Preventing crime and violence through work and wages

The impact of the Community Work Programme

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The article offers an analysis of the potential impact of the Community Work Programme (CWP) on crime and violence. The CWP is a public employment programme that was formally established within the government in 2010. The CWP may have an impact on crime and violence through a number of different ‘pathways’. One of these, the focus of this article, is through wages provided to the participants, 75% of whom are women. Notable here is the likely impact of these wages on the households of participants, including on their children and intimate partner relations. Whereas the CWP may have a beneficial impact on children in a household, there appears to be the potential that the CWP may aggravate the risk of violence, particularly for female participants who have unemployed partners. The article argues that if the crime prevention potential of the CWP is to be optimised, this motivates for providing ‘gender training’ to participants who may be at risk of intimate partner violence. In addition, limited male participation may reinforce a pattern of male exclusion, motivating for increasing the participation of men within the CWP.

Public employment programmes (PEPs) have been established in many countries. Often called public works programmes, they are typically established as a response to high levels of poverty and unemployment. Historically the PEPs that are most well-known are the programmes that were established in the United States as part of the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal during the years of the Great Depression of the 1930s.1 Current examples of PEPs internationally include the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India and the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia.2

PEPs are established as a state response to poverty and unemployment. Their primary purpose is not to address crime or violence. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that job creation does reduce crime,3 and for this reason there may be a tendency to assume that PEPs may also do so. However, it is important to keep in mind that assessing or discussing the impact of PEPs on crime and violence4 should be approached with caution, since addressing crime and violence is not inherently more important than...
the primary social goals of PEPs, namely to reduce poverty and unemployment. Thus, assessments of PEPs should primarily focus on their impact on poverty and unemployment, with other effects, for instance on crime, health or education, regarded as possible secondary outcomes. Nevertheless, since PEPs affect many thousands, or even millions, of participants, their ‘secondary outcomes’ may be of considerable significance. It is therefore worthwhile to deepen our understanding of how to assess these outcomes as well.

This article focuses on a specific South African PEP, the Community Work Programme (CWP). The possible impact of the CWP on intimate partner violence, collective violence and crime more generally, has been raised by other authors. The CWP is of particular interest in terms of its potential impact on crime prevention, partly because, unlike some other PEPs in South Africa, it involves people from poor communities working within their own communities. The article explores the possible impact of the CWP on crime and violence as a consequence of the wages paid to participants. It argues that the mechanism by which CWP wages have an impact on crime and violence is likely to be shaped by the gender and age profile of the participants in the CWP. The article emphasises that the provision of work and wages should only be considered as one of the set of possible pathways through which the CWP may affect crime and violence.

This article draws on material from research on the CWP undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. The research, carried out between August 2013 and March 2015, involved in-depth interviews with participants and community members at six CWP sites in Gauteng, the Western Cape and North West, as well as with other CWP role players, including representatives of national, provincial and local government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been appointed as CWP implementing agents, and policy experts with knowledge of the CWP.

**The Community Work Programme**

PEPs were first established by the post-apartheid government in the late 1990s. However, the most significant PEP, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), was officially launched in May 2004. The CWP is an off-shoot of the EPWP and was established partly on the basis of an assessment of the impact of the first phase of the EPWP. This assessment noted in particular that EPWP programmes were ‘mainly designed to offer a short-term episode of full-time work’ that was ‘expected to facilitate entry into the wider labour market’ but that ‘many participants exited back into poverty instead’. The CWP was established in recognition of the fact that unemployment in South Africa is structural. This means that, even if there are consistent improvements in the South African economy, unemployment is likely to remain a major ongoing problem in the medium to long term. It also means that, as a result of the nature of the labour market, government programmes that provide people with work experience and skills will not automatically enable them to establish their own businesses or find employment.

Unlike the EPWP, the work opportunities in the CWP are not short-term. The idea that CWP participants may exit the CWP to take up work opportunities or establish their own businesses is regarded favourably, and the CWP does indeed enhance the ability of some participants to do this. But it cannot be assumed that participants will be able to do this is, nor is it a primary objective of the programme. Due to the fact that it provides long-term stable work opportunities, the support that is provided by the CWP differs from that provided by the EPWP. The CWP also has a number of other features that distinguish it from the EPWP, and from many other PEPs internationally.

The CWP was initiated as a pilot programme in 2007. Since 2010 it has been located in the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). According to COGTA data, the CWP provided 202 599 jobs in the April 2014 to March 2015 year and was operating at 186 sites around the country in April 2015. Government has also announced that it intends extending the CWP to all local municipalities in the country.
The CWP and crime and violence prevention

Questions relating to the impact of the CWP on violence were previously raised in a paper about one of the pilot sites that was established in North West province. This paper concluded that the CWP had played a decisive role in preventing conflict and violence in that community. It has also been argued that the CWP is likely to prevent violence and crime where CWP activities are specifically targeted at this, in other words, where the participants are doing work that is intended to prevent crime and violence, such as patrolling neighbourhoods.

We can think about the potential impact of the CWP on crime and violence at each site in terms of the ‘nett’ or cumulative effect of a number of different ‘pathways’. These include:

- The impact of the ‘useful work’ activities that CWP participants perform. A core part of the CWP framework is that it should do ‘useful work’, which is defined as that which contributes “to the public good, community goods or social services”. At some sites participants are involved in activities that are directly aimed at enhancing safety, such as community patrols. Other activities, such as support for Early Childhood Development (ECD) programmes, may enhance primary prevention (activities that aim to ‘address potentially criminogenic factors before the onset of the problem’). (See also SACQ 51, a special edition on primary violence prevention.)

- Impact at the level of ‘community’ (sometimes also called ‘neighbourhood effects’). The CWP is ‘community focused’ in a manner which the EPWP is not. Participants work alongside other community members, doing work that is intended to benefit their own community. The types of work undertaken are also supposed to be identified in consultation with that community. The CWP is regarded as a vehicle for ‘unlocking community agency’ and strengthening social capital. Thus the CWP may enhance the disposition or willingness of community members to take collective or individual action to advance community interests, including order and control within the community. Known as collective efficacy, this has been identified as significant in explaining differences in levels of crime between communities that share similar socio-economic characteristics and might otherwise be expected to have similar levels of crime.

- The CWP is a government programme in which major public resources are invested. In this respect therefore, the CWP increases the risk of crime and the abuse of public resources, whether this is in the form of the theft of CWP equipment, corruption by employees, or the manipulation of the CWP by politicians in the service of systems of patronage. The ‘nett’ impact of the CWP on crime will therefore also be influenced by the degree to which the CWP has effective integrity systems, such as systems of financial management, as well as by the willingness and ability of CWP personnel to withstand inappropriate political interference.

This article focuses on a fourth ‘pathway’: the impact of the CWP as a mass employment programme that offers large numbers of people work and wages. Once established at a site, the CWP can be regarded as a local institution that forms part of the mix of institutions – hospitals, schools, formal or informal businesses, etc. – in that area. In common with many of these institutions, the CWP provides regular and ongoing work and income to people within the area. Due to the fact that it employs in the region of 1 000, and sometimes more, people at a site, the number of people employed by the CWP is often much greater than the number employed by other institutions in the area.

If it is true that providing people with employment and an income contributes to reducing crime and violence, it might be assumed that the CWP, as a programme that provides these opportunities ‘at scale’ in the areas in which it is established, will contribute to reducing crime and violence in a significant way. However, in assessing whether this is the case it is necessary to recognise that these job opportunities are largely accessed by women rather than by young men, who tend to be the main participants in crime and violence.

In examining questions about the impact of the CWP on violence, the article does not assume that crime and violence are uniform phenomena. The main forms of crime or violence referred to in this article

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are property crime and intimate partner (domestic) violence against women.

The income ‘safety net’ provided by the CWP

Though the CWP also has broader ‘community development’ objectives, its core objective is to provide an income ‘safety net’ to the ‘poorest of the poor’.

At CWP sites, participants may do two days of work per week, up to a total of 100 days per year, and are paid a wage of R76 per day (the current rate as of March 2015). This amounts to around R608 per month, which by some standards is quite low, but is consistent with the objective to target those who are most in need, and for whom the small income provided by the CWP will be of appreciable benefit. Furthermore, the work provided by the CWP is explicitly intended to be part time.

The CWP enables participants to depend on a small but stable income and use the additional time they have to engage in other income-earning activity, or to look for other work. Incomes from the CWP may be used to supplement social grants, which, subject to a means test, are available inter alia to mothers or other primary caregivers of children under the age of 18, people with disabilities, and elderly people. In addition, the intention behind the CWP is to extend state support beyond the ranks of those who are eligible for social grants, and in so doing to compensate for the ‘lack of social protection interventions that target the working age poor’.

The profile of participants in the CWP

The areas in which the CWP has been established are characterised by high levels of unemployment. However, not all unemployed people want to work in the CWP. A consistent pattern across CWP sites in different regions is that women of 35 and over constitute the largest group of participants. As reflected in row A of Table 1, in January 2015 women in this age group accounted for 42% of all participants nationally. Women between the ages of 18–34 constitute the second biggest group of participants, accounting for 33% of participants. After these two groups men of 35 and over typically account for the third biggest group, with young men being the least likely to participate.

| Table 1: Profile of CWP participants and duration of participation, April 2014–March 2015 |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                  | Female | Male   | Total  |
| Non-youth (35 and over)         |        |        |        |
| All participants April 2014 – March 2015 | 66 987 | 23 217 | 23 217 | 100%   |
| Percentage                       | 33.1%  | 11.5%  | 100%   |
| Long-term participants           |        |        |        |
| (received wages in both April 2014 and March 2015) | 12 753 | 9.2%   | 100%   |
| Percentage                       | 13.8%  | 9.2%   | 100%   |
| Long-term participants (row B) as a percentage of all participants in this category (row A) | 54.9%  | 68.8%  |

Source: Analysis by author of data provided by Community Work Programme, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, April 2015

The demand for positions in the CWP appears to be much higher among women over the age of 35 than among younger women. A similar pattern also applies to older men, who outnumber younger men. This runs contrary to what might be expected, since youth unemployment in South Africa is exceptionally high. The most striking differences, however, are not those between older and younger people but between women and men. There is a relative absence of men, notably of young men, within the programme. Furthermore, as reflected in row C (Table 1), young men are less likely than any of the other groups to remain in the CWP for extended periods of time. Almost half (45%) of young men who were in the CWP had been in the programme for less than a year. It seems reasonable to assume that the reasons for people leaving include relocating, finding better job opportunities, and that they ‘don’t like the
There is currently no data to determine which of these factors are most significant in accounting for the relatively short duration of participation by many young men in the programme. As compared to older women and men, young women are also apparently more likely to join the CWP on a relatively short-term basis, with 36% of female participants in the under-35 category having been in the CWP for less than a year.

Could the reason for the differences between levels of female and male participation in the CWP be that more women are unemployed? In the fourth quarter of 2014, 49.2% of men were classified as employed, as opposed to 36.9% of women (Table 2). However, statistics on people looking for work, who are classified as unemployed, and ‘discouraged job seekers’ who have not recently taken active steps to look for work,33 indicate little gender difference in the two categories.

As can be seen in Table 2, the number of women in the combined ‘unemployed’ and ‘discouraged’ categories (3 690 000) only marginally exceeds the number of men (3 622 000). It is only when both the ‘unemployed’ and the ‘not economically active’ categories are added together that the number of women significantly exceeds the number of men. If the ‘unemployed’ and the ‘not economically active’ are added together, women make up roughly 56% and men 44% of this population of 20 324 000 people. If levels of participation in the CWP were similar to the gender profile of the latter group of people then the differences within the CWP would presumably reflect this 56% to 44% ratio, rather than the 75% women to 25% men ratio currently reflected in the CWP.

The above statistics suggest that there are other gender and age-related factors that have an impact on the demand for positions in the CWP. Research at CWP sites carried out during 2013 and 2014 indicates that there are an inter-connected set of factors that are relevant to understanding this. A widespread perception among female participants was that women have a greater sense of responsibility to provide for children and other family members than men do. Many women are motivated to take on work in the CWP, despite the low wages, in order to be able to care for children – often using this to supplement the government child support grant (CSG).

When children cry because they want food they cry to their mothers and we feel the pain if we cannot provide for them. As a mother it’s even more difficult when you are raising children alone with no help from the father of your children and you are forced to work in order to provide for them. ... I have no support at all from the family of my late husband and rely on the grant I receive from government. It’s difficult because the grant is very small so with the CWP money I am able to make ends meet.35

One explanation for the low levels of participation by men was that that they were irresponsible or lazy. Some female interviewees at CWP sites and at least one government official suggested that the lack of interest in the programme could essentially

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Economically active</th>
<th>Not economically active</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Discouraged job seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6 676</td>
<td>2 414</td>
<td>1 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>8 643</td>
<td>2 495</td>
<td>1 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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Source: Statistics South Africa34
be attributed to laziness. Other interviewees also observed that young people, and particularly young men, were often a difficult constituency to recruit to PEPs. Many of them struggle to adapt to work environments, whether in the CWP or elsewhere. As a result, many of the big private sector companies require young people to participate in ‘work readiness’ programmes in order to be considered for employment.37

Wages are obviously also a factor affecting participation in the CWP. Especially when women receive one or more CSGs, the money that they get from the CWP contributes to a modest, but more satisfactory income. For men, on the other hand, the CWP wages are likely to be their only state-provided income. Paradoxically, some interviewees suggested that it was partly their sense of responsibility to their families that led men to reject CWP opportunities, as the CWP income alone would not enable them to provide for their families.

R540, No! No! Thinking that he is supposed to support children, three children, he also has to maintain himself. That R500 is little for him. But one thing for sure, a woman can do a lot with that R500. I think that is the reason. He says R500 is little, it cannot maintain my children.38

The majority of men moved out because they need other jobs. [This is because] men need more money to feed the family. A woman does not care. As long she supports her children she does not have a problem, she is going to stay there. She [also] gets extra support from the social grants, but a man cannot live on that little money [he only gets from CWP]. He has to go back to the house and buy groceries for the children.39

Nevertheless, the reluctance of unemployed men, and particularly young men, to take up positions in the CWP remains puzzling. Besides the fact that men are generally not eligible for social grants,40 they often have few alternative economic opportunities, even if they do have marketable skills. They often appear to reject the CWP not because they have better economic opportunities elsewhere, but despite the fact that these are not available to them. In one study the income-earning opportunities open to young men in informal settlements are described as ‘poorly paid and highly precarious’, such as ‘temporary formal work (primarily shop work or construction), informal work (such as selling small items at the side of the road or working on public taxis), or a variety of illegal activities (selling drugs or petty crime)’ with many of the men also relying ‘on their family to support them financially’.41

It appears that concerns about social status, reflecting the links between gender, work and personal identity, may go some way towards explaining this anomaly. One feature of the CWP at many sites is that a significant proportion of participants do work that involves cleaning streets and other public areas, including places that have been used as dumping grounds. Even though CWP work may be fairly diverse, the aspect of CWP work that is physically most visible to other community members is often cleaning work. Within many households, work of this kind is typically performed by women.42 As a result, work in the CWP may be seen as low status ‘women’s work’. Home-based care or other care work might also tend to be regarded as women’s work. Men often seem unwilling to work in the CWP when the type of work being done does not align with their own views on the types of work that men should do and be seen doing.

This is borne out by the the number of men participating in other EPWP programmes. Even though EPWP wage rates are the same as those for the CWP, the proportion of men in the infrastructure sector (49%) and environment sector (47%) is relatively large. These sectors are likely to involve much more work that is considered traditionally masculine. On the other hand, in the ‘social sector’, which involves more ‘care’ type activities, men make up only 15% of participants.43 Also, though work in the EPWP is paid at the same daily rates, in the construction sector the work is often offered for more days of the week and month, even if the projects are of relatively short duration. For the short period of time in which they are involved in the EPWP, men are thus likely to receive a higher monthly wage than they would receive in the CWP. While this might account for higher levels of participation by men in the EPWP construction sector, one of the factors discouraging
male participation in the CWP appears to be the gendered nature of the work offered.

In the research at CWP sites, male reluctance to participate in the CWP was often viewed as reflecting a male view that they would be lowering themselves by participating in the CWP; a view referred to as ‘pride’.

There are more women than men in this project because women are used to house work and cleaning and they love working. Men are very few in this project because of pride. Men have pride even when they have nothing. Men will be very shy to work the kind of work we do in the CWP like cleaning the streets and cleaning the schools.44

I think men have pride as there are lots of men who are unemployed and they say the money is too little. Women have no option because they have kids that they have to support. Unemployed men do not want to join because the money is very little although they too have the same responsibilities to raise their children. Men generally do not want to work for little money, they want more money even when they do not have the qualification or the experience.45

Some interviewees expressed a concern that they would be ridiculed by others if they joined the CWP, with participation in the CWP signifying that they have ‘given up’ on making something more of their lives.

What will my peers say when they see me wearing the orange overall and cleaning the streets of Kagiso? Maybe I can do this type of job in another township but never in Kagiso where I live. I will be a laughing stock among my peers and my community. This is not the type of work to be done by young people. If I had to do this job it means that I will be surrendering in life that I have failed and reached a dead end. This is not an inspiring job even for us who are unemployed. How do I work the whole day for just R60 per day? It’s crazy and I don’t think that it is worth my effort, although I am unemployed.46

Women were seen as more willing to put their ‘pride’ to one side, in the interests of supporting their families.

Men do not want to be seen doing that in most cases. They think that if I am going to go to the street and do that thing, I might be seen as being down and out. But he cannot bring any income to the house. What I can tell you is that I have seen that women do not have pride because they want their kids to eat. But men do not care. I can tell you – that is why they say a woman holds a knife at its sharpest point. That is what those women are doing at the ground.47

One body of work that may shed light on this phenomenon focuses on young men’s apparent need to position themselves ‘within gender and age hierarchies’ in order to achieve recognition as men.48 This dominant (or ‘hegemonic’) model of masculinity for working class black South Africans is ‘underpinned by male economic provision’.49 Though young men identify with this expression of masculinity, they are prevented from achieving this status due to the limited economic opportunities available to them, leaving them ‘socially positioned as children’. As a reaction to this, and in order to be able to position themselves as men (in their own eyes and the eyes of others) they invest in a ‘particular youth masculinity’ in which their ability to secure respect is achieved ‘through violence against partners, control of partners, seeking multiple sexual partners, and violence against other men’.50 The corollary of this is that some of those men, younger and older, who do participate in the CWP may not identify so strongly with these ideas about masculinity, and have personal identities that are ‘maintained independently of peer recognition or affirmation’.51

Implications for the status of women and men in poor communities

Since women are generally recognised as the ‘primary caregiver’ of their children, 96% of recipients52 of the child support grant are women, with 11 655 042 monthly grants distributed in February 2015.53 Research evidence indicates that most recipients of the grant use this income either for the benefit of their overall families or very specifically for their children.54 Whether they are recipients of the
CSG or not, it is likely that many female participants in the CWP use their incomes in a similar way. One impact of the CWP may be that it enables women to play the role of ‘provider’ in their households.

Due to the fact that they are generally not recipients of the CSG, or any other grant, most unemployed men fall outside of the safety net provided by the system of social grants. The irony then is that many men seem to exclude themselves from the CWP, in part because participation in the CWP is seen to adversely impact on their ability to achieve or maintain the status of being men. This in turn reinforces their disempowered and marginal position. Arguably, therefore, a major impact of CWP wages is to further consolidate the dynamic, created by the CSG, in which women are able to play the role of economic providers, while men’s position of exclusion remains largely unaffected.

The impact of stable household income on childhood risk factors

As has been established above, participants in the CWP, most of whom are women, receive incomes which, while relatively low, are nevertheless ‘regular and predictable’. CWP wages supplement household incomes and, particularly where combined with the CSG or other social grants, enable women in poor communities to better provide for their children. This suggests that the most significant crime prevention impact of CWP wages may be in reducing childhood risk factors for involvement in crime and violence, through:

- Reducing the economic uncertainty, and thus the emotional stress, that poor families are subjected to. Both poverty and economic instability may contribute to emotional stress. Though the CWP does not reverse the effects of poverty, it creates a modicum of economic stability. By reducing economic stress, CWP wages may also reduce levels of emotional distress, with positive implications for parental efficacy.

- Enabling mothers or parents to maintain a relatively high level of supervision over their children, since they live and work in the same community. They might not be able to ‘keep an eye’ on their children while at work, but it means that the time they spend away from home is not extended by travelling. ‘Poor parental supervision is usually the strongest and most replicable predictor of offending’, while parental support has been found to protect against such behaviour.

- Getting CWP participants to work alongside other community members. This increases their range of social ties with people within their communities, and is likely to increase their access to, and ability to mobilise, social support through their links with people in similar circumstances (social capital). The access that people have to family and other social networks of support may have positive implications for child-rearing, although this will depend on the quality of these relationships.

Unemployment ‘leads to a lack of structure in people’s lives, and to isolation and exclusion from the wider community’. Thus, whether from the wages earned, participation in work, or a combination of the two, it appears likely that participation in the CWP has economic as well as social and emotional benefits for many participants and that these may translate into benefits for their dependants.

The argument that CWP wages, and other benefits of participating in the CWP, will contribute to a reduction in some of the childhood risk factors for crime and violence, therefore makes good sense. However, this argument also needs to take account of the impact of CWP wages on gender power relations in poor households.

Intimate partner violence

There is extensive international literature on the relationship between women's employment (and economic empowerment generally), and the risk of domestic violence. Some authors suggest that increases in women's income (or other resources), particularly where this exceeds the income or resources of their male partners, will increase their risk of victimisation, since they are seen to threaten the status of their male partners. Others propose that ‘increasing women’s economic resources empowers her to bargain for a better situation for herself, or to leave, therefore reducing her risk of abuse’. Studies on how women’s access to an independent income affects their risk of intimate
partner violence (IPV) have provided mixed results. Women's empowerment, or situations where a woman's income exceeds that of her partner, do not necessarily predict an increased risk of violence. However, another study suggests that when a woman's economic situation improves, it might lead to abuse and the dissolution of the relationship, which would then account for the fact that there is no increase in violence in the long term.

Nevertheless, some of the literature does indicate that when women work while their male partners are unemployed, the risk of violence to the female partner increases. As has been argued above, the CWP reinforces female economic empowerment while unemployed men maintain their disempowered position, and are thus increasingly disadvantaged relative to women. This takes place within a culture in which many men are invested in a 'youth masculinity' that includes the use of violence against women as part of its repertoire for being recognised as men. The net effect may be to increase the risk of violence women face from unemployed male partners, and more generally, to leave intact a situation of male dysfunctionality.

The potentially beneficial impact of CWP wages in providing more stable incomes for poor households therefore needs to be juxtaposed against the possibility that the CWP, as it is currently operating, may exacerbate the risk of domestic violence and conflict in the home. Intimate partner violence (IPV) does not only adversely affect its immediate victims. Children who witness or are otherwise exposed to it have a higher likelihood of various 'behavioural, emotional and social problems', including 'higher levels of aggression', and are likely to show 'increased tolerance for and use of violence in adult relationships' later in life. Some CWP sites have in fact taken on the task of confronting domestic violence through awareness campaigns and support to victims of domestic violence. It may, however, be beneficial to provide additional forms of support to female participants, particularly if they are identified as being at risk of intimate partner violence, to enable the CWP to become more supportive of 'primary level crime prevention'.

One programme that has produced positive results in reducing intimate partner violence in South Africa is the Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE). In addition to providing microfinance to female participants, the intervention also offers women participants training sessions that cover gender roles, cultural beliefs, relationships, communication, domestic violence, and HIV infection. Qualitative data suggests that the reductions in intimate partner violence achieved by the programme resulted from a range of responses, including 'enabl[ing] women to challenge the acceptability of such violence, expect and receive better treatment from partners, leave violent relationships and give material and moral support to those experiencing abuse'. This suggests that providing similar training to female participants in the CWP may assist in reducing their vulnerability to intimate partner violence. This may not only assist them personally, but reinforce the impact of CWP wages in helping parents to maintain family environments that are more supportive of primary crime prevention.

**Involvement of young men in crime and violence**

Research shows that greater employment does reduce levels of crime, particularly property crime. But it is primarily by increasing the employment of young men, particularly those who are 'low skilled', that levels of property crime are reduced. This might imply that the CWP's capacity to have an impact on crime is dependent on the participation of young men in the programme. However, it cannot be assumed that increasing the number of young men in the CWP, on its own, would have significant crime reduction benefits. This is because participation in crime is influenced not only by the levels of employment of 'low-skilled' young men, but also by the value of wages. The wages paid in the CWP are relatively low. As a result, the employment of young men in the CWP may not stop those who are involved in crime from continuing their criminal activity.

It is believed that another benefit of employment is that it builds social bonds and can thereby strengthen informal social control that serves as a deterrent to participation in crime. However, higher paying jobs not only reduce financial motives to commit (property...
crime, but may also be more likely to strengthen pro-social bonds. The social bonds formed in employment are not inevitably pro-social in nature, and this may apply to a greater degree to low-wage, low-quality jobs. In so far as the bonds formed at work are primarily with other low-skilled young men, these bonds may actually facilitate participation in violence and crime.

Thus, attracting more young men into the CWP, on its own, may not be sufficient to discourage participation in crime. It may also be necessary for those in the CWP to address questions about how best to work with the notion of ‘masculinity’. The young men who are already in the CWP may not identify strongly with violent youth masculinities. One way to encourage the participation of young men within the CWP may be to affirm these kinds of male identities. However, this is unlikely to attract young men who are invested in violent youth masculinities into the CWP. It may be necessary to find ways of working with these young men in a manner that is compatible with their underlying sense of what it means to be a man, but without reinforcing the violent aspects of their identities.

Conclusion: strengthening the impact of CWP wages on crime and violence

The CWP was not established to reduce or prevent crime. And although crime and violence prevention is an important social objective, it is not intrinsically more important than providing an income safety net to unemployed people. Nevertheless, since the CWP may contribute to reducing crime and violence, it is important to consider how it might do so. This article argues that one mechanism through which the CWP is likely to contribute to crime prevention is through supporting mothers in creating more stable and nurturing home environments. This needs to be balanced against the possible increased risk of IPV resulting from the impact of CWP wages on gender power relations in the home. One way in which the crime and violence prevention benefits of CWP work and wages may be increased is by combining the programmes with ‘gender training’, similar to that offered in the IMAGE programme, to help women more effectively negotiate their status as the main economic providers in their homes.

Still, the low levels of male participation in the CWP will have to be addressed if the CWP is to promote community development in a holistic way. Even though it seems that men have chosen to exclude themselves from the CWP, structural marginalisation of young men, and men more generally, typically translates into adverse behaviour that has disadvantages for women and communities. As a result, the community development objectives of the CWP can probably better be promoted by including men and women, old and young, more equally within the programme.

These conclusions point to the need for organisations involved in crime and violence prevention, including the prevention of gender-based violence, and youth development organisations to partner with and support the CWP in achieving its crime and violence prevention potential.

Notes
4 In this article the terms ‘crime’ and ‘violence’ are understood as overlapping but not synonymous. The forms of violence that this article is concerned with are generally defined as crimes in South African law. However, some forms of crime that are discussed, such as theft or housebreaking, are ‘property crimes’ that do not involve interpersonal violence.
7 Malose Langa, Bokfontein: the nations are amazed, in Karl von Holdt et al. (eds), The smoke that calls: insurgent citizenship,


20 Malose Langa and Karl von Holdt, Bokfontein amazes the nations: Community Work Programme (CWP) heals a traumatised community, in Devan Pillay et al. (eds), New South African review 2, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2011.


24 Malose Langa and Karl von Holdt, Bokfontein amazes the nations: Community Work Programme (CWP) heals a traumatised community, in Devan Pillay et al. (eds), New South African review 2, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2011.


27 Department of Cooperative Governance, Community Work Programme: implementation manual, 8.


Interview with implementing agent staff member, 27 February 2015.


The table is compiled on the basis of data provided in ibid., 2–3.

Interview with a female CWP participant, 4 September 2013, in Themba Masuku, Malose Langa and David Bruce, Draft report on the CWP in Kagiso, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2013, 56.

Interview with a COGTA official, 12 March 2015.

Interview with implementing agent staff member, 17 February 2015; interview with policy expert, 23 February 2015; interview with senior government official, 26 February 2015.


Focus group interviews with CWP coordinators, 10 April 2014, in Malose Langa, Draft report on the CWP in Orange Farm, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 37.

This applies unless they are disabled, elderly or eligible for the CSG as the primary caregiver.


Leila Patel et al., The gender dynamics and impact of the child support grant in Doornkop, Soweto, Centre for Social Development in Africa, Research Report, 2012, 4.


Ibid.


63 Ibid., 21.


66 Ibid., 596.


71 Lynda Warren Dodd, Therapeutic groupwork with young children and mothers who have experienced domestic abuse, Educational Psychology in Practice, 25:1, 2009, 21–36, 23.


73 Malose Langa, Draft report on CWP in Orange Farm, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2015.


76 Ibid.

77 Mikko Aaltonen et al., Examining the generality of the unemployment-crime association, Criminology, 51:3, 2013, 561–94, 586.


79 Mikko Aaltonen et al, Examining the generality of the unemployment-crime association, Criminology, 51:3, 2013, 564.
