Concepts, Attention, and Perception

Abstract

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must
possess concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our
perceptual experiences. In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an
argument against the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention.
In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an
argument, a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual
demonstrative concept possession. In Part Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can
challenge what appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in
Part Three, an important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this
challenge in a particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist's challenge to
the argument is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive.

Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (2) 2008: pp. 213-242