

PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE IN AFRICA

by

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Most of the contemporary philosophy in Africa has been reactionary and defensive against charges or challenges on the character of African philosophy. This preoccupation has led to the neglect of issues of immediate concern and importance for philosophy. The aim in this paper is to argue that the dilemmas of the African philosopher are not peculiar to Africa alone as Bodunrin and Sogolo for example imply; they are perennial and universal. This is partly because of the nature of the subject itself and partly because of social, economic and political realities encroaching upon the liberty of philosophical endeavours. Unfortunately, the African is hard-hit on both counts. The need to define philosophy in an undifferentiated society and culture, and the need to justify the role of philosophy within the confines of meagre economies and political uncertainties, make the philosopher's position uniquely difficult. Yet, paradoxically, it is philosophy that can adequately rescue the philosopher in this situation. For this to happen Africa must liberalise its socio-political systems since the philosophical dilemmas are reflections of social and political experiences.

I

Questions of the content of African philosophy have attracted and occupied the curiosity of most African scholars for decades. In certain cases, controversies over what constitutes African philosophy have dominated, and even become a full course of study on African philosophy. Interestingly, such concerns have not necessarily been preceded or accompanied by questions of whether there existed or exists African philosophers, considering that there is no philosophy without a philosopher. With the passage of time and as the works of contemporary African philosophers become more and more

accessible, the discussions have turned towards the challenge of relevance. In this context, it is not the relevance of philosophy to the problems of the world in general but to the African society in particular. Bodunrin, Sogolo, Wiredu, Oruka and many others have devoted considerable mental labours with excellent proficiency towards enlightening readers and audiences on the issues of relevance. They may have their specific orientations but the aim is essentially the same.

Peter Bodunrin¹, for example, notes three orientations of African philosophy namely, ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy and nationalist philosophy. However, he feels that all these orientations fail to qualify as true philosophies because they lack the rigour of criticism which is an essential aspect of philosophical works.² Bodunrin is here concerned with the philosophic method by which the philosopher treats his material with rigour and 'philosophic criticism'. This requires the African to be equipped with the necessary philosophical concepts, even if it means adopting Western concepts. These concepts, as tools of philosophical analysis and criticism, will assist in "understanding human experience which can be used to study another culture."³ The general impression from Bodunrin is that it is not the content that matters most but the form, since the relevance of content is merely dictated by ideological commitments.⁴

Godwin Sogolo feels that professional philosophy is constrained on two counts, (i) "inherited professional handicap due mainly to historical antecedents"⁵ and (ii) the demand for the practical relevance of philosophy. He acknowledges the fact that Africa has had and does have professional philosophers but the problem is that "their experience gives them one thing and they philosophise on another."⁶ On the other hand, the more they try to be relevant the more they risk losing their status as professional philosophers:

The professional philosopher in Africa is aware that the only way of staying in his profession is by showing evidence of its relevance to society. He is also aware that the same path leads him out of the intellectual community... if he insists on belonging to the community of philosophers he must with humility accept a peripheral position or otherwise quit the scene.⁷

Sogolo's position is based on the assumption that a philosopher cannot be both professional and relevant at the same time. For him professional philosophy is irrelevant to the problems of society in Africa, and the relevant one is that which is non-professional. Clearly, Sogolo's dilemma is based on certain misconceptions about the nature of philosophy and the role of the philosopher.

Both Bodunrin and Sogolo tend to associate professional philosophy with Western free-style and fragmented pursuits of knowledge serving only intellectual curiosity. Often, they refer to this style of philosophising as a "disinterested pursuit of knowledge"⁸ which, as observed by Sogolo, "Africa cannot afford". Philosophy seeks objective truth and knowledge through the rigorous method of critical analysis. But this truth or knowledge is not pursued for its own sake; it is pursued for its value to human life. The question should then be, has truth or knowledge anything to do with (the plight of) human life and society? It is doubtful if the answer is anything other than the affirmative. This philosophic method is applied in the endeavours to comprehend reality and solve human predicaments. Absolved of this responsibility professional philosophy merely serves to satisfy the intellectual curiosities of those practising or studying it. There is of course nothing absolutely wrong with this kind of philosophising in so far as it does not amount to neglect or omission of duty and responsibility. The responsibility of the philosopher is conceivable on two levels. First, as a member of the human race the philosopher shares the responsibility of improving the human lot in the world. Thus the philosophical talents should be employed for the benefit of mankind. The quest for objectivity for example must be seen in the light of cultivating the habit of reflection upon certain perplexities of human beings and their environment, raising fundamental questions and attempting solutions in a careful and rigorous way. Secondly, as a member of an academic community he is entrusted with specific roles not merely for the sake of the community, but for the nation as a whole. There are hardly any free-lance professional philosophers in Africa despite the charge of irrelevance. Like other academics, the philosophers are employed or hired, mostly by their governments, to teach, research and advise on issues pertinent to the development and well being of the nation. Moreover, because philosophy is basically concerned with the nature of knowledge and questions of method, it bears quite directly on other disciplines, and to some

extent shares the practical demands with the other disciplines. So, philosophers cannot sit back and watch, engrossed in the so-called disinterested pursuit of knowledge.

It would be noticeable, therefore, that almost all philosophical enterprises have a bearing on human practice. In fact, the origin and raw material for philosophy is human experience which is also the ultimate beneficiary of philosophy. The wisdom of the sages in traditional African society, for example, was esteemed and cherished by the members of society because it had practical relevance to their experience. Otherwise they would not be different from dreamers and the insane. The ruling class (i.e. the King and Guardians) in Plato's **Republic** are philosophers who are seen to be a great asset to society. This class of professionals is capable of discerning and deriving principles of social and political organisation from objective reason. The Greeks had observed that human action presupposes theory (i.e. that there is a connection between thought and practice and that, often, thought precedes action), so that unless our thought process is correct, our actions are misguided. This observation is universally valid to human beings regardless of temporal, national, racial or geographical differences.

II

Questions of relevance for philosophy are neither new nor peculiar to Africa alone. One is tempted to believe that the greater part of the problem arises from the nature of the subject itself. The history of philosophy reveals varied conceptions and practices ranging from the acceptable to the vulgar. Sophism, for example, championed subjective, commercial and rhetorical philosophy. Protagoras summed it all up by stating that, "man is the measure of all things".⁹ That is, man in his subjective individuality, is the ultimate judge of values. Modern subjectivism refers to man here as mankind **vis a vis** other existent entities in the world. Socrates, whose contribution to the philosophic method enabled a major breakthrough in philosophical enquiries, was misunderstood by most Athenians. This is evident, for example, in the comedy of Aristophanes, in which Socrates is caricatured as a man swinging in a basket, claiming that he walked on air, uttering a lot of nonsense about matters of which he himself understood nothing. The Athenian democratic court found him

guilty of “engaging in enquiries into things beneath the earth and in the heavens, of making the weaker argument appear the stronger and of teaching these same things”.¹⁰ In the 19th century Hegel advocated the contemporaneity of philosophy with the cultural milieu. For him philosophy is a form of expression for **Zeitgeist**. Thus **Zeitgeist** (Spirit of the age) reflects the level of self-consciousness and knowledge attained by the individuals. Philosophy grasps and comprehends that spirit. However, for Hegel, since the philosopher is a product of his own age he can only comprehend reality; he cannot transcend it (“jump over Rhodes”).¹¹ Philosophy like the Owl of Minerva, “spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.”¹² The best that the philosopher can do is to “discern the rose in the cross of the present” since “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.”¹³ Unfortunately, most of his speculative propositions have been read descriptively. Karl Marx’s charge against philosophers was partly motivated by orthodox Hegelianism. Marx felt that the philosophers had succeeded in interpreting the world differently when in fact the point was to change it.¹⁴ This of course is not to say that interpretation is a waste of effort. Interpretation presupposes comprehension (as social diagnosis) which is a necessary condition for prescription. Marx’s complaint was based on the view that although the philosophers might have diagnosed the social evils, they nonetheless failed to offer effective prescriptions. The role of the philosopher was therefore seen as incomplete. It is also possible that the diagnosis was misguided and so led to the unjustifiable legitimization of the **status quos**. Karl Marx omitted one important question namely, why the philosophers failed to offer effective remedial propositions. Answers to this question would greatly help to answer or explain the dilemmas of the African philosopher as well. By the same token solutions thereto would assist in rescuing him from the predicament.

The challenge of relevance is not levelled against philosophy alone but against most disciplines particularly within the Humanities and Social Sciences. Even the so-called Natural Sciences have dimensions the relevance of which is not easily perceivable by the non-scientist. One might even say that the Marxian appeal is most applicable here. Natural Sciences (Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Mathematics, etc) mostly deal with questions of how things or events in nature operate. Thus, they are essentially descriptive of reality; they explain human and environmental reality. Marx requested a contribution to change

for the better. Notably, the ultimate aim in all areas of study and occupation is human well being. Change is desirable in so far as the **status quo** has run out of its suitability to human welfare. The question would then be, how do the natural sciences contribute to this welfare? It would be absurd to gauge the relevance of science by its degree of contribution to change for the sake of change. In all the disciplines the issue is looked at from the point of view of their role in society. Is there, for example, any connection between Biology, Economics, Drama, Law, etc. and human welfare? Anyone, surely, with an answer in the negative would have the unenviable burden to justify his stand. What must be borne in mind is that all disciplines compare and relate theory with practice in the common endeavour to realise human ideals and the good life.

Philosophy is most at home with issues of a theoretical nature. Theory is derivable from practice and practice benefits from theory. Whereas theory is necessarily practical, it is not the case that practice is necessarily theoretical although the two realms are like different sides of a coin. So, the worst that can be said about philosophy is that it is irrelevant to practice. Further, the connection between philosophy and the disciplines whose practical relevance is most apparent becomes most evident in times of theoretical crisis. A theoretical crisis in a discipline calls for speculations on the basis, structure and orientation of the theory. Examples abound in the history of many disciplines: Astronomy, Economics, Political Science, Law and so on. Currently, the paradoxes of Marxism and the end of the Eastern empire have hastened speculations on universalism in thought and practice. Only if one cannot relate theory to practice can one fail to see the connection between philosophy and experience.

III

Sogolo **et al** feel that African history and culture put the African philosopher at an exceptional disadvantage. Unlike the Western counterpart, there is no or hardly any philosophical cultural continuity conducive to, and promotive of philosophy in Africa. In such an atmosphere an articulation of the relevance of philosophy is quite taxing. Sogolo argues thus:

It may be too sweeping to conclude that all the older elements of the European experience are still accessible for the European to reflect upon but much of the past is clearly carried forward in one form or another into the present... The pioneering Greek thinkers have died but their thoughts and ideas have matured into what we now refer to as modern European philosophy.¹⁵

He goes on to say that,

By speaking of the predicament of the African philosopher, I am drawing attention to certain kinds of deficiencies of the individual practitioner dictated by his experience... It is a deficiency due to the mere absence of given pre-requisites and not inherited disability.. Exposure and experience alone are the determining factors of ability.¹⁶

On the basis of these observations it has been claimed that a genuine or professional philosopher in Africa is Western-trained who, however, finds himself reflecting on issues irrelevant to his cultural environment. The non-professionals are found wanting in both method and material. This situation then makes it difficult for the African to carry out relevant philosophical enterprises, notwithstanding his or her intellectual capability. Bodunrin, as said earlier, emphasises the method rather than the material, implying that so long as the method befits philosophy, the content could be drawn from any culture, topic, field and so on. Sogolo stresses the need for both form (or method) and content to reflect the African cultural experience. He proposes "an orientation in African philosophy which has cultural relevance in so far as it is mounted on materials peculiar to African thought."¹⁷ The former proposition does not guarantee relevance or commitment to the issues pertinent to the African society for it leaves too much freedom and arbitrariness to the philosopher on the question of content. Sogolo's proposals too only go so far as catering for the intellectual curiosity of the African philosopher. For example, he suggests that someone interested in the problems of causality could "start by looking into the logical structure of certain important beliefs" to find out whether those beliefs presuppose "a continuity between the physical and the non-physical", involve a mono-causal or dual-causal explanatory model" and whether they are "governed by a unique system of logic."¹⁸ These are, admittedly, plausible and

competent issues in philosophy. But considering the demand for practical relevance the question still remains, "so what?" It appears then that both Bodunrin and Sogolo do not respond to the challenges of relevance quite directly; they do not hit the target.

The claim that African history and culture present a non-philosophical heritage and so can hardly sustain a relevant philosophy is based on a misconception of the nature and role of philosophy in society. We do not intend to keep reverting to the ageing, perennial question of whether Africa has had philosophies and philosophers. The claim thrives on the assumption that the so-called professional philosophy is entirely Western both in form and content. In which case, all non-Westerners cannot afford philosophy; they cannot philosophise professionally. This of course is an absurd conclusion based on prejudiced premises. Moreover, to say that the handicap is only cultural and not personal is to impose an alienating gap between culture and persons, it is to dehumanise culture. This, too, is absurd. Culture is a human product which in turn shapes and forms a significant part of the identity of persons. Empirically, it is a fact that some non-Western traditions are and have been rich in philosophical insights. In any case to say, for example, that since African history and culture have never had evidence of computers and computer experts, it cannot sustain the fashioning of computers suitable for the specific needs of Africa, is to commit a serious fallacy in reasoning.

In reasoning we employ, *inter alia*, both deduction and induction. Both approaches involve a relationship between the universal and the particular. Each one is such by relating itself to the other so that they in a way constitute each other. What they share most in common is the difference. Similarly, humanity is universal but it is constituted by particular human experiences worldwide. The life experiences of a people in a particular part of the world, for example, is evaluated from the point of view of humanity. Cultures may differ (as forms of human responses to the socio-geographic environments) but human life has one and the same dignity. Therefore, studying other cultures is not necessarily alienating oneself from one's own cultural values. On the contrary, it promotes one's appreciation of cultures and cultural differences. Through the comparative analysis of cultures one is able to identify certain constant and variable elements and so attain an objective critical capacity for the different cultural values.

Lack of exposure to other cultures or an unreasonable enthusiasm for one's own culture often produces cultural naivety. This naivety unnecessarily over-evaluates one's own culture. Often subjectivism is passed for objective cultural evaluation in such a situation.

Being exposed to Western philosophies and concepts cannot be regarded as a source of alienation and irrelevance for the African philosopher. Cultural alienation is not so simple to come by since it involves transformations of personal identities. The problems of cultural or personal identity cannot affect one who simply studies other cultures or in other cultures. Were it that easy, it would not have been an uncommon phenomenon to many people in all cultures. Western or European philosophical concepts may not be relevant to European experience alone; they may be relevant and applicable to other cultures as well. After all, the European experience is a human experience. Applying them is one thing and testing them is another. The philosophical concepts are tools with which to understand and evaluate human experience, and they can be used to study another culture. In fact the testing of foreign philosophical concepts, via a comparative analysis is a form of critical assessment and appreciation of those concepts. Further it would be naive to maintain that it is only African philosophy that can be relevant to African problems.

The impact of colonisation on African history and culture has had far reaching consequences and implications. Contemporary African culture has, inevitably, elements of the colonisers' culture. It is a synthesis of traditional African culture and European culture albeit varying in proportions. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to talk of African cultural heritage with total disregard of the colonial experience on that heritage. Colonialism has formed part of the African history and culture so that some traces of Western culture have become part of the African culture. Thus, all the more reason why some of the African professional philosophers should not feel alienated by studies in Western cultural concepts. It may be argued, and rightly so, that philosophy basically gives you the form, the content is often manipulable. Tribute is paid to Thales as a pioneer of professional philosophy not because of the material upon which he reflected but because of the method (as form) of his reflections. Here was a statesman, a mathematician and an astronomer in the 5th Century B.C. who raised fundamental questions and attempted to answer them free from myths. The Milesia school to which Thales belonged

had benefited from contacts with other cultures. Miletus was a commercial city having trading links with Egypt, Babylon, Lydia and so on. Thales himself is said to have travelled to Egypt to study geometry. He came to be known as "one of the seven wise men of Greece."¹⁹

European culture as a term has a wide reference. It includes all the various ethnic, national and subcultures produced and experienced by Europeans or those of European descent. Different European nations have, for example, different languages (English, French, Spanish, Dutch, Italian and so on), socio-economic structures and political ideologies. In fact what are known as European or Western philosophies can and are classified as, for example, British, French and German. Now, when one says that the Western cultural heritage is conducive to philosophy, unlike the African, one must be able to specify exactly what it is with or within that culture that makes all the difference. Then it would be debated whether that particular element could be promoted within the African culture so as to assist in the promotion of relevant professional philosophy. I think this move would remove the mist around philosophy and its role in Africa much faster.

IV

If the challenges of the practical relevance of philosophy are perennial and universal then the African cannot be exempted. However, this would not mean that all the problems encountered by the African philosopher are global. It is indeed true that there are problems that are specific to Africa because of social, economic and political factors. It will be made clear in the remaining discussion that the African's dilemma is due, ultimately, to two major obstacles namely, (i) poverty and (ii) political pedagogy, both of which are beyond his physical control. Such obstacles are almost absent in the Western countries.

The African philosopher may have provoked the pronouncements of irrelevance by his omission of duty. It is perhaps true that many African philosophers have focussed on practically irrelevant material in the hours of social, economic and political need. As a result, the layman has failed to understand the use-value of philosophy. The

preoccupation of the philosopher appears dubious. Take, for example, the labours that have been spent on proving that Africa has had philosophy and philosophers. Basically, the African has been motivated by foreign attacks and the need for a defence; the African is mostly defensive or reactive if he is not analysing proverbs, old sayings and stories. But the African may be overdoing the reactive or defensive philosophy at the expense of the issues that require his immediate attention. It is also possible that the weight of foreign attacks has been exaggerated by the African. In any case who is the African trying to convince, and why? Moreover, where or at what point does philosophical relevance touch the social, economic and political reality? In the classrooms? In the conference room? Or in the research area? True, "philosophy is one of the most popular subjects on the curriculum in many of our Universities".²⁰ In the University of Malawi, for example, philosophy has one of the highest enrolments in the Faculty of Humanities, and numbers go up every year. Some organisations have made specific requests for graduates with a philosophy component in their degrees. Yet there is, at the other end of the corridor, on-going expressions of scepticism about the practical relevance of philosophy.

However, the African philosopher is not at liberty to research, teach and write on topics that are felt to be inimical to the political system. He is conscious and cautious of the risk of seeming to bite the finger that is expected to feed him. This state of affairs robs philosophy of its major asset, function and relevance which come through criticism. For philosophy to derive and pursue the ideals of man it must be able to identify the black areas of the **status quo**. Thus its concern with the 'ought' questions ripening from existing conditions. The critical aspect appears in the light of comparing the existing conditions with what ought to be. Unfortunately it is this critical aspect (the concern with questions of oughtness) that has often earned philosophy a distasteful flavour to the people in power and to all the fanatical advocates of prevailing systems. If the African philosopher is not silent or indifferent to the immediate issues that affect the welfare of his countrymen, at least he is serving the **status quo**. Either way, the issues he is working on are irrelevant to the people's welfare.

This kind of experience by philosophers is also not new in the history of philosophy. In Plato's **Republic**, philosophers are statesmen or politicians. In the medieval period, philosophy was the handmaid of religion and the state. Descartes, Locke and Marx, for example, were exiled for their philosophies. Hegel had to bow down to the whims of the politicians to survive the witchhunt for political demagogues and the "atheism scare" of 1821 in Germany. Philosophical enterprises have thus been thwarted. Mitias observes, for example, that

philosophy is in a state of crisis. It does not seem to possess a sense of identity or even a sense of purpose. (Philosophical knowledge has certainly expanded in the past 40 years, but) it has lost its ability to relate its findings to human life.²¹

One major reason is none other than that "many philosophers distance themselves from the actual problems which require urgent analysis or evaluation."²² Because of anxiety and anguish, the African intellectual has tended to turn his fangs upon himself; he has internalised and contained them. The will to truth has been suppressed by the will to power. Where the will to power is the strongest motive, the will to truth is least evident and consistency is rarest. Such social and political atmospheres have partly been responsible for the philosophers' preoccupations with questions of whether or not Africa has or had any philosophy, whether philosophy is relevant to African problems, whether anything philosophical can be salvaged from proverbs, sayings, tales and so on. They have forced themselves to believe that in a situation where one cannot talk 'straight' one should be poetic, or unsystematic. This, unfortunately refuels the charge of irrelevance.

The paradox is that it is only philosophy that can redeem philosophy; philosophy can restore to philosophy its role as the leading visionary of the ideals of human life. Philosophy is called upon to analyse the ideas, problems, interests and aspirations of human beings both in their individuality and as social wholes **vis a vis** the universal ideals of humanity. Thus it assists in the discernment and realisation of the moral, religious, social, aesthetic, economic as well as political ideals. The philosopher like other people 'think to live, not live to think'.

The philosopher in modern Africa requires the social, economic and political environment that is conducive to his professional call. Normally, he is in a University community that is funded by the government and under the auspices of a political party. Inevitably, the ideological and policy options of the African leaders exert pressures upon the mind of the philosopher. For one thing the critical exercise in research and publications are limited to those areas that are insensitive or favourable to the political **status quo**. Hence the role of disseminating and guarding truth and justice is seriously constrained. For another, the economic reality of his country is such that the philosopher is expected to be "visibly contributing to the development of his nation."²³ Since philosophy is mostly theoretical, it is not easy to obtain the 'visible contribution'. As such it has been designated 'non developmental' and so condemned to poor funding. Okolo concludes that "lack of sponsorship or endowment funds, public or private, government or individual for philosophic studies and activities such as symposium, conferences, professional chairs etc"²⁴ is one of the greatest obstacles to the growth and development of philosophy in Africa. Yet the need for philosophy is felt and noticeable in every country. In almost all the French-speaking countries in West and Central Africa and in the Anglo-phone countries of Central, East and Southern Africa philosophy is taught in their Universities.²⁵ Nigeria alone has ten Universities offering philosophy courses at both graduate and postgraduate levels.²⁶

The philosopher like all other human beings must work, feed, dress and generally survive. Given the circumstances, the African philosopher is forced to become visibly pragmatic and utilitarian in his choice of themes, topics and orientation. He thus works to attract honor, security and financial rewards. Philosophy involves thinking in a special way and that requires a healthy mind in a healthy environment, a situation that is hardly attainable in Africa. In such a situation, philosophy becomes "more and more distant, strange and remote; it even assumes the appearance of an intellectual luxury".²⁷ The obscurity of relevance for philosophy also becomes more and more pronounced.

V

What I have tried to show in this paper is that the dilemmas of the African philosopher are not new nor limited to Africa only. A good portion of them are due to the nature and function of philosophy, issues that are misconceived by many people. However, this is not to say that all societies have the same problems with philosophy. Different societies have certain peculiarities which affect philosophical endeavours in their own way. The African societies have social, economic and political realities with which philosophy must reckon. So, although the challenge of philosophical relevance is perennial and universal, Africa experiences it in its own peculiar way.

The heart of the problem is not that wrong philosophers work on wrong issues for that is a non-starter, nor that wrong philosophers work on right issues for that would imply absence of qualified philosophers. Neither is it a question of right philosophers on right issues, for then there would be no wrong issues, and this, for explicable reasons or factors. The situation is socially, economically and politically determined. There is the pre-conceived prejudice against the theoretical nature of philosophy as belonging to pure-intellectual curiosity, to the leisure class and to the phantasmagoric. There is also the poverty of economic welfare which, capitalising on the socio-economic prejudice, malnourishes philosophy; grants and scholarships, conferences, research, journals etc. At the same time the philosopher must support himself and his family financially - even at the sacrifice of genuine philosophy. Politically, what is relevant is what is not inimical or critical to the **status quo** and the philosopher does not wish to bite the finger that feeds him.

The promotion of relevant philosophy in Africa requires the realisation that "an unexamined life is not worth living" by the African peoples. They have to refrain from the mythical, cultural and political dogmatism and pressure. The African mind needs to be rescued from the excessive forces that inhibit free thought, free choice and free action. The economies are miserable but this fact is sometimes an overdramatised scapegoat. On the political scene, Africa requires the liberalisation that enables unconstrained discussion and criticisms, promotes maximum exploitation and deployment of the talents of the citizens. In fact philosophy thrives better with democracy which is found wanting in many African countries. Eventually, philosophy promotes its own relevance.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Bodunrin, P.O. "The Question of African Philosophy", in **Philosophy** Vol. 56, 1981 p. 163.
- 2 Bodunrin, P.O. "The Challenge of Relevance and Commitment" in **Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Africa** ed. Herta Nagl-Docekal and Franz M. Wimmer, Munchen, 1992 p. 20.
- 3 Bodunrin, P.O. **Ibid.** p. 28.
- 4 **Ibid.** p. 30
- 5 Sogolo, G. "Options in african Philosophy" in **Philosophy** Vol. 65 No. 251 1990 p. 39.
- 6 Sogolo, G. **Ibid.** p. 45.
- 7 **Ibid.** p. 40.
- 8 Bodunrin, **op.cit.** p. 22.
- 9 Russell, B. **History of Western Philosophy**, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974. p.94.
- 10 Plato **Dialogues** translated by Jowett and edited with introduction by J.D. Kaplan, New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. p.7.
- 11 Hegel, G.W.F. **Philosophy of Right** translated with notes by T.M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. p. 11.
- 12 Hegel, G.W.F. **op.cit.** 13.
- 13 **Ibid** p. 10.
- 14 Marx Karl, and Engels, F. **The German Ideology** edited with introduction by R. Pascal, New York: International Publishers 1967. p. 199.
- 15 Sogolo, G. **op.cit** p. 44
- 16 **Ibid.**
- 17 **Ibid** p. 51
- 18 **Ibid.**
- 19 Russell, B. **op.cit.** p. 45.
- 20 Bodunrin **op.cit.** p. 17.
- 21 Mitias, M.H. "Challenges of Universalisms" in **Dialogue and Humanism** Vol. 1 No. 1. 1991 p

- 22 Mitias, M.H. **Ibid.**
- 23 Bodunrin **op.cit.** p. 22.
- 24 Okolo, C.B. "Philosophy in Africa: Present and Future" in **Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Africa. op.cit.** p. 195.
- 25 Bodunrin **op.cit.** p. 17.
- 26 **Ibid** p. 26.
- 27 Okolo, C.B. **op.cit** p. 194.