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Abstract

Contemporary literature on civil-military relations identifies three pillars that define the scope and role of the military in a liberal-democratic setting. These pillars are; civilian control of the military institution, military effectiveness and military efficiency. Collectively, the literature refers to them as the ‘trinity’ of civil-military relations. Since 1999, Nigeria has witnessed an unbroken chain of successive civilian administrations with a subordinated military playing a number of roles as defined by constitutional and political directives. This paper therefore, examines these pillars and the implications they have in Nigeria’s twenty-year democratic journey. It adopts comparative, institutional, legal, philosophical and historical tools in the analysis of these important elements in Nigeria’s civil-military relations. The paper finds out that the unstable and fragile nature of Nigeria’s democratic institutions are major causes of weakness in civilian control of the military and limitations in military effectiveness and military inefficiency. The paper finds out that effective legislative oversight of the military, a transparent military budgeting system and deepening the involvement of relevant agencies of actors as appropriate substitutes to the use of military force.

Key Words: Civilian Control of the Military, Civil-Military Relations, Liberal-Democracy, Military Effectiveness, Military Efficiency

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Introduction

The relationship between the military institution and political leadership of a country is a central subject of discourse in civil-military relations. Generally, the concept of ‘civil-military relations’ connotes the existence of a power relationship between the military institution and the complex political environment in which the former operates. Based on this relationship are three factors, or pillars that shape contemporary discourse in ‘liberal-democratic’ civil-military relations, which are; (1) civilian control of the military institution (2) military effectiveness and (3)
military efficiency. These pillars according to Bruneau are collectively referred to as the ‘trinity’ of civil-military relations¹.

The discourse on civilian control of the military as one of the three pillars dates back to antiquity². The possibility of the military disobeying its principal led Juvenal, a poet in ancient Rome, to rhetorically pose the question- ‘who will guard the guardians?’³. Civilian control implies the capacity to limit the powers of the military and ability to exercise civilian authority over its organisation and missions⁴. These missions cover a range of roles- war fighting, defending, peacekeeping, fire-fighting and policing⁵. The second is the factor of military effectiveness- the military’s ability and willingness to carry out missions assigned by the political leadership⁶. Military effectiveness depends on the resources allocated to the military and the degree of inclination to obey the directives of the civilian principal. The third is the factor of military efficiency. It implies achieving missions within acceptable costs. This translates to an evaluation of military effectiveness within the context of cost-benefit analysis.

It should be noted that Nigeria transited from a prolonged military rule to a semblance of a liberal-democracy in May, 1999. This dispensation or the Fourth Republic has witnessed an uninterrupted period of civilian rule with transfers of power from one elected government to another. The military plays a number of roles under successive elected governments. In retrospect, the Nigerian military

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ventured into the mainstream political stage at intervals for long periods since 1966. These adventures negatively affected its organisational cohesion\(^7\). Since the country currently operates a liberal-democracy, there are certain implications for its civil-military relations. In essence, four basic questions are raised by this paper—what is the nature and basis of civil-military relations in Nigeria under a liberal-democratic dispensation? What is the nature of the civilian control of the military in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic? Has the military been effective in carrying out its roles and to what extent? What is the nature of military efficiency with respect to the use of resources allocated?

The paper also examines the trinity of civil-military relations, as the subject-matter, in Nigeria’s twenty year liberal-democratic journey (1999-2019) in the Fourth Republic. It assesses the nature, basis and the degree of the institutionalisation of civilian control of the military, military effectiveness and military efficiency in Nigeria. In so doing, the article adopts a normative qualitative method where the issues are presented in a thematic style. The constitutional, historical, institutional and philosophical approaches are used as tools in the analysis. The paper therefore, consists of five major sections: an introduction to the conceptual issues; a review of literature which looks at some conceptual, theoretical and empirical issues of relevance; the paper’s framework; a critical examination of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic with respect to these pillars in contemporary civil-military relations and; the conclusion that includes some recommendations.

**Review of Related Literature**

In modern studies of civil-military relations, the problematique of who controls the military remains a topic of discourse. A number of works explain civilian control of the military in the Modern State\(^8\). In addition, the factors of effectiveness and efficiency are seen as ‘a functional imperative’ when evaluating the power of the military and the role it plays\(^9\).

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The direction of the discourse in the late 20th Century period dwells on military effectiveness and military efficiency by pushing them onto the centre-stage with the lingering debate on civilian control of the military in a liberal-democracy. The globalisation of liberalism by the Western powers in the late 20th Century affected the nature of civil-military relations in the new democracies. The military had to submit to the authority of democratic institutions (Forster, 2002). Thus, democratisation of civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency form the major issues of discourse.

In a liberal-democracy, civilian control is explained as a strategic interaction based between a civilian principal and a subordinated military agent. The civilian authority secures military compliance to obey by leveraging on a range of measures. The debate on civilian control of the military has a number of perspectives. One study on the nature of civilian control in Latin America assesses the competence of civilian leaders or the military in four key areas: external defence, internal security, public policy and leadership selection. Civilian control is said to be dominant when the military has no prerogatives in the last three areas. It is moderate when the military has some prerogatives in the first two areas. It is said to be weak when the military has ascendancy in the first three or all areas. Along similar lines, the extent of civilian control is assessed in five key areas: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence and military organisation. It is assessed as high, medium and low depending on the degree to which the military is disposed to contesting the prerogatives of civilians to make decisions in these areas. Another source regards civilian control of the military as a shared responsibility. Civilian leadership is expected to have jurisdiction in defence policy and budget, while

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leaving the military leaders to decide on discipline, promotion, operational doctrine and planning\textsuperscript{12}.

For the new democracies in Central or Eastern Europe, civilian control is viewed within the prism of ‘good governance’\textsuperscript{13}. This is shaped by the system of government, political culture, traditions and the history of such policies. Additionally, civilian control is benchmarked to meet some requirements, which include: existence of legal and institutional constraints to military power, the supremacy of democratic institutions in decision making and military subordination to such institutions; a civilian-led interface between military and democratic institutions and; subjecting defence budgeting to transparent practices\textsuperscript{14}.

With regards to military effectiveness, a strong linkage exists between values, institutions and resources. Military effectiveness is regarded as the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that maximum derives power from the resources physically and politically available. It implies that effectiveness and efficiency are interwoven. The ability to pursue objectives depends on the availability and utilisation of resources to project military power. In a study Brooks identifies four environmental sources of military effectiveness\textsuperscript{15}. These are: how culture or societal values affect the military capacity to confront security challenges; how the social structure of a country determines the wielding of military power; the nature of the political and economic institutions in determining resource allocation projecting military power; and, the level of pressure exerted by external forces on the State in its use of military assets\textsuperscript{16}. For the military to be effective in its missions, it must have the following organisational features such as:- a high level of organisation and integration across

\textsuperscript{16} Brooks Risa, ‘Introduction’, In Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness (Eds.)...
its tactical, operational and strategic levels of command; the capacity to respond to both internal and external constraints that affect its operations; having the skilled personnel and; high caliber of weapons and equipment. Similarly, another study outlines three political requirements for effective military missions. These are: having a defence policy that outlines a strategy or military doctrine; having structures for executing the strategy or doctrine in question and; having the human and material resources for executing the strategic or doctrinal goals.\(^{17}\)

In a study of post-colonial states, Pollack and Barua provide slightly divergent tools in their comparative analyses of military effectiveness.\(^{18}\) Pollack employs eight organisational variables to evaluate the military effectiveness of Arab countries during their war with Israel in 1948 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991.\(^{19}\) These variables are: unit cohesion at tactical levels; generalship or strategic leadership; tactical leadership; information management; technical skills and weapons handling; logistics and maintenance; morale or will to fight and; training. Using a different perspective, he adopts six environmental factors to assess the effectiveness of Arab armies, which include: the influence of Chinese, North Korean and Soviet military doctrines, politicisation of the military, economic development, culture, education and military training methods (Pollack, 2019). The study concludes that Arab militaries largely suffer from ineffectiveness as a result of a combination of certain influences and deficiencies derived from some of these determinants.

In his work, Barua studies the militaries of Argentina in the 1982 Falklands war, that of Egypt in the 1973 war, the Indian army in the 1971 war with Pakistan and Nigeria’s military forces during the civil war of 1967-1970. He uses five parameters to compare military effectiveness in each case- colonial heritage, type of government, resources and the history of the military institution. Additionally, three key variables are seen as sources of military effectiveness. These are: the maturity

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\(^{19}\) Kenneth Pollack, *Armies of sand: The past, present, and future of Arab military effectiveness*...
and skills of the military institution; access and ability to manage both human and material resources and; the quality of both civilian and military leadership. The effectiveness of the Nigerian military was facilitated by overwhelming superiority and foreign support it enjoyed during the civil war. However, he notes that military effectiveness ‘was woefully inadequate’ as colonial legacy placed constraints on the quality of the officer corps thereby, affecting tactical operations.

Military efficiency is normally considered as a prerogative of legislative power, to allocate resources for missions. It is identified as a pillar of civil-military relations and promoted as an aspect of military effectiveness. Military efficiency is a key indicator in assessing military effectiveness. It is part of the efforts to implant Western notions of civil-military relations in new democracies. An example is the Military Professional Resource Incorporated (MPRI), a programme by the United States that facilitates the training, arms sales and usage for the militaries of new democracies. According to Bruneau, a democracy should consider the cost at which the military can execute its missions as directed and evaluate its feasibility. Efficiency is a function of the resources that a civilian authority allocates by law to its military for to accomplish its missions. These costs are seen as having social, political and economic ramifications for both the military and the society.

The reviewed literature captures the essence of the trinity of civil-military relations in a liberal-democracy, as such, it provides the tools upon which an appraisal can be made on the nature of civilian control of the military, the level of effectiveness and whether there is efficiency in resource management within a twenty-year period since Nigeria’s transition.

**Theoretical Direction**

The paper adopts a normative framework that is hinged on two suppositions. These are derived from the ideas of Harold Trinkunas, Peter Feaver and Thomas Bruneau. They examined civil-military relations in the presidential democracies of the United States and Latin America. The first supposition states that in a liberal-democratic system, the military is subordinate and thus, bound to obey its principal

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or the civilian authority. The second is that for obedience as a manifestation of control to take place, the principal should have the legitimacy and some expertise to monitor the agent. The military’s acceptance to obey rests on the capacity of its civilian principal to monitor, reward or punish it as the situation arises. Leveraging capacity of the civil authority determines the levels of civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency. The legitimacy, expertise and political will of the civilian authority define the power and role of the military. However, the degree of military compliance depends not only on civilian monitoring, but also on the extent to which the mutual preferences of civilian and military leaders, in a given security situation converge or diverge. The effectiveness and efficiency in military operations, nevertheless, require monitoring, rewards and punishment by the civilian principal.

In a liberal-democratic system, strong civilian control provides the leverage for high levels of effectiveness and efficiency. The bureaucratic aspect of military matters, as represented by the defence ministry, facilitates inter-agency coordination for military effectiveness and legislative oversight plays a major role in military efficiency in terms of the costs to the State and society.

Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
The constitution, legislations, policies and structures serve as important baselines for studying the civil-military relations of a country. They also define the nature, scope and roles that the military plays in the political system. With respect to Nigeria, the 1999 constitution is the basis upon which the apex civilian institutions of the State relate with the military. Other relevant sources are the national defence and security policies and the Armed Forces Act. The country reverted to presidential democracy in May, 1999 with the executive and legislative arms of government enjoying certain constitutional powers to the command, equipping, funding and monitoring of the Nigerian military.

i. The Constitutional and Structural Basis of Civilian Control
The 1999 Constitution is the fundamental source of civil-military relations in Nigeria as it provides the principles upon which Nigeria is governed under a liberal-democratic arrangement. At the level of governance, the constitution identifies and defines the structural relationship between the executive, the legislature and the military. In addition, the Armed Forces Act and the National Defence policy provide in detail the ethical and operational roles of the military establishment.

The Constitution recognises the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces who is vested with powers to control the military. These powers cover the selection, promotion and discipline of military leaders as well as the operational use of the military. It includes the delegation of responsibility to any member of the armed forces. The National Assembly is vested with powers to determine the military’s composition and provision for its maintenance, training and equipping. The executive and legislative arms share powers to determine the roles of the military in protecting the Nigerian state from external and internal security threats. The National Defence Council and the National Security Council are avenues for executive-military interactions on policy directions for the military and other security establishments.

By way of legislation is the Armed Forces Act (CAP. A20). Adopted from Decree No. 105 under the preceding military dispensation, it provides in the legal and structural frameworks for the establishment, command and composition of the armed forces. The Act identifies the obligations and privileges of military personnel, defines their operational jurisdiction, conditions of service and the application of military law in matters of professional misconduct. In addition, it provides for the jurisdiction of civilian courts of law in matters involving military personnel not satisfied with court martial procedures or rulings.

In terms of structures and institutions, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is the gateway through which all civil institutions formally interact with the military. The MOD supervises the apex military organ known as the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) by ensuring compliance to defence policy and presidential directives. The DHQ coordinates the three armed services in pursuance of policy directives of the president. It is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who coordinates the activities of the three armed services through their respective service chiefs. The CDS, with the support of the service chiefs, is expected to ensure that the three armed services are organised, well-funded, trained and equipped to strategise on pursuing the defence policy of Nigeria. A convention of the CDS is to ensure that the military insulated from the partisanship that exists in the political environment.

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23 See; Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 217 (1),Section 218 (3) & (4) [a-b], 1999, p. 85.
25 For details see; The Armed Forces Act, 2004, pp. 88-94.
In summary, two salient points can be deduced. There exists the principle supremacy of civilian institutions as it relates to control and oversight of the military institution. This is a feature of a liberal-democracy. Second, the executive and legislative arms of the civilian government have jurisdictions over the composition, resource allocation and functions of the military. The president issues orders with respect to the composition, funding, and deployment of the military. The National Assembly makes laws to regulate its functions or engage in oversight by monitoring its activities.

ii. Weak Institutional Capacity of the Nigerian State
The study of civil-military relations includes the capacity of civil institutions within the State. Liberal-democracy as a process is supposed to foster the institutional capacity for transparent and accountable management of resources and guaranteeing basic political and civil rights. Similarly, citizens are expected to have legitimate forms of political representation that address their developmental aspirations. Nigeria’s political elites, in their factionalised struggles of clientelism and patronage, have undermined the efficacy of public institutions toward addressing the myriad of national development challenges. This institutional weakness has relatively constrained the State from being autonomous and embedded in the society. Also, there exists a relative absence of political consensus or formal agreement as to what constitutes the basis for a country and how that country ought to be governed (Holsti, 1996, p. 80). This symptom is what Finer describes as weak public attachment to civilian institutions. When such situation exists, the capacity of these civilian institutions affects the nature of civilian control of the military. Weak civilian institutions that have low levels of attachment to society (as reflected in Nigeria’s subjective political culture) tend to have weak control of the military. Thus, the nature of civil-military relations is rooted in the nature of the Nigerian State which is burdened by relatively weak institutions.

iii. Nature of Civilian Control of the Nigerian Military
Civilian control of the military in Nigeria depends on the prerogatives enjoyed by military as an indicator of the ability of the civilian principal to exercise the ethos of democratic governance. For civilian control to be high, the principal should have

29 Finer Samuel, The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics, 18.
authority over defence policy, internal security, elite recruitment and public policies. When the capacity of the principal is limited, there is a tendency for the military and in conjunction with some willing civilian groups, to take advantage in order to fill the vacuum created.

The military’s internal security missions cover the quelling communal crisis, fighting insurgents and terrorists, routine policing and provision of humanitarian services. This is the result of the limitations of internal security outfits and the failure of non-kinetic instruments to manage the contradictions that span across Nigeria. Since the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) cannot effectively manage internal security threats, the civilian government is compelled to rely on the military. Consequently, the military has made in-roads into areas that are normative competences of other security bodies.

Another feature in the Fourth Republic is the role of retired military officers. This amalgam of ‘democratic converts’ had prominently served in strategic positions during past military regimes. Their role is significant because out of the four civilian presidents (1999-2019) two had previously served as military heads of state. Also, a number of elective and appointive positions were occupied by retired military officers.

The first of these ‘civilianised’ presidencies (1999-2007) had to rely on the military expertise of this group in alliance with foreign support to impose executive control on the military by retirement of selected officers and general downsizing. The ministry of defence, national security advisory office, presidential chief of staff and the counter-intelligence service were headed by people with military back grounds.


Since May, 1999, retired military officers have monopolised the office of the national security adviser (ONSA) and its staffing has been dominated by serving military officers.

Under the two presidents with no military background (2007-2015) namely, Umaru Yar’adua and Goodluck Jonathan, the ONSA gradually usurped some schedules of the defence ministry with respect to arms procurement, operational and strategic directions in defence policy. In one instance, the defence ministry was by-passed by the service chiefs at the behest of the ONSA, in official dealings with the presidency. In the first tenure of the second president with a military background (2015-2019) the inclination to rely on the use of military force for addressing internal security challenges continued. There was an absence of credible reform measures to strengthen civil institutions that manage the principal drivers responsible for instability and insecurity.

Nigeria’s civilian control of the military suffers from two major weaknesses. Civilian authorities are often unable to subject the military, to account for or deter it, from occasional violations of human rights during internal security operations. At different times, some military personnel have unlawfully detained, tortured and occasionally, engaged in extra-judicial killings in the South-South, North-Central and North-East zones of the country without being called to account. Examples are the incidents in Odi town of Bayelsa state in November, 1999 and in Logo and Zak Biam communities of Benue state in October 2001. In the North-East, there are cases of gross abuses committed by military personnel. These actions go contrary to a key objective of the national defence policy which is to provide protection to Nigerian citizens wherever they reside.

The second is the level of legislative input as a requirement in civilian democratic control of the military. Since 1999, the executive arm subverted the independence of the legislature by employing strong arm tactics to impose lackeys as principal officers. As a result, legislative input in civilian control of the military was minimal. There was no legislative input in formulating and drafting the National

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policy on defence of 2006 as it was largely a product of the executive arm. In addition, the legislature failed to review the Armed Forces Act which predated 1999 and a bill meant to clearly define the military’s role was not passed. Generally, civilian control of the military is strong when both the Presidency and the National Assembly are able to exercise their respective constitutional powers in the organisation and missions of the military.

iv. Limited Military Effectiveness

The quality and quantity of military capabilities to achieve the goals laid down by democratic leadership is what translates to military effectiveness. The Nigerian military is organised, trained and equipped to conduct conventional warfare in line with constitutional, policy and its doctrinal provisions. Due to the orientation of the State since independence, the military has maintained a defensive strategy- for deterring and neutralising threats to the national interests. These conventional capabilities were employed during the civil war and in occasional confrontations with neighbouring states over territorial infractions. It also engages in foreign missions under the auspices of international bodies. However, it is fully engaged in many internal security missions across the country.

The military’s effectiveness has been hampered by qualitative and quantitative limitations. Long period of military rule and its impact on the institutions of the State resulted in neglect and subsequent deterioration of its war-making platforms. Between 1999 and 2019, the size of the military witnessed a growth from 94,000 to 135,000 personnel. This development was prompted by the

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37 Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Reinventing the military as a political actor: Alternative discourses of civil military relations in Nigeria’, 96.


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growing internal security threats and Nigeria’s international commitments in peacekeeping operations especially within the African region.

In qualitative terms, the military’s operational and tactical effectiveness are limited by strong attachments to traditional doctrines of fighting and their corresponding operational platforms. There is an incompatibility between these doctrines and the nature of asymmetric threats that span Nigeria’s numerous ungoverned spaces. Since 1999, efforts were made to refurbish or replace obsolete equipment without considering the changing nature of threats. As political, social and economic problems accentuate security challenges, the convention has been for successive civilian governments to invite military personnel to tackle their symptoms. This policy of overdependence on the military has deepened its involvement in internal security and intruded into the functions of the police and other security outfits.

The military has overstretched its available capabilities given the deficits in personnel strength and fire power when compared to the number and scope of missions engaged across the country. This counters two important principles of strategy—economy of effort and concentration of force. For the use of military force to be effective, it has to be optimally applied at the right place and time to achieve decisive results. Currently, the military has deployments in most states of the federation. In hypothetical terms, there exists one military personnel for every 1481 persons within a territorial space of seven square kilometres. This is based on a population estimate of about 200 million people, a territorial land mass of 923, 763 square kilometres and a numerical size of about 135,000 military personnel.

v. The Question of Military Efficiency
One of the principles of democratic civil-military relations is hinged on the accountability of military resources harnessed to meet the objectives laid down by civilian authorities. Huntington refers to this as ‘the dynamic issues of the utilization of military forces’.40 This connotes the costs at which the military is able to carry out its missions to acceptable conclusions with minor implications for the legitimacy of the State. Since the military is subject to decisions taken by a democratic government, the logic is for it to be accountable for the resources legally allocated in order to pursue the directives given to it.

The National Assembly has weak oversight. While the annual military budget is scrutinised at proposal levels before the National Assembly, the legislature and by

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40 Huntington Samuel, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*, 1.
implication, the public are kept in the dark as to how the appropriated budget is implemented. This oversight deficit has remained a feature of the legislature in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This was more evident between 1999 and 2007 as a result of its executive interference, internal crisis and aggrandisement. This trend has placed a question mark on the role of the legislature to monitor the use of financial resources appropriated by the military (Agunyai & Olawoyin, 2019, pp. 105-119). Despite accusations of corruption within the military establishment, the legislature cannot subject the military to account for budgetary allocations or sanction it when the need arises.

In addition, there exist delays in personnel remunerations prompting agitations among military personnel. Generally, the trend in Nigeria’s military expenditure between 1999 and 2019 showed that it annually stood at less than one percent of GDP. Within this period, there has been a consistent increase in the annual defence budget. The 2019 appropriated expenditure stood at N669 billion compared to N45.4 billion in 1999. Recurrent expenditures continue to outstrip capital expenditures as, for instance, between 2009 and 2014 accounted for 14.3 percent of budgetary allocations. This partly accounts for the policy constraints to upgrade and bolster the military’s equipment and facilities.

Conclusion
The paper examined civilian control, military effectiveness and military efficiency in Nigeria’s democratic journey since 1999. Civilian control of the military is apparently weak due to the fragility of public institutions. There is legislative

inability, due to loss of independence, to exercise proper oversight of the military’s activities. Limitations in manpower and equipment amidst the scope and weight of national security challenges for a large country like Nigeria have hampered military effectiveness. Finally, the lack of transparency and accountability in the utilisation of allocated financial resources raises a question on military efficiency. A deficit in civilian control can adversely affect military efficiency and in turn negate the level of military effectiveness. In a democratic setting, the military must operate within the rule of law by accepting the supremacy of the constitution and directives of the civilian principals. In order to institutionalise civilian democratic control, there is need to civilianise the MOD. The ONSA should also be civilianised as the military constitutes a part of the multi-dimensional architecture of national security. There is need for capacity-building for oversight by the National Assembly, by having secretarial staff and interns with knowledge on defence matters. The resources allocated to the military should be subjected to clearly defined templates of accountability in order to vet levels of efficiency. This is to ensure military compliance with best practices. The size, operational and tactical doctrines of the military should be addressed to meet the threat requirements confronting Nigeria. Similarly, the NPF and other security bodies should be adequately funded and equipped to prevent the military from intruding into their functions.

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