BOER GUERRILLA AND BRITISH COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1899 TO 1902

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Abstract

In this article, a review of the guerrilla (i.e. fourth main) phase of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 is provided; a phase that stretched from March 1900 until May 1902. It is indicated how and why the war developed from a (semi-)conventional conflict to a full-scale guerrilla war, and what the consequences of those developments were. The way in which the Boers applied guerrilla tactics at, for example, the battles of Sannaspos, Bakenlaagte, Groenkop, Yzerspruit and Tweebosch/De Klipdrift, are briefly analysed, with special reference to the role played by prominent Boer guerrilla commanders such as Generals Christiaan de Wet, Koos de la Rey and Louis Botha. The British counter-guerrilla strategy is also analysed, with special reference to the scorched-earth policy, internment camps, “psychological warfare”, mobile columns, information/intelligence, blockhouses, armoured trains and drivers. The available sources that shed light on the guerrilla phase of the war will be briefly discussed, and this controversial phase of the war will be placed in the broader context of the history of twentieth-century South Africa.

Introduction

The Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) is, together with the Mfecane, the most devastating war in the history of South Africa. What was supposed to be a white man’s war, soon degenerated into a regional conflict that involved and affected most of the white, black, coloured and Asian inhabitants, including civilians. It was a conflict that had characteristics of a total war and a civil war; a war that left huge parts of South Africa destroyed, culminating in a legacy of bitterness and trauma which cast a long shadow over the history of twentieth-century South Africa. The article will provide an indication of why and how the war developed from a (semi-)conventional conflict (October 1899–March 1900) to a full-
scale guerrilla conflict (March 1900–May 1902), and what the consequences of these developments were. The way in which the Boer forces applied guerrilla tactics at, for example, the battles of Sannaspos, Bakenlaagte, Groenkop, Yzerspruit and Tweebosch/De Klipdrift will be briefly analysed, with special reference to the role played by Boer guerrilla commanders such as Christiaan de Wet, Koos de la Rey and Louis Botha. The British counter-guerrilla strategy will also be analysed, with particular reference to their use of mobile columns, drives, armoured trains, blockhouse lines, a scorched-earth policy and the concomitant “resettlement” of Boer and black civilians in internment camps. In addition, the role of the British commanding officers (Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener) will be highlighted; and the ultimate success of the British forces in ruthlessly swinging the war tide in their favour and forcing the Boers to accept defeat, will be discussed. To begin with, the available sources that shed light on the guerrilla phase (especially diaries and reminiscences) will be briefly analysed.

The sources

More than a hundred years after the Anglo-Boer War, it is possible to piece together the history of the Boer guerrilla operations and British counter-guerrilla operations, thanks to a great variety of sources. Volumes 4 (partially) and 5 of LS Amery (ed.)’s The Times history of the war in South Africa 1899–1902 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., 1906–1907) and Volumes 3 (partially) and 4 of the British official history of the war, i.e. JF Maurice (ed.) and MH Grant, History of the war in South Africa 1899–1902 (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1908–1910), deal with the guerrilla phase of the war, and in most of the approximately 2 700 books that have been published on the history of the conflict, the guerrilla phase receives some attention, albeit that in most instances the focus falls more strongly on the approximately eleven months of (semi-) conventional warfare than on the 26 months of guerrilla warfare. See, for example, the books by T. Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Jonathan Ball, 1979), D. Judd and K. Surridge, The Boer War (London: John Murray, 2002), R. Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray: a history of the Boer War (London: The New English Library Ltd, 1967), B. Nasson, The South African War 1899–1902 (London: Arnold, 1998) and B. Nasson, The war for South Africa: The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2010), as well as several regimental histories and a few postgraduate theses, for example, W.P. Franz, The British Army and the guerrilla war in South Africa (MA, University of South Carolina, 1972). See also the published diaries of Private Tucker (P. Todd and D. Fordham (eds), Private Tucker’s Boer War diary: the Transvaal War of 1899, 1900, 1901 & 1902 with the Natal Field Force; London: Elm Tree Books, 1980) and
Herbert Gwynne Howell (A. Wessels (ed.), *Anglo-Boer War diary of Herbert Gwynne Howell*; Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1986). In some biographies, for example those of Arthur and Ballard on Kitchener (see note 25, *infra*), there are discussions of the role played during the guerrilla phase by the person in question. Then there are also the numerous official British publications ("Blue Books") that deal with the guerrilla phase, including reports, published correspondence and Kitchener's monthly despatches – for example *South Africa. Despatch by General Lord Kitchener, dated 8th March 1901, relative to military operations in South Africa* (Cd. 522, London: H.M.S.O., 1901), and many similar despatches for the following months, published as, for example Cd. 605, Cd. 695, Cd. 820, Cd. 823, Cd. 824, Cd. 890, Cd. 965, Cd. 970, Cd. 984 and Cd. 986.

As far as the British counter-guerrilla operations are concerned, the official collections in the possession of The National Archives (Kew) and the private collections held by many museums and private libraries and archive depots are of great value, including those held by the National Army Museum and the Imperial War Museum in London. Unfortunately, many documents – including about half of the British monthly staff diaries providing details of military operations and of the movements of the various columns, as well as documents collected by the Intelligence Division – were lost when some 750 tons of War Office documents were destroyed by incendiary bombs during the London Blitz on 9 September 1940.2 These losses were very serious, because most of the destroyed documents dealt with the guerrilla phase of the war.3

As far as sources that were created by those who fought on the Boer side are concerned, C.R. de Wet’s *Three years war* (London: Constable, 1902) is of interest, but unfortunately does not provide much insight into the thinking of the man who can probably be regarded as the foremost Boer guerrilla leader. A few hundred Boer diaries and reminiscences are scattered throughout government, museum and other libraries and archives. Some of them have been published,4 for example by the Human Sciences Research Council’s now defunct Institute for Historical Research (see, for example, J.P. Brits (ed.), *Diary of a National Scout: PJ du Toit 1900–1902* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1974), O.J.O. Ferreira (ed.), *Memoirs of Ben Bouwer as written by P.J. le Riche* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1980) and A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Cilliers 1899–1902* (Pretoria: Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1978)), as well as in the *Christiaan de Wet-annale* – see, for example, the diary of Oskar Hintrager (Volume 1, 1973), and the reminiscences of the Cape rebel Japie Nesper (7, 1988). Other sources include J.D. Kestell, *Through shot and flame* (London: Methuen,

**The scene is set**

When the Anglo-Boer War broke out at 17:00 on Wednesday 11 October 1899, both the Boers and the British were under a mistaken impression with regard to the nature and duration of the conflict that would follow. On both sides, there were those who believed that the war would be over by Christmas 1899, whereas, in fact, the conflict ultimately dragged on for more than two and a half years. The Boers – i.e. the inhabitants of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), also known as the Transvaal, and the Oranje Vrijstaat or Orange Free State (OFS) – could field a total of approximately 55 000 burghers (i.e. armed ordinary citizens who were called upon in times of war to defend their respective countries – there were very few permanent force soldiers). The Boers decided to invade the adjoining British colonies (i.e. the Cape Colony and Natal) on a limited scale and to take up defensive positions just inside these territories, from whence they hoped to beat back any British attacks – as the Transvaalers had done during their war of independence (1880–1881). And so, in October and November 1899, the Boers indeed invaded the Cape Colony and Natal on a limited scale, laying siege to the towns of Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafikeng, and taking up defensive positions south of Kimberley, in the vicinity of Stormberg and Colesberg in the north-eastern Cape, and in Natal on the northern side of the Thukela (Tugela) River.

Initially there were only 22 104 British soldiers in, or on their way to, South Africa, and most of them were trapped in the besieged towns referred to above. Had the Boers taken advantage of their numerical superiority and invaded the British colonies at several places and, as far as possible, destroyed lines of communication and concomitant infrastructure, they might well have caused immense damage, as well as headaches for the British Army command. But this did not happen – the British were allowed to land and deploy reinforcements, and to plan and implement
their strategy, and so the seeds were sown for a drawn-out conflict. The British were convinced that, in order to defeat the Boers, all that was needed was an army corps of some 46,000 soldiers—which was duly deployed under the command of General Redvers Buller, who arrived in Cape Town on 31 October 1899. Buller’s plan was to concentrate his force just south of the Orange River in the north-eastern Cape, invade the OFS, capture Bloemfontein (the OFS capital), then move northwards along the main railway line, and capture Johannesburg (the “City of Gold”) and Pretoria (the ZAR capital). However, on his arrival in South Africa, reports from the besieged garrisons in Kimberley and Ladysmith were so unfavourable that he decided to change his strategy. He divided his army corps into four smaller armies, sending one to relieve Kimberley, two others to the Colesberg and Stormberg fronts to stem the Boer advance, and taking one with him to Natal to relieve Ladysmith. Once these objectives had been attained, the idea was to revert to his original plan of action.10

However, in practice, matters went awry. In the course of a single week, henceforth known by the British as “Black Week”, British forces were severely defeated at Stormberg (10 December 1899), Magersfontein (11 December) and Colenso (15 December).11 Once again, the Boers did not follow up their tactical successes, with the result that the British were able to regroup, consolidate, and bring in more reinforcements. Buller’s reverse, and in particular the views he expressed after the debacle at Colenso, prompted the British authorities to send Lord Roberts of Kandahar to South Africa as the new commander-in-chief.12 Roberts, with Lord Kitchener of Khartoum as his chief of staff, arrived in Cape Town on 10 January 1900. While Buller continued with unsuccessful attempts to liberate Ladysmith,13 Roberts planned his elaborate indirect strategy. That he implemented on 11 February 1900, when his army of some 50,000 soldiers (with 110 pieces of artillery) outflanked the Boer positions at Magersfontein, relieved Kimberley (15 February), cornered and bombarded into submission a Boer army of more than 4,000 men under General P.A. Cronjé at Paardeberg (17–27 February), defeated the Boers at Poplar Grove (7 March) and Abrahamskraal-Driefontein (10 March), and captured—without any resistance—the OFS capital on 13 March 1900.14 Whereas Buller’s offensive (which can be regarded as the second phase of the war) was unsuccessful, Roberts’s offensive (during the third main phase of the war) was very successful up to this point. But Roberts’s exhausted army was now racked by a typhoid epidemic and forced to halt in Bloemfontein for more than seven weeks,15 affording the Boers an opportunity to take stock of their situation, decide whether to continue the struggle to retain their independence, and if so, which strategy to follow.
Boer guerrilla operations

Cronjé’s surrender at Paardeberg, with some seven per cent of the total Boer forces, was a watershed event. Henceforth the Boers could no longer win the war; they could merely prolong it. The defeat dislocated the Boers both physically and psychologically and led to the withdrawal of all the republican forces from the Cape Colony south of the Orange River; and when news of the surrender reached Buller’s troops in Natal, it motivated them to such an extent that, on that very same day (27 February), they at long last broke through to Ladysmith, relieving the town the next day.

In the light of the serious reverses on all the main fronts, the state presidents of both republics, as well as most of the senior commanding officers, met for a krijgsraad (i.e. council of war) in the OFS town of Kroonstad. There, on 17 March 1900, decisions were taken that would change the course and character of the war, and which would, in due course, have far-reaching consequences for all the people (white, black and coloured) who lived in the war zone. At Kroonstad, a decision was taken to continue the struggle to retain republican independence, but it was resolved that the strategy and tactics to achieve this would be changed. Instead of trying to stem the British advance by taking up defensive positions across a broad front, the republican forces would henceforth be organised in smaller units, which would have to operate in as mobile a manner as possible – without being dependent on wagon laagers. They would concentrate on destroying the British communication lines, attack the British Army from the rear, and harass the British at every possible opportunity. Henceforth, the Boers would go out to attack, rather than merely to defend. The Boers embarked on the guerrilla campaign with the objective of prolonging the conflict so that it could drain Britain’s resources. In doing this, they hoped that a political backlash in Britain would lead to a political settlement with more favourable conditions for peace.

It is ironic that it was only after suffering a serious reversal in the field (Paardeberg) – and losing a capital city (Bloemfontein) – that the Boers started to exploit what was their strongest weapon against a conventionally trained army, namely mobility. But it must also be kept in mind that the older and more conservative Boer commanders, including P.J. Joubert and P.A. Cronjé, were averse to suggestions of offensive and mobile warfare. Only after they had left the scene, more adventurous leaders like De Wet, Botha, De la Rey — and J.C. Smuts — could initiate the guerrilla phase. General Christiaan de Wet, who in due course became
the most famous guerrilla commander of the war, denied that the Boers were guerrillas. However, this denial should be understood in the light of the fact that the term "guerrilla" had negative connotations at the cusp of the nineteenth/twentieth century, being associated with banditry.\textsuperscript{19} With hindsight, it is clear that most of the Boer commandos operating in the field after March 1900 were, at least to some extent, guerrilla units. In typical guerrilla fashion, they relied on mobility to repeatedly effectuate surprise, after which they would withdraw again as soon as possible to minimise the risk of suffering casualties. Moreover, to a large extent, they lived off the veld (or made use of captured stores), and relied on excellent reconnaissance and field intelligence to outwit the enemy. In addition, they operated behind enemy lines, destroying the enemy’s lines of communication and other infrastructure.

If Kroonstad theoretically marked the beginning of the fourth (i.e. guerrilla) phase of the war – which overlapped with the third (or Roberts’s) phase – then the battle at Sannaspos heralded it in practice. There, on 31 March 1900, General Christiaan de Wet and about 1,500 men surprised and defeated a British force of 1,800 men commanded by Brigadier-General R.G. Broadwood. While losing only three dead and five wounded, the Boers inflicted losses amounting to at least 18 dead and 134 wounded on the British side, while also capturing 426 British soldiers, seven of their field pieces and more than 100 wagons and carts.\textsuperscript{20} It was a classic guerrilla-style victory, with complete surprise being achieved, and after the battle, the mobile Boers left the scene of their decisive victory as quickly as they had taken up position. The De Wet legend was born. He followed up his success by striking southwards, attacking and forcing a British force under Captain W.J. McWinnie to surrender at Mustershoek, east of Reddersburg, after a brief siege (3–4 April 1900): ten soldiers were killed and 581 surrendered (including 35 wounded), while the Boers apparently only had three dead and three wounded.\textsuperscript{21} Once again, surprise was achieved by a mobile guerrilla force. Interestingly enough, De Wet then inexplicably deviated from guerrilla principles by laying siege to a British force at Jammerbergdrif, just north of Wepener (9–25 April 1900) – without any success, and ultimately having to retreat in the face of strong relieving forces.\textsuperscript{22}

Shortly afterwards, Roberts left Bloemfontein on 3 May 1900 with an army of 25,000 soldiers, marched northwards all along the main railway line, entered Kroonstad on 12 May, and reached the Vaal River on 28 May. After annexing the OFS, which was renamed the Orange River Colony (ORC), he went on to capture Johannesburg on 31 May and Pretoria on 5 June – unopposed. Roberts’s march was
co-ordinated with Buller’s renewed advance from Natal towards the Delagoa Bay railway line, while three other armies advanced northwards on Roberts’s left flank.23 With both republican capitals now in British hands, Roberts was convinced that the war was nearly over;24 but he underestimated the Boers’ patriotism and tenacity. Roberts moved remarkably quickly (but also with characteristic impatience) from the Modder River via Bloemfontein to Pretoria, but after Paardeberg he was unable to inflict a heavy defeat on his opponents, who either declined to give battle or to withdraw as soon as possible – to regroup and fight another day, and who now also increasingly conducted guerrilla activities behind the British lines. On 7 June, De Wet launched simultaneous hit-and-run attacks against British forces at Vredefort Road, Renoster River Bridge and Roodewal – which left a total of 45 soldiers dead, 123 wounded and 672 unwounded prisoners taken, while at Roodewal, De Wet captured arms, ammunition and stores worth more than £100,000. Total Boer losses apparently amounted to only three wounded.25 Roberts sent Kitchener southwards to defeat De Wet in the ORC and to oversee the repair of the main railway line. The line was repaired, but Kitchener could not capture the elusive De Wet; as a matter of fact, while encamped at Heilbron Road (today Greenlands) for the night of 12–13 June, Kitchener’s guard unit was surprised by De Wet – and Kitchener (in his pyjamas) and his staff only just succeeded in escaping to a nearby Yeomanry camp.26 But things were not going well for the Boers in the ORC. The largest remaining Free State army was trapped in the Brandwater Basin, and more than 4,000 burghers surrendered without a fight, under controversial circumstances (end of July/beginning of August 1900). From a legal point of view, and to a large extent also in practice, this signified the end of the OFS as a sovereign state.27

The fact that the remaining OFS forces continued with a struggle that was now to a large extent futile, places the responsibility for what ultimately happened to the Boer (and black) civilians squarely on republican shoulders. However, De Wet succeeded in escaping from the Brandwater Basin. Roberts placed Kitchener in command of several columns that chased after De Wet (in what became known as the “first drive against De Wet”), but the Boer pimpernel evaded his pursuers, reached the safety of the area north of the Magaliesberg in the Transvaal, and in due course returned to the ORC to continue his guerrilla activities.28

In the meantime, the guerrilla war escalated. The guerrilla phase (i.e. the war’s fourth main phase) overlapped to a large extent with the third (i.e. Roberts’s) phase of the war. Roberts erroneously believed that with Pretoria in British hands,
the war was over, and that the Boers would surrender. When this did not happen, he launched an offensive eastwards along the railway line that stretched from Pretoria to Komatipoort (on the border with Mozambique, then a Portuguese colony) and from there to Lourenço Marques (the Mozambican capital, today Maputo). The Boers were defeated at the battle of Bergendal (Dalmanutha, 20–27 August 1900), and fell back to Komatipoort, from whence at least 1 000 Boers entered Portuguese territory, where they were interned. (Most of them were subsequently sent to Portugal.)

Roberts annexed the ZAR on 1 September 1900 – henceforth this became known as the Transvaal Colony. By this time, from a Boer guerrilla perspective, war fronts had fallen away. At midnight on 28–29 November 1900, Roberts – convinced that police work was all that was necessary to win the war in South Africa – handed over the supreme command in South Africa to Kitchener, and returned to England to take up his new position as commander-in-chief of the British Army at the War Office. Roberts turned the tide of the war irreversibly in favour of the British, but by not defeating the Boer armies decisively in the field, he laid the foundation for an expensive and exhaustive guerrilla war. He strategically outmanoeuvred the Boers, without defeating them tactically. His annexation of the republics was premature, and in practice the British were only in control of the (former) republics as far as their guns could shoot. Roberts was still on his way back to the United Kingdom when the guerrilla war in South Africa escalated both geographically and in intensity. On 13 December 1900, a Boer force commanded by Generals J.H. de la Rey, J.C. Smuts and C.F. Beyers surprised a British force at Nooitgedacht, west of Pretoria, and overran their camp. British losses included 109 killed, 186 wounded and at least 368 taken prisoner, while on the side of the Boers, 32 were killed and 46 wounded. Then, on the night of 15–16 December 1900, the commandos of General J.B.M. Hertzog and Commandant P.H. Kritzinger invaded the Cape Colony. The Boers intended to take the war back to British territory, in an effort to alleviate the pressure on the (former) Boer republics, and in the hope that a large-scale rebellion would break out in the Cape Colony. Many Cape Afrikaners indeed sympathised with their fellow Afrikaners from the ORC and Transvaal, but not more than 5 000 actually took up arms (whereas some 11 000 had rebelled when the Boers invaded in October–November 1899). In due course, guerrilla commanders such as Kritzinger (already referred to above), Captain Gideon Scheepers, Commandant W.D. Fouché, General W.C. Malan, General Manie Maritz, General H.W. Lategan, Commandant Hans Lötter and Commandant Japie Nescer perplexed the British military authorities by means of actions conducted in the wide expanses of the Cape Colony.
As the war degenerated into a guerrilla conflict, most foreign correspondents and military attachés returned to their respective countries. While the British military authorities tried to convince the British voters/taxpayers (as well as the outside world) that their soldiers were mopping up the little resistance that was purportedly left in South Africa, the Boers tried to convince those same people that they could still win the war, but needed foreign support. Shortly before the watershed Kroonstad krijsraad referred to earlier, it was decided that a deputation should be sent overseas in an effort to procure foreign arbitration. A. Fischer, C.H. Wessels and A.D.W. Wolmarans visited the Netherlands and the USA as well as France, Germany and Russia, but without achieving success. In the meantime, Dr W.J. Leyds, the ZAR’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Europe, continued to propagate the republican cause. There was a great deal of sympathy towards the Boer republics abroad, but very little material support was forthcoming.

Back in the war zone, noteworthy guerrilla clashes occurred, inter alia, at the following places in the western Transvaal, where on each occasion an attack on a British camp was repulsed after fierce fighting, with the British forces – on each occasion – suffering more casualties than the Boers: Vlakfontein (29 May 1901), Moedwil (30 September 1901) and Kleinfontein/Driefontein (24 October 1901). In the eastern Transvaal, General Ben Viljoen captured British positions at Helvetia on 29 December 1900, and on 12 June 1901, General C.H. Muller stormed in and captured a camp at Wilmansrust. In September 1901, General Louis Botha planned an invasion in Natal, and defeated a force at Blood River Poort (17 September), but his attacks on Itala and Fort Prospect were repulsed, and he returned to his operational area in the south-eastern Transvaal. There, on 30 October 1901, he surprised, stormed and decisively defeated a column at Bakenlaagte.

De Wet’s attempt to invade the Cape Colony in November 1900 was thwarted by an Orange River that was in flood. On 10 February 1901 he succeeded in crossing the Orange River into the Cape Colony, but was relentlessly pursued in what became known as the “third” or “great De Wet hunt”. Driven against a full Brak River, he was forced to turn back, but owing to brilliant deceptive movements on his part, he was able to evade his 14 000 pursuers, and by 28 February he was back in the ORC, having covered some 1 300 km in 43 days. He divided the ORC into seven military districts. On Christmas Day 1901, De Wet achieved one of his most audacious guerrilla successes by surprising and defeating a British force at Groenkop (near the present-day town of Kestell). The Boers stormed a British camp on the hill and overwhelmed the British force. The British lost at least 57 killed, 84
wounded and more than 200 (including many wounded) taken prisoner, as well as large quantities of arms, ammunition and stores. De Wet’s losses amounted to 14 killed and 30 wounded.45

Owing to the activities of Generals J.H. de la Rey and J.C.G. Kemp, the western Transvaal became one of the most active areas for guerrilla (and counter-guerrilla) operations. On 25 February 1902, at Yzerspruit, the Boers surprised, stormed and captured a convoy across the open veld, including two field guns and a pom-pom. The British lost at least 53 killed, 129 wounded (mostly taken prisoner) and about 240 unwounded prisoners, while the Boer losses amounted to some twelve killed and 31 wounded.46 On 7 March 1902, one of the British columns sent out to destroy De la Rey’s commando was defeated in a running battle that took place between Tweebosch and De Klipdrift. The British lost at least 68 killed, 121 wounded, more than 800 prisoners (including most of the wounded; amongst them Lord Methuen), four field-guns, two pom-poms and more than 100 wagons and carts. The Boers lost at least eight killed and 26 wounded.47 Not all Boer guerrilla attacks were successful. On 31 March 1902, at Boschbult, the British beat back a Boer attack,48 and at Roodewal, on 11 April 1902, the Boers suffered a heavy defeat.49 On the whole, however, the Boer guerrillas were successful in evading the British columns that were sent out to track them down and destroy them – thanks to, *inter alia*, good intelligence, knowledge of the area and terrain, and mobility as well as inspirational leadership.

By the end of the war, the guerrillas were also still very active in the Cape Colony. This was mainly owing to General J.C. Smuts’s invasion, which started on 4 September 1901 and eventually led to several small sieges in the barren north-west corner of the Colony.50 The Boer guerrilla operations had indeed extended over a period of exactly two years and two months, and had taken the war to areas that had not been affected by the military operations of the war’s first three phases.

**British counter-guerrilla operations**

With the mobile Boers resorting to guerrilla warfare, the British in due course found themselves in what can, by way of hindsight, be regarded as a Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan situation. A month after he had occupied Pretoria, Lord Roberts was optimistic that “it will not be very long before peace is made”.51 But this was not to be. Notwithstanding all its experience in colonial small wars (it had been involved in 230 wars, punitive expeditions and other forms of conflict in the 64 years during which Queen Victoria reigned, 1837–1901),52 the British Army
was ill-prepared to counter the Boers’ guerrilla strategy in South Africa. The mobility of the Boers was a problem that had to be neutralised, while an even bigger challenge was posed by the extent of the war zone. From a British perspective, the counter-guerrilla struggle became a war against the vast open spaces of the Transvaal, ORC and Cape Colony. If the veld could be controlled, and if the mobile Boer commandos could be hemmed in – and thus, if their mobility could be restrained – the war could be won.

It took a long time for the British Army in South Africa to be transformed from a conventionally trained and led force to a successful counter-guerrilla force. Under Roberts’s leadership, this transformation process was started, and a number of other measures were also taken to curb the Boer guerrilla activities. In due course, these measures were taken further by Kitchener. The British counter-guerrilla strategy comprised several distinctive but inter-linked elements, which entailed the following measures.

**Scorched earth.** In most wars, property belonging to the opponent is destroyed. During its colonial wars, the British Army often burnt down the houses of civilians, for example, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), Roberts ordered whole villages to be plundered and razed to the ground. In the Anglo-Boer War, the first farm-burnings occurred at an early stage, shortly after the outbreak of the war, when the British destroyed the farms of rebels in the Cape Colony; and when a British force made an incursion into the south-eastern OFS on 9 January 1900, several farmhouses were destroyed and the livestock carried off. In the light of the fact that the Boer farms supplied the commandos with food, fodder for their horses, information with regard to British troop movements, and medical care to the wounded, these farms were legitimate military targets. The scorched-earth policy, which was part and parcel of an elaborate British counter-guerrilla strategy, was initially implemented by Roberts, but was subsequently extended in scope and intensity by Kitchener. By stripping the land of everything that could be of assistance to the die-hard Boers in their continued liberation struggle, the British hoped to undermine their adversaries’ ability and will to fight on. Consequently, approximately 30 000 white farm homesteads plus outbuildings, as well as the houses of the black farm workers (i.e. more than 100 000 homes in total) were either burnt down or blown up with dynamite, while more than 40 towns and villages were also partially or totally destroyed. Large areas of the ORC and Transvaal were laid waste. These actions of the British forces and the concomitant establishment of the internment camps (see the next section), gave rise to negative publicity in the pro-Boer media internationally, and elicited severe criticism from opposition politicians in Britain and – of course – from the Boer commanders in the field. But, from a
military perspective, there was nothing else the British forces could do in their
desperate efforts to defeat the Boers. In due course, the scorched-earth policy did
indeed contribute towards the British victory.

**Internment camps.** In contrast to what is popularly believed, it was not
Kitchener, but Roberts who established the first camps for Boers. The first camp
was set up in Mafikeng in about July 1900. But it was Kitchener who expanded the
camp system, and it was under his watch that most of the deaths occurred. Of
course, the term “refugee camps” is a misnomer, since these camps were the logical
result of the deliberate scorched-earth policy. In conjunction with that policy, these
camps comprised part of the British military strategy to defeat the Boers who were
still in the field. One should also steer away from the loaded term “concentration
camp(s)”, because of its association with the Nazi concentration and extermination
camps of World War II. Consequently, the less emotionally charged and more
neutral term “internment camp(s)” should be used. The British military authorities
wanted to sever all ties between the recalcitrant Boers, who doggedly continued their
futile struggle, and their families who provided the Boers with food, fodder, shelter,
medical care and information. The death of civilians in the camps was never
intended, but owing to maladministration and neglect, at least 31 000 of the
approximately 145 000 white inmates and at least 23 000 (but probably many more –
possibly even more than 31 000) of the approximately 140 000 black inmates died
in the camps. In total, at least 34 camps for whites (perhaps as many as 47) and 66
camps for blacks were erected across South Africa.

**“Psychological warfare”**. In a desperate effort to persuade the elusive
Boers to surrender, Roberts resorted to sterner measures. As early as 1 June 1900, he
issued a proclamation in which it was stated that Boers who did not surrender would
henceforth be regarded as rebels, and treated accordingly. Subsequent
proclamations that were issued on 16 and 19 June 1900 declared that when a railway
line was attacked, the houses in the vicinity would be burnt down. These
proclamations were indicative of a realisation, on Roberts’s part, that he was no
longer able to win the war by means of traditional military methods. Kitchener also
resorted to proclamations aimed at scaring the Boers, for example, in a proclamation
of 7 August 1901, he threatened to banish those guerrillas who did not surrender by
15 September 1901. The Boers contemptuously referred to the British
proclamations as “paper bombs” – but suffered from their consequences
nevertheless. Mention should also be made of irregular British units like
Steinaecker’s Horse, and Breaker Morant and the Bushveldt Carbineers, who had to
sow terror in order to weaken the resolve of the Boers to continue with their
struggle.
**Mobile columns.** Traditionally, most soldiers in the British Army were infantrymen. Even during the first three phases of the Anglo-Boer War, infantry had only limited value, and with the exception of garrison troops in towns, as well as blockhouse guards, infantry were of no value whatsoever in counter-guerrilla operations. Therefore, in due course, Roberts – and later Kitchener – transformed infantry units into mounted infantry. From November 1900 onwards, the number of mobile British columns nearly doubled from 38 to more than 70. To keep his army mobile, Kitchener had to import most of his horses – at huge cost. In the course of the war, the British used 669,575 horses, mules and donkeys, of which 400,346 perished. Most British soldiers were never able to match the skills of their Boer adversaries as far as horsemanship was concerned. Nevertheless, the more mobile the British forces became, the more they were able to neutralise (at least to some extent) the Boers’ initial mobility advantage.

**More troops, including local inhabitants.** When Kitchener became commander-in-chief in South Africa, he had at his disposal approximately 210,000 white soldiers plus several thousand black and coloured persons who were primarily employed in a non-combatant capacity. Nearly 50% of the soldiers were performing garrison duty. At that stage, the number of Boers in the field did not exceed approximately 35,000. Kitchener needed more troops to pursue the mobile Boers in the field, and consequently asked for reinforcements. By May 1901, he had 240,000 troops – the largest number at any stage of the conflict. These troops included an increasing number of irregular forces, either formed in South Africa, or consisting of volunteers from colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, and in due course also including controversial units such as the Bushveldt Carbineers under Breaker Morant and others. In the course of the war, 448,735 white soldiers served on the side of the British, whereas no more than 78,000 served on the side of the Boers, and never more than 47,000 at any given time. But Kitchener also increased the number of black and coloured troops in British service to a total of as many as 140,000. In due course, at least 25,000 of these troops served as armed blockhouse guards, while several thousand also served in mobile columns that hunted Boer commandos. The fear that the Boers had that black tribes were out to exact revenge for previous injustices visited upon them, also weakened their resolve to continue with the struggle. Kitchener’s counter-guerrilla operations were also strengthened by the incorporation of some 5,500 joiners, including National Scouts (in the Transvaal) and Orange River Colony Volunteers, consisting of former Boer fighters who had voluntarily surrendered and later joined the British forces against their former comrades.
Information/intelligence. Several British reverses could be attributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to a lack of proper reconnaissance, aggravated by a lack of knowledge with regard to the terrain. By means of the incorporation of people who knew the terrain well, for example local black and coloured people, as well as “joiners”, in the British Army in South Africa, the level of information/intelligence gathering was improved. In due course, some of the British officers also became outstanding intelligence officers, for example, Aubrey Wools-Sampson.70

Blockhouses. Roberts started building forts to guard strategic bridges, railway junctions and other places of importance against Boer guerrilla attacks. In the light of the geographic escalation of the guerrilla war, Kitchener ordered the building of blockhouses and, in due course, expanded the blockhouse system. Eventually, approximately 8 000 blockhouses and other armed posts criss-crossed the war zone, mostly along the railway lines, but also, in many cases, in lines across the open veld, in effect dividing up the vast open spaces into more manageable “cages”. Some 60 000 soldiers were used as blockhouse guards, including 25 000 blacks and coloureds. Although the blockhouses were initially built to guard railways and places of strategic importance, they were ultimately incorporated into the elaborate counter-guerrilla strategy: they were meant to hamper Boer movements, and were of great value during drives71 (see infra). The blockhouse network did, indeed, pose a hindrance to the Boer commandos to some extent, but on most occasions when Boer forces were pushed against a blockhouse line, the majority – if not all of the men – succeeded in crossing unscathed, including De Wet.

Armoured trains. Nineteen armoured trains were used to patrol railway lines, and during drives (see infra), they were deployed to intercept Boer commandos who tried to break through blockhouse lines.72 Although these “mobile blockhouses” did, in fact, pose a threat to the guerrillas, they were too few and too cumbersome to play a decisive role in the overall counter-guerrilla strategy.

Drives. With all the above-mentioned measures in place, the British could now plan to intercept Boer commandos, or – if they could not be destroyed in battle – put them to flight and drive them relentlessly, with a view to cornering and destroying them against blockhouse lines (with the assistance of soldiers who had been locally recruited to supply information, and using armoured trains where necessary to support the mounted troops and blockhouse guards). Perhaps the most famous drives were those that were (unsuccessfully) conducted against De Wet (July–August 1900, December 1900 and February 1901). In addition, there were literally a few hundred other large- and small-scale drives, including some that were carried out in the eastern Transvaal and many in the western Transvaal. Moreover,
there were the five so-called “new-model drives” that Kitchener launched against De Wet in the north-eastern ORC, from 5 February to 8 May 1902. During these drives, the Boers lost many men and horses, and many burghers lost hope and surrendered voluntarily. However, it seldom happened that an entire commando was destroyed; and time and again, the main Boer leaders evaded capture.73 “De Wet is as usual everywhere,” complained Kitchener in a letter to Roberts.74

**Other measures.** Several hundred Cape rebels were captured, of whom 435 were condemned to death. This measure was meant to deter Cape Afrikaners from joining the guerrilla commando, and to some extent, it was successful in achieving this objective. However, in an effort to appease Cape Afrikaners, Kitchener commuted 391 sentences to jail time, and consequently, only 44 rebels were executed.75 As was the case during the first Boer invasion of the Cape Colony (October 1899–March 1900), the guerrilla invasions led to martial law being proclaimed in certain districts (December 1900), and extended to include the seaport towns in October 1901. Another important factor was the media. Roberts fostered good relations with the correspondents who accompanied his army, unlike Kitchener, who did not get along well with reporters.76 Through his numerous official despatches, Kitchener informed his military and political masters in London about developments at the war front, and eventually, the relative success that he achieved in countering the Boer guerrillas swayed public opinion in favour of the continued British (counter-guerrilla) war effort in South Africa, which eventually brought about a favourable outcome for the British Empire.

**Concluding perspectives**

By April 1902, there were only approximately 21 000 burghers (including some 4,000 Cape rebels) left in the field — many of them without horses, rifles and/or ammunition. War-weariness was also a huge problem. Most republican leaders at long last realised that they could not continue to fight much longer, and after preliminary talks had been held at Klerksdorp (9–11 April), as well as negotiations in Pretoria (12 April), Boer delegates met at Vereeniging on 15 May. After further negotiations with Kitchener and Lord Milner (British High Commissioner in South Africa), the Boer delegates at Vereeniging accepted the peace proposals by 54 votes to six on Saturday 31 May 1902. That same evening, the terms of surrender were officially signed in Pretoria. The Boer republics were (once again) no more — and most Boers reluctantly accepted this outcome. The factors that induced the delegates to accept the proposals, included —

- the dwindling number of Boers left in the field;
• their lack of arms, ammunition and horses;
• the overwhelming numerical superiority of the British forces;
• the increasing number of black and coloured people who fought on the side of the British; and
• the plight of the civilians in the internment camps.77

It was clear that the British counter-guerrilla operations had taken their toll.

The fact that the Boers resorted to guerrilla warfare effectively prolonged the war, thus imposing an enormous additional burden on the British taxpayer, while also subjecting the British Army command to a great deal of frustration. Had the Boers implemented their guerrilla strategy in all war sectors, and on a larger scale, immediately after the Kroonstad council of war meeting, it would probably have cost the British even more dearly. But whatever the Boers did, they would not have won the war. Even if a full-scale invasion by mobile commandos at the outbreak of war, or later full-scale guerrilla incursions, had led to the capture of one or more ports by the Boers, the Royal Navy would have been able to bombard them and to assist more soldiers in getting ashore.

From a Boer perspective, it can be argued that the guerrilla phase added a heroic chapter to the Afrikaners’ history, showing their tenacity and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. However, all things considered, it was – from a military point of view – a futile and (especially in terms of civilian lives lost) reckless exercise. Although the guerrilla operations prolonged the conflict, they could not lead to victory for the Boers. The guerrilla war contributed towards the civil war element in the conflict (especially in the Cape Colony), and also played a role in causing the conflict to degenerate into a regional total war. So, by 1902, the war that was supposed to have been over by Christmas 1899 – and which was supposed to have been a gentleman’s war and a white man’s war – had become a really nasty and bitter conflict, and sometimes – from a British perspective – it nearly spiralled out of control, albeit that, strictly speaking, the eventual outcome was never really in doubt. While both Roberts and Kitchener initially reviled the guerrillas, Kitchener eventually had to admit that “What are left of the Boers are really fine fellows and when they do fight they do it well.”78 However, if the Boers had been realistic at an earlier stage, and had they realised that they had no chance of winning the war, for example after their defeat at Paardeberg, or at any subsequent stage (for example after the Brandwater Basin surrender, or at – or after – the failed Middelburg peace negotiations of February-March 1901), the Afrikaners would have been spared much suffering.
After a drawn-out, frustrating and bitter counter-guerrilla conflict, the British forces in South Africa were eventually able to undermine the republican forces’ ability to such an extent that their leaders were prepared to negotiate a peace treaty. The British counter-guerrilla strategy and tactics had indeed, to a large extent, been successful. But the British were never able to capture De Wet and Steyn – who comprised the force behind the continued resistance of most Free State burghers, the inspiration of many Transvaalers, and the thorn in the side of the British forces. (As early as 30 June 1900, Kitchener had said that the elimination of Steyn was a prerequisite for the ending of hostilities.)\(^7^9\) The prolongation of the conflict inevitably added to the financial burden placed on the British taxpayer. (The war eventually cost more than £200 million.\(^8^0\) In today’s terms (2011), this amounts to a staggering sum of more than £6,000,000,000.)

By May 1902, the British had muddled their way through to a controversial victory. In the end, they – and in particular Kitchener – were ruthlessly successful. The Boers indeed capitulated under the pressure exerted by Kitchener’s counter-guerrilla operations. The Boer guerrilla operations and British counter-guerrilla operations left a trail of destruction (and death), and a legacy of trauma and bitterness. This cast a long and dark shadow over the history of twentieth-century South Africa.\(^8^1\) But the guerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer War also added a fascinating albeit controversial chapter to the history of the British Army, the history of the Afrikaner nation, as well as to the history of South Africa as a whole.

**End notes**

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2 Transvaal Archives Depot (TAD, now part of the National Archives, Pretoria), inventory of microfilms kept by the TAD, p. 147; TAD inventory of War Office Records (copies) kept by the TAD, pp. 2–5.


For the Boer strategy at the start of the war and the thinking behind it, see, for example, Wessels, A. “Die Boere se strategie aan die begin van die Anglo-Boereoorlog”. Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe 39/3&4. 1999. 227–242.


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As far as the Cape Afrikaners and the war are concerned, see Snyman, JH. “Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899–1902”. *Archives Year Book for South African History* 42/2. 1979.


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48 Naudé op. cit., pp. 345–349; Maurice & Grant, Vol. 4 op. cit., pp. 494–498;
49 Naudé op. cit., pp. 352–354; Maurice & Grant, Vol. 4 op. cit., pp. 499–504;
Amery, Vol. 5 op. cit., pp. 525, 531–537.
51 Royal Archives (RA; Windsor), VIC/P11/39: Lord Roberts – Queen Victoria, 5 July 1900 (letter).
52 See, for example, Farwell, B. Queen Victoria’s little wars. London: Allen Lane, 1973, 364–371.
54 Breytenbach, Vol. 4 op. cit., pp. 85–86.
56 Pretorius, Scorched earth op. cit., p. 22.


60 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

61 South Africa. *Correspondence relating to the prolongation of hostilities in South Africa* (Cd. 732). London: HMSO, 1901, 6. This proclamation was dated 6 August 1901, but was only proclaimed the next day.


63 Van der Merwe, FJ. *Horses of the Anglo-Boer War/Perde van die Anglo-Boereoorlog*. Kleinmond: FJ van der Merwe, s.a.


66 Cd. 1789, pp. 34–35.


70 Wessels, *Lord Kitchener ... op. cit.*, p. 343.


72 Hattingh & Wessels *op. cit.*, p. 122.

73 For more information on the drives see, for example, Amery, Vol. 5 op. cit.; Maurice & Grant, Vol. 4 op. cit.


RA, VIC/P10/12F: Lord Kitchener – Queen Victoria, 30 June 1900 (letter).
