PROSELYTISM AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM IMPROPER IRRELIGIOUS INFLUENCE : THE EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION

Jurisprudentially speaking, "proselytism" is a concept within the larger genus of the protection of religious rights and freedoms. The word lends itself to differing opinions. However, there is a popular school of thought that "proselytism" has to do only with influencing people to adopt a particular religion. Such an understanding relies on the view that only the "religious" can be insidious and bear the potential to improperly proselytise, and thus excludes the possibility of improper irreligious forms of influence. In referring to the example of public-school education, it is argued that as much as the religious has the potential for improper proselytising, irreligious teachings or expressions also run the risk of improper proselytising. Not only are irreligious beliefs in many instances diametrically opposed to religious beliefs; they are a belief in themselves and cannot be seen as necessarily harmless or without the potential to proselytise improperly. Consequently, this article introduces an equitable and accommodative understanding of proselytism, which places the potentially harmful effects of both religious and irreligious beliefs on an equal footing with each other (something befitting to plural and democratic paradigms). This article therefore also cultivates further debate on improper irreligious proselytism in religious rights and freedoms jurisprudence, a scant topic in human rights jurisprudence.


Introduction
The words "proselytism" and "proselytise" descend from a Greek word proselutos, meaning "one who has come to a place" or "one who comes over".Jurisprudentially speaking, proselytism is a concept within the larger genus of the protection of religious rights and freedoms, and lends itself to differing opinions. 1There are also different insights into proselytism emanating from the various traditional religions and the plethora of denominations within each. 2 However, a substantial school of thinking assumes that proselytism can take place only in a religious context.
Lawrence Uzzell comments: "We live in an age of persuasion, in which we are bombarded by political and commercial messages designed to change our thoughts and actions, but the unfavourable term 'proselytism' is reserved for specifically religious persuaders." 3 Uzzell adds that "[s]ecular specialists on human rights and international law, even those who defend freedom of conscience, now use the word 'proselytism' to mean any attempt by any religious believer to win converts from other religions or from irreligion". 4e question arises whether improper proselytism is relevant only to "religious forms of improper influence" and excludes other forms of "improper belief influence".It is argued in the article that influencing the beliefs of someone improperly can include a kind of proselytising action pertaining to a belief, which is not only religious by nature but also of one that is irreligious.In addition to improper "religious" proselytism, improper proselytism should include an understanding of improper  SA de Freitas.BProc LLB LLM (UFS).Associate Professor, Department of Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law, University of the Free State.Email: defreitas@ufs.ac.za "irreligious" proselytism.This article illustrates this understanding by means of the risks embedded in exclusively irreligious public education and teaching. 5

The right to freedom of religion, belief and education
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 and the European Convention on Human Rights 7 it is clear that freedom of thought is a basic right of "everyone".
There is no age limit at which people begin to enjoy such a legal right.Young persons (and therefore pupils) have a right to freedom of thought.This right is important in the context of school education, where a student's freedom of thought may be restricted by ideological indoctrination. 8Article 5(1)(b) of the Convention against Discrimination in Education places the emphasis on the protection of a person's (or group's) convictions as well as the protection of the liberty of parents to have their children morally educated in accordance with their convictions. 9 5 By this it is not implied that there are no public institutions in democratic and plural societies where religious knowledge is forced upon irreligious recipients.Nonetheless, the focus of this article is on those public teaching institutions in so-called democratic and plural societies, such as schools, where irreligious forms of knowledge are forced upon irreligious recipients.Needless to say, the argument presented in this article will also be of value to instances where religious knowledge is forced upon an irreligious recipient, or where a religion is forced upon a recipient loyal to another religion.thinking there are those who take the view that "religious" content should be removed from teaching at public institutions.This endeavour to remove religion from teaching at public schools assumes that teaching can be divorced from religion and, therefore, that such teaching is belief free.In a truly democratic and plural society, public schools need to accommodate a wide range of cultural and religious backgrounds, which precludes their organisation in accordance with any thick concept of the good. 16e positivistic preoccupation in education with "elements of reality alone" or with the mere accumulation of "empirical facts" obstructs the relevance of these facts in their relation to human life in its totality. 17Reverence for facts and the acquisition of scientific knowledge (in an exclusive manner) result in a national system of education that provides its students with manifold simplistic "answers", but is always painfully lacking in profound questions. 18This positivism is also similar to humanist approaches towards education, which support the view that the scientific method is applicable to all areas of human concern, and is the only valid means for determining truth. 19In many instances, school authorities, although not setting out to promote irreligious worldviews, have an underlying worldview of modern education that divorces humankind from its dependence on religious answers to many of the ultimate questions of human existence with irreligious answers.In this regard, irreligious education gives irreligious answers to ultimate questions and conveys its irreligious understanding of reality essentially as a matter of faith.20 Just as there is a risk for a public school to place too much emphasis on a specific religious component in its teaching, there is the risk of a public school substantially withdrawing the religious element from its teaching curriculum.This has implications for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be understood, where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper influence.

Iain Benson comments: 21
Just as it is an error to use 'faith' as a code word for religious faith because of our various forms of 'faith', and to continue to speak in blanket fashion of 'unbelievers' so it is an error to view a non-religious form of public education as one lacking 'faith' commitments.
Added to this is the erroneous understanding that "the public" is divorced from all religious content.The term "public education" is popularly understood in liberal societies in a manner that suggests that "religious education" is to be excluded from the public, and that "public education" means "irreligious education".In the words of Iain Benson, "A division between education called public and religious education also implies, if it does not expressly state it, that a bright-line exists between something we call the 'public' and something else, in this case education that is religious". 22is misconception of "the public", implying a sphere devoid of all religious discourse, could lead to "secular intolerance", where the state sets out to cleanse the public sphere from any actual reference to religious beliefs and practice. 23This understanding that religion is a highly privatised matter poses the risk of creating an understanding of proselytism that is restricted to religious expression only.As soon as religion raises its head in the public domain, attempts are made at stifling it, lest it would overstep its "private" boundaries and hinder the so-called neutral space of the public.Consequently, irreligious forms of expression in the public domain (which includes public schools) and their potentially manipulative proselytising influence occur unchecked.This is also evident in the plethora of jurisprudence and case law where proselytism is dealt with mainly under the banner of "the religious".Another reason as to why "the irreligious" might seem foreign to proselytism is liberalism's understanding, in the context of education, of the idea that faith and rational reflection are mutually exclusive.This ignores the fact that no proof of anything can be so completely drawn as to eliminate its dependence on undemonstrable givens.constitutes an act of faith. 24Therefore, where ultimate concerns rest on irreligious beliefs, then such ultimate concerns also stand the risk of being used in a manipulative manner.Therefore, in education the irreligious can also result in improper proselytism.
This dialectic between the religious and the irreligious in education becomes more fraught when the question of pupils' moral education is raised.In some courses, texts and teachers adopt a "values clarification" approach to moral issues, suggesting that pupils need to clarify and choose their values.Values clarification in its usual form is diametrically opposed to the belief that moral standards derived from religion are absolutely binding. 25When the religious view is excluded from the entire curriculum, students may come to the conclusion that religion is somehow less then acceptable or a private matter not to be discussed openly. 26In the context of courses such as social studies, history, current events, literature, health, hygiene, home economics and family living, typically a question is posed, diverse alternatives are suggested and considered, and the problem is freely discussed. 27Arguments and factors of various types -with the exception of religious considerations -are raised and analysed, and both individual and group solutions are arrived at on an entirely secular basis. 28This subtly provides an aggressive and intolerant approach towards anything religious and allows other beliefs (irreligious) in its place.In a study of textbooks in Missouri in America, for example, it was found that there are few theistic references in textbook descriptions of present-day life and literature.In this we find the inculcation of humanism (which represents a central belief system) by elimination of theism. 29 implications for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be understood, where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper influence.
A central task of public schools in a democratic and plural dispensation is to transmit and reproduce the specific cultural, religious and political traditions of the communities they serve.A school that takes this task seriously, whilst simultaneously adopting a posture of strict neutrality by means of any secular or religious worldview, is oxymoronic. 30There is a problem in education in defining neutrality, because making a neutral choice in education is making a choice. 31Neutrality, when applied as a principle, holds that other principles (for example, those based on religious convictions) may not be included or even accommodated.It is this kind of purported "strict neutrality" which feeds a positivistic approach into school education.The argument against a neutral education can be understood by reference to Nagel's more general claim that liberal theory is non-neutral, because it discounts conceptions that depend on interpersonal relations.Indeed, the family, and particularly the parental bond, constitutes such relations, ignored by the call for religiously neutral education. 32In fact, the "neutral" law will inevitably collide with the moral obligations of individuals, especially in cases where the state assumes the prerogative to organise the curricula of schools without considering the religious or philosophical convictions of parents in the pursuit of supposed "neutrality". 33Against the background of Lautsi and Others v Italy, where the ECtHR dealt with whether crucifixes could be displayed in classrooms, Wouter De Been comments that: 34 … a growing body of evidence … suggests that it is impossible to section off a distinct category of artefacts that sends out a symbolic meaning from another set of objects that does not.Our experience of the world is inescapably qualitative, drenched in emotive and aesthetic meaning.Consequently, taking away the cross will not result in an absence of symbols, but in a symbol of absence, a symbolic absence of religion within a ring-fenced space created by a secular initiative.The same applies to efforts in many liberal paradigms towards ridding public education from anything religious.Having therefore looked at religion and belief in teaching, its protection in human rights instruments, the understanding that religion forms part of the public domain, as well as to how, for example, the teaching of positivist values and calls for neutrality introduce a dominant irreligious influence in the classroom, the relevance of improper proselytism to such irreligious teaching is investigated next.

The irreligious as improper proselytism in teaching
The potential of improper proselytism finds special relevance in matters related to the nature and parameters of the teaching at school of specific modules such as history, literature, physics, biology, and life skills.In this regard, the overlap between a predominantly irreligious education and "inappropriate", "coercive" or "manipulative" forms of proselytism is investigated, and here the risk of improper proselytism as the coercion of learners towards exclusively irreligious influences is addressed.It is in this regard that positivism, the teaching of values and calls for neutrality (referred to earlier) in education pose risks of improperly influencing pupils.Scholarship on improper irreligious proselytism and, more specifically, the improper influence of the teaching of irreligious knowledge at public schools have received little attention in human rights scholarship.
For the purposes of this article an understanding similar to Ted Stahnke's understanding of proselytism is applied, namely that proselytism is "expressive conduct undertaken with the purpose of trying to change the religious beliefs, affiliation, or identity of another". 35However, an important addition is suggested here (and as mentioned earlier), namely that not only should proselytism be linked to the changing of religious beliefs, but also of irreligious beliefs. 36 supported by dictionary meanings ascribed to the term "proselytise". 37Proselytism understood as a form of persuasive 38 expression should include not only religious, but also belief expressions. 39Why should "persuasive expression" be limited only to religious beliefs and not non-religious beliefs as well?
In international human rights there is no definitive consensus about whether proselytism is a manifestation of religion or belief and therefore encompassed within the concept of the right to of religion or belief. 40This lack of any direct recognition of proselytism may be an indication of the sensitivity of states to the issues it raises and the difficulty of delineating agreeable standards. 41 Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275: However, here it is important to note that the essence of the "freedom of religion", as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in its first case about religion, namely R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 CANLII 69, [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada), is that the right not only encompasses the right to hold a belief in private, but inter alia the right to "manifest", "teach" and "disseminate" it.Thus, these things cannot really be offences against others as long as they do not spill over into "coercion".

42
Referring to the ECtHR's view in the Larissis v Greece ECtHR No 140/1996/759/958-960, 24 February 1998 judgement, Stijn Smet states that: "… if the addressee finds herself in a particularly vulnerable relationship towards the proselytiser, who in turn stands in a position of authority or power vis-à-vis the addressee, measures may be taken to protect the latter's autonomy, provided it is effectively impaired.However, if the proselytism does not impair the addressee's autonomy, the conflict is decided in favour of the proselytiser" (Stijn "Freedom of Religion v Freedom from Religion" 119).The manipulation of the addressee or the exertion of an improper influence of a belief (whether religious or non-religious) on an addressee can also be linked to practices where a specific belief is conveyed to the recipient or addressee (who is in a vulnerable position), thereby excluding any other belief that might be of fundamental importance to that recipient.This in turn has the potential to result in an improper form of proselytism towards the recipient.Where the proselytiser is in a position of influence and authority and the addressee is vulnerable, then the withholding of valuable information can constitute a form of manipulation.This is of special relevance to the relationship between teacher and pupil.
inducement to purchase products by means including advertising) generally remains legal and even desirable in a society predicated on a free marketplace of ideas.This distinction between the change of religious beliefs and change of any other belief lacks any coherent justification, 43 though it may be said that it does support arguments about the dominance of coercive fundamentally anti-religious irreligious understandings.
The wider understanding of the protection and limitation of religious belief, which is reflected in regional human rights instruments and in the constitutions of many democratic and plural countries, understands such protection and limitation to include irreligious beliefs as well. 44Therefore, when we talk of freedom of religion and freedom from improper religious influence, then this also includes freedom of irreligious beliefs and freedom from improper influence by irreligious beliefs.
Preventing the "proselytiser" from expressing her religious or irreligious beliefs may violate her freedom to manifest her belief, whilst the recipient or addressee may argue that the "proselytiser" may not improperly interfere with her freedom to hold a religious or irreligious belief.
Fortunately, the ECtHR has taken a wide or inclusive approach to the definition of religion.According to the ECtHR, religion includes claims concerning scientology, druidism, pacifism, communism, atheism, pro-life, Divine Light Zentrum, and the Moon Sect. 45The ECtHR case law tends to revolve around the definition of "belief" rather than that of "religion", and the term "belief" is considered in its jurisprudence to require a worldview rather than a mere opinion. 46An understanding of "religion" as including both belief and disbelief of a certain type makes the notion broad enough to include even the religiously "neutral" values inculcated at state schools.In this regard, there is a sound basis for the objections of those arguing that irreligious schools are not neutral with respect to religion; they implicitly endorse one type of religion (which is humanism) to the exclusion of others.In doing this, they violate the freedom of thought of pupils who are educated at public schools. 47e of the pioneers of educational psychology, John Dewey, explained that the morals of pupils are influenced by the school's curriculum, which is the moral environment found at all schools, conveyed by the school rules, the moral orientation of school staff, and text materials. 48Courts appear to have accepted that teachers exert an influence over pupils not only through the advice or through instruction they give but also by the example set.As the Canadian Supreme Court observed in Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, "[t]eachers occupy positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their students as a result of their position". 49The Court quotes Canadian legal academic Allison Reyes: 50 Teachers are a significant part of the unofficial curriculum because of their status as 'medium'.In a very significant way, the transmission of prescribed 'messages' (values, beliefs, knowledge) depends on the fitness of the 'medium' (the teacher).
Alison Mawhinney states that the susceptibility of children to a pervasive message presented in an uncritical manner is a fact recognised by the ECtHR, which has consistently drawn attention to the impressionable age of children. 51Bearing this in mind, there can be no reason why the teaching of knowledge by a teacher to pupils cannot meet the requirements for improper proselytism, where the "attributes of the source and the target" 52 are such that the target may not be able to exercise free choice in accepting or resisting the change in beliefs emanating from the source.Stahnke comments that it is a basic assumption that a person should be able to make a considered and unrestrained choice in matters of religious belief and affiliation.Therefore, the more proselytism interferes with that ability to choose freely, the more the regulatory power of the state may be attracted, Stahnke 1999 BYULR 327.
The source in the teaching environment has an "intellectual influence" over the target, namely the pupil. 61The primary concern with the attributes of the proselytism target relates to the perceived susceptibility of the target to the types of persuasion that may be employed by the source.The greater the perceived vulnerability of the target, the more likely that proselytism directed to it will be restricted.Children, for example, may be susceptible to a change in religious beliefs. 62Other factors are also used to determine whether there is a form of improper proselytism, for example, the "nature of the place" where the proselytism takes place, as well as the "nature of the action" of proselytism. 63Schools, for example, can be places where the persons are required to be present for the most part. 64Stated otherwise, schools are places where people are present by force of law -"where the listeners are a captive audience". 65What should also be kept in mind is the authority carried by textbooks, which are not only read, but are reviewed, discussed and digested. 66This gives textbooks also a position of authority and consequent influence.
From the above it is evident that there should be a more inclusive understanding of proselytism, which includes irreligious forms of improper influence as well.The ECtHR has emphasised not only the protection of religious beliefs, but also that of irreligious beliefs.The ECtHR has also made a point of referring to proselytism and has expressed the importance of States having to maintain an atmosphere at schools that is free of any improper proselytism, as argued in the above.The relationship between teacher and pupil provides much potential for the practising of irreligious improper proselytism, also bearing in mind that the irreligious, or the absence of the religious, has the potential for influencing improperly.

Conclusion
As complex and diverse as the concept of proselytism may be, there is a popular understanding that it relates only to improper or manipulative religious forms of influence.The privatisation of religion in many democratic and plural societies around the world today has almost provided a paranoid sensitivity towards religion expressing itself in the public domain.This has contributed to the view that it is only improper religious belief expressions that are related to forms of improper proselytism, hereby not realising that irreligious belief expressions can also be manipulative or improper towards the recipient or the addressee, thereby constituting improper proselytism.Improper proselytism not only pertains to religious forms of improper influence, but also to irreligious forms of improper influence, including the preclusion of appropriate access (by religions) to the public sphere.Within the public domain, one finds both religious and irreligious beliefs and therefore there are communicative activities within the public sphere that include expressions of both religious and irreligious belief that run the risk of being manipulative or improper.
The argument here is that proselytism has to do as much with a religious action as with an irreligious action.Where the expression of belief, whether religious or irreligious, amounts to any form of manipulative or undue influence, improper proselytism is applicable.To understand proselytism in this manner places all beliefs, whether religious or irreligious, on an equal footing with one another.Improper religious forms of expression should be no more suspect than improper irreligious forms of expression, with both versions having the potential for giving rise to

16De Been "
Quest for Neutrality" 183.Also see Vischer Conscience and the Common Good 103.17 Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 146.Moral perspectives cannot be avoided.The very selection of curriculum materials (implicitly or explicitly) imports concepts of the moral nature of culture and society.What is deemed important and essential to know has strong moral dimensions, though these dimensions often fail to rise to the level of articulation.
, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) Article 9; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 section 15; the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 section 2; the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (1981) Article 8; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 18; the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
improper proselytism.By critically looking at education and teaching in public institutions it becomes clear that irreligious forms of influence run the risk (as do religious forms of influence) of being improper or manipulative, thereby qualifying improper irreligious belief influences as part of improper proselytism.Viewed in the way I have argued in the above, the popular notion of improper proselytism as being exclusively linked to religious forms of influence is dismantled and coercive viewpoints of either religious or non/anti-religious perspectives are seen for the improper coercive frameworks they could be.Pluralism and Liberalism Seriously: The Need to Reunderstand Faith, Beliefs, Religion, and Diversity in the Public Sphere" 2010 JSR 17-41 Benson "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?" Benson IT "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?The need for a Religiously Inclusive Understanding of the Public" Royackers Lecture delivered at Regis College, University of Toronto (28 March 2012, revised 11 September 2012) and Navarro-Valls 1998 HM Martinez-Torrόn J and Navarro-Valls R "The protection of religious freedom in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights" 1998 HM 25-37 Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" Mawhinney A "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children: A Semiotic Cocktail" in Temperman J (ed) The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2012) 93-111 McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools McCarthy R et al Society, State, and Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism (William B Eerdmans Grand Rapids 1981) McGarry 1983 CL McGarry DD "The Unconstitutionality of Exclusive Governmental Support of Entirely Secularistic Education" 1983 CL 1-34 Pierik "State Neutrality" Pierik R "State Neutrality and the Limits of Religious Symbolism" in Temperman J (ed) The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2012The Child's Right to Religious Freedom and Formation of Identity" 2007 IJCR 251-267 Clarke 1986 ICLQ 271.Neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights nor the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly acknowledges the rights of children to freedom of thought in schools.The UN Declaration (Article 26(3)) provides that "parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children".A similar principle concerning the relative priority of parents' rights, is expressed by Article 2 of the Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (1952) 271.From this it is clear that although the right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by the European Convention to everyone, the education initiatives of the state are explicitly limited only by reference to the "religious and philosophical conviction" of parents.Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 1 and 6 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief may be affected by coercion or through religious persons being subjected to preaching that harm their beliefs. 10The 6Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(1948)states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."7Article9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights(1950), which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."Thisreads exactly the same as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.8 9 The Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), Article 5(1)(b): "The States Partiesto this Convention agree that: (b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where applicable, of legal guardians … to ensure in a manner consistent with the procedures followed in the State for the application of its legislation, the religious and moral education of the children in conformity with their own convictions; and no person or group of persons should be compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their convictions." Needless to say, it is not only in Missouri where theistic references in textbook descriptions are substantially limited.This also has 27McGarry 1983 CL 5-6.28McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 127.For example, the fact that Martin Luther King was a pastor and that the black churches played a key role are ignored in political events of particular importance, such as the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-56.
Prohibitions onproselytism have been enacted regarding the exertion of influence on people whose capacities or circumstances render them vulnerable.This is understood as a form of improper manipulation.42It is interesting to note that this form of manipulation applies almost solely to the conversion of religious beliefs.The manipulation of other ideas and beliefs in similar circumstances (ranging from political persuasion to the 37Stevenson Oxford Dictionary 1427: "Convert or attempt to convert someone from one religion, belief, or opinion to another"; Simpson and Weine Oxford English Dictionary 664: "to cause to come over or turn from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another".38Garnett 2005 USTLJ 457.39 Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism.It is interesting to note that the term proselytism had a meaning beyond that of the religious during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.For example, Edmund Burke in 1790 applied it to the anti-Christian philosophes of the French Enlightenment.40 Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275.41