On the plurality of times: disunified time and the A-series

  • Ryan Nefdt


In this paper, I investigate the nature of the metaphysical possibility of disunified time. A possibility that I argue presents unique problems for those who adhere to a strict A-theory of time, particularly those A-theorists who propose a presentist view. The first part of the paper discusses various arguments against the coherence of the concept of disunified time. I attempt to discount each of these objections and show that disunified time is indeed a possible and consistent topology of time. Then, I attempt to show that disunified time is a problem for a semantics based on the A-series since A-truthmakers are hard to come by in a universe of temporally disconnected time-series. Finally, I provide a novel argument showing that presentists should be particularly fearful of such a universe.

South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(3): 249–260

Author Biography

Ryan Nefdt
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, PO Box 94242, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Journal Identifiers

eISSN: 0258-0136