The significance of understanding the features of moral judgements

  • J N Agbo


This paper is an elucidation of the importance of moral judgments in our conceptions of morality. It notes that no moral judgment can be made unless there is a pre-supposition of some moral standards, rules or principles of conduct. The paper argues that contrary to very popular views, moral judgments are not mainly concerns of meta-ethics, but equally issues in normative-ethical discourse; since discussions in one usually spill-into the other. The (sometimes) mistaken, ambiguous and unsatisfactory judgments of normative-ethics would require clarification (by meta-ethics) of the terms used in such normative judgments. The paper discusses four major features of moral judgments - Objectivity, Universality, Practicality and Autonomy – and argues that these features are the best defense of morality against the pervading pressure of radical relativism.

eISSN: 1119-443X