

Evaluation of Descartes' Rational Foundationalism

Chuka A. Okoye

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v12i1.2>

Introduction

The problem of certainty of knowledge is a major problem in the philosophical enquiry. The very act of wonder, which is believed, stimulated the Ionian philosophers, led philosophy through many ages to its present position. However, as a result of the fact that many philosophers in the ancient times found it hard to reconcile this major problem of knowledge between the knowing subject (man) and the objects, they turned skeptics.

Skepticism, which questioned the very possibility of true knowledge, no doubt agitated many philosophers. This agitation pushed philosophers into the desire to acquire certain knowledge. This search led to the development of some traditional theories of knowledge, which equally aimed at resolving the problem of certainty and thus give the knowing subject a place in the universe.

These theories of knowledge from the ancient times delved into a critical search for the certainty of knowledge as to avoid error. No wonder Plato in the ancient period explained that people are often deceived because they lack knowledge. He made this clearer in his '*allegory of the cave*' where he dismisses erroneous knowledge as shadows and upholds the need for more certain knowledge.

Further in this ancient epoch. Aristotle exposes the dangers of assumption. He lays emphasis on the fact that certainty is very necessary for any claims to knowledge. Sequel to this he made, through his laws of thought, some self-evident truths, which would serve as guidelines to the certainty of knowledge direly needed.

These notwithstanding, we may have understood that the certainty of knowledge is possible but another problem is; through what means? Many philosophers like S. Pierce, Dewey, etc. understood that the things we see testify to their truth and their truth necessarily guarantees their knowledge for certain. Some naïve realists equally share the same idea and this informs their foundationalism. They believed that the foundation for truth is correspondence.

Nevertheless, some philosophers like Rene Descartes believe that the senses are deceptive and therefore accept reason as the very source of certainty. Descartes fields a rationalist foundation for truth which builds on the *cogito ergo sum* and being faced with the same problem of certain only of that, which can never be false or doubtful, he set out to achieve this certainty by postulating his famous method and guidelines – the methodic doubt and the clear and distinct perception of ideas in the light of reason. These helped him attain his foundation, the *cogito ergo sum* – I think therefore I am and further in the existence of God. This paper evaluates this rational foundationalism with a view to seeing its implication for metaphysics and knowledge.

What is Foundationalism?

Foundationalism is a theory, which asserts the certainty of knowledge. This begins from the realization of the fact that our beliefs are generally justified by other beliefs. These foundational beliefs are taken to be so certain that they cannot be doubted.

The Theory of foundationalism is distinguished from other doxactic theories by the view that knowledge has foundations². The contemporary foundation theorists took a rather psychological stance. They traced the starting point of knowledge to the senses. This however would not end up in the senses. In principle there is still the possibility that we

could trace knowledge back to reason just as Descartes did. However, it is only a few thinkers who would be willing to define foundationalism following this latter position. This idea extended to the 20th century thinkers like Pollock who still maintained that our simplest beliefs about the world are in direct response to sensory input, and then we reason from those simple beliefs to more complicated beliefs; like the inductive generalization, which cannot be acquired on the basis of single instances of sense perception³. This however entails an opposing philosophical account in which the very simple beliefs which source is the sense data form a foundation for knowledge and it follows that other beliefs would be justified by these epistemological beliefs. These beliefs on the contrary do not need any justification because they are self-evident truths. Basic beliefs nevertheless, report the contents of the perceptual states.

Two things are required for foundationalist to stand. First of all, there must be an account of known basic beliefs. Secondly, we must have an epistemic assent to what we believe. This again differentiates this foundationalism from other doxastic theories, which take a limited class of epistemological basic beliefs. Generally, it is believed that these basic beliefs do not stand in need of justification, they are self-evident and other beliefs are justified through them. Thus these basic beliefs provide a foundation for epistemic justification. Basic beliefs according to Cruz do not require the justification of reason, as doing so would imply justification of the basic truth from other truths, which means they are no longer basic. For basic beliefs to provide a foundation they must have secure epistemic status⁴. These analogically are akin to the first premises in logical syllogistic arrangement. Premises must necessarily give a clear ground for other premises and the conclusion.

The major motive of foundational theorists is mainly to avert the skeptic criticism of infinite regress or circularity. It is very general among the skeptics, to render any proof of certainty redundant by the accusation of circularity, which goes to prove knowledge from the pre-existing one and so on 'ad infinitum'. Basic beliefs rather are evidence in terms of which all other beliefs are justified. The above does not however exhaust what foundationalism denotes. Some foundationalist tenets can differ from others in their nature and their mode of operation. This necessitates the secondary form of foundationalism otherwise called the *fallible foundationalism*.

Casting our minds back, we remember that it is in a bid to settle the question of what makes us justified in accepting something rather than the other that foundationalism sprang forth. Thus for foundationalism to succeed, the thing we accept as true must be infallible. This is so to the extent that the basic beliefs must be things we are completely justified in accepting, which do not depend on anything else. Every other thing, *ipso facto*, is proved by these foundational beliefs which provide the foundation for any epistemological structure.

Fallible foundationalism appears weaker than the infallible foundationalism, is self-justified and proves other truths. Thomas Reid had it that fallible foundational beliefs are beliefs of common sense, which have a right of ancient possession and until this inherent right is successfully challenged, they remain justified without support from any other belief.⁵ The fallible foundationalism is quite different from the infallible foundationalism. The fallible foundationalist truths are basic beliefs that provide a reason for their acceptance but without any guarantee of their truth. This fallible foundationalism is called so because it is a fallible guide to the truth rather than a guarantee of truth.

Despite the empiricist sectionalization of foundationalism as solely perceptual, there is need to give more room for the conceptual knowledge, which on its own capacity, it foundationalism. This conceptualism was seen in Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* which is self-evident and *prima – facie* guarantees its own existence and proves other things around it. Descartes' rational foundationalism did not end here. The existence of God formed the fallible foundation for Descartes who needed to prove the world of science from God's existence. With the aid of these two types of foundationalism, Descartes satisfactory attained the certainty he desired.

The Method

Descartes was embarrassed by the amount of error that covered his thoughts. He came to discover eventually that nothing was indispensable. Amidst his disappointments, he still found some favour with mathematics, which informed his later criterion for accepting knowledge – the clear and distinct perception of things in the light of reason. The recognition of mathematics was however limited. This limitation is as a result of the fact that the true use of mathematics and its essence, which is to nurture the soul in truth and to open the mind to the knowledge of the universe, was not fully and clearly understood but instead was seen as the subservient means of the mechanical arts by the predecessors of Descartes. The pre-Cartesians did not succeed in building anything worthwhile for the foundation of mathematics.

Sequel to this, Descartes rejected the whole world of science as inconsistent hence they have their root in philosophy; a discipline, according to him, suffused by confusion, uncertainty and doubts. He thus had to break away from the past. He said:

Not that I imitated the skeptics who doubted only that they may doubt and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself; for on the contrary, my designs was singly to find ground or assurance and cast aside the loose earth and sand that I might reach the rock.⁶

Copleston analyzing this comments that “it is undeniable that in one sense at least Descartes consciously and deliberately broke with the past and was determined to start afresh without intrusting the authority of any previous philosophy”⁷. This breaking away is necessary for Descartes, as it is a pre requisite for perfecting the revolution, which he was set to make. Descartes rightly observed, further, that the house built by one architect are usually more elegant and commodious than the ones constructed by many architects and that the edifice with a diseased foundation is bound to collapse thus he started this foundation building from the self.

Nevertheless, there was a problem with this foundation building. The mind, which Descartes targeted as the pure existence from where this investigation would be carried on was discovered to be over burdened by many confused ideas. As a result, it would be very difficult for the judgment of the mind to be clear and firm as it would have been, had it retained the full use of reason as it were at birth without blemish. Descartes was of the view that human mind has been perverted by tradition and destroyed by all kinds of prejudices and errors, which equally robbed it of the purity, and essence such as we may assume Adam to have had on the day he was created by God⁸. For Descartes to be successful, he would have to wrestle the human mind back to its original purity, and bring the human nature to its highest degree of perfection. To achieve this, he made up his mind to reject,

bodily, all opinions that he had so far admitted, thus believed, and put into his mind other better opinions, or even the same opinions, which square with the norms of reason. Thus he declared that everything should be doubted; all that are properties of tradition and prejudices. He believed that by so doing, our minds would attain original purity and therefore reach the truth with certainty.

Descartes used himself as an experimental specimen. He employed the methodic skepticism in which everything is doubted and refused save the things that he clearly and distinctively perceived. Thus he stated his formula as “a clear and distinct perception of ideas in the light of reason”. Using this, he slated out four rules to guide this method. He agreed never to accept anything as true if he did not have any justification for its being believed. This is to avoid precipitancy and prejudice and thus accept only what is clear and distinct and lacks occasion of doubt. He sought to divide each of the difficulties under examination into many parts as to proffer an adequate solution. He further resolved to direct his thoughts orderly; from the simplest to the most complex as to establish an order in his thoughts even when the objects had no natural priority over one another. Finally he stated that throughout such complex enumerations and such general survey he would make an effort to ensure that nothing is left out in his investigation. These rules assisted Descartes in his inquiry, which culminated eventually in his foundationalism.

Descartes' Foundationalism

Descartes set his methods and the rules that would aid him achieve the certainty he desired. He saw in philosophy very many controversies, which he believed was as a result of the foundation on which philosophy and indeed science was laid. He said:

I will say nothing of philosophy but this: seeing that it has been cultivated by the most outstanding minds of several centuries and up to now there is no point but is disputed and consequently doubtful. I had...almost regarded as false whatever was no more than plausible with a shaky foundation.⁹

He believed that there is need to bring in the certainty of mathematics to sanitize the philosophy arena by basing philosophy on a newer foundation. This firm foundation, he felt, would be an absolutely certain truth that it would be indubitable.

However laying a new foundation for any edifice entails pulling down the whole structure. Descartes remarked that it is not only to beautify the house that a house is rebuilt but some houses are rebuilt compulsorily because their foundations are faulty and therefore spells danger for the inhabitants. He carried out this reconstruction using the methodic doubt. He doubted and rejected everything that blurs the mind's view in its attempt to certainty.

During this doubt, he discovered a truth that was impossible for him to doubt. This truth was the confirmation of the *res cogitans*. He saw during the course of his doubting that he could not doubt his existence as a doubting being. The fact of his doubting becomes for him clear evidence that he exists. Since doubting is already a proof of his rational nature thus to think is to exist *cogito ergo sum*. He states his route clear thus:

I decided to feign that everything that had entered my mind hitherto was no truer than the illusions of dreams. But immediately upon this I noticed that while I was trying to think

everything false, it must be that I who am thinking was something¹⁰.

This truth was so glaring to him that even the criticism or the strongest argument of the skeptics cannot deny this fact. Descartes believes he has the truth he has been looking for; a foundational truth on which other truths will be based. He observed that the truth 'think therefore I am' was so solid that it became the first principle of philosophy he sought.

He saw the certainty, which he had so desired, in the *cogito ergo sum* and thus tried to trace other truths from it. Descartes' effort, no doubt, was very strong and conscious. He felt that the philosophy discipline was mixed with both the good and the bad apples of reasoning which he would empty to select away the bad appreciable. It is quite evident that this rational truth gave a wonderful insight to the subsequent thoughts on foundationalism. We are privileged to have such a truth, which is based on a hyperbolic doubt but which gives us a clear picture of an indubitably truth, which according to Copleston is immune to the corroding effect of natural doubt¹¹.

Descartes employed two arguments namely, the dream argument and the demon arguments. Whereas the dream argument demonstrated the infallible foundationalism founded in the *cogito ergo sum*, the demon argument presented the fallible foundationalism, which is the existence of God. He further explained that the activities of the dreams are not much different from conscious actions. If, he said, I dreamt of myself having a paper, shaking my head beside the fire; there is no much difference my being awake makes when I wake up and see myself in a similar condition.

The demon argument on the other hand explains how we cannot doubt God. If God happens to be a powerful evil

genius who has deceived him (Descartes) into believing that he exists whereas it is mere illusion, then he must not be God. God, in the belief of Descartes, is a perfect being. Perfect in the strict of sense of it excludes deceit. Being a perfect being, God should be incapable of deceit. Descartes used the ontological argument to prove this God's existence. He felt that the only thing needed of us is the analysis of the idea of God not whether He exists or not. This analysis would come to help us agree that God's perfection entails His existence. God is the uncaused cause to whom existence is ontological.

Sequel to our explanations of the fallible foundationalism, which entails that such foundations are not self-evident but give conclusive grounds for being believed as true, we would immediately discover that the existence of God falls into this explanation. Descartes was yet to be convinced that despite the possibilities of mental fictions, that God could also form such a fiction. He believed that the idea of God is a distinct and derived from neither some sense perception nor any kind of mental fictions. This idea of God, he concludes, is innate in him just as the idea of himself. This idea is the image of God in him akin to the idea or mark of the workman on his handiwork.

His Christianity was not hidden at all in his further attempt to explain the existence of God through the universal sustenance. He believed that he neither created himself nor does he sustain himself. Following this, Jakko stated that Descartes submitted that his being is not his own because, to be in the real sense of it is to cause oneself.¹² Descartes actually believed that he never caused himself lest he would have made himself more perfect. These explanations about God seem to be more dogmatic than logical. Descartes needed God to prove the world of science without which his philosophy may likely encounter serious problems.

Foundationalism and the Problem of Interactionism

In the modern period the Cartesian rational foundationalism projected the problem of dualism in the mind-body interaction problem. Descartes' choice of the '*cogito ergo sum*' as the foundational truth, through which other truths could follow from, pushed aside the body and subsequently other phenomenal things as dependent on the mind. No doubt, Descartes accepted that the mind and the body are disparate entities, which are substantially and essentially different. Nevertheless, he did not deny that there is an interaction between the two. It is this mode of interaction which triggered off the very major problem of mind and body in philosophy in the modern period.

Descartes' definition of substance, as that which exists but requires nothing but itself to exist¹³, separated the mind and the body. The mind was seen as the *res-cogitans*-the thinking thing. Whereas the body- *res extensa* is merely extensive in nature. The two substances, following Descartes, are absolutely independent of each other. Thus if we must know something about the soul, we need not go through the body or even make reference to it and if we must make reference to the body, we need not go through the mind. Hence each substance, differentiated by their attributes, is closed in their systems. This no doubt shows forth dualism in nature.

The above tenet evidently cannot be divorced from his rationalist background. Having rejected the ideas of his scholastic predecessors as dogmatic and traditional, all left for him was to go through the mind to assert truth. He was convinced that the sense is deceptive and untrustworthy this informs the reason behind his founding the whole corpus of knowledge on innate ideas. With this he felt the whole existential reality could be made explainable thanks to his clear and distinct perception of ideas in the light of reason,

which he argued was right, hence even God cannot deceive him. We shall therefore examine Descartes based on his argument about the soul as a thinking thing, which he believed also is the major essence of the human person as distinct from the body. He said:

In so far as I am thinking and not extended and on the other hand, I have a distinct idea of the body in so far as it is extended, not a thinking thing, its it certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it.¹⁴

The soul is the very essence of man; that which makes him who he actually is. Man is essentially a thinking substance while the body is merely characterized by extension. Thus he exists without his body. To be able to explain man's activities as being controlled by the mind, Descartes pushed over certain activities to the mind ranging from the willing, doubting, to even feeling such that when one feels some pain, the pain is in mind and not in the body. Despite this, Descartes tried to reestablish the independence of the body from the mind. He explained that he is not just logged into his body as a pilot in a ship but instead that he is united with his body that forms one whole with it.

Descartes no doubt understood himself very well as to the separation of the mind and body but the unity or rather the interaction of the two became a problem to him. To solve this problem, Descartes brought in the Pineal gland as the centre of interaction between the mind and the body. When there is an experience in the body, the animal spirit carries this to the brain and to the pineal gland, which sends the message to the mind. The mind in turn, through its activities activates the animal spirit thereby sending signals to the nerves and thus the result comes in the physical. This suggests a strong point of interaction.

This casual mode introduced by Descartes brings up a sort of push-reaction. The body is casually made to interact with the mind and vice versa. This push casual interaction renders the whole process mechanical. In the first place, we are not satisfied with this push because of the substantial difference between the two interactors. The body operates and obeys the chemo-physical laws, whenever there is a disintegration of matters. The soul is indestructible and immaterial. It does not obey the law of motion or chemo-physics. The soul could be said, implicitly though, to act upon matter and effect change in the physical world by the process of psycho-kinesis, which takes place in the pineal gland.

Descartes would have narrowly escaped this problem of interaction had he avoided this essentialist conception of the soul as self-consciousness. Had he extended his explanation to the issue of consciousness, he would have escaped being trapped by the problem of absence of consciousness. He never struck the distinction between the soul and the mind. Thus even the man and animal, which he claimed to distinguish in the actual fact, were not distinguished. Animals could have minds and mental states but not souls. Furthermore, this essentialist notion of substance makes man merely a thinking thing and nothing more. Thus we could question Descartes: What then happens when one experiences some periods of thoughtlessness as in a dreamless sleep or in the case of consciousness, does the individual stop to exist for the time? Reacting to this, Rader stated that he is not inclined to say that his existence ceases whenever he stops thinking. He continues to exist in a state of the unconscious.¹⁵ The problem of this essentialist explanation of substances seems problematic. Descartes may need to further distinguish man from other existent things.

The Innate Ideas

The problem of the innate ideas can be traced back to the method of Descartes. Descartes from the onset rightly pointed out that a house with a bad foundation spells danger. Therefore there is need for Descartes to ensure that his own foundation does not spell danger for the edifice he suffered to build. The clear and distinct ideas of Descartes may not have been the best method to use. S. Pierce explained that some ideas could be clear and distinct but not true. The above expression by Pierce threatens the very trust, which Descartes best bestowed on the innate ideas. The issue of innate ideas has not gone down well with some philosophers like John Locke who maintained that at birth, the human mind is *tabula rasa-clean slate*, which is filled up eventually with experiences.

Sequel to Locke's view, Hume objected to Descartes arguing that mental events are nothing more than "a bundle or collection of perceptions". The duo above believed therefore that it was better to look out than in to find truth and real knowledge. Hume stated:

When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or darkness, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.¹⁶

Hume may not be perfectly right in his submissions since not all the knowledge we get follows the conceptual type and not all are linguistically expressible. Nevertheless, we can give it to him since it is difficult to perceive any subject above the experience of such subject. To say the least, Descartes'

foundational truth and the methodology, which he used, are purely subjective. Little wonder Rader argued that to accept the clear and distinct perception as true it to reject all tests of truth beyond individual opinion.¹⁷ Descartes cannot just be taking about objective truth where his method rejects all inquiry into objectivity. Nevertheless, his raising the problem of the mind and body distinction and attempting a solution to him is, however a plus to it is a plus him.

Science and the Place of Foundationalism

Descartes evidently saw the field of science as having its grounds in philosophy. Sequel to this, he asked: is it not, that all expressions of science come from philosophy? The solution, which he was prepared to give to the philosophy field, therefore surely extends to science. However, to trace the world of science became a problem to him when he was left only with the *cogito ergo sum*. He, therefore, went ahead to establish the existence of God, which according to his third and sixth meditation proceeded the “*cogito ergo sum*”.

Descartes having found the existence of the scientific world through the fallible foundation, he proposed a mechanical interrelationship between objects. This mechanical interrelationship which centered on the chemo-physical explanation of the universe accounts for the termination of matter and even an interaction which now become a push kind of interaction. This explanation of Descartes, no doubt is based on the nature of things, an investigation which has rendered his work methodologically reductionist. If this is so, then the Cartesian metaphysics would render the field of science totally dysfunctional. Jonathan Ree seems to equally buy the same idea as he stated that contemporary scientists would be very suspicious of Descartes because he based his philosophical reflection on the nature of things rather than experimentation.¹⁸

Descartes' foundationalism presented us with a straight-jacketed methodology of inquiry into the world of science without any conceptual and theoretical assumption, which denies conceptual system outside of which one cannot comfortably make judgments of statement of fact independent of theoretical assumptions. There is no one way of understanding the world. Thus, Feferabend denied this Cartesian idea of releasing the human investigation into the physics from the supposition that there is only but one rational way of going into investigations about the world of science.¹⁹

The understanding of methodology of science and this diverse process postulated above by Feferabend has its effect in the current trend in the sciences where there is an effort to scientifically understand the micro physical world. Many thinkers seem to subscribe to the fallible foundationalism of Descartes founded on the existence of God. It is strongly believed that God must have some roles to play in the establishment and the arbitrariness of the laws at the microphysical world. As such the postulation of the fallible foundationalism could still be very relevant in the explanations of quantum events. These events are quite difficult to explain with physical laws and the induction of experimentation. At the micro-physical level, the atoms follow arbitrary laws this makes the principle of their operation difficult to explain. To say the least, the advent of quantum physics in the 20th century opened up the fact that our understanding of the universe which we think along side the systematic science may not really be the way we think it to be. In fact, with the nature of quantum physics, the physical world is more blurred.

Heisenberg attempted an explanation of the nature of atoms through the uncertainty principle. His principle held that atomic particles can never be completely defined, for the

more their motion is pinned down the more uncertain their position becomes. For instance, if the beam of electrons should pass through a narrow slit the width of the resulting diffraction pattern carries inversely as the width of the slit. However, if the width of that slit assume the, uncertainty position... ΔY and the diffraction pattern the uncertainty in a transverse momentum... ΔM , $\Delta Y \Delta M > h/2$. The more we know the position more accurately, the less accurately we know about the momentum, the more accurately we know the momentum the less accurately we know the position. That is to say that there is no accurate knowledge of the above at the same time. This accounts for the incompleteness of the quantum physics.

Not only did Heisenberg attempt to sort out this problem encountered in quantum physics other physicists like Neil Bohr, who proposed the complementarity theory that dealt the blow on the Democritus' theory, Planck, Schrödinger, etc. attempted their own solution but yet quantum physics open ended. No wonder, Haldane explained that the universe is not only queerer than we imagine but queerer than we can imagine.

From all indications, quantum mechanics merely give us probabilities. This renders it essentially, a statistical theory per se, if we view the activities that go on at the microphysical level, which is said to be purely statistical, then we can concluded that quantum mechanics can irresistibly be said to give an accurate interpretation of the world. But if this is so, how then can individual events be calculated hence statistical theories deal with collective events?

This problem becomes a difficult one. However, some scientists would explain that quantum mechanics can be applied to calculate the properties of one single atom.²⁰ this however may not be tenable because every atom is sustained

and covered by the electromagnetic radiation coming from the surrounding atom. This makes it impossible to view each atom independently. Quantum mechanics to say the least, deals with the mean of all the external influences on the ensemble of atoms. Based on this problem, one cannot really say that foundationalism has a strong footing when brought into the field of science. But arbitrary laws which atoms follow in the micro physical level could still be said to have a sequence, which is difficult to be interpreted by man himself. Based on this second notion we can allow God a little but negligible intervention in micro physical events. This idea of the divine intervention was echoed by Einstein who wondered that God plays a dice with the universe. To this little extent we may tolerate the fallible foundationalism of Descartes who may still hold the key to success of the order in the remains open as far as the Cartesian foundationalism is concerned.

Conclusion

Descartes' search for the truth, which culminated in his foundationalism, has received many attacks from many philosophers. His approach immediately portrays one who has reached his conclusions before stating his premises. This is responsible for his being guilty of many fallacies. Descartes accused his scholastic predecessors of cognitive traditionalism in which he explained that they believed in Aristotle to the point of traditionalism and undue dogmatism. Nevertheless it is enough to state that he (Descartes) was guilty of what he accused others since he almost worshipped the platonic ideas. The mathematics of Descartes may not be as trustworthy as Descartes took it. Thus if mathematics has anything to do with reality then it is not certain unless it is not about reality. The mathematical view of the universe denies the universe its metaphysical nature which hides more than it

brings out the true nature of reality. Science may flaw Descartes in many respects. We may not actually be talking about a foundational truth in the presence of theory development in science which has rendered the whole field of science and indeed the whole universe an uncertain whole.

Despite the shortcoming in the work of Descartes, we quite appreciate his work, which polished the philosophy of the modern period. His systematic approach to the problem of knowledge aided the systematic approach to scientific investigation. His development of rationalism in the modern period equally armed philosophy through his foundationalism in the modern period better describes him as their father of modern philosophy.

References

1. B. Lidsley, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1989) P.10.
2. J. Pollock and J. Cruz *Contemporary Theories of Mind* (Oxford Rowman and Little Field Pub. 1999).
3. J. Pollock and J. Cruz *Contemporary Theories of Mind*, P.32.
4. J. Pollock and J. Cruz *Contemporary Theories of Mind*, P.35.
5. T. Reid *Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (ed.) W. Minister: The New Man Press, 1960) P. 67.
6. F. Copleston *A History of Philosophy (Vol. iv)* (West Minister: The New Man Press, 1960) P. 67.
7. Rene Descartes *A. Discourse on the Method Transl. E. Anscombe & P.T. Geach* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1978).
8. Rene Descartes *A Discourse on the Method Transl. by J. Veitch J. M. Deur & Deut & Sons Ltd. 1978, P.81.*
9. Rene Descartes *A. Discourse on the Method Transl J. Veitch J. M. Deut & Deut & Sons Ltd 1978, P.81.*
10. Rene Descartes *A Discourse on the Method Transl by J. Veitch P.27.*
11. F. Copleston *A history of Philosophy, P.27.*
12. H. Jakko *Ontological Argument Revisited cited in Collection of Critical Essays* ed. Doney, London: Macmillan 1907, p.183.
13. See Rene Descartes *A Discourse on the Method Transl. By J. Veitch*
14. See Rene Descartes *A Discourse on the Method Trans. by E. Ansecombe & P.T. Geach.*

15. Melvin Rader *The Enduring Questions* (2nd Ed) New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969) P. 278.
16. David Hume *Treatise on Human Nature* (ed) D. Kolak From Plato to Wittgenstein, P.304.
17. Melvin Rader *Te Enduring Questions* P. 131.
18. Jonathan, Ree *Descarte* (London: Allenlane Pub. 1972) P.36.
19. J. Shan *Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy* (London: University College Press 1993) p.309.
20. James Christian *Philosophy an Introduction to the Art Wondering* (Canada: Wadsorth Pub. 2003), P. 218.
21. J. Shand *Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, P.309.