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Appraisal the independence of the judiciary in Cameroon in the fight against corruption

Kwei Haliday Nyingchia
Ngaundje Doris Leno


This article explores the substantive and institutional independence of the judiciary in Cameroon as laid down by the Constitution in relation to its ability in repressing corruption without interference. This paper adopted doctrinal research methodology approach It is the position of this paper that apart from the Constitutional recognition of judicial independence, no mechanisms have been put in
place to ensure the functional independence of the judiciary thereby subjecting judges to all sorts of pressures with the most grievous being financial, social and political pressures. Also courts operate like deconcentrated services of the Ministry of Justice without any financial autonomy, while the Higher Judicial Council which manages careers and promotion of judges is headed by the President of Republic. As such, we contend that the judiciary cannot effectively fight against corruption because of the absence of real independence. The National Development Strategy for 2020- 2030 has acknowledged that complaints about the independence and  inefficiency of the judiciary are rife. This paper recommends an urgent reform of the judiciary in conformity to international standards on judicial independence. This should be superseded by the Constitutional recognition of the Chief Justice as the Head of judiciary, financial autonomy, automatic system of career management and a significant increase of financial treatment for judges.

Key-Words: Corruption, Judiciary, Independence, Tenure, Justice, Judges, Military Courts