Second-personal reasons: why we need something like them, but why there are actually no such things
AbstractStephen Darwall, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint (2006), has argued for an account of morality grounded in what he calls second- personal reasons. My first aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of an account like Darwall’s; as I read it, it responds to the need for an account of morality as ‘intrinsic’ to the person. However, I go on to argue, as my second aim in this paper, that Darwall’s account is ultimately unsuccessful. I hope to achieve these aims by contrasting Darwall’s second-personal account with two other accounts, Hobbes’ and the neo-Kantians’. In the first case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account meets a need that the other accounts don’t in virtue of its differences from the other accounts; and in the second case, I aim to
show that Darwall’s account ultimately fails in virtue of its residual similarities to at least one of them.
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