Introduction

This book begins without pretensions on the position the author wants to defend. The opening statement says “the position I intend to support is the belief that there is a material world and that this is all there is”. The author also acknowledges the fact that we have many reasons to question his option. The inherited conventional wisdom which harps on the existence of at least two diametrically opposed realities namely the physical and the spiritual as characterizing realities of different natures, the body and the mind (soul) are the real issues around which this inquiry is set. The author has shown his awareness of the seriousness of the controversy and the pessimism of arriving at a conclusive solution to the problem.

The problem is the necessity to explain, granted the existence of two opposed entities, their interaction, how and where this interaction takes place. We have the body which is a material entity and we have the soul which is a spiritual entity. The first is said to be in space, to have some weight, to be
observable, temporal and as consisting of parts. The second, the soul on the other hand is not locatable in space and time cannot be weighed, is not observable, elusive and intangible. The soul has been assigned the properties of thinking, reasoning, willing, desiring, affirming, etc, while the body has the property of walking, handling, jumping, running, eating and doing all kinds of jobs but only on the prompting of the first which is the soul. The bone of contention therefore is, how the soul (mind) which is not physical (not locatable in space and time) affect the body which is a physical entity. The controversy leads to both epistemological and metaphysical problems. Epistemological problems are gnoseological and conceptual. On the gnoseological side, the question is, how do we know the nature of the soul and the nature of the interaction that exist between it and the body? On the conceptual side, we ask how do we handle the conceptualization of the soul and the body so that we do not end up with a “put-up-job” or a theoretical linguistic posturing of our own proclivitistic creations borne out of culture, belief, ideology and indoctrination.

Osei’s book *The Mind-Body Problem in Philosophy: An Analysis of the Core Issues*, is a work set within the tradition of analytic philosophy with its distinctive esoteric and abstruse linguistic genre which makes it fairly difficult for the uninitiated to understand. Yet, the details are dotted with the delicate fine lining of clarity and persuasive arguments drawn from hard core philosophy ranging from the traditional classical positions of Plato to the scholasticism of St. Augustine and Aquinas, to the modern methodic mindset of Descartes, the critical philosophy of Kant, the analytic spirit of Russell, Moore and Ryle, the linguistic subtleties of Sprigge,
Review: The Mind Body Problem in Philosophy

Shoemaker, Strawson and Davidson and the scientific spirit of Bohr, Churchland, Duhem and Schrodinger, the phenomenology of Husserl, the vitalism of Bergson and the psycho-behaviorism of Skinner. This makes the work at once very elastic and accommodative of the major traditions in philosophy and comprehensive in its treatment of the mind-body problem. It indeed covers a broad spectrum of the issues, concerning body/mind and to that extent is an important addition to the stock of extant literature in the controversy of Mind-body interaction. But the university education is a process of initiation into the many esoteric provinces of knowledge. Osei’s work therefore serves the purpose of inducting the student into the labyrinth of the analytic tradition of inquiry, in this case inquiry, into the Mind-body problem. It should therefore be approached as a necessary condition for qualifying as a thorough-bred scholar in philosophy.

Our aim in this review is to attempt a simplification and a deconstruction of the book from our own point of understanding. An attempt will also be made to point out areas of disagreement with the main arguments presented in the work. The idea is to provide this review as a useful companion in the easy ingestion of the book considering the rather turgid and fairly difficult way the book is presented especially for a new comer into the precinct of the hall of Philosophy. My two cardinal objectives are to achieve simplicity and a deconstructive synopsis of the text. (Deconstruction is used here in the sense of reading the reviewer’s meaning into the author’s possible, intended or actual meaning).

The author is aware of the analytic-cum-ideological dangers potentially inherent in the text and this is why he sets
out to provide us with a background to the problem of body/mind (soul) interaction. The possibility of the existence of an unempirical entity called the soul, the possibility of its interaction with the body and the nature of the soul itself as an existent entity constitute the metaphysical problem which the author seeks to address. Though the author has taken his position from the onset, the problem cannot be escaped by merely taking a position. Every philosopher looking at the issue of Body-mind problem cannot approach it casually, it has to be approached with valve and rigour before one’s position can be seen to attract any merit. This, then, became Osei’s lot as he needfully must traverse the length and breadth of the tortuous terrain that characterise the discourse on body-mind enigma. The author has done this by examining the many theories that have attempted their hands in the pie of proffering enduring solution to this seemingly intractable problem. Before we delve into the theories and their limitations and the reason for Osei’s opting for a materialist conception/solution to the problem, we shall carry out this review under four subheadings, namely; Background to the problem of Body-Mind interaction, different theories that have been proffered in an attempt to tackle the problem, then, we shall look at Osei’s materialist position (agnostic materialism) and I shall conclude with my personal thoughts on the body-mind problem.

**Background to the Body-Mind Problem**

Within the setting of Western philosophy, Osei begins his discourse of the mind/ body problem by examining Plato’s treatment of the issue of the nature of the mind and the body. In the Phaedo, Plato talks about the existence of two distinct entities, the mind and the body. For him, the mind is concerned
with reasoning and understanding while the body deals with our sensations and passions. He sees the body as a great hindrance to the mind’s accomplishment of its true functions, to wit, that of contemplation of truth (forms) while the body is seen as a meddlesome entity tailored towards craving and appetitiveness. This is a dualistic picture of reality namely the mental and the bodily. In the Republic, Plato gives us a tripartite conception of the soul. The human person is seen as a soul consisting of three parts, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive. The rational represents the spiritual component with wisdom as its attendant virtue, the soul is another spiritual component with courage as its attendant virtue, while the body is the physical component with temperance as its attendant virtue. This boils down to the fact that man as an existent reality is a composite of material reality and immaterial reality, that is, physical and the spiritual dimensions of reality respectively. For Plato, the nature of the mind (which is represented by the rational and the appetitive parts of the soul) is quite different from the body. While the former survives death, the latter disintegrates at death.

The next philosopher he examines is Aristotle, who in De Anima sees body and mind as intricately interwoven in a relationship of complementarity and ontological fusion (as one existent reality). It is only the intellect which is known as active reason that is distinct from, and operates independently of the body. This means that the faculty of sense perception and the faculty of reason, though go on in the individual, have different ontological bases. Thomas Aquinas, on his own part, insists on the need to demarcate between powers that function through the body and those that do not – Those that do not,
namely, those of intelligence and will, constitute the body. This means that for him, there is a divide between mind and body. Osei thought that this could pose a problem for the angels who being spirit beings and lacking bodies, do not have bodies through which they can enjoy psychological feelings of joy, happiness, ecstasy, etc. The truth is that angels have their bodies different from ours. First Corinthians chapter fifteen verses thirty-six to forty-four (1 Cor.15:36-44) tells us that there are bodies terrestrial and others celestial. This means that angels have bodies and also enjoy the psychological states that are proper to their celestial nature.

The next to be examined is Rene Descartes who in his *Meditations* rejected the idea of splitting the powers of our psychical endowments between the body and the mind. He went a step further to bifurcate the mind and the body along distinct lines. The mind performs some functions which include doubting, affirming, denying, desiring, knowing, hating, willing, etc, which means that mental experience covers both sensory experience and all that goes on in reasoning, understanding and imagination. This leaves the body with the quality of extension and as the executor of the will of the intellect in the physical realm. While the mind is represented by the quality of thought, body is represented by the quality of extension. This presents mind and body as mutually opposed entities. While the former is intangible, the latter is spatio-temporal. This brought to the fore in its sharpest outlines the conflict between mind and body as opposed entities. We are then called to account for how we could have interaction between a spatio-temporal entity and a non-spatio-temporal entity. Descartes, through the cogito argument, proved that the existence of himself as a thinking substance is
epistemologically prior to the existence of himself as extended body. It is therefore the epistemological divide that grounds the ontological divide (cleavage) between the thinking substance and the extended substance (the incorporeal and the corporeal respectively). This further provides grounds for Descartes alleged incompatibility between mental and physical properties which fuelled the mind-body problem. At this jointure, Osei employs the views of Paul Churchland and D.M. Armstrong to counteract the certainty of a dualism of mind and body independent realities. Armstrong employs the possibility of deception about our awareness of mental experiences, (Via Introspection and memory). He also stresses the need to keep separable the subject of the awareness and the object of the awareness – which Descartes insists constitute the same substance – it is consciousness being aware of itself, that is, direct self-awareness. It must be pointed out that Descartes must be understood on his own terms. The concept of memory which Armstrong brings in to ground the possibility of error in awareness does not come in, because, memory is not synonymous with consciousness; it is a mental faculty for the store of information. At any time we are directly self conscious and aware of our own consciousness we cannot be in error. Any time we are in error about the consciousness of our consciousness, then, it means that in truth we are not conscious and as such our language must be restructured to reflect our state of uncertainty about our consciousness. So, with this bit, I stick to the plausibility of Descartes Cogito position.

Further to the above, Osei uses Herbert Feigl’s position to incite that physical does not mean merely perceptual, coming from quantum physics where perceptual qualities are
only indications of a more intricate (complicated) underlying reality in which case, the physical must be seen as more than the perceptual. The truth still remains that we cannot move from the perceptual via quantum to reach mind distinctive qualities. It will be logically a slippery slope to move from perceptual qualities to anchor on mind defining qualities. This will be a dangerous and uncertain transition whose intervening logical space and gap cannot be logically and scientifically proven (justified or substantiated). Whether we construe the physical as constitutive of the experiential and non-experiential, cannot by that token become ‘embracive’ of the mental thereby making the mental an aspect of the ‘non-experiential-physical”. This will be a kind of marriage by adoption or coercion – which will be illegitimate. Grover Maxwell’s rejection of naive realism as the representative view of physicalism in yet another grand design to co-opt the mental into the physical by hook or crook, this meets the same rejection as Armstrong’s. This, therefore, leaves unfettered the position of dualism as the most plausible option open to us in the discourse of mind-body problem. All we need to do is to understand, explain and specify their different qualities and continue to seek clarification on their interaction instead of any frivolous attempt as circumvention of the duality reality.

Some Of The Theories Put Forward To Address Mind-Body Problem

Osei’s book *The Mind-Body Problem in Philosophy* is quite exhaustive in examining the theories that feature in the discourse on mind-body problem. The mind-body problem lends itself straightforwardly to dualist and monist theories. This means theories that claim (assume) that mind and body
Review: The Mind Body Problem in Philosophy

are distinct entities and those that claim that they are one substance but may have double qualities. Here, we have physicalism (materialism, realism) and idealism. He captures the theories under mentalist and physicalist theories. Under mentalist theories we have idealism, mentalism and neutral monism. It does seem to me that under mentalist-theories that emphasis is on the purely immaterial nature of our mental life and those theories that look at it from the point of view of psycho-physical attributes or both. Mental life could be constitutive of both the material (psycho-physical aspect and the immaterial (wholly spiritual) aspect.

Under mentalist theories he treats Berkeleian idealism, Humean idealism and pure process idealism – which does not permit actual distinction between the process and the contents. It rather construes the ideas as intrinsic qualities of particular processes. He maintains that what makes these different positions all form of idealism is their commitment to the view that what exists must either be definable by reference to what we are aware of in perception or introspection or are capable of being constructed from these by the exercise of our imagination and reasons. Consequently, the physical world for idealism, is something that exists in the mind, as object of perception, its being is its being perceived (50).

Apart from the above theories, we have panpsychism which is an ancient theory that is derived from animism, the view that all existent things are suffused with spirits. This means that the talk about wholly materialist reality is unacceptable (untenable) since all things are made up of spirits
which animates them. It is therefore a philosophical articulation of animism as a mentalist theory.

An important dimension is noted here to the effect that, in line with Kant, matter is composed of the phenomenal and noumenal aspects. While the phenomenal aspects is perceivable and in line with idealism, exists in the mind as ideas, the noumenal aspects since it exists unperceived, exists outside the mind. This position is bought by T.L.S Sprigge as constituting a type of existence which exists outside the mind thereby refuting the idealist position that nothing exists unperceived. However, our claim to have knowledge about the noumenal world is merely speculative and not substantive as it cannot in any way be grounded in experience. It will therefore be harmful for the phenomenalist to pressure us into accepting a noumenal existential arrangement. Materialist/physicalist positions are used to critique the idealist theories – notably we have what Sprigge calls the independent existence of physical things outside their occasional presence in perceptual situations. This means that we do not need the ever abiding and sustaining presence of Berkeley’s God for physical things or their ideas to exist. Sprigge therefore rejects what he calls phenomenalist instrumentalism as the cause of the belief in the existence of extra-mental reality. Sprigge further attributes our craze for extra-mental existence to our addiction to the necessity of pragmatic device in our approach to understanding reality. He describes it as a useful pragmatic fiction. He calls it a fiction because we have no means of fleshing out the determinate character of extra-mental reality without recourse to the concepts and vocabulary that figure in experience (64). What Sprigge has striven to achieve is to show the incoherencies involved in the postulation of unperceived
physical object as the extra-mental entity. For him, the phenomenalist approach is internally incoherent and intuitively unfulfillable. (97)

Other lines of argument against Idealism could be seen from the absurdity of maintaining the non-existence of an organized coherent physical existence independent of the mind’s perception of it. Again, it may be seen as preposterous to grant the unseen mind existence and then deny existence to what is seen. This flies against the common parlance that “seeing is believing”.

From here, Osei examines some physicalist theories notably logical behaviourism, functionalism and Mind-Brain identity theory.

Talking about physicalist theories, Osei sees them as giving reductionist account of the mind. An example is the reduction of macro object into their micro equivalent as we have in physics through atomic and subatomic theories. Since physics, for instance, is committed to an ontological primacy of micro properties such as protons, electrons, quarks, leptons, etc, it must fashion out theories that will aid in explaining macro objects via micro properties. Apart from ontological reduction, we have another form of reduction known as conceptual reduction also called analytical reduction (85). Conceptual reduction claims that the very content or subject matter of our ordinary statements about higher level objects turns out, on conceptual analysis to be referring to micro entities (86). It is like saying that when we talk about the unobserved entities we are indirectly referring to the observed – the unobserved, here, seen as signs of the existence of the observed which the scientists can make meaningful through
what they call “correspondence rules” (see Ozumba,54-59 and Suppe,27-29) or bridge principles” (Osei, 125). By so doing the unobserved is made observable through some form of reductionism. This is what Behaviourism does when it reduces mental life to bits of overt behaviour, in this case, what is important is not mind or consciousness but man’s responses to stimuli within an environmental setting – By assuming a reductionist posture, it denies the existence/reality of mental life. While scientific behaviourism of Skinner does not countenance dispositional properties because of its disdain for suggestive mental life possibilities, logical behaviourism provides room to account for dispositional properties. This is so because logical behaviourism is concerned with determining the status of mental concepts in our public language. It is concerned with articulating a reductive device which will help explicate mental concepts like thought, belief, perception, image or memory into sentences about publicly observable behaviour. It is therefore a linguistic reductionist thesis. This means that every mental occurrence for it to be meaningful must have its equivalent expressible in publicly observable behaviour. This may be why people like Gilbert Ryle talk derisively of the “Ghost in the Machine”. But the truth remains that no matter what we try to do via behaviourism we cannot dispense with mental terms altogether by using behavioural equivalents as substitutes (Kant and Quine express this view). The basic truth here is that we cannot solve the mind-body problem merely by dissolving the concept of mind as scientific behaviourism attempts to do. We therefore cannot deny the phenomenology of the reality of mental life.

Functionalism on the other hand is concerned with a process of individuating mental states by reference to their
causal relations to input stimuli to other mental states and to output behaviour (95) – This means that our mental life, sensory experiences and other undetermined events are responsible for, or are causes, or functions of our behavioural responses in given situations. In functionalism, the reductionism is causal and functional. This means that if we understand all the component inputs (mental, sensory and others), we can determine the direction of behaviour. It is therefore concerned with the functional role of mental states in causing our behaviour. The problem with functionalism is that it is based on unsupported assumption that we can carry out a reductive causal implication of mental states on behaviour. This is too bogus and unscientific. The problem of “absent qualia charge” levelled by Sydney Shoemaker readily comes to mind here. This means that, perception of mental states is indeterminate and as such its exact causal input cannot be determined. Galen Strawson says that the concept of pain is logically independent of the concepts of cause and effect as Shoemaker had tried to analyse. We can have pain that is not decidedly causal.

Mind-brain Identity is also a reductionist theory that tries to reduce mental states to equivalent brain states. This means identifying mental state – types on one hand and the brain state types on the other and then trying to correlate mental events with brain events. The occurrence of a mental event and the firing of fibre in the brain is said to be correlated. By so doing, mental life can be made identical with brain processes. Another name for this theory is Causal Theory of the Mind (CTM). Its chief advocate is D.M. Armstrong. His idea is to define mental state types in terms of the causal role they play.
in being the effects of stimuli or being the cause of behaviour (107).

In his discourse of token physicalism, he mentioned the token-token identity theory and epiphenomenalism. Token identity theory states that “for every token instance of a mental state, there is some token neural event with which that token instance is identical” (122). Token identity theory is therefore different from type identity theory because while type identity theory tries to pick out the property intrinsic to a physical system that makes a given physical state type identical with a certain pain type, token identity theory is concerned with a token instance of mental state that is identical with neural state. This means that while type identity is concerned with mental state – pain state identity (as types) while token identity is concerned with mental state – neural state identity (as tokens). This means that while type identity refers to a specific type example, pain or any other property. Token identity is less specific as it concerns neural states, example firing of a neural fibre or any neural event.

The major problem with both the token identity theory and the type identity theory is their inability to overcome the challenge of multiple realisability argument which Quine calls the twin problem of indeterminacy and multiple decidability/compatibility theory. This means that the mapping of the identity between the mind states and the neural or pain states can be done in multiply compatible ways with each incompatible with others. At the end of the day we cannot reach an identity relationship that is conclusive. There is also no way of determining with finality as token identity theory claims that every mental state/event has a corresponding neural state that instantiates it. How are we sure that the case of
instantiation is not in error, that multiple other (invisible undetermined) mental states are not responsible for our instantiation which we are attributing to a particular neural state. We cannot rule out the possibility of error in both type and token identity theories. The erroneous assumption here is that the use of “bridge principles” or “correspondence rules” translates to a one to one correspondence between micro predicates and macro ones or between mental states and neural or physical states. This is a pragmatic make-believe, an explanatory device contrived to bridge the gap between the observable (observed) and the unobservable (unobserved) entities of the world of science. There is no neutral arbiter to justify the perfectibility of the substitution instances involved in the various reductive exercises. This means that we cannot be sure when asymmetric or symmetric correlations hold for mental states and physical states (Brain or neural states). Fodor thinks that event identity is preferable to property identity hence that token identity should be preferred to type identity. In my judgment, they are both vulnerable to the same pitfalls. The assumption from Fodor’s point of view is that the weaker the reductiveness of a theory the less vulnerable to error it becomes. Since token physicalism is weaker than type physicalism, in terms of their explicitness in reductiveness, then, token physicalism should be preferred to type physicalism. But the truth is that every event is not a physical event- there are strong indications that spiritual events condition/influence or control physical events. Token physicalism which is built on solid physicalistic assumptions may not be right after all.
The Theory of Non Reductive Materialism

This section deals with the theory of non reductive materialism which is the last theory the author treats. It is very crucial to the last chapter which talks about neutral monism; agnostic neutralism and agnostic materialism. In the conclusion, the author points out that the basic premise of his book is “that a metaphysical theory worthy of its name must do two things: first, it must posit a fundamental entity with which it can explain the fundamental properties and laws of the universe; second, it must be able to explain the ostensible feature of the universe. Though physicalist and mentalist theories strive to achieve these by adopting either physically fundamental entity or a spiritually (mentally) fundamental entity, but each fail in explaining why and how each is reducible to the other, or events in one sphere can be said to be identical with events of the other sphere. Again, the problem of the nature of interaction between them necessitated theories like occasionalism, parallelism, epiphenomenalism, double aspect theory, action at a distance as ways of obviating rather than explaining realistically the nature of the interaction that exists between mind and body.

Non reductive materialist theory made frantic efforts at solving the mind-body problem by using the principles of coexistence, coextension, non-entailment, non exclusive mutuality and non causal interaction. At the end, we had a non-reductive specie of token identity theory which boils down to a kind of double aspect theory where mind and body can be said to denote the different aspects of the same ontological reality. This again failed to account for how the transmission of values across the two domains can be adequately explained. This means inability to account for how interaction takes place
between the mental and the physical. This view is anchored on the belief that in perceptual experience we are faced with mental activity which simultaneously needs a physical medium like the appropriate sense organ. This means that mental events occur in the body and this shows that body and mind are intimately related and can be seen as a wholly physical process which either begins as a mental act or a bodily act with both constituting a physical experience. This also means that we do not have two events, a mental event and a physical event; rather, there is just one event but which seems to instantiate two distinct event types – the mental event type and the physical event type (153). This is a kind of ontological identity, that is, identity of object with different properties. Here we agree with Osei that the ground of coexistence of the properties is not enough to deal with the mind-body problem.

The author goes further to show that neutral monism will not also do because it holds that though there is a fundamental entity, it is itself neither physical nor experiential. Absolute neutralism will also fail because it professes total ignorance of any fundamental entity that grounds our experiences (mental or physical).

But agnostic neutralism suggests that there exists a certain fundamental stuff and that this stuff has a certain structure unknown to us and this stuff manifests its existence to us through mental and physical properties akin to Spinoza’s substance known through its attributes and modes or better still, through the attributes of thought and extension. The author defends agnostic monism thus:

The strength of agnostic monism lies in the recognition that humans do have some cognitive access to a portion of reality; but it recognises in the same breath that the concepts which
we deploy in our understanding are inadequate for delivering a comprehensive picture of reality. (209-210).

This brand of monism he calls agnostic materialism. He kowtows to agnostic materialism because he sees it as being grounded on the empirical evidence of the subsistence of matter. The question one may ask at this juncture, is, agnostic with respect to what? Matter or mind? Is it not reasonable to be agnostic with respect to mentalism than with materialism? However, the truth is that mentalism is less problematic when related to brain – processes or what goes on in the mind. Mentalism’s problematicity stems from its relationship with soul or spirit.

Reviewer’s Concluding Thoughts

It may be apposite to conclude this exciting, tasking, painstaking and loaded book by sparing some thoughts. The question is why mind-body problem? What is the genesis of mind-body problem? Of what purpose will the solution to the mind-body problem serve? Are there spiritual undertones to this intractable, interminable controversy?

Yes, the origin’ is spiritual and the goal is spiritual. The genesis is the need to ascertain whether man had a soul, and if yes whether it was mortal or immortal. It was to determine the veracity that there is life after death and to know how to prepare for it. For the Greeks, the existence and immortality of the soul gave hope of possibility of reminiscence (recollection) and the fact of a return to the abode of the gods after earthly sojourn. For the Hindus and Buddhists it is all related to Karma and union with the Brahma the universal soul after we have been acquitted through accumulation of good Karmas and
attainment of enlightenment. For the Jews, Muslims and Christians, it is about seeing the soul as using the body to live out a probatory life on earth with the eventual eternal existence in hell or paradise depending on how one’s life was lived.

It does seem to me that all the above goals are quite expressive of the fact of immortality of the soul and this paints the picture of the soul as the active principle quite different from the body but which operates through bodily organs to achieve its aim. This then puts paid to the fact of dualism as the preferred perspective in understanding soul-body problem.

My position is that mind is not synonymous with soul, but rather is the animated (activated) portion of the physical component of a man which coordinates the brain, the heart and other organs of the body to fulfil the physical and spiritual functions of the body as directed by the “spirited-soul”. The much hullabaloo we have in our intellectual discourse on Mind-body problem is symptomatic of;

   (1) An exercise aimed at distracting man from the truth.
   (2) And attempt at quietly toning down any emphasise on the immortality of the soul, the reality of the after life and the attendant judgment of our earthly actions.
   (3) An effort to reduce the soul to brain processes and to buoy up the theory of annihilation and decomposition as the final end of man.
   (4) To deny the existence of God and His ownership of man as His Creature and the fact of final account of man’s earthly stewardship.
Suffice it therefore to say that, with the above possibilities in mind, the path of wisdom is to toe the line of dualism and emphasise more the reality of the soul over the body. This is the whole import of Berkeley’s arguments in his book *A Treatises Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, where he strove to prove the primacy of spirit over matter. For as the holy writ says “all that is in the world are the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the pride of life and all these shall pass away with the world but only he that does the will of God shall abide forever” (1Jn. 2: 15-17). We are therefore to understand the weight of significance of material and spiritual realities and accord them the importance they deserve in a prioritized order. Any constructive theory which fails to take into consideration the spiritual necessity of dualism will to that extent be deemed a partial view of reality. Just as we feel the air without seeing it, so do we feel the spiritual though we may not be able to bring it to agree with our physicalistic theories. The danger with agnosticism is that it may withhold us from desiring to seek out spiritual truths and then leave us on the threshold of spiritual indifference to the peril of our soul’s inevitable accountability in eternity.

My submissions therefore are as follows;

That the preferability of dualism is anchored on the following points.

1. The fact of Scriptural Revelations that man is a living soul made up a physical body and a spiritual soul.

2. The Uniform testimony of the major religions to the effect that the soul is the spiritual component of man which continues to exist after death – whether as in eternal existence, reincarnation,
transmigration, reunion with the Brahma or as in the case of ancestral spirits as we have in African traditional religion (ATR).

3. The obvious distinction between the living and the dead. The living is animated by the spiritual soul and the dead is left wholly physical because of the absence of the soul.

4. The undeniable presence of spirit originating activities like thinking, willing, reasoning, desiring, affirming, etc, which are absent at death.

5. The activities of the spirit-soul as in dreams. The body lies completely listless and insensitive while the soul having left the body continues its interactive commerce in the dream world.

6. The inviolability of the distinction of Mind (soul) and body by all philosophical constructs whether they are mentalist theories or physicalist theories.

7. The failure of science to use micro-physical predicates to explain or explain away the concept of mental life – the applications of neuroscience, psychology, bio-genetics, etc, have not been able to disprove the discrete existence of the mind. Physics has rather further confirmed the existence of the unobserved through quantum theory.

8. Cartesian dualism which adopts a realist stance in respect of psychophysical interaction but experience has shown that the autonomy of mind from body is only conceptual and not ontological –
interaction still goes on because of intimate relationship and functional complementarity due to coexistence.

9. From the regulative standpoint, a world that is configured wholly from the materialist standpoint will yield a robotic existence with scant regard for sanctity of human life since there will be no vision of responsibility for our actions in the afterlife. The motto will be “let us eat and drink for tomorrow we shall die and shall be dissolved into nothingness”. But this is life complacency at the great risk of confronting the reality of the afterlife with irredeemable shock and consternation. For regulative purposes à la Kant, there is the cautious need to adopt dualism as a more rational perspective.

10. The ancient truism about the fact of opposites found in Anaximander, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Heraclitus, etc., still hold good today, as we see day and night, black and white, life and death, male and female, tall and short, head and tail, etc, so do we have mind (soul) and body. Similarly, we have good and bad (evil) heaven and hell, pure and defiled, weak and strong, rich and poor, (the list is endless).

11. The established fact that consciousness works outside the domain of quantum mechanics – (according to Steven Wigner). This establishes the apartness of the physical and the non-physical reality. The dualism that exists is not simply that of coextensive, intimate discrete properties of the same substance but the existence of conceptually distinct but functionally cooperative existences known as mind (soul) and body.
Review: The Mind Body Problem in Philosophy

For deeper perspectives and criticisms of the theories treated by Osei, it is better grasped by reading the text. What we have done here is to offer a general review of the text. I must state that the text is a product of painstaking research work as it critically examines the different sides of the issues involved in a philosophical understanding of the mind-body problem. I may not agree with Osei’s conclusion but he has striven within the ambit of his preferred framework to defend his position which he calls the Theory of Agnostic Materialism.

I remain a die hard dualist. This may be because of my spiritual and religious orientations. The fact of the distinctive existence of mental and physical realities is as clear the noon day to me. Man is a composite of two complementary (not opposed) but ontically different entities. One is more earth bound and the other (mind/ soul) is more spiritual bound. My inspiration is drawn from the scripture which says that God created man (his body) from the dust of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life and man became a living soul (an embodiment of body- physical and soul -spiritual). (Gen 2.7) Spiritual things belong to a different “form of life” (Wittgenstein, Peter Winch) and can be fully understood within that form of life. And in Ecclesiastes 12:7 we have the account of the immortal nature of the soul. At death, the body returns to the dust (earth) and the soul returns to God who gave it. There may be nothing wrong at the level of academic exercise to theorize and speculate on the nature of the soul and the nature of interaction that exist between it and the body, however, we must note that there is a divine limitation imposed
on man’s epistemological capacity as is borne out by the scriptural wisdom that “revealed things belong to man while secret things belong to our God” (Deut 29:29). This is why we cannot question the rationality of creating dogs with better perceptual capacity than man. The creator of all things endows upon each creature such capacities and abilities as are appropriate for their functional existence. Quoting from Berkeley’s *Principles*:

We should believe that God has dealt with the sons of men, than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge, which he had placed quite out of their reach ... upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. That we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see (8).

Berkeley goes further to say “But no sooner do we depart from sense (revelation) and instinct to follow (purportedly) the light of a superior principles, to reason, meditate and reflect on the nature of things which before we seemed fully to comprehend, prejudices and errors of sense (reason) do from all parts discover themselves to our view... and endeavouring to correct these by reason we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties and inconsistencies which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation” (7). All these, is not to suggest intellectual inactivity or settlement in the vineyard of forlorn scepticism or agnosticism but offers a counsel on the need to always apply what I call the integrativist approach in tackling philosophical problems. This is done by bearing in mind that most problems have their spiritual and physical dimensions. It therefore
necessitates the following of the inner light of the spirit through meaningful search corroborated by divine revelation so as to avoid unnecessary dissipation of intellectual energy in the pursuit of spurious understandings or enervating intellectual wild goose chase.

Now we know in part and in the life to come we shall know all things as they really are (1Cor. 13:13). Suffice it to be content with the knowledge of a mind/soul which is for now intangible, non spatial and spiritual and its interaction with a body that is spatio-temporal and subject to the laws of physics and nature. We can do nothing against the truth of dualism but to accept it willy-nilly or continue to poke at it to our intellectual exhaustion and frustration. On a final note Osei’s book is no doubt an ingenious work in content, outlay and in its analysis of the subject matter. This makes it a crucial “must read” for students, practicing philosophers, psychologists, scientists and the general reader who needs to understand the many sidedness of the conundrum/controversy surrounding the mind-body interaction. That is, the epistemological cum metaphysical debates. Osei’s ingenuity is borne out of his mastery of the many intricate issues that characterize the mind-body problem as is evinced by the confidence of expression, the breadth of literature and the facility of discourse of the relevant issues. The test of the pudding is in the eating. I welcome you to go through the text yourself.
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