Reason and Sagacity in Africa: Odera Oruka’s Contribution to Philosophy

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Abstract
Commentators on the four trends in contemporary African philosophy as enunciated by H. Odera Oruka frequently focus on the merits and demerits of each trend. However, many of them are oblivious to the way in which sagacity emancipates African philosophy by putting reason in its rightful pivotal position. This article argues that while the professional philosophers accused ethno-philosophers of doing disservice to African philosophy, they too stand accused of the same. This is due to the fact that both ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy function within the Western grid and therefore in the interest and service of the Western world. Philosophic sagacity, the article argues, discards the undesirable elements of ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy, while retaining desirable ones, namely, the Africanness in ethno-philosophy and the objectivity in professional philosophy. Because philosophic sagacity is African and objective, it is a desired tool of change in Africa. It can, for example, be used to address negative aspects of ethnicity that bedevil Africa. There lies the most important contribution by H. Odera Oruka to philosophy in general and African philosophy in particular.

Key Words
Odera Oruka, philosophic sagacity, ethno-philosophy, professional philosophy, reason

Introduction
H. Odera Oruka was an erudite scholar of great dexterity who published books and articles in diverse areas of philosophy, namely, ethics, logic, social and political philosophy, philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics, and African philosophy. It is, however, in the last academic topography that he is best remembered, especially with respect to philosophic sagacity which he is credited to have introduced within academic circles. In philosophic sagacity emphasis is laid on reason in matters pertaining to African cultures and belief systems. In this paper we offer a rationale for holding the view that Odera Oruka’s major contribution to philosophy in general, and to African philosophy in particular, is his philosophic sagacity.
Homage to Odera Oruka, in our view, would be incomplete without touching on his antidote to the tirade on reason in Africa as found in two trends in African philosophy that he branded as ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy. This is evidently what he most importantly bequeathed to the discipline of African philosophy. In this paper, focus is on three out of the four trends that were enunciated by Odera Oruka as he contributed to the debate on African philosophy that has raged for several decades. Central to the three trends - ethno-philosophy, professional philosophy and philosophic sagacity—is the question of reason, and, by extension, the ‘philosophicality’ of African philosophy. Hence, if there is, for example, African ethics, African epistemology or African metaphysics, the question is how philosophical these ‘philosophies’ are. At the very base of the debate is the concept of reason, which is conceived as the exclusive product of the West.

Consequently, the questioning of the ‘philosophicality’ of African philosophy is *ipso facto* the questioning of the authenticity of philosophy in ‘cultures devoid of reason’. Another Kenyan philosopher of international repute, D.A. Masolo, appropriately captured the role of reason in the debate when he wrote:

> The birth of the debate on African philosophy is historically associated with two happenings: Western discourse on Africa and the African response to it… At the centre of this debate is the concept of reason, a value which is believed to stand as the great divide between the civilized and the uncivilized, the logical and the mystical… To a large extent, the debate about African philosophy can be summarized as a significant contribution to the discussion and definition of reason…(Masolo 1994, 1)

The paper begins by looking at the locus of reason in ethno-philosophy and then in the professional school. From the weaknesses of the suppositions of these two schools, it then argues that Odera Oruka as a genuine African philosopher could not afford to be dispassionate in the discourse on African philosophy. His partisanship gave rise to philosophic sagacity as the restoring medium of reason in Africa. It is the approach that properly maps the geography of reason, in that it shifts it to encompass Africa as well.
Perversion of Reason by Ethno-philosophy

Though the term ethno-philosophy had been earlier used by Kwame Nkrumah, within the discourse on the nature of African philosophy its meaning is associated with Paulin Hountondji (1983), who used it to refer to the astounding philosophy that Placide Tempels, among others, was “discovering” in Africa. Within academic circles, therefore, ethno-philosophy as an approach to African philosophy is directly linked to Tempels’ book *La Philosophie Bantoue* (1945), which was translated into English under the title *Bantu Philosophy* (1959) - a book which marks the birth of modern African philosophy, as it has generated much debate. Ancient African philosophy is arguably found in the thoughts of Africans such as those Egyptian thinkers whose works were either destroyed or stolen when Egypt (Kemet) was conquered by Alexander the Great, the Macedonian ruler, St Augustine, Anthony William Amo, Zara Yacob and Walda Haywat (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2002; Olela 1981; James 1988; Sumner 1988; Asante 1990, 2000; Ben-Jochannan 1989, 1994; Nantambu 1996).

The gist of ethno-philosophy is that African philosophy, unlike Western philosophy, is a lived communal philosophy, a *Weltanschauung*. It is exercised as a collective wisdom of the people and not as a preserve of any one person or persons: every individual in the society shares it. African philosophy is an existential lived experience, common and obvious to all Africans. Tempels expresses this view when he asserts:

> We do not claim that Bantus are capable of presenting us with a philosophical treatise complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our own intellectual training that enables us to effect its systematic development. It is up to us to provide them with an accurate account of their conception of entities … (Tempels 1959, 24).

To Tempels, therefore, there was philosophy in the culture of the Bantu people he was examining, but the people themselves were not aware of it and hence could not articulate it. This amounts to seeing African philosophy as being embedded or yoked in the cultural beliefs and practices of a people innocent of the critical and independent aspect of reason, waiting for someone - a Westerner - with “intellectual training” to bring it to the fore.
There is tremendous amount of literature critical of the position of ethno-philosophy. However, a rather original and novel version of criticism leveled against ethno-philosophy is to be found in E. Wamba-dia-Wamba’s “Philosophy and African Intellectuals: Mimesis of Western Classicism, Ethno-philosophical Romanticism or African Self-Mastery?” A historian by academic training, he argues that in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, the question of philosophy is necessarily linked to the formation and development of intellectuals as a social stratum. Intellectuals, as a social category, emerged as a result of the separation of manual labour from intellectual labour within society. This separation was necessitated by the desire to increase production, and the increase could only take meaningful effect if the means (of production) was improved, hence requiring the need to establish a line of divide between manual labour and intellectual labour. Historically, according to Wamba-dia-Wamba, the human society has evolved in relation to its social division of labour. This separation gave birth to a social stratum of intellectual “producers” who kept growing in numbers and diversity, their views becoming more and more complex. With this growth, diversity and complexity of the social stratum of intellectual “producers” emerged a class of intellectual “producers” called philosophers. Wamba-dia-Wamba hence asserts:

Philosophy-doing, as a relatively autonomous social activity, emerged as a historical outcome of that separation. In pre-class divided communities, where intellectual work was not fundamentally separated from manual labour, philosophy as a social activity did not exist. This does not mean, however, that people were not thinking. But most likely they were not thinking systematically about thinking (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991, 8).

In the article, Wamba-dia-Wamba goes on to assert that the emergence of African philosophy as a specific way of philosophizing must be traced to the colonial and neo-colonial forms of separation between intellectual work and manual labour in Africa: that in colonial and neo-colonial Africa, the colonialists had to invoke this separation so that they could use intellectual workers to perpetuate and safeguard the colonial ideology. The intellectual workers were to be used as African ideological askaris (watch-dogs) of colonialism (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991).

The colonialists, according to Wamba-dia-Wamba, found intellectual workers in the name of missionaries and ethno-philosophers very useful not only as ideological askaris of their
regimes in the dominated societies of Africa, but also as the militant propagandists of dominant ideas towards the masses. They played a key role in the domination of the African people, and because of their roles as ideological askaris and militant propagandists, what the missionaries and ethno-philosophers said about Africa and its peoples were not necessarily correct. The missionary, for example, discovered how pagan and sinful the African was and how thirsty for salvation she or he was. The ethnologist, on the other hand, discovered how static, primitive, a-historical the African’s way of life was, and implied that it needed to be dynamized. Wamba-dia-Wamba believed that even if what they said about Africans was correct, it should nevertheless be rejected on the grounds that it was a philosophy that was primarily projected towards the domination of the African people (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991). He, for example, asserts that:

… ethnophilosophy is a philosophy of and for the dominated Africa. It does not matter whether or not actual ways of thinking of some real Africans fit in this way of viewing things. The fact is that this specificity is discovered, theorized in the face of a humanity that dominates it and requires it to be so dominated (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991, 10).

According to Wamba-dia-Wamba, ethnophiologists are intellectual producers who are engaged by colonial and neocolonial forces in service of their interest of dominating Africa. He goes on to postulate that even the etymology of the term “Africa” is a “search for a difference requiring to be dominated.” The term “Africa” comes from the Greek aphrike meaning not cold; from the Latin Aprica meaning sunny or Afriga meaning land of the Afrigs, the Roman term for the peoples living in the southern part of the Roman Empire. Etymologically therefore, the term “Africa” is a reflection of a European attempt at grasping un-European difference. European philosophy has been theorizing this difference, not as a positive other, but as a target, a colonizable target. A philosophy of Africa seen from the point of view of its difference from Europe is a philosophy of peripheralization (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991).

The Copy-Paste Frame of Professional Philosophy

As an approach to African philosophy, the professional school came as an antithesis of ethno-philosophy. Its proponents concurred that African philosophy should be critical, discursive and independent, contrary to the insinuations of ethno-philosophy. They accused the ethno-
philosophers of doing disservice to African philosophy by denying it reason and dressing it in myths, magic and extra-rational traditionalism. In particular, the African scholars who had joined Tempels’ bandwagon were in essence playing his game. They were “settling for an inferior and idiosyncratic conception of philosophy which lacks the intellectual rigor of Western philosophy and thereby virtually guarantees its own marginalization in the world market” (Van Hook 1993, 36).

Despite its apparent noble and afrocentric leaning, the professional school in general has also not been problem-free. Just as the professional philosophers accused ethno-philosophers of doing disservice to African philosophy, they too can and indeed have been accused of the same. However, their disservice stems from what may be called ‘the Western framework’ which ipso facto allows the West to dictate the rules and agenda of the philosophical enterprise. There is an apparent over-glorifying of how philosophy is practiced in the West in the name of universalism. They thus play the game as the West would have it played, and by that very token, guarantee its irrelevance to issues, problems and struggles of Africa (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2010, 108-109).

Some of the critics further argue that what the professional philosophers are claiming to be universal is really essentially another particular emanating from the historical context of the West. Lucius Outlaw, for example, rejects the claim that African philosophy has to be rational, and argues that the concept of rationality as used in philosophy is a product of Western culture (Outlaw 1987, 35).

Some particularists, such as innocent Onyewuenyi (1982), Kwame Anthony Appiah (2004) and Godwin S. Sogolo (2003), on their part, are uncomfortable with the emphasis on a paradigm of cognition that is universal to every human culture. Their concern is that African cognitive systems have some peculiar features that would be lost or ignored for no good reason by emphasizing on an essentially universal system, which is often of the Western type. Such emphasis, according to particularists, is biased against and undermines African cognitive systems. Barry Hallen, who happens to be sympathetic to the particularist cause, shares in Sogolo’s criticism of universalism that “its philosophers, such as Wiredu, have
embraced a paradigm of cross-cultural rationality that is too extreme and too Western in orientation and therefore unfairly discriminates against the rationality of certain African modes of thought and beliefs” (Hallen 2009, 57).

**The partisanship of the African philosopher**

The underlying criticisms leveled against ethno-philosophy and the professional school outlined above can be paraphrased as follows: Though both are accomplices to eurocentrism, they have divergent *modus operandi*. Whereas ethno-philosophy is guilty of misrepresenting Africa and its values, the professional school is accused of a ‘copy - pasting’ slant. Nevertheless, they both function within the Western grid, and therefore in the service of the Western world. The genuine African scholar in general and the African philosopher in particular therefore has a duty to serve the African interest in the global community. Okot p’Bitek, in line with this imperative, appealed for a cultural revolution that would initiate a proper understanding of Africa and offer a new vision for its future:

> The African scholar has two clear tasks before him. First, to explore and destroy all false ideas about African peoples and culture that have been perpetuated by Western scholarship. Vague terms as *Tribe, Folk, Non-literate* or even innocent looking ones such as *Developing*, etc., must be subjected to critical analysis and thrown out or redefined to suit African interests. Second, the African scholar must endeavour to present the institutions of African peoples as they really are (p’Bitek 1979, 7).

Thus the genuine African philosopher, besides being concerned with discussing the subject matter and finer points of philosophy as a discipline, has the special responsibility of deconstructing mainstream philosophy with a view to liberating the identity, consciousness and culture of the marginalized African “other”. This is the role ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy never took up. In this regard, S.O. Imbo correctly observes:

> Sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, a very tensed, gendered northern European rationality came to claim universality…One legacy of this claim has been the definition of rationality as the true discovery by the human mind of the pure essence of reality with the result that non-European influences have been consigned to the realm outside positive knowledge and in some cases accused of irrationality (Imbo 2002, 160).
The African philosopher finds him/herself inevitably in the peculiar position of combating Western philosophy, which has for centuries assigned itself universality and appointed itself the spokesman for humanity in its totality. The European is thus purportedly the standard of proper humanity: the yardstick with which the quality and value of the “other” is determined. Thus the additional responsibility of the African philosopher is to reclaim African humanity, identity and philosophy from the European rationality which came to claim universality as the core of reality itself in its explanation of the world, history and philosophy.

Given the manner in which the discourse on the existence of African philosophy has proceeded, an African philosopher is bound to be suspicious of any mainstream philosophical view that claims to be neutral. The views of such great Western philosophers as Hume, Hegel, Kant and Marx, and scholars such as Lévy-Bruhl and Evans-Pritchard have made matters worse. Their views have been explicated and appropriated in the academy in such a way and for purposes that derogate or deny the humanity of non-Europeans, and this has had disastrous social and political consequences for Africa. History therefore makes it difficult for the African philosopher to remain neutral, because whatever the philosopher working in or on Africa does has political consequences. Given that this history has made the African philosopher labour under all sorts of burdens, given that it has interfered with her/his being, identity, culture and society, she or he would find it difficult to be neutral; for this would be tantamount to one abandoning one’s responsibility to oneself and one’s society.

Indeed, it seems that given the present scenario, it is not clear what it would mean for an African philosopher to remain neutral. Even if she or he opted not to choose, she or he would have *ipso facto* made a choice. This is the kind of choice that was made by Odera Oruka, who explicitly and wholly identified with philosophic sagacity. It is in this light that one should see his contribution to African philosophy.

**Emancipation through philosophic sagacity**

It is against the explicated backdrop that one should view philosophic sagacity as an approach to African philosophy. In philosophic sagacity, philosophy ceases to be a tool for domination,
and is instead employed in the direction of what Okot p’Bitek and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o would call “decolonizing the mind”. Any philosophy in Africa that does not assist in this endeavor should be seen as falling short of authenticity. It is on these grounds that ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy are viewed by critics as suspicious contributions to African philosophy.

When Odera Oruka introduced philosophic sagacity to the international community in 1978, he pointed out that its broad aim was to address some of the problems that arose from ethno-philosophy and the professional school. He wrote that its purpose was to “invalidate the claim that traditional African peoples were innocent of logical and critical thinking” (Odera Oruka 1978, 17). For him, African philosophy in its pure traditional form does not begin and end in folk thought and consensus, since Africans, even without outside influence, are not innocent of a logical, dialectical and critical mode of inquiry. Consequently, philosophy can be found in traditional Africa without resorting to ethno-philosophy because there are rigorous indigenous thinkers, the philosophic sages, who although devoid of modern education, think critically and reflectively (Odera Oruka 1978, 3-4).

Philosophic sagacity, according to Odera Oruka, is supposed to “trace African Philosophy by wearing the uniforms of anthropological field work and using dialogical techniques to pass through anthropological fogs to the philosophical ground” (Odera Oruka 1991, 3). Expressed differently, it sought to discard the undesirable elements of ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy, but retain the desirable ones. In particular, it sought to merge the Africanness in ethno-philosophy and the professionalism in the professional school. More importantly, the Africanness was to be genuine and the professionalism was to be objective. In this regard what C. Barasa has to say about Oder a Oruka captures the broad aim of philosophic sagacity:

Odera had profound respect and genuine enjoyment of African culture and lifestyles ...those who did not understand his supporting arguments for some aspects of cultural practices, for example, regarding burial, wife inheritance and the extended family, mistook him for a controversial academic and traditional diehard. Contrary to such a view, ..., he believed in a progressive modernizing of our society’s ideologies, values and institutions, within an African culture framework (Barasa 1997, 21).
Philosophic sagacity can be used to counter the hegemony and patronizing attitude of Western scholarship towards African values. Odera Oruka hoped (and was convinced) that philosophic sagacity would play a cardinal role in the then on-going philosophical discourse within academia regarding the exact nature of African philosophy. According to him, philosophic sagacity “… is the only trend that … can give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy. None of the other two trends [nationalist/ideological philosophy and professional philosophy] can objectively play this role” (Odera Oruka 1983, 384-385). Essentially, Odera Oruka postulated that philosophic sagacity would bridge the gap between ethno-philosophy and the professional school by addressing the weaknesses of the two trends. More specifically, it sought to show that traditional Africa is not a place free of a critical independent mode of inquiry - that this mode of thought does not begin and end with Western tradition and influence (Odera Oruka 1987, 51).

From a different standpoint, Odera Oruka made a distinction between culture philosophy and philosophic sagacity. Culture philosophy refers to the philosophy underlying the culture in question and acts as its immediate and ultimate justification. In a free or well-informed society any reasonable person is conversant with the prevailing culture philosophy. Philosophic sagacity, on the other hand, is a product and a reflective evaluation of the culture philosophy. The philosophic sage makes a critical assessment of the culture and its underlying beliefs. He produces a system within a system, an order within an order. He operates at a second-order level, which is generally open-minded and rationalistic (Odera Oruka 1983, 386-387). At this point one cannot fail to notice the difference between philosophic sagacity on the one hand, and ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy on the other. Philosophic sagacity is embedded in a people’s culture and is a philosophic statement about that culture. It is an open-minded and rationalistic expression of the underlying principles of culture. It is an objective second-order activity of one who belongs to and shares deeply in the experiences of a given people.

Odera Oruka was also concerned with the negative aspect of ethnicity (or geo-politics, as others may refer to it) in the nation of Kenya. He envisaged that given philosophic sagacity’s
ratiocinative character and anchorage in culture, it could be a useful tool in bringing forth a unified national culture. Herein is to be found the second function of philosophic sagacity.\textsuperscript{1} He envisioned that this particular function would be undertaken in two phases. Regarding the first phase, he hoped that researches would be undertaken among the various ethnic groups in Kenya with the objective of unearthing their culture philosophies. In other words, the researches would identify and make explicit the fundamental principles (\textit{mythos}) upon which the various cultures were based. With that done, phase two would involve identifying \textit{mythos} within the diverse cultures which are nevertheless consistent. The \textit{mythos} from the various ethnic groups that are incompatible would require further attention from the philosophic sages, who would be requested to resolve the incoherence. If necessary they would be relied upon to recommend alternative ideas that are consistent. All this would go a long way in coming up with a harmonized systematic culture, which, in turn, would enhance national unity (Odera Oruka 1976).

Given that philosophic sages are critical and deeply rooted in the cultures of their people, they are well placed to explicate and resolve the inconsistencies of their cultures. Better still, they can be relied upon to offer alternatives to the conflicting opinions and practices within the nation. Given the high esteem most philosophic sages are accorded in their respective communities, they are best placed to undertake this task of harmonizing the inconsistencies. In addition, given the criticisms leveled against ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy as approaches to African philosophy, proponents of either of the schools would, if assigned the task, only serve Western interests.

The question of African unity has been a preoccupation of some African political leaders, especially during the period immediately after political independence of several African countries in the late 50s and early 60s, though the solutions they offered varied. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, called for a social revolution in the emergent independent African nation-states - a revolution in which African thinking and philosophy are directed towards the redemption of the African humanist society of the past. He believed that his notion of

\textsuperscript{1} Sometime in 1976, Odera Oruka presented to the relevant authorities in the Ministry of Culture and Social Services of the Kenyan Government, a research proposal titled “The Philosophical Roots of Culture in Kenya”. The main objective of the research as explicated in the proposal was to assist Kenya to mould itself into a harmonious nation by coming up with a national culture.
consciencism was best placed to achieve this. He defined it as “the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself defined as the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society” (Nkrumah 1970, 79).

The concerns of Nkrumah and Odera Oruka point to the same direction - that of how to achieve unity. However, whilst Nkrumah’s consciencism was concerned with the broader issue of African personality and African society, Odera Oruka’s philosophic sagacity focuses on Kenyan personality and Kenyan society. While Nkrumah’s apprehension is Western, Islamic and Euro-Christian elements, Odera Oruka’s is negative ethnicity. One can therefore adapt Nkrumah’s definition of consciencism and use it to define philosophic sagacity as follows: “It is the map in intellectual terms (based on reason) of the disposition of forces which will enable Kenyan society to digest the inconsistent ethnic elements in Kenya, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the Kenyan personality. The Kenyan personality is the cluster of humanist and coherent principles which underlie the traditional Kenyan society.”

Almost 50 years after political independence the ugly head of negative ethnicity continues to bedevil Kenya. Most Kenyans see themselves first and foremost in terms of their ethnic groupings, and only peripherally as Kenyans. Politics in Kenya, for example, is driven by the question of ethnicity, and this was epitomized by the violence and senseless killings that followed the bungled general elections of December 2007. If the government of Kenya is serious about tackling negative ethnicity, it should genuinely start thinking in terms of engaging the services of philosophic sages in the manner in which Odera Oruka envisaged.

In as far as the third function of philosophic sagacity was concerned, Odera Oruka believed that it could act as a useful source of information and education. In Africa today, more than

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ever before, there is a concern, especially amongst the elders, that the indigenous population knows nothing or very little about their customs and cultures. Most of such individuals are however not to blame, at least not directly. A good fraction of them are born, brought up, schooled and employed in urban areas. Urban areas are by nature inhabited by people from different ethnic groups and nationalities, and hence the cultural heritage is usually quite diverse. Those urbanites who rarely pay visits to their rural homes and therefore hardly ever interact with their kinsmen and kinswomen thus find themselves in danger of being estranged from their cultural roots. This problem is compounded by the fact that during their schooling they are hardly taught about the cultures of their ethnic groups, and literature on these areas is also scanty. The result of all this is that most young people hardly know anything about their cultures, and thus are not conversant with the philosophy of their cultures, that is, with the mythos of their cultures.

To be really conversant with a culture one must be familiar with its mythos. The mythos forms a system, which in a broad sense can be referred to as the people’s philosophy. Its contents make up the ‘philosophy’ underlying the culture in question and acting as its immediate and ultimate justification (Odera Oruka 1983, 386). Thus since most of the urbanites are not familiar with the mythos of their culture, they are not conversant with the philosophy of their culture, and are, as a result, largely uncultured in as far as most of the traditions and social institutions of their communities are concerned. This is the significance of the observation of one of the sages in Masolo’s article when the sage says the following of the young Luo generation: “In fact very many of them, cannot even speak correct Dholuo” (Masolo 1997, 250). The Kiswahili saying that “mwacha mila ni mtumwa” which translates to “one who abandons, ignores or does not know his people’s culture and customs is a slave”, captures the concern of the third function of philosophic sagacity. The objective of philosophic sagacity in this respect is to “indigenize” the locals and also hopefully make the non-locals go native, so that they may understand and perhaps appreciate the customs and culture of the community in question (Ochieng’-Odhiambo, 2009).

A culture has both practical and theoretical aspects. Things such as music, dance and dress, among others, constitute its practical aspect. Its theoretical aspect comprises its philosophy, which justifies such activities. A culture without a clear philosophy is actually incomplete
and vulnerable to foreign values and isms. Thus one sure way of avoiding invasion by foreign ideas is for a nation to develop and articulate the philosophy of its culture; for one cannot defend ideas by use of guns, but rather by contrary ideas. Herein is to be found another rationale for philosophic sagacity.

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