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EDITORIAL

The impact of Covid-19 on international security

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International relations are conventionally interpreted within a dialectic between order and disorder. International order (which is not the same as just order) is based on mechanisms for regulating relations between states and economic forces. International order is based on a recurring situation which certainly evolves but does so in a predictable way. These regulations rely on diplomatic apparatuses (bilateral relations between states) and on international and intergovernmental organisations (the UN system, EU, African Union, OSCE, etc.). They are also based on a set of values and practices which are more or less observed and are explained in the UN Charter and the founding texts of these organisations.

Three notions pertain to this conception of international order: international order is based on international law, on multilateralism (states enjoy equal rights on the international stage, hegemonies are rejected), and on the idea of international co-operation meaning states today are interdependent, face common challenges, and solutions can only be found through co-operation between states. The World Health Organisation, for example, was initially based on this idea. In its teaching, the Catholic Church adds to this approach the fundamental notion of pursuing the common good.

This order-centred approach is challenged by the dynamic between states which intend to establish their place in the international system by pursuing and increasing their power and by serving their national interest alone. Seen from this angle, international relations are also about the rivalry between states, the geopolitics of powers, and an exacerbated economic and financial competition (geoeconomics) which tends to turn all sectors of activity, including health and education, into mere international markets subject to international competition. Threats and reprisals, international sanctions, and the use of law as a weapon are all tools available to states in search of power and hegemony.

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Thus, international relations are based on this dialectic between order and disorder, entropy and negentropy. The Covid-19 crisis has of course had many kinds of impact on this dialectic and therefore, more specifically, on peace and international security; we can quickly list these now before we turn to two obvious lessons learned from this international crisis: the need to integrate a foresight dimension into policies and risk as a central figure of the contemporary international scene.

1 – Rising tensions and deregulation

The current crisis has not strengthened solidarity and co-operation between states. On the contrary, it has weakened them. We have thus seen a rise in tensions between the United States and China over the origin of the virus and heard calls for compensation to be paid by the Chinese government. President Trump has also decided to halt funding for WHO – an organisation which everyone agrees is in need of reform but also recognises that it is indispensable. China has taken advantage of the situation to tighten its grip on Hong Kong and attempt to further marginalise Taiwan. "What if... China uses the coronavirus crisis to promote its world vision?" asks the Institute for Security Studies.

Relations between the United States and Iran have hardened. In Syria and Yemen, the Covid-19 crisis has provided opportunities for the dominant belligerents to strengthen their positions. Another disadvantage of the crisis is that it has brought all international negotiations on arms-control issues to a halt. The economic crisis generated has increased the competition between states (the war of masks, exacerbated competition in the search for a vaccine) and, once the crisis is over, it risks leading to exacerbated economic nationalism which the topic of economic sovereignty illustrates very clearly. As far as Europe is concerned, whilst ending the crisis has seen the outline of a Franco-German partnership, and knowing that there was no common health policy, we are nevertheless forced to note the discord that has prevailed in the reactions to the first wave of coronavirus and the absence of a real concerted policy.

Emerging markets, particularly oil producers, were hit hard, as were commodity-producing countries. Also, many tourist markets have been completely destroyed together with many Middle Eastern economies that are directly dependent on them (Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, etc.). The tourism revenues of a country like Turkey are around 26 billion dollars a year – a big share of which is earned during the summer months – which represents around 3.5 per cent of its GDP.

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The countries confronted with such a loss of income will need to borrow, which risks causing a real explosion in the debt markets of emerging oil-importing and -exporting countries in the Middle East.

In the United States 30 to 40 per cent of American shale producers are expected to go bankrupt and, internationally, this can only give rise to tensions between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia since the United States does not have the same levers to reduce production. To this we can add the fact that for countries that live off oil lower revenues mean they will have less money to spend on all sorts of things, including social services. Dire budget cuts are to be expected, including, for example, in public-health spending in Saudi Arabia.

At a time when relations between Europe and China were supposed to address major issues such as the granting of 5G licences and the bilateral investment agreement, the crisis has in a way reshuffled the cards, requiring both immediate co-operation from a scientific point of view, but also showing the Chinese government's often problematic capacity for influence and interference by means of a proactive diplomacy which verges on aggressive provocation with some states. The new awareness of an overdependence on the Middle Empire will probably have a direct impact on foreign policies and could lead to a geopolitical Europe or divisions over geopolitical stakes between European countries who favour NATO and the United States, European countries who accept China's economic and financial dominance, and finally countries who want a geopolitical Europe.

It is of course worrying that the United Nations have shown themselves to be powerless in this global situation. WHO's inability to provide timely and relevant information is glaring proof of the need to reorganise a global structure which is in many ways necessary but which today is subject to influence from private donors and to multiple political constraints. The global pandemic has not come up against an international political structure able to stop its spread.

Human-rights violations: At a national level we have seen individual freedoms being restricted in very many countries. In authoritarian regimes these restrictions are in fact tantamount to human-rights violations. In democratic regimes the many restrictions imposed have raised fears about the emergence of a domestic security order which could lead to the emergence of societies based on mistrust instead of societies normally based on trust. The debates about "track and trace" which should be the subject of particular attention are one illustration of what is at stake in a latent security order.

It is of course the subject of the right to health that has been most strongly debated during this period. This right is obviously guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has been expanded over the years. In the Preamble to its Constitution, WHO considers the right to health to be a fundamental human right which includes the right to access healthcare, the right to access information, and the prohibition of discrimination in the provision of medical services. What does the right to access healthcare mean? In the current pandemic the United States and other developed countries are being confronted with this same old question, which becomes more acute in the case of developing countries and, of course, overcrowded refugee camps throughout the world.

Access to adequate healthcare is therefore a problem. The second right stipulated by WHO is the right to access information. Governments have to prevent misinformation at all costs and provide accurate and timely health advice. And yet, in many places we have seen disinformation policies such as in France with the criminal refusal to recommend the wearing of masks; in China, of course, where the government restricted information and closed the debate in the name of stability or some form of collective security; or in the Middle East where Iran interrogated or detained journalists who contradicted or questioned official reports and warned that those who published statistics other than government figures would be arrested, whilst at the same time it issued orders censoring the media. In Egypt Prime Minister Moustafa Madbouly warned that legal action would be taken against anyone spreading false rumours about the pandemic.

Social inequalities: the Covid-19 crisis has reinforced inequalities both within societies and internationally: inequalities between individuals and inequalities between peoples. These inequalities are about meeting fundamental needs: health, already mentioned, and patients' ability to survive also point to already existing inequalities – excess mortality among Afro-American populations is one of the most dramatic illustrations of this, but this situation can be found in the poorest groups everywhere in the world; food also, with fears over an imminent famine in the eastern Horn of Africa and Yemen; but also situations of great poverty in rich countries. Gulf countries, just like those in the European Union, have been unable to reach an agreement, political reactions were recorded on a national basis, with different effects in each country. But a recurring problem has been relations between nationals and expatriates. In Kuwait, for example, there have been some tensions among nationals who have almost accuses migrant workers or expatriates of importing the virus. It is certainly true that many workers and labourers live

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close to each other in camps that may not be as healthy as possible, and there are sudden outbreaks of cases among migrant communities living in work camps.

There have been many situations where tensions arose between expatriates and nationals, perhaps particularly in certain small Gulf states where expatriates represent a significant majority of the population and have always been viewed with a certain reservation by some.

Political leadership crisis: one of the most striking aspects of this crisis has been the absence of political leadership at an international level. In Europe no political leader has been able to deliver a message that could be heard at a European level, let alone an international one. As for President Trump, he is firmly entrenched in his unilateralist and demagogic way of thinking. Moreover, as we shall see, the current crisis has revealed states' weaknesses particularly with regard to their ability to anticipate a crisis that had long been predicted by foresight studies, but also with regard to some ministries' ability to manage the complexity of contemporary societies as well as the actual monitoring of public policies needing to be implemented. The case of the French Ministry for Health is a good example of this political, technical, and managerial failing and a perfect counterexample to MIT's approach to problem solving. At the hearing of the former French Minister for Health everyone could see the extent to which the comparison between the private sector and the public sector was clearly to the disadvantage of the latter.

The issue of "state capacities" has rightly been raised by Francis Fukuyama. At the end of the Cold War the latter became known to a wider public thanks to his book *The End of History*. The American political analyst has written several times on the subject of the coronavirus crisis, particularly in the *Foreign Affairs* journal. The academic's purpose has been to consider the various consequences of the crisis depending on the country. Whilst, for him, regime typology does not seem relevant when seeking to explain a state's successes or failures in coping with the challenge posed by Covid-19, there are nevertheless three criteria which in his eyes seem to explain the results observed: "State capacity, social trust and leadership". The emphasis is thus laid on the interrelationship that governs relations between the ruler's individual figure, the collective structure that organises action – the state –, and citizens' social trust in each other. At an international level, Fukuyama, like other authors, has noted that Asian states, particularly China, have fared better than European and North American states. Economically and politically, the shift in international relations towards the Far East is continuing, to the detriment of the United States whose decline seems inevitable.

Fukuyama holds a pessimistic view: nationalism, isolationism, xenophobia, and global attacks on the liberal order are trends that tend to accelerate with the coronavirus crisis. The re-emergence of borders and the rise of nationalism are both aggravating factors leading to a rise in conflicts but, given that a large number of governments are using the crisis to domestic political ends, it is intrastate rather than international instability that seems more likely to him. These assertions are the subject of critical debate. The refusal to differentiate between regimes deserves to be questioned. Illiberal regimes led by populists seem in fact to be in greater difficulty than liberal democracies. Trump, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Putin are dealing with specific difficulties and their disastrous handling of the crisis cannot simply be compared with the failures of some European countries such as Italy for example.

Overall, we can see that authoritarian leaders have continued to accrue powers in civil societies thanks to quarantine policies. Indeed, Covid-19 has reinforced authoritarian tendencies as with the emergency legislation designed to contain the spread of the virus in the Middle East. Thus, with the spread of Covid-19 the Arab human-rights demonstrations which started in 2019 and were heralded as an echo of the Arab Spring have stopped. Citizens now have their movements and aspirations tracked by compulsory applications on their mobile phones as in China, Israel, and Singapore but, whether in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, or Saudi Arabia, the governments of all these countries have used coronavirus as an excuse to suppress freedom of expression, ban demonstrations, imprison dissidents, and shore up their power.

Moreover, two further criticisms can be levelled at Fukuyama. Can it be said that China has handled the crisis better when lies are state policy there, as Emmanuel Lincot's contribution to this volume clearly shows? Similarly, can we claim that international instability is less of a concern than internal disorder? The rise in tensions between the United States and China is obvious and fraught with risk, as is China's adventurist policy in its immediate strategic region. Finally, in his contribution Marc Finaud shows the impact of the crisis on ongoing international negotiations, particularly in the nuclear field. Besides, Fukuyama's predictions about the impact of this crisis on the poor countries of the South, in particular the growth in immigration and the consequent rise in xenophobia point in the direction of increased international instability.

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2 – Lessons learnt from the global pandemic

Multiple challenges without a suitable international policy

For a long time now globalisation and the intertwining of spheres of activity have seriously affected the development of national foreign policies, while the economic and financial crisis of 2006 has imposed drastic revisions in the field of defence. National foreign policymaking has been made difficult by a historical shift in security issues: the end of the Cold War has blurred the figure of the "enemy"; to the logic of binary interstate confrontation has been added a multifaceted threat that makes the choice of a new international architecture uncertain, an architecture which is moreover being hampered by the rise of populism and illiberal regimes. The evolution of security theories bears witness to this. Over the last 20 years there has been talk of unilateralism, empire, a multipolar world, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, economic war, pandemics, and so on. The French case is exemplary here: White Papers on defence have come one after another without any sign of a clear strategy. Relations between the United States, Europe, and China are at the crossroads of these uncertainties, with ambivalence being the order of the day between these three players, between, on the one hand, the obligation to co-operate within a framework of economic and financial interdependence and, on the other hand, economic and industrial rivalries, multiple tensions at a strategic level, and military co-operation that is sometimes under strain.

In Europe the difficulty in drawing up a common foreign and security policy stems in particular from the diversity of Europeans' political projects. To take up Sabine Saurugger's classification, it is obvious that Europe's external projection differs according to whether one sees Europe from a national civic perspective ordered around the tension between democratic order and illegitimate elites, or sees it as an extension of democracy (the case put forward by European federalists), whether one agrees with the proponents of liberal post-nationalism that "the European Union is a set of procedures, rights, and standards that influence national democracies and make them more democratic", or espouses Kantian cosmopolitanism. This probably reflects a specific characteristic of the European Union which is that, originally, it was a foreign policy objective of its Member States, the question then being whether European policy is still an area of foreign policy or is now integrated into domestic policy. The answer is likely to vary depending on a state's date of accession and the degree of integration

accepted. However, it is clear that the foreign policy of such a group can only be defined in the long term and is not fit for a rapid response in times of crisis.

Torn between the wish of some to remain under American protection, the willingness of others to confine Europe to crisis prevention and management – and not crisis resolution –, and the fierce desire of sovereigntists, one wonders whether Europe has a projection of itself on the world map. US policy in a way helps complicate matters. Trump's foreign-policy rhetoric, which is partly at odds with that of his predecessor, is not going in the direction desired by Europeans and, in practice, the points of conflict are multiplying as can be seen in relation to NATO. Worse still, in a way: George Friedman, director of the Stratfor think tank, did not hesitate to write in his exercise in international foresight: "It is unreasonable to talk of Europe as if it were an entity. It is not, in spite of the existence of the European Union. Europe consists of a series of sovereign and contentious nation-states." And Europe as such does not exist in his exercise in style titled *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century…*

A few years ago, Nicole Gnesotto already pointed out two major developments in her view: on the one hand, the United States' inability in the medium term to ensure international security on its own; but also, and this is the argument that matters to us here, the very evolution of security: "the non-military dimensions of crises – whether in terms of their unfolding or their pacification – have taken on considerable importance over the past two decades. Who can still believe that the solution to the Lebanese conflict or the Iranian question requires military confrontation? How can we fail to recognise, in the case of Afghanistan, the inadequacy of strategies based solely on weighing up the balance of power? Intensified by the emergence of global threats (climate, health, crime, terrorist networks, etc.), the inadequacy and relativity of the military machine in managing crises have become a major factor in the face of which the strategic modernity of the European framework is evident." The pandemic further reinforces this perception.

The end of the Cold War saw a succession of paradigms attempting to describe the course taken by contemporary international relations. Fukuyama, already cited, and Huntington were among the first to try their hand at it. But the attacks of 11 September 2001 turned the first phase of the post-Cold-War era upside down, with observers describing the "emergence of hyper-terrorism" (Heisbourg) and invoking the "era of chaos" (Delpech), a dialectic of order and disorder which the war in Afghanistan and then the invasion of Iraq in 2005 reinforced. Are we to think that this period was reduced to a "phase" after the death of Osama Bin Laden which coincided with the Arab Revolutions? During

the same period another theme gained momentum: that of financial crises, which now seem to be a structural feature of global capitalism and are currently threatening the ambition of some European states to forge a European political and economic power in the 21st century.

Hyper-terrorism, financial crisis, and the regulatory capacity of politics – what these first two issues have in common is that they reveal the limits or difficulties of a state in ensuring both internal and international order. And whilst the United States' Republican responses have suggested a continuation of the American empire, the withdrawal of US troops this time by the Democrats – a withdrawal completed in December 2011 in the case of Iraq and scheduled in the case Afghanistan –, against the backdrop of the financial crisis and Chinese competition, demonstrates the awkward tribulations of the American power in the early 21st century.

These first two issues have a second point in common. They point analysts back to the difficult exercise of deciphering the dialectic between major trends and the occurrence of an event. Whilst the September 11 attacks were imaginable, they were not plausible enough for American national defence experts. The "sleeping citadel" (Guisnel) had become bureaucratic, its actions "routine": contrary to Heisbourg's thesis mentioned above, one of the observations made by experts is that, if American secret services had been better co-ordinated or had paid better heed to warnings from European services, the worst would probably not have happened. Similarly, the predictable onset of the subprime crisis has profoundly damaged the economic and financial outlook, and the cyclical nature of crises has opened a period of uncertainty about the viability of some states and, more fundamentally, about the sustainability of the international financial system. The pandemic is the third major example of a risk which had been foreseen by various analysts (see the contributions of Paul de Puybusque and Valérie Fert) and in a way already experienced at smaller scales, but was the object of no precaution and no prospective work on the part of politicians, whether at a national level or at the level of the international organisations concerned. We now know that there are five major challenges awaiting not just one state or one power but all states. These five challenges are: the demographic challenge; the economic challenge for developing countries; the challenge of global warming; the challenge of available reserves; and the challenge of implementing global health policies in the face of pandemic risks.

But states are not on an equal footing when dealing with these challenges. Their control and possession of the necessary energies, whether fossil or renewable, are very different, as is their level of economic development. States'

capacities in the face of epidemic risks are also very varied. Finally, their place in history and race for power are also important differentiating factors. One of the reasons for the meagre outcomes of world summits is that, while the above-mentioned challenges require a comprehensive and concerted approach, the rivalry between states persists. This is clearly shown by Emmanuel Lincot in his analysis deciphering Chinese strategy during the coronavirus episode. Even as we recognise the perceptual effects in the mutual accusations the Chinese and North Americans are levelling at each other, it is no less true that the two powers remain rivals, geoeconomics being an inescapable reality in the ongoing competition.

Planetary disorder is linked to a long list of unsolved issues. While it is possible to agree on the five major challenges mentioned, the question of solutions remains more elusive. It has at least three different dimensions. The first one concerns the very consensus among the solutions mentioned. Depending on the challenges, the order of different kinds of knowledge varies as does the knowledge of the consequences of possible responses. Uncertainties linked to knowledge make it necessary to reason in terms of scenarios, whether optimistic or prescriptive ones; or again, as we learn the lessons of history, to ask the question of possible "ruptures", which brings our reflection back to the dialectic of the event and the long term initially evoked. The uncertainty linked to the state of our knowledge aside, the difficulty as to the solutions to be applied lies in a political engineering over which we have little control, but which we know cannot be carried out by individual states alone.

The issue therefore is co-operation between states, something which is frequently addressed by game theory in particular. Rapoport and Jervis, each in his own way, gave us some answers. But between rationality and the interplay of passions, or simply the competence of those in power, there is a wide margin which points to the possibility of harmful competitive games. Thus, international stability today depends on the understanding that risk is central, that a prospective anticipatory approach is becoming crucial, and that only international co-operation can enable effective crisis management, which needs to lead to reforming international structures – one thinks particularly of WHO – rather than abolishing or abandoning them.

An international risk society: faced with these uncertainties in terms of knowledge and action, it is therefore risk that appears to be central in contemporary international relations. Beck already described some of its particular characteristics long ago. We can probably broaden the scope of his observation and speak of a global risk society. Strategists, for their part, may consider the

innovative nature of this observation. After all, the Cold War was very much defined by the risk associated with the use of nuclear weapons, a risk which was circumscribed by the rhetoric and strategy of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, the risk was then as important as it was limited: limited to two superpowers, limited to one type of weapon use, and strategically framed by a doctrine of graduated response. Today's novelty comes from the multitude of risks and the spread of threats within many "normal" activities involving multiple political actors who are subjected to the invisible but deadly hand of the markets; it also comes from a segmentation of thought and a specialisation of approaches that does little justice to the complexity of the issues at stake. The American report on security *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2010) has taken note of these changes by taking up the concept of "natural security" which brings together within the same analysis the question of the new balance of power between mineral resources, energy, food, and finance.

For the new issues linked to the geopolitics of pandemics call into question many intellectual certainties. Under the influence of a realist view of the world, the response that won almost universal support was to conceive of security as a matter of survival and to assume that we were facing an existential threat. These are the well-known concepts of security and safety which were essentially seen as concerning the physical survival of the nation state and a potential armed aggression against it. Peace was thus reduced to a question of defence and considered the preferred subject of "defence and strategy" studies.

Under the influence of this approach, international-relations analyses have long treated security as an empirical subject, not least because of the equivalence established by this realist school of thought between the notions of security and power. From that point on, security analyses have been reduced to mapping power and military threats, whilst peace has been seen as a situation of non-rupture, of status quo in relation to this order, which is the notion of the balance of power. Thus, one recalls Raymond Aron's judgement "impossible war, unlikely peace" about the East-West rivalry, thereby neglecting the internal analysis of the opposing actors. Consequently, those analyses that chose to focus on peace from a perspective other than the international order perceived as this balance of power have been marginalised and relegated to the voluntary sector.

By favouring the empirical perspective, these analyses have nevertheless neglected a fundamental dimension of security: its ontological and epistemological dimension. As expressed by the writings of Hobbes and, in a completely different style, those of Edgar Morin (cf. *Pour sortir du 20ième siècle* ("How to end the 20th century")), security is about "being", existence, knowledge, the relationship with other human beings, the mediation between life and death,

and between chaos and order. This is analysed in *Politics of Security* by Michaël Dillon who argues that, whilst security has thus been the basis of modern political thought, the task of political practice has been to "secure security" by instrumentalising technology. This has only been conceived of within the framework of the state. This approach has today been adopted by many think tanks that focus on defence studies and threat analysis. And yet, this approach is necessarily called into question for two reasons: on the one hand, all the analyses that revolve around the notion of human security tend in fact to demonstrate that the state can in many ways constitute an element of insecurity for the individual – either because of the policies pursued by governments, or because of its fragility.

It is also the metaphysics underlying realist theories that foresight research calls into question: thus, drawing on scientific research, particularly in biology, Jeremy Rifkin's latest books describe the requirements of a "new consciousness for a world in crisis" and call for a "civilisation of empathy", explaining that "our problems stem from a disconnection between our vision of the planet and our ability to achieve it: our brains, our mental structures predispose us to a way of feeling, thinking, and acting in the world that no longer suits the new contexts we have created for ourselves".

The realist and state-centred approach was maintained after the Second World War and during the bipolarity of the Cold War, but since the end of the 1990s the phenomena of globalisation, transnationalisation, fragmentation, the emergence of networks, diasporas, etc. have given rise to a new way of seeing the world. The themes of chaos, disorder, heterogeneity, civilisational clash, and balkanisation set forth in the neorealists' rhetoric have replaced the idea of order and certainty, introducing the question of doubt, epistemological fear, and uncertainty. Thus, the state is no longer the central actor, while the preservation of security and promotion of peace need to be placed within a broader approach: there are more actors as civil society has been included in the international sphere and religious actors have again been taken into consideration, as have cultures in all their diversity. One recognises here Huntington's theses for example. Moreover, globalisation has brought the economy back to the forefront together with the problem of its political regulation; as a result, development aid has been turned upside down. This approach certainly has its limits: who are the central actors and who the secondary ones? How should peace issues be prioritised today? Challenges to the bipolar order have led to a fundamental uncertainty of which various countries' "White Papers" on defence are telling examples given their difficulty in discerning the "face" of the enemy. But, here again, a broadening of the classic research done during this second post-Cold-War phase leads us to

counterbalance this perception of change: if we include in our analysis of societies not only the theme of security but also that of change, and therefore that of order and disorder, then we can include in our approaches the by now classic work of Edgar Morin on entropy and negentropy (*La Méthode* ("The method")), that of De Rosnay, and the more recent work of Henri Atlan, in particular *Le vivant post-génomique* ("Postgenomic living beings") which deals with self-organisation and contributes a great deal to our understanding of governance.

These brief remarks demonstrate the current challenge for our reflections: should we stick to a classic approach to peace and security while taking into account the most recent work; or should we move to a more fundamental level which integrates our approach to peace into a more global approach to contemporary changes and a reflection on the cycles of order and disorder that are linked to change? In terms of analysis, this points to a global question that has already been raised albeit in other words: can we continue to conceive of security as a question of defence and strategy? And how can we clearly define an approach to peace without diluting this concept or simply making it the equivalent of democracy? Among various authors, Barry Buzan is one of those to whom we owe an examination of the relationship between security and defence, as well as an attempt to theorise the issue of security. In his classic *People, States and Fear*, first published in 1987, Buzan had already argued that security was not limited to national (or state) security alone, but that it extended to new objects and sectors. These were the military, political, economic, environmental, and societal sectors. However, Buzan's analysis was not confined to describing this phenomenon, it also attempted to explain it. To this end, he seemed to argue that the extension of security was the result of the emergence of new "objective" threats against Western societies. In doing so, Buzan anticipated a contemporary approach and described at an international level what Beck saw within societies and analysed as the emergence of a "risk society". Whilst one intellectual tradition has seen security and peace in terms of threats, it is clear that risk is different, shifting the analysis from specific sectors – identified actors and weapons – to the idea of more diffuse threats that ultimately arise from the perverse effects – in the sociological sense of the term – of the multiple interactions of human actions, as in the case of environmental issues or biopolitics.

Buzan thus enabled internationalists to broaden the agenda of security studies to new sectors (economic, environmental, demographic, identity, etc.) and to deepen it by introducing new reference objects such as the international, regional, local, or even society, the nation, community, group, individual, etc., the risk then being that levels of analysis could somehow be "diluted".

By associating security with risk, Beck encouraged internationalists to consider the prospective dimension of their approach and subject of study. However, two approaches coexist within foresight: a risk-based approach and another based on change.

The risk-based approach: risk is to be distinguished from threat and requires a more general reflection on modernity. This approach is generally that of Beck, being extended to international relations: we live in risk societies, where risk is now the fundamental characteristic. Whilst the idea of threats refers to a precise identification of adversary actors, the idea of risk introduces the notions of uncertainty and probabilities, broadening the spectrum of areas to be monitored. The *Center for 21st Century Studies* and *Jamestown Foundation* are among the interesting sites that belong to this approach. The *Center for 21 Century Studies* tries to identify 21st-century issues that pose risks: urbanisation, international mobility, finance, climate security, but also bioethics, and media and digital-culture issues. Here we can gauge one of the essential aspects of foresight: anticipating a future that does not yet exist but whose potential threats to societies rather than a particular group are imagined. The same goes for bioethics or digital culture where risk, security, and safety interact.

Within this approach there is an undercurrent, not too far removed, which emphasises the developments observed by thinking in terms of "challenges". This approach is less negative or pessimistic; thus, the difference between this school of thought and the one based on risk relates to the role of the heuristic of fear which divides the community of risk thinkers. The challenge-based approach also has the merit of drawing on the idea of a common humanity which needs to collectively overcome the challenges identified. Its weakness may be that it does not insist enough on the political framework of debates. Thus, the Millennium Project has identified "15 Global Challenges facing humanity": sustainable development and climate change, clean water, population and resources, democratisation, long-term perspectives, global convergences of IT, rich-poor gap, health issues, capacity to decide, peace and conflict, status of women, transnational organised crime, energy, science and technology, and global ethics. As we can see, there is a specific entry for peace and conflict, while all the other approaches ultimately relate to the survival of humanity, the future integrity of life on earth, and harmony between social and national groups. This approach also draws on systemism.

It includes a scenario-based method structured in a matrix around six main themes that arise from the concept of human security and for which the

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participation of other centres or actors is required: demographic and human resources, environmental change and biodiversity, technological capacity, governance and conflict, international economics and wealth, and integration and whole futures.

The change-based approach: there is also a change-based approach which is central to the thinking of foresight analysts. The main idea is to follow radical changes in our societies, particularly in science and technology. Intellectual mediation is then necessary to combine this prospective approach with thinking about peace: it is the future attacks on our integrity that are thus anticipated. The *Institute for Alternatives Studies*, *Foundation on Economics Trends*, or *Foresight Network* can be classed as belonging to this school of thought.

   Thus, as we have seen, the geopolitics of pandemics requires a multidisciplinary approach which integrates not one but several different social time scales. It raises the issue of the multiple inequalities in accessing resources and rights, with a particular emphasis on going beyond state interests. It is ultimately inseparable from an ethical reflection on the current course of international relations.

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