Interlocking concepts in Sartre’s ontology of human freedom

Abstract

In a way, Jean Paul Sartre can be regarded as a transcendentalist of the phenomenological persuasion. Central to his existential ontology and theory of phenomenology is the question of human consciousness. Sartre’s analysis of the concepts of Being, Nothingness, Negation, Freedom and the phenomenon is closely connected to his theory of consciousness. Nevertheless, this consciousness is neither a container nor is it self-contained. Rather, by the act of intentionality, consciousness is forever reaching out to the world as facticity. It is consciousness that marks the boundary between “being-in- itself” and “being-for-itself. It is consciousness that manifests as nothingness in man and also projects into nothingness as the absolute foundation of things. It is consciousness that rejects a state of affair and this rejection amounts to a state of negation. Yet, this self-manifesting attributes of consciousness demonstrate how consciousness manifests its vital possibilities as ecstatic freedom. The bottom line of Sartre’s existential ontology therefore, is that the whole talk about Being, Nothingness, Negation, Phenomenon etc amplify the fact that the ultimate significance of consciousness to human existence is that it constitutes the basis of human freedom. Invariably, without consciousness, man would not know if he is free or not as he would not be able to categorise things in the universe.

Accordingly, this paper situates Sartre’s conception of freedom within his analysis of Being and Nothingness all of which have their basis in human consciousness. We intend to show how consciousness determines what constitutes Being, non-Being, negation, phenomenon and freedom. On the whole, we show that Sartre’s phenomenological and ontological analysis of Being and Nothingness is intended to argue the point that consciousness determines what manifest as Being or as Nothingness. How human consciousness authentically does this constitutes the realm of freedom for Sartre.