Philosophy of Development or Development of Philosophy?
A Dilemma in Contemporary African Philosophy

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Introduction
In most cases, the results of philosophical reflections carry with them a pretension of universal applicability. This universalism appears in two modes. There is first, the universality of the level of discourse, and secondly the applicability of philosophical methods to all other fields of scientific inquiry. In the first instance, philosophic conclusions are taken to be general, that is, valid for all peoples, ages and circumstances. The answers to such questions as what is justice; whether abortion is morally right; whether punishment should be retributive or deterrent; what are the determinants of morality; the conditions, the extends, the objectivity of human knowledge; the whole question of being in all its ramifications, are meant to be applicable to all. This tendency to universalism is clearly seen in the wide spread of philosophy in such a way that it often stands at a meta-level of all other disciplines or other aspects of human life. That is why we have philosophy of language, of religion, of science, of culture, of education, of economics, etc. Given this, somehow overarching embrace of the discipline or method of philosophy, it is not surprising if there is an emphasis on the philosophy of development in a situation of underdevelopment. In the African continent, where underdevelopment is endemic, it is not surprising that academic philosophy is very much concerned with its role in development. Indeed, with the possible exception of the search for identity, which can summarize many apparently disparate philosophic discourses in contemporary Africa, the issue of the link between philosophy and development is the most recurring theme in recent philosophic discussions in Africa. The theme is found in different guises in symposia, seminars, conferences, articles and books.

The preponderance of the theme of development in African philosophical engagement tends to suggest that there is prima facie acceptance that philosophy must somehow make a major contribution to development. In most cases, the question at issue is how to make this conviction a reality. This essay argues that it is not a given that philosophy must lead to the type of development that is in question; that as a second order activity its primary aim is not development, and that philosophy in the strict sense of the term can flourish more when the conditions that development assures are provided to thinkers of every society. Thus the constant call in Africa for philosophy to contribute its quota in African development may in fact be putting the cart before the horse.

Philosophy: Loose and strict meaning
It goes without saying that in the quest for the contribution of philosophy to development, what is meant is philosophy in the strict sense of the word. Because of the debate in the past decades about the nature and existence of African philosophy, the standard distinction between philosophy in the loose and strict sense has been made more popular among African philosophers. In the former conception, philosophy is synonymous with such literary forms as proverbs, wise sayings, folklore, popular wisdom, etc. In the strict sense, it is academic philosophy, the type that most faculties and departments of philosophy generally preoccupy themselves with. The first sense of philosophy is found in generally accepted or acceptable principles in any human community. The second is often the results of reflections on these principles and sayings. The loose sense of philosophy is a first order activity, which is the general patrimony of popular cultures, while the second sense is a second order activity characterized by individual personal critique on the first order activity or principles. There is in practice no hard boundary between these two conceptions of philosophy, and many thinkers whose works are sometime grouped among the first order activity could also be grouped comfortably in the second order level. Philosophy in the loose sense is what Theophilus Okere calls non-philosophy which he understands as the contextual underpinnings of any philosophy, including the totality of one’s cultural symbols. For Okere, it is from this context, as a background, that every philosophy emerges through the process of
hermeneutics, leading to results that are personal to the philosopher; results which so often run counter to those of other philosophic minds both among the philosopher’s forebears and contemporaries. Our view is that, in most discussions about philosophy and development in Africa, it is philosophy in its strict sense that is understood, even though, for several reasons, many philosophic workers in Africa are not very hasty in dismissing popular philosophy, or first order activity or still T. Okere’s non-philosophy as extrinsic to academic philosophical reflections.

Development: What do we mean?
As philosophy is understood in the strict sense, so is the word development understood in a somewhat restricted sense. Here it is understood as advancement in science and its application in technology. There are of course many other aspects of development: cultural, psychological, human, religious, economic, political, etc. In a sense most of these aspects of development have strong connections with one another. However what philosophy is being called upon to foster is development in the sense in which it implies advancement of the general visible conditions and standards of living, infrastructural improvement, and in general keeping abreast with the most recent inventions in science and its application in technology. Development in this sense is axed squarely on the reduction of poverty and the improvement of other tangible factors that impinge significantly on the daily life of individuals and communities. In this respect, there is no gainsaying that most parts of Africa are lagging behind most other parts of the world, especially the advanced economies. African countries by any computation are generally poor, their gross domestic products are comparatively very low, their levels of science and technology are generally rudimentary, and the life expectancy of their populace short and in some instances getting shorter.

African philosophy and the issue of development
The concern for the role of philosophy in development arises from this background. It can be seen as a quest for the relevance of philosophy in the face of obvious and immediate biting needs of African societies. In extreme poverty, purely ivory tower engagement is viewed with deep suspicion or scorn. What use is it spending one’s time discussing highly sophisticated and abstract theories without obvious relevance to the concrete situation? Thus it appears to be an a priori agreement in most of Africa that all academic disciplines must bend themselves in order to find a place in the immediate amelioration of the uncomfortable situation.

This concern imposes on the various disciplines the character of contextualization. In philosophy, it could be viewed from the positive perspective that African philosophy is taking account of the specificities of its naissance. It could be interpreted as the type of contextualization that is traceable in all philosophies, even though the advocates of a completely abstract philosophy would be slow to accept contextual underpinning of the outcome of their reflections. But acceptance of the role of the context in the outcome of philosophizing is the background of the understanding of philosophy as hermeneutics championed by such eminent thinkers as Paul Ricoeur, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Philosophy becomes not just a reflection on abstract principles but a reflection that is fertilized by the thinker’s particular history and surrounding. This fact tailors the understanding of the task of philosophizing. It can also be seen as the social concern of the philosophic agent. But in a way, this quest can also be viewed as being imposed from outside. This means that since inadequacy of resources, for example, is one of the major causes of the African predicament that gives rise to underdevelopment and partly to the crisis of identity, the attempt to give pride of place in the distribution of resources to the natural sciences and technological studies propels philosophic thinkers to argue for the role of their discipline in development. In most developing countries, the allocation of resources in the universities, the availability of research grants, and development of the infrastructures of research take account of the role a discipline is perceived to play in improving life or the role of the discipline in the reduction of poverty.

The interest of African philosophers in the issue of development is focused in two directions. The first is the exploration of the influence of philosophy on the human agent of development. There is a general agreement that philosophy helps development by improving in some
respects the human beings involved in carrying out the process of development. This agreement also implies that the inadequacies of the agent of development, among other factors, lead to the conditions of poverty and misery in the first place. Hence economic development presupposes that human agents be enabled or trained to engage in actions that lead to the amelioration of undesirable conditions. For some authors, philosophy can do this by making human agents more morally responsible, and thus curbing such counter-developmental tendencies like corruption and mismanagement of public resources. There is here an undertone that the philosophical practice of discussing such ethical issues as justice, virtue, fairness, punishment, non-violence, etc, makes the human beings better equipped to answer to the promises of these notions. Furthermore, there is also the presupposition of Plato that knowledge is virtue and hence the awareness of the implications and the meaning of ethical values lead to translating them into practice. A confirmation of the above presumptions is seen in the fact that in contemporary African philosophy, there is wholesale neglect of discussions of virtue or habit, which in the best tradition of Thomas Aquinas is acquired by repetition of good acts and which is very instrumental in instilling good moral sense and behavior.

The second focus of African philosophy is on the structure of development. In this case, the philosophical engagement is credited with the ability to invent a system that will be more practicable in Africa, being more attuned to the specific situation. This second focus is related to the concentration on the agent of development since it is humans who are knowledgeable enough that will fashion suitable systems. In addition, knowledge of history, culture, society, religion and the contemporary world is what equips the agent for this task. There is the supposition that philosophy, more than any other discipline is placed to encapsulate the type of versatility required to fashion a suitable socio-politico-economic system that would lead to the improvement of the African predicament. Paulin Hountodji and Olusegun Oladipo hence gave African philosophy the role of critique of ideology. Kwasi Wiredu goes beyond the mere assignment of task to propose a democratic system that will eschew all forms of political party and base on the African practice of decision by consensus. V. O. Awosika also proposes a non-party system with an electoral college throughout the African continent. Pantaleon Iroegbu suggested the system which he names Obacracy, which appears to be mere neologism, combining Igbo and Greek words in expressing the same notion: democracy. In a recent international conference, T. Tshiamalenga Mtumba suggests the ideals of ancient Egyptian Ma’at as condition for good governance in Africa. Sophie Oluwole prefers traditional African democratic system as a way out. Francis Njoku opts for covenant relationship as the basis for good governance, not minding the impracticalities of this suggestion, while Anthony Echekwube suggests a return to African communalist systems of governance to curb the excesses of rulers.

In all these, the role of philosophy is limited to the immediate, visible needs of the African society. There has been pretty little attention to other somehow more invisible problems, created by African underdevelopment. Prominent among such is the psychological trauma which is like a fall out from the history of the continent. It is often not seen by African philosophers themselves that this factor exerts enormous influence on the outcome of their work, including their concern for development. It has been argued that much of contemporary African philosophy is in effect an attempt to counteract the effect of this psychological trauma. The feeling of inferiority, of being disadvantaged, being in Franz Fannon’s title, The Wretched of the Earth stands deep in many; Africans due to natural disadvantages, historical denigration through slavery, colonialism, exploitation, on-going discrimination and the residue of these negative factors. African philosophy has been subtly seen as a means of obviating this feeling, and being so perceived is due to two reasons. In the first place the erstwhile denigration denied the African the ability to philosophize. Hence the effort to argue for the existence of African philosophy, which we have referred to is in reality an effort to assert the philosophic capacity of the African, and in the view of Placide Tempels, to assert his humanity in the process. The second reason is that philosophy has in its western tradition assumed a somewhat
self-imposed honorific connotation and the best and the most honorable of human activities, the queen of the sciences (in the words of Immanuel Kant), open only to those who have attained certain level of refinement. The African of the colonial era was certainly not part of this group of humanity, and this is very clearly seen in the negative reaction of Tempels’ European confreres to the attribution of philosophy, no matter how debased to Africans. As V. Y. Mudimbe rightly pointed out “Had Tempels chosen for his essay a title without the term “philosophy” in it, ... his book would have perhaps been less provocative.”

The effort of much of contemporary African philosophy is summed up by the attempt to obliterate the stigma of African inferiority or to suite the psychological burden of Africa. It is seen in Tempels who wrote *Bantu Philosophy* to show that the African is human; the professional school of African philosophy fosters the same project by insisting on philosophy close to western philosophy in content and method. Sage philosophy and the historical movement try to prove that Africa has a philosophy, the former by researching on contemporary Africans who make critical reflections on their folk wisdom; the later by going back in time to ancient Egypt to show that Africa has a rich philosophical patrimony which was very instrumental in the development of Greek philosophy.

**Does philosophy predate development?**

However, whatever role that is eventually assigned to philosophy in development requires an examination of whether philosophy is really apt to fulfill such role. The overwhelming quest for the role of philosophy in development appears logically to presuppose that there is first a philosophy which is then called upon to contribute in development. Some reflections on African philosophy have raised voices directly and furtively against this presupposition. Stephen Theron views philosophy as one monolithic engagement the only main line of which was long since drawn in the western tradition of philosophy. For him the western tradition is *the* tradition of philosophy and this tradition remains the same “whoever is in charge.” In his view India and China could lay claim to philosophic thought, but the progress of this tradition has been atrophied either “by excessive pragmatism or through confusion with mystical religious praxis.” As for Africa, Theron inveighs against all quests for specifically African and indeed other world philosophies:

> It is natural that Africans (and others) will at times feel a certain envy (sic). But everyone has something to envy. The remedy lies in study of the tradition (meaning western tradition) instead of idly marking time asking what use philosophy is for Africa. It is for Africa to be of use to philosophy.

Theron’s idea about a monolithic philosophy the best expression of which is preserved only in the western philosophic tradition and western culture appears to be so narrow that it runs counter to some of the best minds of that tradition. It is the expression of the residue of the triumphalism of the West, championed in such thinkers as Hegel and brought to it full and terrible consequences in Hitler’s Nazism.

Nevertheless, Paulin Hountondji’s diatribe against African philosophy seems to serve the same purpose so long as contribution to development is concerned. For Hountodji, African philosophy is not to be exhumed from its past, contrary to the pretensions of ethnophilosophers. The efforts of those who seek to find philosophy in culture is retrogressive, since African philosophy like African science and mathematics belongs to the future not the past. What is clear is that in Theron as in Hountodji, we cannot even speak of a philosophy that will help development when there is no such thing as African philosophy at all, or at least not in the sense in which the philosophic workers themselves conceive it.

Peter Bodunrin’s view about African philosophy has the same implication as Hountodji. Bodunrin makes a distinction between some disciplines that are connatural to any culture like history and various forms of literature, and those that are not, like historical and literary criticism. In his altogether analytic and critical view of philosophy, he asserts that philosophy belongs to the later group of disciplines and is, therefore, new
in Africa. Bodunrin further asserts that science is the standard means of knowledge, and that scientific and technical rationality implies certain attitudes which are indispensable for development. In his view, African culture and tradition are dominated by magico-religious assumptions of the world in which Jurgen Habermas’s interaction, rather than action predominates. In the sense in which African philosophy, like ethnosophy, fosters attitudes that are magico-religious, it is detrimental to development, for one cannot attain sciento-technical advancement with a magico-religious view of the world.

Some views that might be slightly different from the above may be first that of Kwasi Wiredu. In his study of the crisis of identity in Africa, Wiredu dwells on the problem of African identity crisis due to the fact that the momentous change Africa experienced at the time of colonialism was not a reflected change. It was a change imposed from outside and one in which the elements introduced in the change were also imported from outside. For Africa to overcome some of the problems posed by the problems of identity, Africans have to do their own reflexive thinking and fashion or choose by themselves systems of governance and social organization that they desire. “But how can Africa do her own thinking when ... the minds of very many African remain colonized in the deepest reaches of their conceptual framework?” Thus Wiredu concludes that “Africa’s problem of identity is at bottom a philosophical problem.”

Being a philosophical problem presupposes that it is within the ambit of philosophy that it could be solved. G. I. Onah clearly calls on philosophy in Africa to change its usual course and engage in a process of self questioning which is important in order to know whether life is worth living at all. For him, Africa has reached such a critical point in its existence that the dictum *primum vivere, deinde philosophare* should be turned to *primum philosophare, deinde vivere*. That means that philosophy should be instrumental in the examination of the African life to answer the question why live at all. What has led to this critical moment is the level of poverty in Africa which leads to the questioning of the very meaning of man’s existence. It is thus for Africa to return to philosophy for it to make a headway in the most basic questions.

Both for Kwasi Wiredu and G. I. Onah, what is meant by philosophy is not specifically African philosophy. It is rather the philosophic engagement, without any special normative connotation, that is being invoked here for solutions to African problems. It goes without saying that the philosophy of any region or people; western philosophy, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy contains elements or principles the application or amplification of which could help development in Africa. But one would also easily agree that even if this were so, such philosophies would not be so portent in this regard as the one which is borne in Africa and nurtured by the conditions, questions and problems more peculiar to Africa than other places. If this is so, it means that since for most of the above thinkers, African philosophy has not really taken a deep root, philosophy may not be in position to aid development in the manner desired by many. The situation would be otherwise if the talk of the role of philosophy carries a historical perspective in which ancient Egyptian philosophy, Ethiopian philosophy, the philosophy of North African Christian fathers, and Islamic philosophy were also called in to play. But it is clear that the philosophy that is called upon to help in development is contemporary philosophical discussions and conclusions, with an eye on the effect of these on individuals, groups of individuals and on structures of the society. This requires a prior advancement of the level of philosophical engagement before it can conceivably aid development in any meaningful way.

**Does philosophy presuppose development?**

It seems appropriate to ask whether the existence of a vibrant philosophy presupposes development, i.e., is it necessary to assure a modicum of the type of economic, scientific, and technological development we have referred to above for philosophy to flourish in a society or culture? The answer would be in the affirmative if we go by the first book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Aristotle explores the origin of knowledge and philosophy from sense perception to memory, to universal knowledge, and arrives at the conclusion that some knowledge is meant for utility, but that first
philosophy is not. That this is so is attested to by the beginning of mathematical art which was only possible in places where men began to have leisure, like in Egypt where the priests had leisure, and were thus free to devote themselves to the knotted questions of life, the type of question that philosophy occupies itself with. To say then that philosophy presupposes development would mean in this regard that the condition of mastery of the basic natural needs, which development is apt to ensure, is necessary for the class of philosophers to emerge in the a society.

An obvious objection to this supposition would be that there have been a good number of philosophers who have flourished in history without the society being able to overcome most basic needs. And if this condition is to be a prerequisite for the whole society before philosophy could be tolerated, then most of Africa must then say good bye to philosophical engagement pending the time their society comes to a certain level of advancement. However, it appears obvious that Aristotle did not imply that the larger society must attain leisure for philosophy to flourish. What is necessary is that the class of philosophers, like the Egyptian priests, be able to enjoy that leisure; and in contemporary African societies, that a certain level of material assurance be available for this class to emerge. The necessity of the type of material assurance that development could provide is amply verified in other traditions of philosophy apart from Egypt. Philosophers have never been men unable to feed themselves. The history of western philosophy is peopled by thinkers from well to do families. That, among other things, enabled them to acquire the type of education necessary for them to engage in philosophical reflections. Such background also enabled some of them to acquire independence of spirit and critical confidence vis-à-vis the institutions of their societies. There were some philosophers, like B. de Spinoza and J. J. Rousseau who lived in relative poverty, but even these were nurtured in the early years of their lives in backgrounds well beyond the middle class of their time.

In his essay, "Sources of African Identity," William Abraham of Ghana links the emergence of philosophy with some degree of "material self-assurance." For him, philosophy like myth arose from man's primordial existential predicament. The human being realizes to his chagrin that contrary to his desire, nature is not always subject to his will. This consciousness sets off an attempt to tame nature through various means. There is the theoretical represented in myths of origin in which there is an explanation of the paradise that was there ab initio and why things are no longer the way they should be. The ritual is an attempt to accede by a sort of memorial to the original situation of paradise, giving an assurance that the present order will not have the last say. For Abraham, Philosophy is a further attempt to solve the same original predicament, but it emerges only when man has gained certain leverage over nature. Philosophy is thus a sort of intellectualization of the general existential predicament and "the existential distress can be safely intellectualized only if nature has been harnessed to a comfortable degree and its independence sufficiently overcome."

Abraham illustrates his point with reference to the progress of ancient Greek philosophy. The Ionian, he says, saw a conundrum in change. It created puzzlement, but this puzzlement was not sudden, was not initially viewed as an intellectual problem and did not lead straight on to philosophy. The Greek poetic tradition was very much obsessed with the problem of change in human life. The Ionians who produced the forebears of Greek philosophy complained about the vicissitudes of life. Already they were successful in "harnessing nature to build a surplus of material wealth and a surplus of nature." But not having assurance of continuity of life to enjoy their wealth, they soon "broke into open accusation of the gods." Homer compared man's life to leaves, with seasonal life; new generations arising as the old ones cease. Mimnermos of Colophon also complained that man won riches without the help of the gods, but was prevented from enjoying it by old age and death. And Semonides of Amorgos compared men to cattle before Zeus, who ended their life as he wished. The Greeks first attempted to solve this distress through rites and myths. Myth offers existential solution. It contains a unified account of the world, and outlines the means by which nature could be controlled. In its generalizing style, myth replaces existential historical occurrences with historical archetypes. It is from this point that, according to Abraham philosophy emerges but backed with a measure of material assurance:
Myth replaces the historical content with historical style. Philosophy eschews both the historical content and the historical style in its handling of precisely the same experience as myth. Indeed it is when a people have enough material self-assurance, and philosophy has emerged, that myth begins to acquire overtones of incredibility and figment. Until then it takes the place of philosophy.  

Conclusion
The lesson from the above views is that the quest for African philosophy anchored on its ability to aid material, economic development appears to be thwarted. It is not philosophy, meaning an academic discipline taught in university departments which has ever been the engine of development in any country or region. It appears on the contrary, that it is rather when such desired progress has been achieved to a degree that the society becomes confident enough to devote resources to foster such experts as philosophers that the best result could be garnered. These experts would in turn be able to pose the types of disturbing questions which have become the trade marks of philosophy. The desired condition may in fact not be available to all in the society at any point of emergence of philosophy. To expect otherwise would amount to suspending progress until material conditions are significantly improved in the wider society. What is to be emphasized is that there is a palpable contradiction in the obvious denigration of academic philosophy as inconsequential to development on the one hand and the quest for modern indigenous philosophy on the other in many parts of the developing world. A people really concerned about developing their indigenous philosophy should on the other hand provide their class of thinkers with the same type of “leisure” that enabled Egyptian priests to be the originators of the mathematical arts.

Notes
1 H. Odera Oruka, the founder of the Sage Philosophic Movement affirmed this universalism by insisting that philosophy must be universal in the sense that the problems discussed and the method must apply to all human beings. For him, many regional philosophies, Western, Russian, Chinese, Indian, are consistent with this universalism, and African philosophy must also do so. See his “Fundamental Principles in the Question of “African Philosophy,” Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), pp. 45 – 46.


3 The search for the role of philosophy appears clearly in conference themes which are pointers to the expected relevance of philosophy in different aspect of development. For instance the International Society for African Philosophy and Studies has chosen the following themes among others in recent years for its annual conferences: Thought and Practice in African Philosophy, Nairobi, March, 2003; Philosophy and Development in Africa, 9th Annual Conference, Dar es Salaam, April 27 – 29, 2003; Philosophy, Globalization and Justice, University of West Indies, April, 2004; Philosophy, Ideology and Civil Society in Africa, Enugu, Nigeria, March, 2005.
also bear the same message: Africa: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Bigard Seminary, Enugu, 1997; Philosophy and the Quest for Responsible Governance in Africa, Bigard Memorial Seminary, Enugu, March, 2004; Philosophy and Praxis, University of Benin, May, 2004; Crisis in Africa at the Beginning of this Millenium: The Response of Philosophy, Science and Religion, Seat of Wisdom Seminary, Owerri, March, 2006.


8 For a sample of how thinkers can be incorrectly grouped, we have the example of Leopold Sedar Senghor, former president of Senegal and one of the foremost African thinkers whose grouping into the current of Ethnophilosophy has almost become a cliché. A close reading of Senghor reveals that he could in fact be said to be engaged in the process of hermeneutics. See J. Obi Oguejiofor, “Ethnophilosophy and Hermeneutics: Reviewing Okere’s Critique of Traditional African Philosophy,” in J. Obi Oguejiofor and G. I. Onah, (eds.), *African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture, Essays in Honour of Theophilus Okere*, Lit, 2005, pp. 70 – 92.


13 The word Oha means the masses or the people. Iroegbu merely used it to replace the Greek word demos which has the same meaning.


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31 Ibid., p. 31.