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‘Errors of Judgment’: The Case of Pain Sensations


F Loonat

Abstract

Errors of judgment regarding pain sensations are not possible. Christopher
Hill, in his paper ‘Introspective Awareness of Sensations’, argues that we do sometimes commit ‘errors of judgment’ and he draws on an example that involves the perception of pain to illustrate his point. I analyze Hill’s example and draw on other examples of pain sensations to show how errors of judgment are not possible. I argue that pain sensations appear to be causally shaped and in some cases generated solely by beliefs, expectations and dispositional states. Changes in beliefs, expectations and dispositional states appear to change the sensation that is generated. If pain sensations are generated in the way that I suggest, then the fact that some of the influences that causally shape and generate a pain sensation are constantly subject to change means that there may be little ‘truth’ that can be objectively established regarding a belief about a pain sensation. If there is little ‘truth’ that can be objectively established about a pain sensation, it will be inaccurate to label an instance of pain avowal as an ‘error of judgment’, or to speak about judgments concerning pain in terms of truth or error more generally.

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eISSN: 0258-0136