# **Compelling Factors of Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration in Rwanda**

Penine Uwimbabazi<sup>1</sup> Email: <u>u.penine@gmail.com</u> and Ralph Lawrence<sup>2</sup> Email: Lawrencer@ukzn.ac.za

#### Abstract

This article illustrates the policy intricacies of post-war reconstruction in contemporary Africa. It specifically examines the often neglected effects of ruralurban migration on urbanization and development in Rwanda after the genocide of 1994. Given the waves of urbanization caused by refugees returning to Rwanda, as well as by internal migration precipitated by fear of conflict and insecurity, grouped settlements termed imidugudu have been introduced by government, as an alternative means of providing facilities similar to those offered in cities. To be efficient, the imidugudu need to be well planned and obtain consistent support from the government. However, even if this were forthcoming, such a solution might not be sufficient to deal with the impact of rural-urban migration on urbanization and development, despite the overall growth in the economy. Relying upon pre-existing research, this article analyzes the determinants of rural-urban migration and their consequences for development in Rwanda. The article calls for further, more-detailed investigation of how rural-urban migration is affecting the distribution of development; in the course of reconstructing peace and furthering sustainable economic well-being in Rwandan society.

#### 1. Introduction

Rural-urban migration is a concern in developing countries. Although the reasons for rural-urban migration vary from country to country, the causes and consequences of this pattern of migration are similar in many respects. One common cause of rural-urban migration is the lack of job opportunities. In rural areas, a large

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> PhD candidate in Policy and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Private Bag X01, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Professor of Government and Public Policy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Private Bag X01, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa and Visiting Research Fellow, Social Science Research Institute, Duke University.

percentage of employment is reliant upon agriculture.<sup>3</sup> However, poverty, unproductive land and the need to survive often lead to the breakup of rural communities, impelling migration to urban locations.<sup>4</sup> But the growth of urbanization can also become problematic; jobs may prove elusive, housing may be scarce, services become overwhelmed and crime and pollution are real threats. Pronounced urbanization has led, too, in some instances, to a decline in foodsecurity as production diminishes in the hitherto populated rural sectors. These general features have been evident in Rwanda, especially since the genocide of 1994.

In Rwanda, rural-urban migration is extensive.<sup>5</sup> This can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, there is limited land and a high level of poverty in Rwandan's rural regions. Secondly, the pattern of ruralurban migration has not been managed properly. Thirdly, because of the scarcity of land, the government of Rwanda is promoting grouped settlements (*imidugudu*) so that people can use their small parcels of land for strategic farming.

These grouped habitats are intended to improve aspects of servicedelivery such as water, electricity, schools and hospitals and to afford security. Despite this positive-sounding strategy, people fail to cope with the new living conditions found in grouped settlements and then choose to move once again towards major cities, especially to the capital, Kigali.

Latterly, scholarly attention upon Rwanda has sought, especially, to understand the genocide of 1994 and the subsequent socio-political and economic reconstruction (See Justino and Verwimp, (2008); Uvin (1999) and Pottier (2002).) However, what is perhaps missing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda defines an unemployed person as one who is seeking and available for work. In 2006, 71% of the working populations were classified as subsistence farmers, either as independent laborers on farms, or as unpaid family farm workers. See <u>www.statistics.gov.rw</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> According to the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, in 2007 nearly 92% of the poor in Rwanda live in rural areas (2007: 52).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The population living in urban areas, including Kigali has risen slightly to 16.6% in the past five years, at the same time increasing urban boundaries (The National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2007: 30).

to date is a full appreciation of the new development-challenges facing the economy. These challenges are in the form of urbanization emanating from rural-urban migration and resettlement, as well as in the return of previous cohorts of refugees who started to leave Rwanda in earnest, after the upheaval of 1959.

This article investigates factors associated with rural-urban migration and with urbanisation in Rwanda more generally, by re-examining and interpreting existing information and published findings. The next section discusses the factors of rural-urban migration and urbanization in Rwanda. The third section considers the implications of Rwandan government policies upon rural-urban migration. The consequences of these policies are investigated subsequently.

# 2. Factors of Rural-Urban Migration and Urbanization in Rwanda

With pressures for, as well as on development and economic growth, African countries strive to develop, maintain and improve the lives of their citizens. These imperatives of development are, in turn, often complicated by the twin imperatives of devising policies in accordance with global trends and of satisfying the priorities of international funding agencies. Urbanization is one significant consequence of such forms of development which have been pursued in Africa. The movement of people from rural areas to urban centres has accompanied the quest for industrialization.

Rural-urban migration has frequently been viewed in a negative light - as a major factor exacerbating serious already existing urban unemployment problems. However, some recent studies have suggested that urbanization is the main road to development. Identifying development with modernization, industrialization and technological advance, Naudé (2007), for example, argues that, for the African continent, progress is needed in two interdependent ways: firstly, countries need to industrialize; and, secondly, they need to encourage urbanization. The concern, however, is whether this urbanization can be managed properly. Before urbanization is encouraged, policymakers need to know whether their cities have adequate infrastructure to support such migration and whether their cities are sufficiently prepared to absorb and to administer the needs of this increased urban population. These considerations are pertinent to Rwanda.

Given the history of violent conflict and genocide that Rwanda has experienced in recent times, the present government has been struggling to rebuild the state by focussing primarily on economic development in tune with the eight Millennium Development Goals.<sup>6</sup> More particularly, infrastructural development has emerged in the capital city, Kigali. Due to urbanization being motivated by the Rwandan government in all aspects of their overall development strategy, the city is growing rapidly.<sup>7</sup> The reason why Kigali has become the epicentre of urbanization stems from two more general factors underpinning the increase of rural-urban migration in Rwanda. Firstly, the pressure for settling the population has been exacerbated, not only by personal insecurity but also by the geographic circumstances of the country. Secondly, the persistent movement of people has occurred due to prolonged socio-political instability.

#### 2.1. Economic factors of rural-urban migration in Rwanda

Since the mid-1990s, rural-urban migration has increased in Rwanda. This is partly due to the fact that there is limited land for agricultural use and distribution. Musahara (2001: 8) explains that almost 60% of the Rwandan population has less than 0.5 ha per capita, in comparison to the 1950s, where more than 50% of people each had, on average, access to more than 2ha. With the diminishing availability of land for agricultural production, migration to urban areas has become an alternative livelihood strategy for many Rwandans.<sup>8</sup> Nowadays Rwanda has an estimated population of 10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The eight Millennium Development Goals are: 1) End poverty and hunger; 2) Universal education; 3) Gender equality; 4) Child health; 5) Maternal health; 6) Combat HIV/AIDS; 7) Environmental sustainability; 8) Global partnership. (See www.undp.org.milleniumgoals.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Rwandan government claims that the county now has enough food to feed its population. A survey on household living conditions reported by the Rwandan Comprehensive Food Security Analysis indicates that about 66% of all households are found to be food-insecure (2006:2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Despite Kigali's growing migrant population, its rate of poverty of 20.2% is considerably less than elsewhere. By contrast, the rates of poverty for the Eastern,

million and it is the most densely populated country in Africa, with about 397 inhabitants/  $km^2$  (The National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2009: 3). The population is expected to grow to around 16 million by 2020, which in theory would reduce by half the already very small plots of land used by rural households (Global IDP, 2002: 50).

Rwanda has been described as a country with severe demographic stress which relies for subsistence on a limited base of resources (Homer-Dixon, 1995:1). The country is mountainous with little land available for agricultural expansion (Musahara, 2001) and because of its hilly nature, soil degradation is widespread. With the land's declining capacity to provide subsistence, many in the rural areas, especially young adults (who are the most capable labourers), tend not to value agricultural production. Not only are they deterred by small plot-size and poor land-quality but they have also come to envision a different future for themselves and their offspring. Previously, Rwandan children would inherit a piece of land that would support their families when they got married. Today, people no longer regard this system as feasible because there is insufficient land to share. Therefore education and entrepreneurship are encouraged as a more viable alternative to farming.

Until twenty years ago, Rwandans preferred a sedentary life in their own locations where their families had been rooted for generations. Rural-urban migration was not common. Instead, migration was confined to movement from one rural place to another, as people sought better land and thus a potentially more sustainable livelihood. This internal movement had mostly marginal agricultural benefit. Homer-Dixon (1995: 3-5) explains that from 1978 to 1991, urban areas had few opportunities for employment and rural-urban migration was restricted. The erstwhile political control of ruralurban migration is believed to have kept the internal migration rates low in Rwanda, in comparison with other African countries.

Witness, though the contrast thereafter. The United Nations Development Report on Rwanda indicates that the urbanization rate

Western, Northern and Southern provinces are 50.4%, 62%, 62.7% and 67.3% respectively. (The National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2007:6).

of the Rwandan population more than trebled in the span of a decade, from 5.5% to 16.7% between 1991 and 2002 (UNDP 2005-2006: 3). Natural population growth in urban areas but more specifically, inward migration and the return of refugees from foreign countries after the 1994 genocide, reflect this extraordinary increase.

#### 2.2. Socio-political factors of rural-urban migration in Rwanda

Rural-urban migration has continued unabated in Rwanda. This is due to the continuing violent conflict in the country and across its borders, a fact which is estimated to have caused the loss of one million lives. It also led to approximately one million people being displaced internally, 80% who were relocated in 1997 and 1998 as the result of the increased insurgency in and around Rwanda. Most of the survivors lost not only their families but also their homes and their possessions. Due to the trauma they experienced, the majority preferred to abandon their home-areas in favour of building a new life in the cities. Furthermore, the cities seemed safer for survivors than returning to live near relatives who were believed to have killed their family members. Thus, this exceptionally large shifting population has caused a continuous mass migration to the cities, especially Kigali.

Moreover, there were approximately 600 000 refugees of a previous generation who had left Rwanda between 1959 and 1973 and then returned after 1994 (Leeuwen (2001); Global IDP (2002) and The Republic of Rwanda (2001: 9)). Having lived in exile for so long, they preferred to re-establish themselves in Kigali itself. The Rwandan government and international agencies had to prioritize these movements and provide alternative shelter. As safety, settlement and livelihood became a concern, not only for individuals but also for the government, catering for housing needs in Kigali and other urban areas became an urgent priority (Harding, 2009: 12).

As will be discussed later, the Rwandan government's response to this influx, of rural migrants in particular, was to attempt to group people in settlements near an urban centre. However, no means of livelihood were provided and people ended up with little to or thing to eat. Basic services were inadequate; access to clean water was insufficient and electricity was not available in many places. As a result, many people, especially young adults, relocated yet again, leaving such settlements with Kigali their ultimate destination.

This, in turn, has imposed an enormous strain on Kigali's infrastructure, which has not been upgraded to match the population growth. To give a sense of Kigali's exponential growth, in 1907 it had only 357 people in an area of 8ha but by 1945 its population had expanded to 6 000, settled on 250ha.<sup>9</sup> The city was recognized as the capital of Rwanda after independence in 1962. Kigali's population then exploded to 140 000 inhabitants in 1991, covering a much larger area of 112km<sup>2</sup>. By 1996 the population had nearly tripled in size to 358 200 but by 2001, it had nearly doubled from this figure to 605 000 within an area of 314km<sup>2</sup>.

Thereafter, the population virtually doubled yet again over the next five years, reaching 1 000000 in 2006 and occupying a staggering area of 730km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>10</sup> Figure 1 displays in graphic terms the more recent spell of population-growth and physical expansion.




Figure 1: Kigali: population growth and physical expansion: 1997-2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See <u>www.rwandagateway.org</u>, for these statistics on Kigali.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> All these statistics can be found on the city of Kigali's website, www.kigalicity.gov.rw

Unsurprisingly, given the rapid pace of change in Kigali, the Rwandan government and the authorities managing Kigali are confronted with an escalating deficit in housing and attendant services. Official sources reported in 2008, that approximately 80% of Kigali's residents reside in unplanned settlements which have burgeoned out of control (Barigye, 2008). The city had no site prepared for waste management and there existed neither environmental-sanitation infrastructure nor facilities for treating sewage.<sup>11</sup>The city administration, therefore, are clearly lacking in policies, strategies and the where-withal to deal with rural-urban migration. Should Kigali's population keep growing unchecked, there will be profound consequences for the increasingly incapacitated city.

Currently, the government has acknowledged the problems of slums in Kigali, resulting from rural-urban migration and has called for stringent measures to curb unplanned settlements.<sup>12</sup> However, such pronouncements will not, in and of themselves, deter or prevent people from flooding into the city. After all, many rural migrants now gravitate towards Kigali because they have some sort of base there - formed by their family and friends who preceded them. Making a virtue out of necessity, a spokesperson for the Kigali City Council (KCC) has intimated that the population explosion has its economic advantages, with increased purchasing power accruing to the city. The consequent increased demand for goods and services can be beneficial, thereby offering incentives to enhance the capacity for production (Barigye, 2010).

The upshot can be likened to a set of contrasting spirals. Because the Rwandan government's effort to enhance development, through resources and infrastructure, is directed primarily towards Kigali itself, the city attracts ever more rural-urban migration on a massive scale, with cause becoming intertwined with effect in an upward

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Sano notes that the city plan for 2010-11 has focused more on road infrastructure, giving little attention on sanitation. The money budgeted for road construction account for 70% while the funds designated for sanitation are less than 10% (Sano, 2007: 46).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See statements on <u>www.rwandagateway.org</u>

spiral. Simultaneously though, a downward spiral unfolds as demand increasingly outstrips supply, leading to a rising shortfall in public amenities, services and facilities.

How can Rwandans escape this dilemma? The Rwandan government's initial solution, as noted earlier, was to group the rural populace in settlements, although this was as much for political reasons, in order to protect inhabitants from conflict, as it was for economic reasons. Among the latter, was the need to make better use of the surrounding land for food production and the ability to render services more effectively. This strategy was subsequently adapted and incorporated in a national statement of intent, billed as Vision 2020. Both will now be explored below.

# **3.** The Implications of Rwandan Government Policy for Rural-Urban Migration and Urbanization

## **3.1. Human settlement policy**

The Rwandan government's human settlement policy was established in 1996. The swelling numbers of people deserting the hinterland and their homes after 1994, fearing for their personal safety and despairing of the shortage of land became, as we have observed, strong forces for migration to urban precincts. This was augmented by refugees returning home after the change of political regime in the mid 1990s.

The policy itself entailed gathering rural residents into nodes, known as grouped settlements or *imidugudu* (The singular is *umudugudu*), for purposes of protection and development. The policy was meant to be a short-term response to immediate needs. What is noteworthy is that this policy was introduced as a compulsory measure: all rural inhabitants were instructed to regroup in *imidugudu* and prohibited from building new houses outside these designated settlements (Leeuwen, 2001:625). Forcing people to relocate has attracted criticism (Global IDP, 2002:51). Some have equated these group settlements with the `villagisation' of Tanzania and Ethiopia, where the experiments were adjudged to have failed (Leeuwen, 2001: 625).

Although the policy on human settlement was devised to deal with an emergency, it has remained in place ever since. Significantly though,

the government relented and changed course and expunged the coercive aspect of the policy. Relocation is now undertaken voluntarily. The policy was updated in 2004, with special plans included to facilitate social-service delivery for those in *imidugudu* (Republic of Rwanda, 2004). In some regions, the policy has apparently been implemented quite successfully, making possible the delivery of services such as water, electricity, health centres, and schooling.

The current revised policy on settlement has five objectives:

- Rationalization of national land use
- Creation of new housing units
- Improvement of the quality of houses in rural areas
- Strengthening the role of local communities in settlement management
- Organisation of a system for rural housing finance

The government of Rwanda's goal is to have 70% of the national population in *imidugudu* by 2020 (Havugimana, 2009:48). Achieving this target in the absence of compulsion might appear ambitious, unless rural inhabitants need to find sanctuary or are induced to move.

The government has tried to mobilise the population but the process is turning out to be very slow, partly due to a lack of funds. Despite this, some people have managed to group themselves in various small initiatives in order to earn a small income. Community initiatives are being supported by both government and nongovernmental organisations.

Interestingly, the settlement policy has in effect become a universal norm, since the *umudugudu* has evolved into being construed as the basic administrative unit in the national system of governance. Thus it is now as applicable to Kigali as to any remote rural zone. A resident's prime contact with government is through the *umudugudu*, where the quest for assistance and services commences. Consequently, new houses must be built in an existing *umudugudu*, based upon a proper government plan. The eventual target is to have all Rwandans living in these settlements, whether in urban areas or in urban-villages - rural settings.<sup>13</sup>

Seen from another perspective, the policy on human settlement, if successful, would realise a robust form of decentralisation, with the *umudugudu* serving as a means of local governance, if only for administrative purposes.

Rwanda's policy on human settlement was absorbed in 2000 into a much broader conception of development for Rwandan society. Unveiled that July, it was billed as Vision 2020.<sup>14</sup>

#### 3.2. Vision 2020

The main aim of Vision 2020 is to offer inspiration for Rwanda's transformation into a middle-class society within two decades. This is to be guided by both global and national development programmes, such as the eight Millennium Development Goals and the national Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). Vision 2020<sup>15</sup> outlines strategies for human settlement, land consolidation, urbanization and decentralization. In terms of Vision 2020, each city is directed to have an urban Master Plan and Land Use Management Plan by 2010. This would provide the framework for attending to the specific requirements for basic infrastructure.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See 'Government Implements Low-cost Housing for Returnees', which can be found on www.irin news.org, a website for humanitarian news and analysis (Accessed on 9 July, 2010).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2000) Rwanda Vision 2020.
<sup>15</sup> The vision has six pillars;

a) Good governance and a capable state

b) Human resources development and a knowledge based economy

c) A private sector-led economy

d) Infrastructure development

e) Productive and market oriented agriculture

Regional and international Economic integration with gender equality, protection of environment and sustainable natural resource management, science and technology including ICT being cross cutting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2008), Ministry of Infrastructure: National Urban Housing for Rwanda..

Vision 2020 is in the process of being implemented by different ministries, with the EDPRS being central to addressing policy challenges in economic development, poverty reduction and governance.

The current version of EDPRS runs from 2008 until 2012. Its main goals are to:

- i. Increase agricultural productivity
- ii. Extend energy and transportation infrastructure into rural areas
- iii. Create non-farm employment on a large scale
- iv. Reduce the population growth rate
- v. Make progress on land-reform
- vi. Target improved access by the poorest to core services, including basic health care and education
- vii. Address weak institutional capacity.

#### (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2007: 1).

The emphasis on urban development is telling, since it is anticipated that the proportion of urbanized will rise from 10% to 30% of the population.<sup>17</sup> However, this might well be an underestimate, since Kigali, based on the statistics cited previously, in 2010 already contained at least 10% of the national population. How much of the further urban growth would be realized in Kigali and how much in other urban areas, fuelled by *imidugudu*, is a matter for speculation.

According to Vision 2020, rural settlements that are *imidugudu* have to be organized into active development centres which will be equipped with basic infrastructure and services, including recreation centres. The system of group settlement is intended to serve as an entry point for the development of income generating activities, which are to be non-agricultural in nature. One potential benefit of urbanization is that if people are able to create jobs and start businesses, local tax-revenue are generated which could underwrite the costs of further development within that specific urban locale. Eventually, in theory, increased economic activity spawned by urbanization could help decrease the average cost of providing basic services within urban areas.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> United Nations Development Programme, <u>www.undp.org.rw</u>

<sup>20</sup> Rwanda Journal Volume 22, Series B, 2011 : Social Sciences

Despite being praised for pursuing the Millennium Development Goals assiduously and attempting to meet the EDPRS along with vision 2020, the United Nations Development Programme's Report on Rwanda (2007) identified crucial challenges that persist, including a rise in the level of absolute poverty and widening inequality (Ingere, 2010: 48). Over 60% of the population live in poverty and 42% in absolute poverty, while 57% live below the poverty line.<sup>18</sup> This obviously bears proper investigation but a plausible hypothesis, is that this may be a consequence of tilting the weight of development heavily in favour of Kigali, at the expense of investing elsewhere, *e.g.* in rural city centres and in the agricultural sector.

#### 3. Coping With Rural-Urban Migration And Urbanization

Consider the following argument: there is a need to yoke urbanization to development only when urban populations are productive by being engaged in industry, services and technical production. Settlement alone is not enough. Instead, settlement as an urbanization strategy should be pursued, together with meaningful interventions aimed at making urbanization a developmental paradigm. This more or less expresses the intentions articulated in Vision 2020. In practice though, problems, as could be anticipated, have arisen with both aspects of this approach.

Currently, the majority of those living in Rwanda's rural areas are women, mostly widows. The men tend to search for employment in the cities. Most migrants, often for lack of an alternative, are obliged to create their own employment through informal labour, frequently as vendors. Equally though, vendors, beggars, street children and the homeless are hunted by local defence agents and then sent back to the rural areas from whence they came. Many rural males therefore find themselves living a twilight existence, neither having the land to sustain themselves nor discovering opportunities in the urban formal sector. Although there have been reports on the visible threats to vendors - of them being apprehended and thrown into prison (which entails them losing their goods) - they resume the hawking-trade on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> United Nations Development Programme, <u>www.undp.org.rw/Poverty-Reduction</u>. html

their release, since they foresee no other prospect for their livelihood (Barigye, 2008).

The rural poor frequently lack the basic education and skills to thrive in an urban setting. Should they be encouraged to migrate? Do they, indeed can they, thrive in the *imidugudu*? In a Latin American context, Anderson avers that there are desirable and undesirable rural-urban migrants. The latter, being frequently who are not well equipped for urban employment, have little to offer the urban community (2002:13-14). Should urbanization then be regulated? If so, by whom and to what end? There are many complex issues here, both moral and practical. They will be addressed in the final section. For the moment, identifying them will suffice.

Marginalisation is assuming unprecedented forms among the newly urbanized migrants of Kigali. General conversations there in December 2010, suggest that security is now more associated with ordinary crime; whether this is armed robbery, banditry or the highjacking of vehicles. A drug trade has emerged as well as prostitution - by-products of the city's development. Family bonds have come under strain as traditional customs reflecting cultural practices and values, especially sexuality, shift across the generations.<sup>19</sup> Living conditions are often uncomfortable and perilous for the migrants. As previously mentioned, informal settlements abound. Having few services, they pose a serious health risk (Barigye, 2008). An increase in traffic has caused road-congestion to abound and this is often complicated by the hilly terrain. Air pollution from vehicles afflicts the urban environment. Pollution is also caused by burning charcoal. Some 99% of Rwandans use wood as a source of energy, which leads to massive deforestation and soil destruction (Harding, 2009: 20).

Given the problems accompanying the scale and pace of urbanization in Rwanda, which is most marked in Kigali, one may well ask what is to be done.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Penine Umimbabazi spent the month of December, 2010 in Rwanda as part of her current doctoral research.

#### 5. Conclusion

The phenomena of inward migration, the rate of urbanization, the Capital's morphing into the burgeoning epicentre of growth and it's becoming a major target of government effort, is not peculiar to Rwanda. It is indeed a familiar story among developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Rwanda's case though, certain unique features have had a pronounced effect. Political conflict has been a significant ingredient in Rwanda. Civil strife from the end of the colonial era onwards, led to residents seeking a safe haven elsewhere, often in neighbouring states. Their return in the mid-1990s and thereafter, swelled the ranks of the urban population considerably and rapidly. However, this social movement was precipitated by the genocide of 1994, which exacted a huge human toll and wreaked socio-economic havoc throughout the land. The present government has therefore had to deal with inward migration and urbanization, as integral to the simultaneous process of restoring peace and pursuing nation-building.

Clearly, as Vision 2020 suggests, the intention is to shape a balanced pattern of development which is distributed across Rwanda as a whole. Hence the emphasis on grouped settlements or *imidugudu*, first introduced in the mid-1990s but then reconceptualised and still assumed to offer a solution to the issue of land shortage, whilst simultaneously slowing rural-urban migration. Grouping people in planned villages, it is averred, can free land for agriculture and make it more feasible for the government to provide social and economic services to the population, in the process facilitating business activities and extending agricultural services. The upshot would be the *imidugudu* constituting a seamless national network of local administrative units.

The question is, whether or not the implementation of *imidugudu* is a significant and successful response to the issue of rural-urban migration and poverty-reduction? This question can surely only be addressed in the following ways: by detailed empirical study of the *imidugudu* themselves, by concentrating on tracking and understanding patterns of migration, by ascertaining levels of economic activity and by capturing the quality of life of those residing in the grouped settlements. Presumably, in order to discourage people from

moving to cities, *imidugudu* in rural areas need to be well-planned and equipped with basic services. Further investment in agricultural activities, industries and other rural economic development would be essential and could encourage people to settle.

Development would be thus both urban and rural, with both undertaken in parallel. Again however, the wisdom and practicality of such a strategy is a matter for proper scrutiny.

A related wicked problem – as policy analysts term a dilemma – is Kigali, which seems to be the prime locus of uneven or imbalanced development in Rwanda. The issue is two-fold: (i) how to stem, regulate or control the escalating influx of people - the upward spiral characterised earlier and (ii) how can adequate levels of resources, infrastructure and services be provided to meet the needs of the existing residents - the downward spiral. Related to this, is how the city itself should be developed, by addressing the economy and the environment. Once more, there is no substitute for detailed evidence in tackling such problems.

There is much to ponder and still much research to be under-taken on rural-urban migration, urbanization and urban and rural development. These endeavours can only add to assisting the causes of peace and development in Rwanda.

#### References

- 1. Anderson, L. E. (2002). *Rural-Urban Migration in Bolivia: Advantages and Disadvantages*, Institute for Socio-Economic Research, Universidad Católica Bolivia, Bolivia.
- 2. Barigye, T (2008). Kigali Hawkers in Cat and Mouse Game with Policy, *The NewTimes*, December 2008, Kigali, Rwanda.
- 3. Barigye, T. (2010). City's Population Overshoots Projections, *The NewTimes*, January 2010, Kigali, Rwanda.
- 4. Byerle, D. (1974). Rural-Urban Migration in Africa: theory, policy and research implications, *Internal Migration Review*, Vol. 8(4), pp. 543-566.
- 5. Global IDP Database (2002). *Profile of International Displacement: Rwanda*, Global IDP Project, Norwegian Refugee Council, Switzerland.
- 24 Rwanda Journal Volume 22, Series B, 2011 : Social Sciences

- 6. Harding, B. (2009). Review of the Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, *Chapter on Ecosystems in Rwanda, Final Draft.* (www.rema.gov.rw)
- 7. Havugimana E. (2009). State Policies and Livelihoods, *Rwanda Human Settlement Policy: a case study of Ngera and Nyagahuru villages,* Unpublished PhD, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
- 8. Homer-Dixon, T. (1995). *Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda*. A project on environment, population and security, American Association of the Advancement of Science and the University of Toronto, Washington D.C., USA.
- Ingere, B. (2010). Do We Understand Life after Genocide? Centre and periphery in the construction of knowledge in post genocide Rwanda, *African Studies Review*, Vol. 53(1), pp. 41-60.
- Leeuwen, M. (2001). Rwanda's Imidugudu Programme and Earlier Experiences with Villagisation and Resettlement in East Africa, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 39(4), pp. 623-644.
- 11. Musahara, H. (2001). Land and Poverty in Rwanda, Seminar on Land in Rwanda, *Landnet*: Rwanda Chapter, Kigali, Rwanda.
- 12. National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (2006). Preliminary Poverty Updates Report: integrated living conditions survey, 2005/06.
- 13. National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (2007). EICV Poverty Analysis for Rwanda's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, EICVEDPRS Final Report, Kigali, Rwanda.
- 14. National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (n.d.), Labour Market and Economic Activity Trends in Rwanda, Analysis of the Enquête Intégrale sur le Conditions de Vie des Ménages (EICV) Survey, www.statistics.gov.rw.
- 15. Naudé, W., (2007). Geography and Development in Africa: overview and implications for regional cooperation, Discussion Paper No. 2007/03, Helsinki, United Nations University.
- 16. Republic of Rwanda (2001). *Brookings in Rwanda: Land and Human Settlements*, Ministry for Lands, Human Resettlement and Environment Protection, Kigali, Rwanda.

- 17. Republic of Rwanda (2004). *Human Settlement Policy in Rwanda*, Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA), Kigali, Rwanda.
- 18. Republic of Rwanda (2008). *National Urban Housing Policy for Rwanda*, Ministry of Infrastructure, Kigali, Rwanda.
- 19. Samers, M. (2010). Migration, London: Routledge.
- 20. Sano, J.C. (2007). Urban Environmental Infrastructure in Kigali City: challenges and opportunities for Modernised Decentralised Sanitation System in Poor Neighbourhood, unpublished MSc thesis, Wageningen University.
- 21. Todaro, M., P., (1970). Labour Migration and Urban Employment: Reply, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 6 (3), pp 187-188.
- 22. Todaro, M., P., (1976). Internal Migration in Developing Countries, Geneva, International Labour Office.
- 23. United Nations Development Programme (2006). Support Project to the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) in Formulation of Urban Development Policy [sic.], 2005-2006.
- 24. Villarreal, M. (1998). Adolescent Fertility: social-cultural issues and programme implications, Sustainable Development Department, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations.
- 25. World Food Programme (2006). *Rwanda: Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis*, Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC), Kigali, Rwanda.

## Websites

- 1. www.undp.org.rw/Poverty-Reduction.html
- 2. <u>www.irinnoews.org</u>
- 3. <u>www.kigalicity.gov.rw</u>
- 4. www.rwandagateway.org
- 5. www.statistics.gov.rw
- 6. www.undp.org