THE 'BUSH DOCTRINE' AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract
The terrorist attacks on the U.S in September 2001 pushed President Bush to move on the war footing; hence, the U.S National Security Strategy, announced in September 2002, appears to endorse a 'doctrine of pre-emptive war' that is highly unilateral, and takes its radar on the global fight against terrorism. Thus, what came to be known as the 'Bush doctrine' has come into full strategic practice. In all, the pertinent question is, 'how did the Bush doctrine set the international system of the 21st century'. Taking the path of 'hegemonic stability theory' as the central organizing framework, this paper critically attempts to examine the Bush doctrine in the light of realities in the 21st century international system, and concludes that the unilateral posture of the Bush doctrine, operating as the sole policeman of the world, left the world more insecure than it claimed to bringing universal security and a final end to global terrorism. The paper is of the advocacy that any proactive strategic doctrine that intends to make the world safer must take cognizance of multilateral consensus, the weight of international law, moral responsibility, and peace-making approach.

Keywords: Strategy, Doctrine, Terrorism, War, Security, and Law.

Introduction
Unarguably, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and
political influence in the global power configurations. Largely, the United States is, nowadays, variously described as the ‘preponderant power’, ‘hegemonic power’, and even as ‘imperial colossus’ (Allison and Treverton, 1992). America possesses preponderant power; power which is increasingly regarded as illegitimate in many parts of the world, but which is difficult to challenge. Apart from the challenges of the Cold War that adorned almost the second half of the twentieth century American struggle for global hegemony, which was guided, strategically, by ‘deterrence’ and ‘containment’ doctrines, the United States has not been severely challenged in the face of her global power the way non-state actor, a radically religious-inspired terror, confronted her on 11 September, 2001.

Towards the end of the 1990s academic debates about the role of the U.S in world affairs left the classroom and entered the public consciousness. As the fall of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 2001 marked the beginning of the real twenty-first century in much the same way that the real twentieth century began, comparatively later, with the guns of August 1914, the triumph of internationalism over isolationism, has not actually ended the debate of contesting perspectives on American foreign policy. The debate is now largely, since the end of World War II, on the right approach to internationalism: ‘should the United States employ ‘unilateralist’ or ‘multilateralist’ approach in the pursuit of her foreign policy goals?’ Which approach would best maintain America’s pre-eminence in the global arena? The ‘unipolarism’ that emerged in the post-cold war engagement structurally fashioned the U.S internationalism to
be ‘assertive’ and ‘hegemonic’ in promoting American values and interests. J. Nye (2006:101) observes:

...The main issues of contention between the United States and those who express opposition to its hegemony is not American ‘arrogance’. It is the inescapable reality of American power in its many forms. Those who suggest that these international resentments could somehow be eliminated by a more restrained American foreign policy are engaged in pleasant delusions.

Thus, the unprecedented rise of U.S power and assertive hegemony in the world affairs in the 1990’s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, pushed the American foreign policy to the front seat of unilateralism and seemingly unlimited power of the policeman of the world, and removed the rationale for American’s continued strategic-cum-military engagement with a common aggressive, but powerful enemy.

The unipolar moment promoted unilaterlist tendencies of assertiveness and arrogant hegemony, although the two Presidents of the 1990s period: George Bush Snr. and Bill Clinton were multilateralist in their approach, and handling of America’s global hegemonic power. President Bush Snr. used the United Nations to build a coalition against Iraq in the first Gulf War over Saddam Hussein’s illegal annexation of Kuwait, while Bill Clinton tried to reshape global politics through his
firm belief in the institution of UN, commitment to the Middle East peace process, liberation of autonomous entities in the former Yugoslavia, and partnership for peace policy. However, all this went with the closing chapter of the twentieth century. The election of President Bush Jr. to chart the course of the beginning of the 21st century American global hegemony changed the tide of events in the American led world.

Although, during his campaign Mr. Bush pledged himself to pursuing a humble foreign policy – “an American foreign policy that reflects American character; the modesty of true strength, the humility of real greatness”, (Zakaria, 2004) - the surrounding of his cabinets with hawkish realists like Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfield, and Colin Powel sent not a signal of ‘deterrence’ or ‘containment’ but that of ‘aggressive pre-emption to U.S would be adversaries and the world community in general. Inevitably, the 11 September 2001 incident in U.S took the Bush administration to the lane of pre-emption. The tragedy perpetrated by the Al-Qaeda terrorists against the United States exposed her vulnerability in the face of her global power preponderance: thence, the Bush administration’s resolve to fight terrorism globally became expedient. According to Ross (2006:63), “the event of September, 11, 2001 taught us the reality that weak state like Afghanistan can pose a great danger to our national interests as strong state”. This implies that in America’s ‘war on terror’ nothing should be taken for granted, and any diplomatic overture that entails delay of action should be dishonoured and disregarded to that effect.
In the aftermath of a terrorist attacks on the U.S on 11 September, 2001, President Bush declared a global war on terror, which formed the rudiment of his doctrine encapsulated in National Security Strategy unveiled in 2002. *The Economist* (November, 2005) points that ‘the Bush Doctrine is America’s first attempt at a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War’. The doctrine was heavily anchored on pre-emption, and put the U.S foreign policy on a hawkish radar. The ‘war on terror’, which the U.S fights with pre-emptive strategy, has taken her forces into Afghanistan and Iraq, ready to clear the air in Iran and North Korea. However, the Bush grand strategy in its manifestations, particularly in the Middle East, does not go without mixed feelings and controversies. The Bush doctrine was based on the hypothesis that freedom is for everyone. The first part of this strategy was to end state support for terrorism; the second part of it was to replace terror-sponsoring regimes with democratic governments. *Newsweek* (August, 2007) observes that the 9/11 attacks was the ‘hatch box’ while the ‘war on terror’ was the driving force of Bush doctrine. Thus, 11 September, 2001 Al-Qaeda Jihadism against the U.S changed America from being the ‘unblessed peace maker’ to ‘war monster’. It suffices to say that the U.S foreign policy as a response to the 11 September, 2001 attacks and her subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, have generated and confirmed the widespread perception abroad that ‘if necessary the U.S will make use of its military capabilities to maintain its global hegemonic power and status’.
The Concept and Context of the 'Bush Doctrine'

It is no exaggeration to describe 11 September, 2001 incident as the start of a new era in American strategic thinking. The attacks of that morning had an effect on U.S foreign policy comparable to the Pearl Harbour attack on 7 December, 1941 which propelled the United States into World War II. In an instant, the event of 2001 transformed the international security environment. The threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that had seemed distant and hypothetical suddenly became a dominant reality, and responding to them necessitated a new grand strategy. Dunn (2005:216) observes:

Terrorism was no longer one among a number of assorted dangers to the United States but a fundamental threat to America, its way of life, and its vital interests. The Al Qaeda terrorists who masterminded the use of hijacked jumbo jets to attack the Pentagon and to destroy the twin towers of the World Trade Centre were carrying out mass murder as a means of political intimidation.

The gravity of this danger was amplified by two additional factors. First, the cold blooded willingness to slaughter thousands of innocent civilians without the slightest moral compunction raised fears about potential use of
weapons of mass destruction. Given the terrorists’ conduct and statements by their leaders, as well as tentative evidence that state sponsors of terrorism were seeking to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, there was a risk that WMD might be used directly against the U.S as well as its friends and allies abroad. Second, in view of the fact that the 19 terrorists in the four hijacked aircraft committed suicide in carrying out their attack; the precepts of deterrence were now called into question. By contrast, even at the height of the Cold War, American strategists could make their calculations based on the assumed rationality of Soviet leaders and the knowledge that they would not willingly commit nuclear suicide by initiating a massive attack against the U.S or its allies. The 2001 attack, however, undermined that key assumption.

We, thus, live at a time when ‘deterrence’, which has often worked in confronting hostile states, cannot be relied on in facing non-state actors with millenarian aims and potentially equipped with devastating weapons. Though the threat has been developing for sometime, the September 11 event demonstrated that this peril is now quite real. Stone (2007:118) posits that the terrorism of 9/11 dramatically altered the sense of security complacency that had prevailed during the 1990s and provided the impetus for a new grand strategy for the U.S foreign relations. As a result, there is good and compelling strategic reason to act decisively against the most lethal threats, rather than to hope to be able to deter them or to retaliate following a mass causality attack.

In the wake of the attacks, President Bush and his team in White House were explicit in saying that the “war
against terror” would not be completed quickly. And, in January 2002, speaking to a joint session of the Congress, President Bush outlined what became known as the Bush Doctrine in the U.S foreign policy archives and in the lexicology of international politics of the 21st century:

*We will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorist to justice. And... we must prevent terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world... yet, time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons,* (First Quarterly U.S. Congressional Report, 2002).

Two elements were crucial to the doctrine. The first was a sense of urgency, reflected in the words that ‘time is not on our side’. The second was that the unique danger created by weapons of mass destruction required the U.S to be prepared to take swift, decisive, and preemptive action. Both of these imperatives reflected the calculation that whatever the risks of acting, the risks of not acting were more ominous. These
features foreshadowed the elaboration of a ‘grand strategy’ known as the National Security Strategy (NSS).

The U.S NSS was released by the White House on 17 September, 2002 and immediately attracted wide attention, including both ‘praises’ as a determined and far reaching response to the grave dangers America now faced, and ‘criticisms’ as a radical and even dangerous departure from foreign policy tradition. In its thirty two pages, the document provided a candid, ambitious, and far-reaching proclamation of national objectives. First, it called for pre-emptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. Second, it announced that the U.S would not allow its global military strength to be challenged by any hostile foreign power. Third, it expressed commitment to multilateral international cooperation but made it clear that the U.S ‘will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to defend national interests and security’. Fourth, it proclaimed the goal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe, especially in the Middle East. Adeleke (2004) argues, “America’s 21st century internationalism proceeded from on the ground of firm national interest and not from the interest of illusory international community”

Thus, the pre-emptive approach of the Bush doctrine inevitably put the U.S on the course of the policeman of the world.

However, it is important to stress that the questions that border on the wide contours of the problem that formed the focus of this thesis do not arise from the Bush departure from classic American foreign policy of multilateral engagement to unilateral strategic doctrine of pre-emption,
but center wholly on the manner through which his administration executed the doctrine vis-à-vis the world community. The pertinent question that will always resonate is ‘did the Bush doctrine succeed in making the world safe from terrorism or further endangered the world with more terrorism?’

**Theoretical Framework**

For better understanding of the issues and international political-cum-strategic dialectics that surround the formulation and execution of the ‘Bush doctrine’ the choice of ‘hegemonic stability theory construct’ meshed in the wider realist (power politics) paradigm as the most appropriate framework of analysis is imperative. An important early statement of what came to be known as the theory of hegemonic stability is that of Charles Kindleberger in the final chapter of his work, *The World in Depression 1929-1939* (Kindleberger, 1958). From this point, it came to international limelight with the writings and thoughts of scholars like Robert Keohane, Paul Kennedy, Joseph Nye, John Ikenberry, Jarrod Weiner, David Lake and Susan Strange (Brown, 2005).

The central thesis to this theory is that ‘for the international system which is composed of comity of nations with diverging behaviours and interests to be stable and less conflictual there must be ‘a powerful enforce nation’ (hegemon) that will always ensure order in the system’. Keohane (1984) posits, ‘the hegemon must have the ‘capacity’ and ‘will’ to do so, and her role and actions in the system will be widely, albeit tacitly, accepted as ‘legitimate’ by other members of the system’. Thus, capacity, will, and legitimacy
need to be found in one country if a stable international system is to work. Therefore, Nye (1990) and Kennedy (1988) confirm that the hegemon uses her preponderant influence and self power to ensure co-operation, police security, defend rules, punish and reward according to the rules, and encourage others to accept her ideas. In otherwords, hegemonism sees the most powerful state in the international arena as the policeman of the world.

The international system does not have one supranational government that makes and enforces rules in it. Thus, state with hegemonic leadership in the system is seen as an alternative to world government; hence, the hegemon is expected to ‘act and play fair’ in her global leadership role. However, “there is the temptation”, according to Ikenberry (2001), “to ‘play fast’ and act on ‘self interest’ which always demean the idea of legitimacy of the hegemon”. It is apt, therefore, to say that hegemonic state primarily does act more on self interest than on collective interest; hence what is more crucial is how this would-be self interest will preserve her continued leadership and ensure some sort of stability and order in the system.

As a matter of relevance, the U.S leadership in the world and her ‘willingness’ to abide by the rules of the system, and to use her political power to encourage others to do likewise, is crucial. Because of the strength of the U.S, she is able, if she wished, to turn a blind eye to infractions of the rules by other states or proportionately challenge them, if by so doing she will be able to stake her interest and preserve the system. Thus, the hegemonic power of the U.S is able to act as a kind of substitute for international government, but without
violating the basic assumption of rational egoism. The U.S performs this role because it is in her interest to do so, (Ikenberry, 1998). As the country with the largest stake in the preservation of the world system, she is willing to act in accordance with the rules and to bear most of the transaction costs of running the system, not as an act of altruism but on the basis of enlightened medium-term self interest. This is the context why the Bush doctrine in the U.S. calculations became unavoidably expedient.

The 'Bush Doctrine' and the International System of the 21st Century:

It is understandable that ‘the Bush doctrine’ was pushed through the radar of ‘war on terror’, clamping down on the terrorists wherever they exist, denying them the base and support, tracking down their sources of finances, and bringing severe actions to bear on the governments or states that sponsor them. These goals that informed the rudiments of the grand strategy the Bush administration believed cannot be achieved by relying on the traditional strategy of ‘deterrence’ and ‘containment’; hence, the nature of today terrorists and unpredictability of their actorship in international system need proactive measures that would nip their evil plans at the bud before they materialize. In this context, ‘preemption’ was fashioned as the train that conveys the message of ‘the Bush doctrine’ to its would-be adversaries (Albright, 2005:280).

The conventional view of the Bush administration was that the delay of actions to study the real situation first, which is the position of the UN, and the gathering of the
support of the majority of the leading nations to forge a collective action (coalition) may create a time lag that is dangerous to the fundamental principles of the U.S, and may enable the would-be terrorists with miniaturized weapons and destructive technology to launch attacks against their targets, principally against the U.S. Therefore, to George W. Bush, actions against them must be swift and proactive to counter their proportionate ability and quickility to attack first. This is the stand where the U.S government under President Bush relied on selling the ideology of pre-emption to the world on the war against terror. However, whether the world really bought this ideology well or not, did not really matter to the Bush government hence, it went out on his way to orchestrate its grand plan against her ‘perceived’ adversaries. But it matters a lot to examine and ascertain how the much taunted Bush doctrine informed and shaped the global realities in the 21st century after the 11 September, 2001.

The 'Bush Doctrine' and United Nations
The U.S under Gorge W. Bush saw the institution of the UN as an instrument that should be subsumed within American’s global ideological line. As Lawman (2006:66) notes, “the U.S invokes the institutional actions of the UN when it becomes expedient that they would give the U.S global interests some sort of lead, and disregards them when they seem likely to checkmate American’s global overstretch. In other words, America has little faith in the all-time efficacy of the U.N institution in solving global problems. She abides by the resolutions and decisions of the UN when they becomes necessary to her and thwarts them when she wishes. It is true
that the Bush administration succeeded in selling his hawkish ideology of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks when he secured a coalition against the Taliban through the institution of the UN, but the Bush administration cannot be said to have respected the opinion of the world body. He, rather, overshadowed it with unqualified American arrogance and bellicosity. The U.S attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan, principally with her NATO allies in Europe and the support of other ally nations. The fact that there was collective action, a kind of acceptable, other than willing coalition backed by requisite UN Security Council resolution, confers some sort of legitimacy on America’s war in Afghanistan does not mean that it exhausted all the avenues to it before doing so. Rather, it seems plausible to argue that the UN acted the script doctored by the Bush doctrine. However, one may not have noticed the fragility and seemingly irreconcilable difference inherent in the US-UN relations during the Afghanistan war, but the American preemptive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003 took this unblessed relation to the gutters. The U.S-Britain unilateral coalition against Iraq without a requisite U.N authorization for it almost polarized the world. The administration of President George W. Bush criticized the UN for failing to support the American-led invasion of Iraq, which was prompted by the purported Iraq’s defiance to UN mandates regarding weapons of mass destruction. Others criticized American action and saw it as a demonstration of the weakness of the UN when opposed by the power of the U.S (Lawman, 2006).
Based on the Security Council resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 Iraq was given a final opportunity to comply with the UN weapons regulations. That meant that Iraq should make full disclosures about its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme, and allow the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) total and unhindered access everywhere necessary to bring about the implementation of the resolution. The differences in outlook, strategy and goals between the major powers in the Security Council became increasingly evident over both the interpretation and implementation of resolution 1441. The U.S and her key ally, Britain, began to disparage the entire process, expressing dissatisfaction over both Iraq’s disclosure of its weapons to UN inspectors. On the other hand, France, China and Russia found the process satisfactory, and expressed the desire to give the UNMOVIC and IAEA more time: they were convinced Iraq could be disarmed without recourse to regime change.

As veto wielding powers, the differences between the five permanent members of the Security Council meant that the UN would be hamstrung. Whereas, the U.S and Britain wanted the Security Council to determine that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 1441 and authorize the use of force, France, China and Russia countered that there was no breach of UN mandate and, hence, there was no need for a resolution invoking the use of force. Alongside this controversial debate, there was another where the U.S and Britain argued that resolution 1441 even provided for the authority to use force without any recourse to a renewed
authorization. This was also rejected by France, Russia and China. As Hirsh (2003:37) observes:

...while the international community only required Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions and disarm under UN supervision and verification, the U.S had already gone beyond that threshold to focus on regime change in Iraq.

When it became clear that the US and Britain could not obtain the ever sought UN Security Council resolution that would permit the use of force against Iraq, the U.S and Britain abandoned the UN mechanism, and unilaterally invaded Iraq on 20 March, 2003 which saw the forceful ousting of Saddam Hussein from power and his eventual execution.

Although the U.S and Britain later sought the legitimacy of the UN after the war to reconstruct Iraq, it is imperative to point out that the decision by the U.S and Britain to abandon the UN mechanism and attack Iraq with the express aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, beyond the issue of disarmament, was a universal statement of force and power politics that undermined and polarized the UN system with a significant bearing on the contemporary international relations and diplomacy of the twenty-first century.

**The 'Bush Doctrine' and the State of International Law**

The charter of the UN calls upon member states to attempt to settle disputes peacefully and failing that, to refer matters
to the Security Council for appropriate action. Article 51 of the UN charter provides that ‘nothing in the charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a state, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. Thus, states can take military actions without requisite recourse to the UN system in matters of self defense only. Compare that to the passage below from President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy: ‘given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the U.S can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attack, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first’. The mystery here is not what the administration said, but rather why it chose to arouse global controversy by elevating what has always been a residual option into highly publicized doctrine.

In reality, no U.S President would allow an international treaty to prevent actions genuinely necessary to deter or pre-empt imminent attack upon the U.S. Whether tracking the language of Article 51 of the UN charter or not, the Bush administration’s pre-emption doctrine proves a clear departure from past practice on the ground that it is implemented in a manner that is aggressive, indifferent to precedent, and careless of the information used to justify military action. Calibrated and effective actions taken against real enemies posing an imminent danger should not overturn the international legal apple cart; measures wide of that
standard would indeed raise troubling questions about whether the U.S is setting itself above the law or tacitly acknowledging the right of every nation to act militarily against the threats that are merely imagined and suspected. The Bush team toed this line by invading Iraq, but the issue was blurred by the multiple rationales given for the conflict-enforcement of Security Council resolutions, ensuring self-defense, and liberating Iraq citizens from dictatorial regime.

The character of American global politics in Bush administration brought severe indication that ‘the principle of just war’ thinking is changing. The post-Cold War climate has leaned towards the consensus that the UN was the body that could legitimately sanction the use of armed force. The Bush administration wanted to assert the right to its own authority and build a coalition to support it. The U.S obviously has the power to act unilaterally, but it would have the right to do so only in extreme emergencies when there was no time for UN resolutions and consultations, and even then it would be subject to UN review. Although, the U.S-led invasion of Afghanistan to route out the Taliban and their supposedly Al-Qaeda allies under the banner of war on terror in 2001 has no problem of legitimacy as a result of UN Security Council resolution backing it, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not receive the support of the UN. So, the legitimacy of U.S authority for its actions remains unproven, if not amounting to illegality. It is important to point out, here, that there is no basis, legally or morally, for going to war to install democracy in a country whose traditions are alien to democracy, or for resorting to war because another country is arming itself.
Therefore, the deliberate strategic misinterpretation of UN Security Council’s resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 by the U.S and Britain to suit their ideology of regime change in Iraq other than disposes Iraq of ‘the would-be weapons of mass destruction’ under the UN supervision constituted a bunch of illegality and a breach of international law. In another angle, the ‘war on terror’ within which the Bush doctrine is largely anchored violated and undermined the universal charters on human fundamental rights as part of international law. Stone (2007:138) argues:

*The question of the means of war and their justification also faults the United States for the torture of prisoners. Unarmed prisoners have right; in the case of the Iraq invasion, these rights were violated. To the extent that torture was a necessary part of the prosecution of the war, it falls under the ban of the use of unjust means of warfare.*

Thus, the probability that unjust means of coercion were approved at high levels of the U.S command raises the issues of U.S systematic reliance on unjust means to prosecute war. Since 2001 attacks on U.S, torture has been used by the Americans in the war on terror...the horrific images of tortured detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a terrible toll on America’s standing in the world (Newsweek November, 2005). The Bush administration claimed that ‘legal protections’ for prisoners of war and civilians under the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to terrorist suspects captured abroad; and in certain extreme cases torture is used to extract information from them. Zakaria (2008:186) contends, ‘the rendition policy of the Bush administration as regards terror suspects violates the principles of Geneva Conventions’. Thus, arrests a suspect without a concrete charge in one country and sending him off to another country alien to him to languish without a fair trial is a grave violation of a human fundamental right and international law, at large. According to Wolfe (2006:96), “even though the U.S said Iraq war was covered by the Geneva Conventions, it never stated clearly how the terror suspects and insurgents should be treated”. The activities of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and American soldier-prison guards in Iraq and Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and other secret CIA prisons brought American’s ‘moral crusade’ and the legality of her actions to worrisome question. Therefore the existence of ‘monster’ like Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, and other CIA secret prisons, where ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman treatment’ are meted to suspects proclaimed the Bush administration’s unwillingness to abide by the spirit of Geneva Convention, international law, which the U.S ratified in 1994. It is important to stress, here, that the manner through which the ‘war on terror’ was executed by the Bush team violated the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the third Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, the principles of 1985 UN Conventions Against Torture, and 1992 U.S Army Field Manual.
'Bush Doctrine' and the Global Security

Needless to say that the Bush doctrine was a fall out of strategic response to organized terrorism that was perpetrated against the U.S in 2001 that change the character of security thinking in the 21st century. The doctrine, which is rooted in the global ‘war on terror’, was meant to respond, with proportionate quickness, to any form of threat to the security survival of America and her allies before they are fully materialized or carried out. And, in doing this, the U.S, in most cases, would not have the room to bow to the institutional framework of global consensus of morality that is associated with international law; having considered that institutional engagements and international morality as bunch of delays that could give the ever swift terror-inspired adversaries the opportunity to strike first, thereby putting the lives and security of the her citizens and allies in serious danger.

Ironically, the pre-emptive war against terrorism, although accompanied by greater stress on the value of democracy, has increased the costs of acting accordingly by heightening the American need for allies throughout the globe. ‘Without the war, as the Iraqi case proved, the U.S might have put more diplomatic pressure on the ‘acclaimed non-democratic states to abide by her democracy vision’ (Dokubo, 2008). The Bush administration appears to be driven more by the politics of regime change it was dealing than by an ‘abstract commitment to democracy’. Hence, Jarvis (2005:334) observes:

Military victory over the Iraq armed forces was swift, but opposition by Iraq insurgents to the
American occupations bolstered by the influx of anti-American terrorists, has not relented. Far from combating terrorism, the invasion of Iraq resulted in the recruitment of more anti-American terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world.

It suffices to say that the pre-emption spearheaded by the Bush led administration against global terrorism as exemplified by Afghanistan and Iraq, arguably, created more terrorists than it killed; has weakened the resolve of others to combat them; and has increased the chances of major attacks against the U.S concerns abroad.

The preemptive campaigns against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Saddam-led Baathist regime in Iraq were viewed as a grand strategy by the Judeo-Christian West to suppress Islam. The U.S led ‘war on terror’, invariable, produced anti-West sentiments across the Arab world. Countless terrorists groups rallied round Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda jihadists and heightened the strategic vulnerability of the U.S soldiers, investments and citizens abroad. The renewed support of Palestine terrorists against Israel settlements by Arab states is not unconnected with the U.S actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, the Bush-led war against Al-Qaeda terrorists heightened the already security tension and political volatility of the Middle East region. As Jarvis (2005) further observes, ‘about notable twenty six terrorist groups across the Arab states identified their resolve to sink America’s presence in the region alongside with her unfailing ally, Israel’. Apart from radicalization of many elements in the Islamic world, as anti-West psychology brews, the war created a sharp divide
between the Christian and Islamic world in an unprecedented fashion. Religious ideological distrust and intolerance that the Bush pre-emotions in Afghanistan and Iraq created, coupled with ceaseless Israeli bombardment of Palestinians, almost pushed the world to the precipice of another world war. The Bush attitude towards the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein-led Baathist party in Iraq changed the tide of global security. Apart from contending with the growing spate of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and in many parts of Europe like Madrid, London, Moscow, and so on, the world saw the emergence of Iran and North Korea as the new rebel violators of Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The threat of nuclear blackmail from Iran and North Korea owed much from the unilateralist posture of U.S-led war on terror. The fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein sent sinister feelings to Tehran and Pyongyang leaders that they might be the next target, considering that the instrument of the UN is inadequate in the face of America’s burgeoning global hegemony. This caused the Iranian and North Korean governments to restart their earlier suspended nuclear programmes that violated the NPT in order to prepare against any would-be American-led military eventuality or assault, and exercise the privilege of nuclear regional leadership in their different domains.

The fuss of nuclear weapons development and the West ideology has left the world more volatile and insecure as the two countries are viewed by the West as close allies of terrorist organizations and terror sponsoring states, rogue states. From Amman, Bali, Madrid, London to Moscow with the score of terrorist attacks and bomb explosions that
claimed hundreds of lives, the Iranian and North Korean governments complacently never felt sympathetic’ (Green, 2009:103).
The war against Iraq, which did not obtain the necessary Security Council resolutions authorizing it, sharply pitched the permanent members of Security Council against U.S and Britain. China, Russian, and France never believed the rationality of U.S moral crusade on the war against global terror, after the Afghanistan collective action. The three - France, China, and Russia- lost the vigor to support America and openly denounced the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This in the long run marred the Bush determination and efforts to obtain international support to fight terrorism globally. As the ‘anti-terror-cum-regime change war’ in Iraq progressed, the international support needed to combat insurgencies were grossly lacking in; hence, the increasing surge of terrorism that greeted the U.S-led occupation and the sentiment in the Arab air, in the absence of international legitimacy accorded to U.S militarism in Iraq, coalesced to hamper global security. In otherwords, the way in which the Bush grand strategy got underway in the scale of international politics ironically made the world, more or less, further insecure than otherwise.

Conclusion
The response to 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S substituted the broader policy of envisioning an appropriate role for the U.S in a changing world with one of the declared commitment to counter terrorism universally. This degree of commitment hanged to the radar of ‘preemption’ gave the
Bush administration a purpose, which President Bush himself often called a ‘crusade’. In other words, the administration’s ‘real-politic’ stance negated the hard work of creating a foreign policy that promotes greater justice, peace, international law, and multilateralism.

However, a vision of a just world moving toward harmony does not contradict the suppression of a movement that encourages terrorist acts. No doubt, the capture of the terrorist membership of Al-Oaeda is a global requirement. Harriman (2008:40) argues:

*Disarming of enemies committed to killing U.S citizens will require the killing of many of our enemies. The very meaning of national statehood requires such actions, usually similar to large police actions than international law.*

Thus, in addition to police actions against international terrorist groups, the power of international law must be strengthened. International law and strengthened international police actions and peace-making forces in the future may be the best insurance against terrorism that would hamper international peace. The struggle against the rage that induces people towards terrorism requires support for policies of just and sustainable peace-making. Therefore, these elements of vision will need to be transparently evident in today's U.S foreign policy if she intends to make real progress against global terrorism and responsibly reassert her global leadership.
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