

THE RISE OF SEA POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION'S STRATEGY FOR WORLD DOMINATION

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He who commands the sea has command of everything.

— Themistocles.¹

He who rules the sea controls the commerce of the world, and thus the riches of the world, and finally the world itself.

— Sir Walter Raleigh.²

It is impossible not to note how man's ability to comprehend the ocean and to use it for its own needs directly affects the growth of the political prestige of the country and its economic and military might.

— Admiral Gorshkov.³

Introduction

Twenty-one years ago, in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Party, directed the following warning to the Western democratic states:

'Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.'⁴

Since Khrushchev directed this brutally straightforward warning to the Western World that it is the Soviet Union's long-range foreign policy objective to dominate the entire world, the Kremlin has ferociously striven towards the attainment of this goal. Thus all steps, all action and all planning by the Kremlin during the past few decades have formed part of a diabolical and merciless plan to overthrow capitalism during 'the second half of the twentieth century'⁵

However, it should be pointed out that in later years Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union will secure world domination, not by making war but by means of peaceful competition with Capitalism. He furthermore declared that, for this reason, the Kremlin will strive towards the promotion of peace and peaceful co-existence.⁶ This assurance, how-

ever, must be rejected as mere false propaganda because reality and experience have unmistakably proved that the Kremlin's definition of the concepts peace and peaceful co-existence is totally different to that of the West. While proclaiming peace, and propagating the principles of détente and peaceful co-existence, it actually prepares for war.

The latest evidence of this typically, communistic interpretation of détente was the unequivocal statement by First Secretary of the Party Leonid Brezhnev during March 1976 that détente —

'creates the most favourable conditions for building the new society in socialist countries, and for developing the revolutionary and liberation movement.'⁷

Aspirations towards Maritime Supremacy

As indicated above, the long-range foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union is world domination. Therefore, despite its so-called 'peace offensive' the real aim is to change the balance of power in its own and socialist satellite's favour.⁸ Today the Soviet Union has almost 50 per cent more Inter-continental ballistic missiles than the United States of America. She has more nuclear and other submarines. More than 60 per cent more

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1. J.J. Clark and D.H. Barnes: *Sea Power and its Meaning* (New York, 1966), p17
2. A.E. Sokol: *Sea Power in the Nuclear Age* (Washington, 1961) p66.
3. S.G. Gorshkov: *Red Star Rising at Sea*, as translated by T.A. Neely from a series of articles originally published in *Morskoi Sbornik*, United States Naval Institute, 1974 p9
4. M.G. Saunders: *The Soviet Navy* (London) p299.
5. *Ibid.*, p301.
6. *Ibid.*, p299
7. *South Africa International*, vol 7 October 1976.
8. *Ibid.*, p74

long-range bombers. More than twice as many other fighting planes. More combat surface ships. More than twice as many men and women in her armed forces. She is also spending up to 50 per cent annually more than the US on developing her armed forces and new 'sci-fi' weapons.⁹

Thus it is clear that despite détente, the Soviet Union is planning a power build-up which greatly exceeds her defence requirements.

A field of considerable importance in this respect, and one in which the Soviet Union is desperately trying to obtain complete superiority, is on the seas and oceans of the world. Here we have witnessed, since the Second World War, a phenomenal increase in the size and striking-power of the Soviet Navy. In fact, the building rate has been so rapid that already in 1958 Admiral Burke, United States of America's Chief of Naval Operations, could declare:

'The Soviet Navy build-up is the most significant development in Soviet planned strategy since World War II'¹⁰

This realisation of the need for maritime supremacy by the leaders in the Kremlin was outlined by Vice-Admiral E.M. Eller of the United States of America's Navy as follows:

'The leaders (in the Kremlin) prepare especially at sea for they know that the sea is the artery, uniting and giving life to the far flung free world. They know that even in this air-atomic age the key to world victory lies in the great waters of the world.'¹¹

Although it is generally accepted that it is the free world's complete dependence on the sea that has led the Soviet Union to embark on energetic efforts to secure maritime supremacy, her actions in this respect should also be seen against the background of certain geopolitical ideas formulated by the British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, at the beginning of this century.

Geopolitical Aspects of Russian Maritime Strategy

Sir Halford Mackinder first set forth his theories on geopolitics in a paper entitled 'The Geographical Pivot of History' presented to the Royal Geographic Society in London in 1904.¹² Studying the global features of the earth, he observed that three-fourths of the earth is water, while the rest is land. The formation of the land and water masses (land

masses spread out as islands in the water area) led him to declare that 'the arrangement of land and water boundaries over the earth's surface is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires and in the end to a single world empire.'¹³ The largest of these islands, said Mackinder, is the triad Afro-Eurasia. It contains twice as much territory as all the other land masses (islands) combined and seven times the population of all the other islands. This large area he called the 'World Island'. Within the 'World Island' is the pivot area or 'Heartland'. The 'Heartland', according to Mackinder, stretches eastward from East Europe to Siberia and southward from the Arctic Ocean to the Himalaya mountain range.¹⁴

It was Mackinder's firm belief that the 'Heartland' contains elements of power, sufficient for controlling the entire world. His classical warning was therefore:

*'Who rules East Europe
commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland
commands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island
commands the World.'*¹⁵

The rest of the world Mackinder divided briefly into the following geopolitical regions: Bordering on the 'Heartland' he outlined an 'Inner or Marginal Crescent'. This area includes the countries of Germany, Austria, Turkey, North Africa, the Middle East, India and China. According to him all these areas are vulnerable to penetration by land forces from the 'Heartland'. The remaining countries he called the 'Outer Crescent'.¹⁶

In 1943 Mackinder revised his theories and then pointed out the existence of a mantle of deserts which stretch around the northern regions. Within

9. *To The Point* vol 6 no 26, 11 February 1977 (Re-mussing the balance of the world might) p7.

10. M.G. Saunders: *op. cit.*, p299.

11. *Ibid.*

12. N.J. Padelford and G.A. Lincoln: *International Politics Foundations of International Relations*. (New York, 1954) p53.

13. J. Kieffer: *Realities of World Power* (New York, 1952) p58
G. Renner: *Global Geography* (New York, 1954) 1i6.

14. J. Kieffer: *op. cit.*, p29-30.

15. N.J. Padelford and G.A. Lincoln: *op. cit.*, p54.

16. *Ibid.*

this desert belt lie the 'Heartland' and the 'Midland Ocean' (North Atlantic ocean) with its subsidiary seas. This are he considered to be the 'fulcrum of world power'¹⁷

Outside these regions lie the 'Great Ocean (Pacific, India and South Atlantic) and the surrounding lands (India, China, Australia, South America, Africa south of the Sahara which he called the 'Secondary Heartland' and the countries on the West Coast of America'. Among these lands of the 'Outer World' Mackinder saw two regions with great potential for the future : firstly the tropical areas which border on either side of the South Atlantic Ocean and secondly India and China.¹⁸

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union is master of the 'Heartland' and world domination its stated long-range objective, it is clear that this theory would have an enormous impact on Russian strategic thinking and that Russian leaders would adopt it as the guiding principle in the formulation of a global strategy aimed at securing world dominance.

However, it is very interesting to note that, in typically Russian tradition, the leaders in the Kremlin have always rejected the idea that any geopolitical doctrine governed their strategic planning.¹⁹ It was only recently that Admiral Gorshkov openly highlighted the role of geographic determinism in influencing strategic doctrine in the Soviet Union.²⁰ Before this time Mackinder and other geopolitical theorists were denounced in Soviet publications as protagonists of Western imperialism, whose only object is to exploit the underdeveloped territories of the world for the benefit of capitalism.²¹

The full-scale effort by the Soviet Union during and after the second World War to conquer as many parts of Europe as possible is further evidence that domination of the 'Heartland' is a primary objective. Today the Soviet Union is in control of all of Eastern Europe plus 50 per cent of Germany — the access route to the 'Heartland'.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union was not the first totalitarian country to adopt such a geopolitical theory as basis for a strategy aimed at securing world domination. During the thirties Nazi Germany embarked on a similar plan : conquer East Europe and the Soviet Union in order to secure possession of the Heartland and the military routes leading to it ; destroy the sea power of the allied powers ; dominate the World Island and hence the world.²²

After the Soviet Union had by 1949 succeeded in gaining control of the 'Heartland' she was in a position to concentrate on spreading the Communist revolution. However, it was soon realised that in order to make real progress towards world domination, she should not only extend and consolidate her influence on the 'Heartland' and the 'World Island' but should also become master of Mackinder's 'Great Ocean'.

The importance of controlling the 'Great Ocean' by any country with aspirations for world domination was formulated by Admiral J.J. Clark and Captain D.H. Barnes of the United States of America as follows :

*'Who rules the seas around East Europe, the Heartland and the World Island commands them all.'*²³

A further significant geographical feature concerning control of the 'Great Ocean' is the fact that effective control over it could be exercised by domination of only a few vital areas called 'bottlenecks' or 'chokepoints'. Areas of special importance in this regard are the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the Horn of Africa, the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the Southeast Asia-Straits of Malacca, the sea routes round Africa and the Caribbean.²⁴ It is interesting to note that the peoples of the free world oceanic alliance today depend upon the trade and free movement of goods along some 70 000 miles of primary sea routes, all of which pass through one of the aforementioned bottlenecks.²⁵

In the days when Britain was a leading power in world politics and no other country could successfully question her supremacy at sea, domination of these important geographic crossroads was of the

17. *Ibid.*, pp55 – 56.

18. *Ibid.*, p56.

19. M.G. Saunders: *op. cit.*, p285.

20. *Survival* vol 19 no 1 January/February 1977 (S.G. Gorshkov The Sea Power of the State) p24.

21. M.G. Saunders: *op. cit.*, p32.

22. J. Kieffer: *op. cit.*, p32.

23. J.J. Clark and C.H. Barnes: *op. cit.*, p9.

24. S.G. Gorshkov: *op. cit.*, p8. J.J. Clark and C.H. Barnes: *op. cit.*, pp14 – 15.

25. J.J. Clark and C.H. Barnes: *op. cit.*, p16.

utmost importance. In fact, the formula for world power followed by Britain during this period was :

*'Who controls the bases,
controls the seas;
Who controls the seas,
controls the world.'*²⁶

It is against this background that the Soviet Union's efforts to obtain bases and political influence in countries such as Angola, Aden, Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, India, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mocambique, Somalia and Yemen should be seen. Operating from these areas she will not only be in a position to effectively control these bottlenecks but also Western trade.

The enormous build-up of the Soviet Navy, Merchant Navy and intensive propaganda campaign for the withdrawal of Western military power from overseas areas, should likewise be interpreted.

The Free World's Dependence on the Sea

How important it really is for the Soviet Union to obtain supremacy at sea can furthermore be appreciated when the free world's dependence on the sea and sea arteries is realised. At present more than 100 million tons of goods are transported annually by sea between the western countries.²⁷ The dependence of the industrialised countries on oil transported by sea from the Middle East and other raw materials transported from the Southern Hemisphere serves as further evidence.²⁸

According to *Jane's Fighting Ships 1976—1977* the NATO countries reliance on ocean trade is evidenced by the following facts:

1. In the North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas at any time there are just over a thousand merchant ships at sea plying between ports, in addition to some three thousand lying within those ports.
2. Oil is transported to these nations in NATO tankers of which two hundred are daily at sea in the Indian Ocean.
3. Over a quarter of the British Merchant Fleet is east of Suez at any time.²⁹

The Western World's dependence on the sea has led Rear-Admiral Eller of the United States of America to correctly describe the West as a 'World Sea Confederation'³⁰ The Soviet Union realises this

hard fact and is firmly convinced that if it can gain the upper hand at sea and cut the maritime arteries, the Western economics will be strangled. In this regard Rear-Admiral Eller has noted the following :

'The leaders in the Kremlin know what the arteries of the sea mean to the free world and build their forces accordingly.'³¹

The Soviet Union's Maritime Forces Expansion Programme

How important the domination of seas and oceans in a world conflict is, emerged clearly from both world wars. During the first World War the German submarine campaign could have achieved victory but for Allied sea power. During the Second World War, the role of Western sea power was again decisive despite the tremendous development of air power and other new weapons.³²

Being convinced that 'in future as in the past, no attempt to secure world dominion can succeed without the mastery of seas and oceans'³³ the Soviet Union has, embarked on an unparalleled naval construction program.

This program was set in motion in 1950 when Stalin announced an ambitious ten year plan for the construction of a large number of surface vessels and medium-range submarines.³⁴ After Stalin's death in 1953 the construction of surface vessels was largely abandoned and more emphasis placed on the construction of missile carrying submarines.³⁵

26. J. Kieffer, *op. cit.*, p104

27. *Die Burger*, 6 June 1976.

28. It is estimated that the Cape route alone is used to supply the West with 80 per cent of its oil supplies and NATO 70 per cent of its strategic material; *Navy International*, vol 82, no 7, July 1977, p25

29. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1976—77* (London) p117

30. M G. Saunders *op. cit.*, p304.

31. *Ibid.*, p309.

32. *Ibid.*, p295

33. *Ibid.*

34. T.B. Millar: *Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area*, Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1970, p7; R.W. Herrick: *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Maryland, 1968) pp57—66.

35. T.B. Millar, *op. cit.*, p7; R.L. Garthoff: *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (London, 1958) pp202—203.

When, in 1955, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and First Deputy Minister of Defence, he developed a sophisticated naval strategy. A large submarine fleet was built, including nuclear-propelled vessels and vessels with nuclear strike capacity capable of attacking the enemy homeland, disrupting lines of communication, and destroying the enemy's surface ships and submarines. Furthermore, Stalin's surface fleet was not scrapped but retained to provide 'comprehensive combat support'.³⁶

Along with the build-up of the Navy the Kremlin also embarked on a program for the expansion of the merchant navy, the fishing fleet and the oceanographic and hydrographic fleet. The merchant navy — *Morflot* — is at present one of the largest — about 8 000 vessels³⁷ — and most modern in the world. A peculiar fact about *Morflot* is that 'it is as much an arm of the Soviet defence and foreign policy as is the Soviet Navy'³⁸ Great anxiety today exists among Western ship owners about the expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and its increasing intrusion into the major trade routes of the Western World.³⁹

The oceanographic and hydrographic fleet is at present bigger than the combined research fleets of the rest of the world. Besides its research function it also gathers data which can be used for submarine as well as satellite communications.⁴⁰

About Russia's maritime forces expansion program, Admiral Burke former United States of America's Chief of Naval Operations said the following in 1958:

'The naval building rate of the Soviet Union since World War II has exceeded all other peace-time naval construction programs in history They already have the largest submarine force in history and they are still building submarines at the rate of 80 a year, a rate never equalled by any nation at peace.'⁴¹

In 1967 the state was reached where Admiral Gorshkov could declare the following:

'In the past our ships and naval aviation units have operated primarily near our coasts Now we must be prepared for broad offensive operations against sea and ground troops of the imperialists on any point of the World's territories.'⁴²

Fifteen years after Admiral Gorshkov became

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, it was in a position to conduct, in co-operation with the merchant and fishing fleets the world wide exercises 'OKEAN'.⁴³ Similar exercises were held in 1975.⁴⁴ Also in 1970 Admiral Gorshkov made the following important statement in respect of the Soviet Navy's capability :

'The Soviet Navy has been converted, in the full sense of the word, into an offensive type of long-range armed forcewhich could exert a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in the theatres of military operations of vast extentand which is also able to support state interests in peacetime.'⁴⁵

At present the Soviet Navy is far larger than is required to implement a purely defensive strategy. Moreover, it has attained equal partnership and prestige with the hitherto supreme Red Army. In his most revealing book, entitled 'Navies in War and in Peace', published in 1973, Admiral Gorshkov openly declared that :

'the Soviet warfleet is a powerful factor behind creating favourable conditions for the extension of Socialism and Communism and a factor behind the active protection of peace and consolidation of international security.'⁴⁶

Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, former chairman of the Military Committee of NATO has summarised the growing naval strength of the Soviet Union as follows in June 1977 :

36. T.B. Millar: *op. cit.*, p7; *Survival* March 1970, p94.
37. *Time* September 1977.

38. T.B. Millar: *op. cit.*, p11

39. *Time* September 1977, *Defence Transportation Journal*, April 1977.

40. *Africa Institute Bulletin* vol 12 no 9, October 1972 (Aanslag op Suider-Afrika) p361.

41. M.G. Saunders: *op. cit.*, p309

42. *Africa Institute Bulletin* vol 12 no 9, October 1972 (op. cit.) p362.

43. *Survival* vol 12 no 8 August 1970 (L.L. Whetton: The Mediterranean Threat) p253.

44. *South Africa International* vol 7 no 2, October 1976, p76.

45. *Survival* vol 12 no 8 August 1970 (L.L. Whetton: *op. cit.*) p253.

46. S.G. Gorshkov: *op. cit.*, p134; *South African International*, vol 7 no 2 October 1976, p76; *Survival* vol 17 no 2 March/April 1975, (R.G. Weiland: Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace') p54.

'At no time in the history has a country built so quickly in peacetime so many warships of every type; and, exceptionally, a country which is not dependent upon the sea, a land power very largely self-sufficient in internal resources. Soviet naval strategy has evolved in a short ten years from a purely defensive coast-protection and army-support arm to a worldwide presence of impressive offensive power'⁴⁷

The specific roles envisaged for the navy by Admiral Gorshkov was outlined by Rear-Admiral Gunter Poser, former NATO Head of Intelligence, as follows :

- a. To back up the machinations of peace strategy by show of military aid to favoured regimes and trouble makers ;
- b. To add to the prestige of the Soviet Union by 'showing the flag' as an ubiquitous sea and super power and protector of anti-Western movements ;
- c. To shadow Western maritime activities and to gain favourable positions for the control of the Cape oil route, a vital seaway for the West ;
- d. To prepare logistic support and facilities in advantageous locations for crisis and war ;
- e. To guarantee the import of minerals and other raw materialsurgently needed for Soviet armament and heavy industry and to explore similar resources on the sea bed ;
- f. To support the huge fishing fleet ;
- g. To protect the activities of the big merchant navy and its dumping practices ;
- h. To co-operate with spying and subversive missions of the fishing and merchant fleets.⁴⁸

During July 1976 the Soviet Union entered a new phase in its strive to secure domination of the oceans when the first aircraft carrier, the 40 000 ton Kiev, undertook its maiden voyage. According to *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76* the Kiev is only the first of a scheduled six aircraft carriers to be deployed.⁴⁹

Almost simultaneously with the appearance of the Kiev Admiral Gorshkov published a new book *The Sea Power of the State*. The major points of this book, as summarised by Western military experts are the following :

1. It is the task of the Soviet Navy to achieve such strength as to deprive the oceans of their protective role which they have, up until now, afforded the United States of America.
2. The Soviet Navy must have the capacity for

cutting off the enemy's sea transport, enforcing a blockade of the enemy's ports, bases and some coastal areas.

3. The Soviet Navy must be in a position to play a very big role in local wars.
4. Soviet sea power has a 'critical note' to play in eliminating the 'imperialist's' attempts to control the world's oceans and their natural resources.⁵⁰

Western Reaction to the Soviet Maritime Threat

In contrast with the Soviet Union where no stone is left unturned in order to secure supremacy at sea, the Western powers have, despite their total dependence on the sea, not only allowed extremely valuable overseas bases to fall into hostile hands, but have also allowed their naval forces to deteriorate to a position which could only be described as dangerous.

The alarming state of affairs could perhaps best be realised by referring to a report in the magazine *To The Point* during December 1976. According to this report the United States of America's Navy has, during the past decade, shrunk from a 1 000 ships to less than 500. However, the Soviet Navy has, during the same period, grown to a mammoth total of 2 500.⁵¹ The Soviet Union has three times more submarines as the United States of America and is even building aircraft carriers at a faster rate.

This disturbing tendency is not only restricted to the US fighting fleet : the merchant navy is in a similar position. According to a statement by Edwin Hood, President of the Council of Shipbuilders, in 1972, the United States of America, which emerged from the second World War as the supreme maritime power in terms of merchant ships, has sunk to an ignominious sixth position since the war.⁵²

47. *Navy International*, June 1977, p10.

48. *South Africa International*, vol 7 no 2, October 1976, p79.

49. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-76*, (London) p93.

50. For a brief summary of 'The Sea Power of the State' see *Survival* vol 19 no 1, January/February 1977 (S.G. Gorshkov: *The Sea Power of the State*) p24; *The Plain Truth* November 1976, p3.

51. *To The Point*, vol 5 no 52/53, 24 December 1976 (World Naval Balance Pivots on the United States) p16.

52. *The Plain Truth*, November 1969, p9.

In Britain the position is even worse. According to *Jane's Fighting Ships 1976/77* the Royal Navy is 'inadequately equipped' to effectively protect the oil rigs and the 320 km Exclusive Economic Zone and expanded fishery limits.⁵³ Twenty five years ago the Royal Navy numbered more than 300 vessels. Today the number has slumped to 112.⁵⁴

This situation is precisely what Rear-Admiral Eller had in mind when he warned the West in 1958 that its greatest danger is to allow its naval strength to decline. From a position of weakness, he said, the West will inevitably sink to decisions based on terror.⁵⁵

The question arises whether the West in general and the United States of America in particular is unaware of the seriousness of these developments. The answer to this question is paradoxical. On the one hand the Western powers are only too aware of the dangers inherent in the Kremlin's maritime build-up, while on the other hand positive action to counter the threat remain in abeyance.

Evidence that military and political leaders of the United States of America are indeed fully aware of the consequences of Russia's maritime policies is numerous.

1. In 1968 the American House Committee on the Armed Forces, tabled the following report:

'The Naval forces now being created by the Soviet Union and the uses of sea power now being made by the USSR are part of the overall communistic design of total victory in the struggle against the US and other free world nations.'⁵⁶

2. After the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy of the United States of America emphasised the importance of sea control as follows :

'If there is any lesson of the twentieth century, and especially of the past few years, it is that in spite of the advances in space and in the air this country must still move easily and safely across the seas of the world.'⁵⁷

The reasons for his firm views on control of the seas were also outlined by him:

'Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas means victory. The USA must control the seas if it is to protect our security.'⁵⁸

3. President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America held similar views :

'All through our nation's history the prosperity of our people and their safety have been tied very closely to the role we play on the seas of the world. That is a role we can never wisely or safely neglect.'⁵⁹

4. During December 1976 Admiral James L. Holloway, United States of America's Chief of Naval Operations declared as follows :

'During the past 15 years the Soviet Navy has evolved from a coastal defence force to one with sufficiently imposing strength to challenge the US Navy throughout the world. The impressive developments accomplished during that time, with considerable reduction in the size of the US Navy, have resulted in significant shifts in the Naval balance.'⁶⁰

5. Similar statements were made by political and military leaders in other Western countries.

The question that immediately arises is : if the dangers inherent in expanding Soviet sea power are being realised by leaders in the West, why then is the deterioration of their naval forces being tolerated? Although economic factors are undoubtedly playing a significant part, it seems, however, as if this sorry state of affairs could, to a large extent, be ascribed to the fact that leaders of the free world harbour the illusion that peace, security and survival can be attained by following policies of appeasement, compromise and détente. A renewed effort to redress the naval balance would jeopardise this conception. The futility of this attitude could not sufficiently be over-emphasised because events during the past few decades and pronouncements in recent years have undisputably

53. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1976 - 77*, (London) p123.

53. *To The Point*, vol 6 no 27, 8 July 1977 (Why Cadman is Confident) p8.

55. M.G. Saunders: *op. cit.*, p305.

56. *The Plain Truth*, November 1969, p11.

57. *Ibid.*

58. J.J. Clark and D.H. Barnes: *op. cit.*, p121.'

60. *To The Point*, vol 5 no 52/53, 24 December 1976 (World Naval Balance Pivots on the United States) p16.

proved that the Soviets, while talking peace, earnestly prepare for war. The only reason why the Kremlin has responded to the West's détente overtures is because it realises that the dove hiding the mouth of the cannon might sometimes bring greater gain.

Further reasons for the Western world's unwillingness to redress the maritime balance are its lack of will, moral courage and vision.

Conclusion

Today, as in the days of Drake, Nelson, Mahan, control of the seas is vital in peace and war. For the free world in particular it is of extreme importance because without it there is no survival. The time has come for the Western world, with its historic knowledge of the importance of sea power, to once again realise that sea power is total power.