Michel Foucault on education: a preliminary theoretical overview

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Introduction
Michel Foucault's work is already well-known in the field of education. His detailed studies of madness, punishment, sexuality, and the human sciences have provided educational theorists with a whole new array of concepts (like discipline, and problematization), analytical techniques (such as archaeology, and genealogy) and arguments (as pertaining to the intimate embrace of knowledge and power, and ways in which human subjects relate ethically to themselves and others). What is not yet well-known is that Foucault's oeuvre as a whole incorporates within itself and offers for wider consumption a number of key educational themes. For purposes of clarity, these themes can be reduced to three, dealing with what might be called the past, present, and future of schooling, or, its development, its functions, and its prospects.

These three themes can be described more accurately and specifically using some of Foucault's own terminology:

a) An historical or 'technico-political' account of the rise of the school, from its negatively oriented seventeenth century origins to its more positively conceived nineteenth century entrenchment and expansion;

b) an explication of the everyday mechanics of schooling as a disciplinary technology or 'moral orthopedics'; and

c) the implications for contemporary educational institutions and practices of a model of education as a 'block of capacity–communication–power'.

The identification of these three themes, as part of a wider process of extracting and examining all references to the field of education across Foucault's entire oeuvre of books, articles and interviews, is the product of an ongoing research project. The two primary aims in this research project were as follows:

1. To excavate, explain and understand the implications of Foucault's work for education in the abstract and in general, and for curriculum development and pedagogical practice in particular; and

2. to shed critical and substantive light on, and offer additional or alternative policy directions for, current debates about the relevance, utility and effects of the outcomes-orientated, globally aligned education policy research and practices in South Africa.

Foucault's concepts, methods and arguments invite us to look as much before as behind and beyond both pragmatic policy formulations and abstract theoretical critiques, in order to investigate the everyday functioning and effects of relations of power, forms of knowledge and ways of relating ethically to oneself and others. Yet, despite a vast scholarship on the work of Foucault, the field of education has been relatively under-represented in terms of full-length studies as envisaged by this research project. Only a few anthologies and a handful of books (Baker & Heyning, 2004; Ball, 1990; Blades, 1997; Marshall, 1996; Meadmore, Burnett &
O'Brien, 1999; Olssen, 1999; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998; Symes & Meadmore, 1999; Tamboukou, 2003; for an overview, see Peters, 2004) have directly examined Foucault's relevance for education; and to date no text has marshalled together in one place all of Foucault's references to the field, let alone attempted to apply or develop such insights in a sustained manner. Whilst there are many references to education and the school throughout Foucault's work, he never devoted a specific study to the field as he did for madness, health, knowledge, crime, sexuality, or identity. The best-known of his discussions of education occurs in Part III of Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1986), but his analysis here is intermingled with parallel discussions of the military, monastic, economic, juridical, medical, and of course penal manifestations of disciplinary techniques. Only in two texts — the first an interview with John Simon at the University of Buffalo (Foucault, 1971), and the second a general discussion with high-school pupils under the auspices of the journal Actuel (Foucault, 1977) — does Foucault focus primarily and almost exclusively on education. Both of these texts date originally from 1971, shortly after Foucault, having briefly headed the Department of Philosophy at the newly established University of Vincennes, had been appointed to a Chair at the Collège de France. More broadly, Foucault's interest in education can be dated from his involvement in the 'May events' instigated by students and joined by workers in Paris, 1968, to the publication of his substantial research into punishment and sexuality in 1975 and 1976, respectively (Foucault, 1986; Foucault, 1981). Aside from these texts, educational issues also figure prominently in some of Foucault's lectures at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro in 1973 (Foucault, 2000), and in an interview given on French radio in 1975 (Foucault, 1996).

The three Foucauldian themes of the 'technico-political' history of the school, the everyday mechanics of schooling as 'moral orthopedics', and the modelling of education as a 'block of capacity–communication–power', are the subject matter of this article. Drawing on these findings, subsequent research will: utilize Foucault's concept of 'problematization' to examine how the experience which we call education has been produced through historical forms of constraint and their analytical corollaries, discourses of teaching and learning; contextualize the origins, development, and institutionalization of the pedagogical impulse inherent in western political rationalities, from ancient times to the present (for an initial outline, see Deacon, 2002); investigate the impact of disciplinary technologies at the level of educational discourse in South Africa, from Fundamental Pedagogics through Freirean and critical pedagogy and People's Education to the constructivism and pragmatism of current policy research; and analyse the effects and implications of outcomes-based education in South Africa, with particular reference to pedagogical techniques of knowledge construction, pupil and parental participation, and hermeneutic assistance in facilitating self-mastery and the acquisition of globally relevant skills, ethics, and good citizenship.

A 'technico-political' history of the school

A Foucauldian account of the successive historical metamorphoses of the school incorporates but also goes beyond conventional liberal, Weberian, Marxist, and revisionist approaches (see, for example, Archer, 1979; Cubberley, 1948; Green, 1990; Hunter, 1994). Conventional explanations of the rise of mass schooling in terms of the interests of capitalists, the needs of national states, the struggles of workers, the arguments of educational reformers or the general progress of society pay insufficient attention to the relatively marginal, mundane, contingent, and discontinuous disciplinary technologies spreading throughout early modern societies, and
ignore how these both made possible, and came to be utilized and colonized by, larger, more
global mechanisms.

In the early modern world, it was not yet a foregone conclusion that the school would
become the chief socializing mechanism intermediate between the family and the world of
work. The school was not the only institution that offered education; it was in direct peda-
gogical competition with institutions peddling in apprenticeships, salvation, rehabilitation,
cure, moral instruction, and the arts of war; and its functions were for a long time largely
restrictive and negative, containing social problems rather than promoting social development. Only once schools had begun to demonstrate their peculiar mastery of disciplinary techniques
for managing people, under pressures emanating as much from below and from the peripheries
as from above and the centre, did systematic instruction and its instrument, the school, appear
as more than merely one amongst many competing strategies.

Drawing directly on Foucault's work, one can identify five distinct trends or stages in the
early modern history of discipline, from the Great Confinement (1600–1750) to the middle of
the nineteenth century: a progression through various phases of confinement; a transition from
degrees of exclusion to degrees of inclusion; a shift from group-centredness to individual-
centredness; a change from harsh and relatively inflexible to mild and ostensibly gentler
practices; and, perhaps most importantly, a shift from negative to positive conceptions and
practices of discipline. Each of these trends displays different correlations between tendencies
towards individualization and totalization; each differently utilizes time, divides space, esta-
blishes institutions, produces knowledge, and regulates subjects; all amalgamate human
capacities, relations of communication and relations of power; all seek to fundamentally alter
those who are confined; and all have lateral effects, extending beyond themselves.

In seventeenth-century Europe, the old transcendental certainties no longer convinced,
even while the new rationalisms were still received sceptically. Simple, brute confinement was
the default solution applied to most of society's various perceived ills, from moral decrepitude
through social vagabondage to political disquiet; but enclosure in itself was insufficient. The
evolving Protestant work ethic abhorred both upper class 'wastefulness' and lower class
'idleness', and demanded that all contribute to prosperity for all. Alongside confinement, soon
also associated with the rehabilitative activity of honest toil, schools functioned chiefly to
contain disorder and neutralize dangers, and were justified in terms of their presumed capacity
to prevent ignorance, idleness, and insubordination. (See, apart from Foucault's own texts
mentioned above, Bushnell, 1996; Jones & Williamson, 1979; Stone, 1964.)

The realization that confinement on its own could not adequately address the difficulties
faced by the early modern authorities in managing socio-economic change on so unprecedented
a scale was a driving force in the shift towards more positive forms of discipline. The waning
authority of the mainstream churches, the declining guild system and the cumbersome nature
of the houses of correction rendered these institutions increasingly inadequate; whilst the
existing educational institutions were perceived as poorly regulated, arbitrarily managed,
abusive, ineffective, generating resistance, depriving parents of income, exacerbating labour
shortages and producing delinquents. Their lack of regulation was associated with a lack of
'humanity' or, from a Foucauldian point of view, with a poor economy of coercion. Tellingly,
it was not the shortcomings in their methods of instruction, textbooks, or curricula that counted
for much; it was the practice of corporal punishment.

This perennially criticized and yet centuries-old aspect of schooling loomed remarkably
large in contemporary criticisms of educational practice (for merely one amongst many examples, see Montaigne, 1958:71-73). The apparently progressive belief that free men are both more productive and more malleable than slaves rubbed shoulders with the conservative view that existing social hierarchies would be upset were a commoner teacher to beat a noble pupil. Foucault suggests that the concern was less about inhumanity or violence per se and more about the kind or degree of violence that might best mould particular individuals; and it was to the pedagogical models of the Jesuits and Pietism that critics turned in search of alternatives: the normalizing subtleties of objectifying classification, perpetual comparison, and humiliating exclusion.

The effects of confinement itself — stricter surveillance, accumulated knowledge, and tighter partitioning — had made possible, but did not ensure, greater social control; these effects had also rendered more visible and problematic the rather unwieldy functions of existing schooling. It was proliferating material disciplinary techniques, generated among both marginal groups and those in or rising to positions of dominance, that made simple enclosure much more effective. Some of these marginal groups (especially dissenting religious communities, like the Jesuits in France, Pietists in Austria, and Quakers, Methodists, and Catholics in England) used extra-state disciplinary mechanisms as weapons of self-defence, whilst others used state mechanisms (like the lettre de cachet) to regulate themselves and others. Numerous private academies, organizations, and associations sought a degree of moral distance between themselves and the centralizing state (see Archer, 1979; Feld, 1977; Koselleck, 1988; Melton, 1988; Watanabe-O'Kelly, 1992; Yates, 1947). In addition, certain state apparatuses, like the police, concerned with the minutest details of the entire social body, facilitated the generalization of disciplinary techniques.

Only once dissenting groups had become more established and accepted and hence less susceptible to state intervention, did their techniques of moral self-control combine with the state's own efforts at maintaining order to impose moral training directly on the rest of society. The ensuing flood of national educational legislation from the mid-eighteenth century onwards (for which see, in particular, Bowen, 2003) was thus much more an after-effect of disciplinary technologies than their cause. Increasingly, discipline comes to be directed primarily at individuals and only secondarily at groups, and seeks not merely to confine but above all to correct, involving what Foucault called 'an inclusion through exclusion': in the case of schools, individuals are only 'excluded' from the rest of society in order to better embroil them in or 'attach' them to relations of power and knowledge. Consequently, a new and more positive disciplinary emphasis gained in influence, with the aim of primary education becoming the development of children's minds and bodies and the improvement of moral attitudes and behaviour. It is also at this time that educational discourse first begins to pay attention to the implicit, possibly innate, assuredly calculable future potential of the young; no longer so externally orientated and reactive, relations of power now sought to subject individuals by proactively intervening in their future behaviour.

This Foucauldian account of the rise of the early modern school offers several avenues for future research. On the one hand, Foucault's work alerts us to the fact that state control, though important, does not always takes the same form but varies according to mechanisms inherent in the particular institutions which it encounters. On the other hand, schooling, and education more generally, is not reducible either to these mechanisms or to 'discipline' in the abstract; discipline is just one mode through which western political rationalities have constituted
themselves. Rather, the specificity, multiplicity, differences, and reversibility of the functioning and effects of educational systems must be taken into account and accounted for. Lastly, from a rationalized twenty-first century perspective, the overlaps and interconnections between early modern pedagogical, spiritual, military, and penal techniques appear strangely, even uncomfortably, intimate. In this regard, worthy of further investigation are, first, Foucault's brief and often overlooked comment that, whether or not the prison or the Panopticon became the model for disciplinary institutions, it was a school, the 'pedagogical machine' of the École Militaire, which may have provided the inspiration for the Panopticon (Foucault, 1986:173; Bentham, 1995:87); and, second, the links between early modern prisons, armies and religious orders such as the Rasphuis of Amsterdam, the militant Society of Jesus, and the pious professional army of Maurice of Nassau (Spierenberg, 1991:127-34; Feld, 1977:172ff).

**Schooling as 'moral orthopedics'**

The centuries-long shift from negative to positive features of discipline was of primary importance in the establishment of schooling as a society-wide disciplinary technology. It went hand in hand with the development of new educational procedures and relays through which individual and collective subjects could be managed, their contexts regulated, their capacities augmented, and their effects channelled, including,

- the development of new teaching methodologies;
- the application of new forms of micro-discipline;
- the apportionment of time;
- the management of sexuality;
- the manipulation of bodies;
- the spread of lateral controls; and
- the production and extraction of knowledge and the reappraisal of curricula and learning.

The combination of an expanding school population and the enhanced training of increasing numbers of teachers made possible a kind of 'moral orthopedics' which over time slanted away from external vengeance and towards internal amendment. Though cumbersome, these initial disciplinary tendencies also contributed to the creation of a specialized time of schooling and the reconceptualization of childhood; to a proliferation of new, especially sexual, anxieties about children, and the reorganization of adult–child relationships; and to the rise of the idea of education as a science.

Schooling in itself had been a disciplinary response to the need to manage growing populations; within the progressively discriminating space of the schoolroom the productive regulation of large numbers of pupils also required new methodologies. First the monitorial method, already tried and tested at medieval universities, gradually supplanted the traditional one-on-one teacher–pupil relationship; this approach, in which a small number of older or more advanced pupils were individually tutored by teachers and then tutored the other pupils, signalled a shift in pedagogical relations of power by supplementing confinement with the moral and disciplinary 'relays' of increasing numbers of trained teachers, support staff and pupil assistants. Later, the monitorial method was superseded by the 'simultaneous method' (attributed, but not exclusive to, Jean-Baptiste de la Salle: see De la Salle, 1935) of direct group instruction by a single teacher.

Accompanying these new instructional methods was a 'micro-disciplinarization' of schooling. Foucault referred to 'a judicial power within the school', in the sense that the more
or less simple transfer of knowledge from one person to another cannot be disentangled from those authoritative processes which seek to instill discipline into the moral fibres of its inmates and thus differentiate between them, their nature, potentialities, levels, and values. Punishment in schools began to shift away from the public, the spectacular and the physically violent, to the personal, the mundane and the psychologically compelling, from 'threats or blows' to 'a cold and neglectful countenance', in the words of John Locke (in Baskin, 1966:348; echoed by De la Salle in Foucault, 1986:178), from external retribution to internal reform. The body, once made to be tortured, became something to be trained and corrected, from the gymnastics of handwriting to regimens of personal cleanliness: a new moral orthopedics that was intended to fashion the future more than punish the past.

The school refined and modified the disciplinary time it inherited from the monasteries, enhancing its value and its usefulness by adding it up and capitalizing it, dividing duration into successive or parallel segments, and serializing these from the simple to the complex. Like other disciplinary institutions, the early modern school attempted to exercise control over and responsibility for nearly all of its inmates' time, a principle rendered concrete by subsequent concerted interventions in pre-, post- and home-schooling, vocational training, Sunday schools, extra-mural activities and managed recreation, and taken to its logical conclusion in today's concept of lifelong learning. However, time, even before it can be used productively, or made available for various tasks, needs to be understood in a particular way, to exist in a particular format, and to be invested in or possessed by particular people; it follows that disciplinary time also made the specialized time of schooling possible in the first place. In the context of an expanding population, declining infant mortality, increased longevity, differentiation of domestic space, and a sharper demarcation between the public and the private, childhood became a problem of survival to adulthood, not merely at birth.

The new conception of childhood was first framed negatively, in terms of protecting the innocent child from the various dangers that might beset it, such as disease, ignorance, immorality, or adult sexuality. Increasingly, however, it was also felt necessary to positively strengthen children by developing their physiques, character, and reason (Ariès, 1962). In the midst of these new anxieties about children, Foucault espied what he called a 'pedagogization of children's sex': at home, parents, siblings, tutors, and servants, and at school, teachers and fellow pupils, constituted in relation to the child potential sources of danger, contagion, perversion and bad influence. Childhood sexuality was thus the premise around which great battles were fought in the schools, and also the pretext for the reciprocal surveillance of, and the reorganization of the relations between, parents, priests, police, pedagogues, and physicians (Foucault, 1981:110; 104). It consequently became more pressing, and more justifiable, to separate children from adults, younger children from older children and middle class from lower class children, and for certain categories of children to be 'rescued' from 'inappropriate' institutions like workhouses, poorhouses, prisons, and guilds. Schools began to develop, first, functionally differentiated spaces, and later, separate classrooms; and pupils were distributed spatially and serially, not only according to progress, age, or level of achievement but also character, cleanliness, even morality. Schools' putative control of all aspects of existence extended well beyond the formal school gates, fostering a whole margin of lateral controls which permitted the indirect supervision of parents and families and, ultimately, society as a whole (Foucault, 1986:211).

Schooling taught not only punctuation, but also punctuality, and not only reading, but also
hygiene; it taught that learning should not only entail gratification but also require chastisement. Schools also exercised what Foucault called 'epistemological power' — a power to extract a knowledge of individuals from individuals — which functioned in two ways. On the one hand, pupils' or teachers' personal understandings of and functional adaptations to school mechanisms could be recorded, accumulated, and used to subject individuals in new ways; on the other hand, epistemological power generates a kind of clinical knowledge, which underpins current discourses from educational psychology through teacher appraisal to whole school evaluation, and out of which emerged the idea of education as a science. Despite these scientific pretensions, the actual content of educational knowledge only slowly divested itself of its classical, scholastic and overtly religious orientations, and struggled to establish itself against local and popular knowledge. The influence of the scientific revolution — an emphasis on the direct practical manipulation and study of objects — only belatedly came to secure its place in the curriculum, first alongside, but ever after increasingly at the expense of, grammar and God.

The moral orthopedics of schooling offers fertile grounds for further investigation. Leaving aside any advantages that the bourgeoisie or the state may have recognized in the school, or the needs of the capitalist economy for its services, the real, material, technical, and effective foundations of compulsory, universal, state-run education systems can be discerned in the process of the 'disciplinarization' of the early modern school. Foucault's work should make us more inquisitive about the twentieth century shift towards more child-centred and participatory pedagogies, not least given the finding that pedagogical methods are not simply imposed but are formed out of individuals' own adaptations to school functions. There are also signs that the family, which according to Foucault was unseated a few centuries ago from its position as model for the government of a state and, by implication, a school, is today regaining some of its erstwhile importance, in the form of direct parental and community involvement in financing and governing public schools, and in the phenomenon of home-schooling. Finally, it is worth bearing in mind the degree to which modernity's vision of a progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge, the grouping and partitioning of curricula, the evolutionary differentiation and classification of learning cycles and phases, and the separation of ages and standards, so central to modern systems of education, are products of historically contingent disciplinary procedures.

**Education as 'capacity–communication–power'**

Over a comparatively short period of time, modern schooling has brought countless individuals and diverse populations to accept and tolerate steadily increasing degrees of subjection. Aside from the more historical and methodological aspects discussed in the preceding two sections, Foucault's work also offers nuanced understandings of the manifestations, functioning and effects of contemporary educational institutions and practices. Such institutions, where relations of power and knowledge come to support and link up with each other in more or less constant ways, form what Foucault called 'blocks of capacity–communication–power'. These 'regulated and concerted systems' fuse together the human capacity to manipulate words, things and people, adjusting abilities and inculcating behaviour via 'regulated communications' and 'power processes', and in the process structuring how teaching and learning take place. What distinguishes educational institutions from prisons, armies, and hospitals is that the former emphasize 'communication' above 'capacity' and 'power' (Foucault, 1982:218-219).
Universities, like schools, are multifaceted amalgamations of economic, political, judicial and epistemological relations of power, which still reflect the exclusionary and inclusionary binaries of their origins: university campuses are relatively artificial enclaves where students are expected to absorb socially desirable modes of behaviour and forms of knowledge before being recuperated into society. Foucault predicted that universities will become increasingly important politically, because they multiply and reinforce the power-effects of an expanding stratum of intellectuals and, not least, as a result of new global demands for active, multi-skilled and self-regulated citizens.

At the heart of the practice of teaching, Foucault argued, is a defined and regulated relation of surveillance which acts to improve its efficiency. This essential element of hierarchical observation is neither reducible to mere domination, nor does it nullify dispensed knowledge, skills, and values. Power relations are seldom one-sided, even at their most extreme, but in most instances reciprocal; those who exercise power in the school are caught up in and subjected by its functions just as much as those over whom power is exercised. In fact, in many everyday educational situations, it is the teacher, performing under the critical gaze of others, over whom power is exercised. What particularly intrigued Foucault, even though he did not develop this insight, was the problem of knowing how, in the typical pedagogical relationship, to avoid the effects of domination (Foucault, 1987:129) Whilst domination can be avoided or minimized by counteracting practices of power and by practices of liberty, relations of power (which Foucault clearly distinguished from domination), are inextricably intertwined with pedagogical effects of guilt, obligation and verification, and assumptions about degrees of ignorance, dependence on others, legitimate compulsion, and achievement.

Foucault sheds more light on pedagogical power relationships by contrasting the two most prominent forms of instruction: the lecture and the seminar (Foucault, 1971:199-200). He argues that the lecture, that apparently non-reciprocal and unequal power relationship, is more honest and less devious than the seminar about the relationships of power which inevitably invest each of them. A lecture which is tentative about its truth-claims and which exposes itself to criticism might neutralize power relations by rendering them more visible; whereas the ostensible freedom and reciprocity of the seminar may disguise power relations to the extent that students uncritically absorb what is only the informed opinion of the teacher. On this basis Foucault felt that seminars, whilst necessary, might be better suited for training in methods than for the development of free and critical thinking. It follows that one-on-one tutorials, group research programmes and group work are at least as likely to manipulate students as a traditional 'chalk and talk' method. Tutorial politics depend inordinately heavily on personal qualities, amicable interaction, and firm commitments, and are not well-suited for the average learner; group work, though less elitist, may enhance inter-peer politics at the risk of promoting unequal participation and domination by a few. Though Foucault himself was undoubtedly a little naïve in believing that in his lectures at the Collège de France (where students only attend what they want when they want), he managed to avoid exercising power over his audience, concrete empirical investigation would seem to be required to determine the actual and comparative power-effects of lecturing to large groups and holding small interactive seminars. (One empirical study (Gore, 1998) has identified and documented several techniques of power — surveillance, normalization, exclusion, classification, distribution, individualization, totalization, and regulation — across four different pedagogical sites, and concluded that these techniques, premised on inequalities of one sort or another, are relatively continuous and present
in all sites, apparently regardless of content, level, methodology, or (progressive or conservative) orientation.)

Three facets of Foucault's remarks on contemporary educational practices will be worth following up. The first has to do with the nature and effects of power and domination in education. The current emphasis on developing skills, knowledge, and attitudes (roughly corresponding to the 'capacity' and 'communication' aspects of Foucault's model) should not be permitted to obscure or inhibit analysis of the workings of numerous and diverse power relations which, specific to educational institutions, cannot be wished away or blamed solely on external forces. The twentieth-century shift from traditional didactic or teacher-centred to more co-operative or child-centred instructional formats has not dissolved or tamed power relations but merely reformulated them. Also, in this regard, it is worth investigating, for its pedagogical implications, the long theoretical tradition which can be traced back to the Stoics and which asserts that it is precisely those who do not care for themselves, who are undisciplined and swayed by appetite or interest, who are most likely to abuse power. Second, what Foucault had to say about 'the events' of May 1968 in France might be fruitfully applied to South Africa in 1976 or 1985:

the individuals who were subjected to the educational system, to the most constraining forms of conservatism and repetition, fought a revolutionary battle (Foucault, 1977:223).

Third, Foucault's work provides support for a concept complementary to that of lifelong learning: lifelong teaching. If we wish to think differently about, or bring about changes in, these pedagogical institutions, theories, and practices which have made us what we are, the concept of lifelong teaching proposes a potentially transgressive, perpetual process of self-transformation, which, through exemplary practices, may in turn impact upon wider social transformation. Perhaps all three of these areas for further investigation — power relations, care for the self, and lifelong teaching — could be examined under Seneca's precept: "men learn as they teach" (Seneca, 1969:43; also in Foucault, 1997:215).

**Conclusion**

Michel Foucault's oeuvre is a vast resource not only for social and political theorists but for educators too. It deserves to be mined and exploited more thoroughly, in a manner not unlike the way Foucault approached Nietzsche's work:

The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest (Foucault, 1980:53-54).

The research project to which this preliminary theoretical overview refers is an attempt to develop the implications of Foucault's work for education in all its facets. From a Foucauldian perspective, it seeks to show, not what education is but, how it operates in concrete and historical frameworks, in the sense of the actual processes, techniques, and effects which come into play when some individuals teach, or are taught by, others. What kinds of power relations govern the process, what bodies of knowledge are called into being, which different institutions are involved, what forms do the interactions take, and what effects do they have? Questions such as these, as well as the initial findings of this project, will help in addressing more concrete future applications of Foucault's work to education.
Notes
1. The first two-year phase of this research project, 2003/2004, was supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF).
2. 'Problematization' refers to ways in which specific historical practices give rise to or condition the emergence of objects of analysis, themselves an amalgam of experiences (such as teaching or learning), discourses (such as educational psychology), practices (such as teacher training) and institutions (such as schools), and also to ways in which genealogy transforms a 'given' into a question and in so doing requires the rethinking of power relations, forms of knowledge and moral action. See also Deacon, 2000.
3. This section draws upon a more detailed investigation, in press: Deacon, 2006.
4. The section outlines and develops the research findings in Deacon, 2005a.
5. The section draws upon Deacon, 2005b.

References


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