.99	70,762	0.28	170,650	382,512	901,766	40,490	99,580	382,512
PLC	2004	3.08	62,899	0.28	125,352	297,371	1,004,118	48,859	281,435	297,371
	2005	3.00	62,899	0.35	96,047	371,753	1,128,592	74,382	202,036	371,753
	2006	3.30	70,762	0.37	175,277	447,168	1,319,154	75,415	408,593	447,168
21.	1996	4.94	3,648	0.37	15,331	42,634	928,918	26,682	-	9,600
(INDUSTRIAL /	1997	5.97	2,456	0.41	15,221	51,220	1,024,968	35,268	-	9,600
DOMESTIC	1999	2.81	3,456	0.64	18,749	66,433	1,078,413	45,681	-	66,433
PRODUCT)	2000	4.15	4,032	0.35	20,034	72,358	1,283,900	51,606	12,367	72,358
NIGERIAN	2001	3.52	4,608	0.66	24,479	86,786	1,662,691	66,034	13,372	86,786
ENAMELWARE PLC	2002	3.15	8,640	0.55	24,858	94,112	1,673,462	73,360	14,506	94,112
FLC	2003	2.96	10,080	0.50	26,204	98,385	1,778,588	77,633	15,523	98,385

	2004	3.10	11,520	0.55	26,631	102,835	1,639,663	82,083	55,119	102,835
	2005	3.46	14,400	0.83	35,067	111,745	1,776,702	91,628	-	111,745
	2006	4.47	14,400	0.72	31,411	118,088	1,600,000	97,971	-	-
	1996	6.45	6,000	1.19	22,543	101,352	162,303	70,718	-	10,000
	1997	1.20	16,000	0.14	39,037	262,451	192,472	133,760	-	100,000
22.	1999	1.39	16,000	0.12	24,309	291,509	207,339	146,474	-	291,509
(INSURANCE)	2000	1.09	10,000	0.09	24,915	705,004	207,271	148,013	705,004	299,664
LAW UNION	2001	1.51	20,000	0.16	40,639	929,119	262,604	152,079	929,118	312,283
AND ROCK	2002	1.30	24,000	0.18	49,159	956,393	315,063	155,217	956,393	324,975
INSURANCE	2003	1.40	30,000	0.28	68,168	1,148,220	519,654	164,905	1,148,220	381,376
PLC	2004	1.29	-	-	-16,661	1,405,412	729,932	70,346	1,405,412	648,876
	2005	1.25	-	0.22	-	-	1,110,000	-	-	1,091,474
	2006	1.58	-	0.06	-	-	1,330,000	-	-	-
	1996	3.30	-	0.06	29,465	1,278,141	261,932	465,629	124,193	40,000
	1997	3.10	17,000	0.06	31,414	1,255,874	276,366	465,629	186,143	70,000
	1999	2.90	35,000	0.36	80,232	2,327,921	448,785	465,629	476,863	738,212
23.	2000	6.53	72,000	0.25	113,214	2,827,753	642,570	42,477	334,280	770,006
(INSURANCE)	2001	4.33	75,000	0.25	139,683	3,574,424	904,191	77,621	488,564	1,124,176
NIGER	2002	2.95	105,000	0.22	176,235	5,295,776	1,269,034	106,047	920,982	1,181,275
INSURANCE P	2003	4.11	120,000	0.21	192,160	7,182,325	1,670,634	130,844	820,496	1,240,517
	2004	4.04	200,000	0.25	285,332	8,248,983	2,104,629	145,763	690,364	1,877,980
	2005	3.57	75,000	0.19	312,672	8,400,982	2,311,460	317,524	712,895	2,089,427
	2006	3.19	-	0.18	734,196	11,154,881	3,140,000	794,084	700,030	5,487,465
	1996	49.60	764,462	6.47	1,251,099	724,289	11,583,369	637,790	333,764	72,119
	1997	61.90	466,571	4.97	871,871	975,519	11,627,542	889,020	147,729	72,119
0.4	1999	52.50	1,113,414	8.90	2,156,422	1,933,555	18,006,167	1,823,316	173,770	1,933,855
24.	2000	61.00	1,113,414	1.03	529,706	1,352,080	18,920,626	908,024	333,517	1,018,563
(PETROLEUM MARKETING)	2001	64.70	1,278,911	7.11	2,082,478	1,567,940	27,063,856	757,544	881,857	686,083
MOBIL OIL NIG.	2002	64.05	474,230	2.46	830,431	1,604,560	31,508,777	575,544	918,477	686,083
PLC	2003	143.95	1,457,480	6.06	2,165,048	2,052,533	37,108,054	575,544	1,366,450	686,083
0	2004	184.00	1,563,000	7.32	1,985,461	2,168,713	46,546,705	551,504	1,286,162	882,551
	2005	165.00	2,187,611	10.08	3,393,903	5,261,028	50,914,923	747,972	1,955,947	3,305,081
	2006	178.00	2,187,611	7.15	2,535,481	4,924,024	50,810,000	3,170,502	2,090,346	-
25.	1996	33.10	175,751	2.33	520,853	713,667	8,063,087	626,075	2,323,138	56,694
(PETROLEUM	1997	35.00	151,184	-0.63	-95,294	466,944	8,444,771	371,352	3,014,194	75,592
MARKETING)	1999	18.10	529,143	5.46	1,226,392	762,618	12,077,448	687,029	4,520,099	762,618
CHEVRON OIL	2000	52.00	831,511	6.75	1,532,311	950,941	17,097,552	875,349	4,199,697	950,941
NIG PLC	2001	67.00	680,327	5.64	1,143,247	1,123,971	21,123,972	1,033,261	6,619,487	1,123,971
(FORMERLY	2002	56.01	580,546	5.59	1,553,566	1,556,674	26,977,451	1,465,964	6,584,756	1,556,674
TEXACO)	2003	160.00	-	2.48	1,655,202	2,007,063	32,679,321	1,916,353	10,242,447	2,007,063
	2004	169.00	761,966	3.25	1,314,415	2,831,506	42,391,492	1,942,546	12,762,765	2,831,506
	2005	119.98	10,441,354	4.13	1,779,903	33,115,166	51,900,000	1,946,818	10,109,139	3,115,166
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	2006	150.00	1,300,422	5.16	1,852,352	3,386,459	65,910,000	1,959,043	12,708,245	3,386,459
	1996	2.60	17,500	0.39	40,353	141,285	252,626	106,285	7,435	35,000
	1997	2.50	17,500	0.32	32,276	146,630	268,289	94,130	7,435	35,000
26 (DDINTING	1999	2.25	42,000	0.46	65,543	152,917	864,038	100,417	17,436	152,917
26. (PRINTING AND	2000	6.40	42,000	0.75	111,770	207,143	1,003,881	36,790		
PUBLISHING)	2001	5.00	26,250	0.63	96,391	262,203	913,513	39,612	32,884	229,319
LONGMAN NIG	2002	3.05	-36,750	0.31	77,192	263,557	680,148	9,093	29,043	234,514
PLC	2003	3.00	-17,640	0.22	51,964	295,440	795,971	14,962	45,964	249,476
1 - 2	2004	2.22	-36,750	0.43	111,892	311,862	1,051,917	26,212	36,174	275,690
	2005	3.04	-44,100	0.82	173,399	411,110	1,304,641	75,743	54,930	351,433
	2006	6.93	-	1.16	283,561	619,347	1,743,874	203,751	64,163	555,184
	1996	6.90	143,942	1.11	1,012,663	6,934,402	10,265,912	772,869	502,052	205,632
	1997	4.20	148,055	1.17	706,362	6,979,035	9,436,882	1,195,063	64,590	246,758
	1999	3.10	190,004	0.79	769,560	7,691,234	10,366,569	1,776,274	32,247	6,289,603
27. (TEXTILE)	2000	2.90	-	0.81	629,640	7,223,307	9,204,644	-	1,037,175	5,591,875
UNITED NIG	2001	4.00	265,108	1.07	903,006	12,241,532	14,483,892	-	2,162,836	9,235,454
PLC	2002	3.26	295,149	1.26	1,576,683	12,817,344	21,989,308	5,061,660	2,207,374	10,003,955
1 20	2003	3.25	-	-	335,184	12,574,302	22,713,031	4,702,429	2,333,896	9,644,724
	2004	1.87	84,328	0.16	340,475	12,487,478	21,838,790	4,775,058	2,202,162	9,713,363
	2005	2.30	-	0.11	246,626	13,000,338	17,664,955	4,870,357	2,630,842	9,812,662
	2006	0.91	-	-0.89	-210,965	13,082,122	20,300,000	4,074,105	3,239,789	9,016,410

Source: NSE factbook 2001,2005 and 2007 editions; BSSG issue number 3 & 9.

SP = Stock Price

DIV = Dividend Payment

EPS = Earnings Per Share

PBT = Profit before Tax

EARN = Earnings

DEBT = Total Debt

## **APPENDIX B: REGRESSION RESULTS**

Table A: Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.1

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	-54083.4	99040.60	-0.546
EARN21	4.847E-02	0.007	0.725
DIV2000	1.296	0.090	14.349

Dependent Variable: DIV2001

R Square = 0.938 Adj. R Square = 0.930 SER = 319920.0

F statistics = 127.755 DW-Statistics = 1.504

Source: Research results compiled from the secondary data.

**Table B:** Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.2

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	207648.5	299539.6	0.693
EARN25	4.872E-03	0.009	0.528
DIV2004	0.961	0.096	9.961

Dependent Variable: DIV2005

R Square = 0.886 Adj. R Square = 0.870 SER = 821590.3

F\_statistics = 54.330 DW-Statistics = 2.642

Source: Research results compiled from the secondary data.

**Table C:** Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.3

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	-26305.3	416414.1	-0.063
EARN26	-1.9E-02	0.010	-1.908
DIV2005	1.219	0.106	11.484

Dependent Variable: DIV2001

R Square = 0.950 Adj. R Square = 0.939 SER = 900664.6

F\_statistics = 85.261 DW-Statistics = 1.244

Source: Research results compiled from the secondary data.

Table D: Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.4

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	0.634	2.096	0.302
DIV2001	4.189E-06	0.000	2.864
EPS2001	9.046	0.756	11.962

Dependent Variable: SP2001

R\_Square = 0.900 Adj. R\_Square = 0.889 SER = 7.5262

F statistics = 89.544 DW-Statistics = 1.801

Source: Research results compiled from the secondary data.

**Table E:** Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.5

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	-3.662	8.316	-0.440
DIV2006	8.22E-07	0.000	0.469
EPS2006	22.668	1.883	12.040

Dependent Variable: SP2006

R\_Square = 0.950 Adj. R\_Square = 0.939 SER = 19.842

F statistics = 85.113 DW-Statistics = 1.255

Source: research results compiled from the secondary data.

Table F: Standard Multiple Regression Result for equation 4.6

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-ratio
(Constant)	-218471	1550071	-0.141
MEPS	276118.4	125195.4	2.205
MEARN	-3.2E-02	0.021	-1.481
MGRT	-5100.005	93981.40	-0.054
MSZ	30970.07	116734.5	0.265

Dependent Variable: MDIV

R\_Square = 0.186 Adj. R\_Square = 0.038 SER = 832610.1
F\_statistics = 1.255 DW-Statistics = 1.461
Source: research results compiled from the secondary data.