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Wolf and Christman on autonomy: Two objective views.


Ian Jennings

Abstract

In this paper I examine the attempts of Susan Wolf and John Christman to rescue efforts to characterise the concept of autonomy from the difficulties faced by so-called subjective theories of autonomy – theories which treat agent's own appraisals of their desires as final arbiters with regard to the assessment of whether or not they are autonomous. I conclude that Wolf's view either ends up falling foul of her own objections to subjective theories or ends up describing virtuous, as opposed to autonomous, agents. But I also conclude that Christman's combines the virtues of the subjective and objective views of autonomy. His view represents an advance on subjective views in that it explains why certain obviously sick selves which subjective views must regard as autonomous are excluded from the status of autonomy.

S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.19(3) 2000: 151-167

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eISSN: 0258-0136